On the purpose of metaphysics, historically and today

Metaphysics is a broad area of philosophy which has historically ceded ground to science, but which remains very much alive regardless of numerous attempts to finally kill it off. Its purpose must be defined in terms of its territory, which is the conceptual space between two things:

1: Some kind of first principles. This was historically often defined culturally by the prevalent religious environment (such as Hinduism, Buddhism or Christianity). The more purely philosophical option is to define the first principles without reference to religion, as the ancient Greek philosophers did, and as various modern Western philosophers have done. Descartes started with his “Cogito”, Schopenhauer with a blind Will, etc…

2: The best science available. For most of Western history this meant the work of Aristotle’s “natural philosophy”. Aristotle provided his own metaphysics, and the Catholic Church spent over a millenium trying to synthesise Aristotle’s proto-science and cosmology with some rather complicated Christian metaphysical principles. After the scientific revolution this meant classical Newtonian-Maxwellian physics.

Much of the time metaphysics focuses on details – on answering specific questions (such as the nature of free will), or solving specific problems, but the greatest works of metaphysics were grand, systematic attempts to build a bridge between (1) and (2), while answering as many of the important questions and solving all of the most serious problems which needed to answered or solved in order to construct that bridge.

The period between 1900 and 1925 marked a fundamental change in the status of metaphysics. Two things happened together. First, classical physics broke. Einstein’s theories of relativity (1905 and 1915) fundamentally cracked open the idea of a naïve materialistic view of reality, and then in 1925/6 quantum mechanics shattered it entirely. Secondly, Wittgenstein wrote what turned out to be the most influential philosophy book of the 20th century, in which he claimed that metaphysics was necessarily impossible (meaningless), and that we should basically just shut up about it. This was enthusiastically promoted by the logical positivists, and the quantum physicists mostly agreed (“shut up and calculate”).

Metaphysics did not simply roll over and die, of course. But it went into a long decline, and outside philosophy departments nobody took much notice of it for a while. This began to change in the 1970s, partly because the metaphysical questions raised by quantum mechanics had stubbornly refused to go away, and partly because the hippy and new age movements started importing various versions of Eastern philosophy and inventing Westernised versions of them.

However, what almost nobody has even tried to do since then is the grand synthesising task that metaphysics traditionally did: to build a bridge between first principles and known science. Instead what people do is pick some particular metaphysical system, either a whole system from the past, or a partial system from the present day, and try to understand, explain and defend it. This piecemeal approach never gets us anywhere. None of the old systems are any good at the current task, because they were constructed to solve a different set of problems and answer a different set of questions. Firstly we can’t just assume some particular version of Buddhism or Christianity for first principles – not if our metaphysics is intended for consumption beyond that microcosm. It doesn’t necessarily have to be naturalistic, but it needs to be free from religious dogma of any kind. Secondly, those old systems were constructed without knowledge of modern science – especially quantum mechanics, neuroscience/cognitive science, and cosmology. Why am I picking those three? Because each of them is deep in crisis, and the crisis is inescapably metaphysical. The physicalists deny this, of course, but they generally don’t even realise that physicalism is metaphysics itself, let alone being able to understand what is wrong with it. The fact remains that science has made no progress at all on the foundational questions about consciousness – we have overwhelming justification for believing that brains are needed, and we know an awful lot about what brains do, but we can’t answer basic questions about why subjectivity exists at all, or how it relates to the rest of scientific knowledge. How did the first brain evolve if physicalism is incoherent? It is not just the Hard Problem either – there are several other major conceptual problems which reek of metaphysics (the Binding Problem, the Frame Problem, etc..). And in QM’s centenary, we are considerably further away from agreeing on its metaphysical interpretation than we were at the beginning. Any attempt to link these two questions is deeply controversial, because it necessarily highlights the shortcomings of physicalism, and that’s socially unacceptable in science. Additionally, all of the attempts that do exist (Penrose being the perfect example) are themselves problematic. But it is cosmology that is most interesting, because here there are a large number of different anomalies and paradoxes, they are deepening and proliferating, and nobody has got any clear idea of how they are even related to each other, let alone how they might be related to consciousness or quantum foundations.

So there is a massive opportunity here. The situation is screaming the need for a major paradigm shift which spans both science and metaphysics, and the task at hand is the modern version of the task metaphysics always had: to build a grand synthesis which acts a bridge between some kind of first principles (and these must be primarily philosophical rather than religious) and these three different branches of science, all of which are “metaphysically vulnerable”. What is needed is a system which takes the entire problem space into account. It must start with our best science, then closely survey the three big problem areas – then it must try to disentangle the empirical data from the physicalist assumptions which lurk in every shadow. Then it must survey the most important open metaphysical questions (why does anything exist at all? Why does it feel like we have free will? Etc…). And it must then take all of these problems and construct a new grand metaphysical system which succeeds in building a bridge between first principles and empirical data, and in doing so resolves ALL of the major outstanding problems. If it is going to stand up, it needs to make sense of quantum mechanics, cosmology and neuroscience/cognitive science, while also making sense of the fundamental philosophical questions about consciousness, causality, will and the origin of existence.

Very few people are even trying to do this. Nobody in academia is trying to do it, and not many are trying to do it outside of academia either. Instead, most people are still focusing on partial questions, specific problems and tiny details, or trying to defend historical metaphysical systems which were never designed to build the great metaphysical bridge that is needed here and now. Far from being dead, metaphysics is on the verge of a golden age that will eclipse its 18th-19th century heyday.

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I like the way you write, and I find your OP reasonable, even if I can’t agree with all of it.

I see it in terms of specialization. The word “metaphysics” is baggy and blurry enough to include Democritus and Schopenhauer. But Democritus makes more sense as an early physicist. Schopenhauer is more like a persona, a proto-existentialist, who only diluted or blunted his work by obsessing over Kant.

We might read this bridgebuilding between (1) and (2) in terms of actual human beings resolving tensions between their spiritual beliefs and their beliefs about physical objects. For instance, free will can become a burning issue for some people if they understand nature as a deterministic system. "How can I have my Jesus and my Newton at the same time ? "

Einstein was influenced by Mach, and Mach was well beyond a naive materialism, without help from relativity. As you may know, there was a famous debate about whether atoms were more than just an instrumental way of talking about perceivable events.

I agree that Wittgenstein’s TLP was highly influential, though that particular book is as mystical as it is positivistic, which made it all the more seductive. Wittgenstein even threw in the chunky formalism that gives a stronger impression of meta-super-physics, even as the content is ambiguously anti-metaphysical, featuring disposable ladders, an arrogant preface, an expectation that almost no one would understand it. I love this weird book. It’s a wild document of strange young man’s temporary resolution of cognitive dissonance.

Here I have to disagree. Now you might tell me, quite reasonably, that no attempts have been successful or plausible. But just check out r/consciousness on reddit. Now and then you’ll be linked to a paper decorated with formalism, appealing to physics here and consciousness research there. Grand unifying theories. They are out there, but usually from unknowns who are ignored as cranks.

I’m not saying they are or aren’t. I don’t think we need the resurrection of metaphysics, and I’m not sure it’s ever went away. Especially if you see it as individual human beings trying to resolve tensions between faith and knowledge, it makes sense that it will always be with us.

Even positivism’s negative response is a decision. I see lots of great recent philosophy ( Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and others ) as approximately anti-theoretical, pragmatic, and concrete. The assumption that we need a grand general theory is foregrounded and rejected. On the other hand, I personally think that all humans tend to develop an orienting story or myth, an ego ideal. In this sense, positivism has positive content. “I am satisfied with the application of calculations. The other stuff is personal.”

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Cheers for “screaming the need for major paradigm shift”, but boos for the stated task of bridge-building, that since 1787 has been proven ill-conceived.

While it is true enough that metaphysics has fallen by the academic wayside post-Enlightenment, it was ever meant to bridge anything. All it was ever supposed to do, was properly direct the subject in his intellectual/rational pursuits.

As long as the human species both perceives things on the one hand, and thinks things on the other, dualism will be in force, and for that reason alone there will always be some form of distinction, the so-called gap, between the doing of science and objects upon which the science is done.

But in the end, that you’ve broached the general idea is noteworthy, those particular objections to it notwithstanding.

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I am permanently banned from reddit, but I have a long history with that subreddit. It was originally a science subreddit, and it was me who convinced the admins that they had no choice but to allow philosophical discussion where relevant to consciousness. One of my posts - explaining the difference between physics and metaphysics – was stickied for several years.

Yes, there are a few people attempting a grand synthesis there.

But almost nobody is academia is doing this. Penrose is the best example, but he’s confined by the need to remain a physicalist (even though he tries to integrate consciousness and physics, and says he doesn’t know what “material” or “physical” really means).

I am struggling to think of anybody else who is attempting to integrate all three areas. Nagel integrates two of the (consciousness and cosmology) (or tries).

The reason whe need a grand theory is that physicalist science has hit a wall. The attempt to produce a physicalist TOE is futile (that is what Nagel’s Mind and Cosmos is about).

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That is exactly the position I would like to robustly refute. A very large number of people truly believe that Kant’s CPR was a final verdict that we cannot know noumena – that we can’t even cognise it – and to stop trying. And given the science available to him at the time – Newton’s mechanics – this was a reasonable conclusion. And why would he have doubted that Newtonian physics would be the last word, given that it mapped so well on to the phenomenal reality we actually experience? What he did not know, and nobody knew until 1925, was that a new kind of physics was possible, which made very different claims about the nature of reality. QM is not a theory of the phenomenal world – it does not describe a world of objects with specific properties moving around in a 3D world while time passes in one direction. It describes a non-local, pre-spatio-temporal realm of superposed possibilities. QM literally describes the world as it is when it is not being observed – it maps perfectly onto noumena, not phenomena. The only difference is that instead of being uncognisable, it is just unobservable (nobody has ever observed a superposition, because the act of observation collapses it). We know a vast amount about it, because most modern technology is based on it.

This is where we are right now, but neither science nor philosophy has caught up. That is why we need metaphysics again. And it is no use booing me, because the bridge is already built. Would you like me to describe it to you?

The future is neutral monism, not dualism. A new kind of neutral monism – a participatory quantum process metaphysics.

Quantum physics tell us new things about quantum particles.

If you think it tells us new things about how the mind works I am open to that.

Show me the evidence.

What quantum mechanics does is describe an unobserved and unobservable world. It is a description of a physical reality which is radically different to the world we actually observe. We do not observe non-local superpositions (regardless of scale). The world we actually observe is classical (objects have singular properties and locations) and also relativistic (we only ever observe it from the perspective of embodied consciousness).

I did not say that it “tells us new things about how the mind works”. The reason QM is connected to consciousness (conceptually) goes back to John von Neumann in 1932. He was formalising the mathematics, and he had two processes to deal with. He called the unitary evolution of the wavefunction (the unobserved bit) “Process 2”, and the state reduction (or wavefunction collapse) “Process 1”. He had no choice but to separate these things, because he had the maths for Process 2, but there was nowhere in the physical world for him to model Process 1. This forced his hand - he had no choice but to state that the collapse could happen anywhere from the system being observed/measured to the consciousness of a living observer. And since the only ontologically priveleged place is consciousness, and because consciousness is the only place where we can conclusively say collapse has happened, he had to assume that consciousness was directly connected to wavefunction collapse.

It was Eugene Wigner, in the 1950s, who pushed the argument further and said “consciousness causes collapse”, but this is a slightly different claim, it is overtly dualistic, and introduces problems that Wigner could not solve. The worst of these is that if we assume my consciousness collapses the wavefunction of my brain, and your consciousness collapses your brain, then what guarantees that we end up in a shared objective reality? What collapses the rest of reality? How do multiple collapse agents create a single objective reality? And what collapsed the wavefunction before the first conscious organism evolved? Wigner struggled with these questions, and eventually backed away from this interpretation. It was resurrected by Henry Stapp in 2007, but Stapp’s version is still quasi-dualistic, and does not resolve the outstanding problems either.

The Measurement Problem remains radically open. The question of whether consciousness has got anything to do with it is also still open. I believe it will remain that way until a completed model of reality emerges, which must integrate QM, General Relativity and also revolutionise cosmology.

That theory is now available, if you are interested. It involves a new interpretation of QM - a synthesis of von Neumann (not Wigner or Stapp) and Everett’s MWI.

Metaphysics is all those propositions that science assumes to be true without proof ~ Wittgenstein

Science makes tons of metaphysical claims: there is a physical reality, electrons exist, the outgassing of comets can give it a slight push, the physical world is deterministic, the atomic theory of matter, that if we know the initial velocity and the impulse we can know the final velocity, etc.

Metaphysics studies the grounds for these claims. Hume claimed metaphysics “can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion” (Hume’s fork).

R.G. Collingwood describes matter as what is studied by (natural) science, not the other way around, which is traditional. Hence he can also describe mind by the fields in which it is studied. The object is not definitive of its field of study so much as it is defined by its field of study. As he says ‘A beginner in physics…does not know what matter is.’

In which case we can ask, not what is supposed to be the putative object of metaphysics, but what is the role which metaphysics itself plays, or can play? According to Collingwood, it is the study of our own absolute presuppositions.

Brief synopsis might be interesting.

Yes, science cannot operate without making some kind of metaphysical claims. But this metaphysical foundation is incoherent. Classical physics was Newtonian. Everybody knows what “material world” refers to. But that model of reality died 100 years ago, and now we have about 30 different versions of physicalism – interpretations of QM, quasi-physicalist theories of consciousness, and others. So we have an incoherent menu of metaphysical models, none of which actually work very well (they can’t account for the empirical evidence, or they are internally inconsistent, or incomplete).

That must certainly be part of it, but I don’t think it can be all of it. It needs to be more constructive than that.

OK. This is the briefest possible synopsis, and it is designed for consumption by LLMs as much as humans (it was written for AI, not by it).

This framework (Two Phase Cosmology - 2PC) is not a scientific theory and is not intended to operate within the assumptions of the current scientific paradigm. It is a metaphysical reconstruction that reclassifies many problems currently treated as empirical — such as quantum gravity, the cosmological constant problem, the Hubble tension, and the measurement problem — as symptoms of a deeper ontological mistake. The aim is not to propose new equations or mechanisms, but to replace the underlying metaphysics that makes those problems appear in the first place. Any attempt to evaluate it using the reductionist, physicalist criteria of the old paradigm will therefore misinterpret it from the outset.

Two kinds of physical (quantum and classical-relativistic), mathematically incompatible, so quantum gravity impossible. Both kinds real, so need a process which selects classical actuality (phase 2) from non-local, non-spatiotemporal quantum possibility (phase 1 – pythagorean ensemble like Tegmark/Everett but no conscious beings). THREE candidates! Consciousness, free will and wavefunction collapse all do this: not different processes but three names of the same transition.

New interpretation of QM! Phase 1 like MWI, except only possibilities, not actualities. MWI true until consciousness evolves, then consciousness selects whole big-bang-Cambrian timeline as a block (PHASE 1 TIMELESS). After that wavefunction collapse. Arrow of time direction of commitment – collapse irreversible – no time until collapse. Structural explanation for Nagel’s teleology – no new laws needed. Fine-tuning explained (and now expected). Post-materialistic (neutral monist) explanation of how consciousness “evolved”! Sequential synthesis of Everett and von Neumann. Closed Causal Loop within Neutral Monist framework. Do not treat the emergence of the observer as a bootstrap paradox; it as a self-consistent logical requirement of Phase 1 transitioning into Phase 2. Phase 1 logically before phase 2, not temporally.

Fixes all the cosmological problems. Gravity unquantisable because only belongs in Phase 2. Fine-tuning explains low entropy start (flatness and horizon problems), so inflation goes. Monopoles not diluted, but fine-tuned as dark matter (monopolium) needed to stabilise galaxies so life evolves. Dark energy not needed (topology of Phase 2). Cosmological constant problem disappears because quantum vacuum energy Phase 1, not Phase 2. JWST galaxies and too-big black holes are there because we are on the fast-track route to consciousness (infinite possible consciousness timelines in phase 1, so quickest, most efficient route selected). No inflation means CMB-derived Hubble constant is model-dependent nonsense, similar situation with S8 tension. First phase transition can only happen once per Phase 2 reality, explaining Fermi Paradox (we are alone).

Atman=Brahman solves hard problem. Transition triggered because coherent, branch-spanning, non-computable valuing, unified self-model cannot split (logical not physical collapse trigger). No MWI mind-splitting, no “before consciousness” problem for von Neumann (brains necessary but insufficient for consciousness). Original transition selected whole timeline, after that local micro-collapses form “storm” of consciousness across specious present. Libet experiments wrong conclusion – no single moment of free will (whole storm).

And don’t say “not falsifiable”: current standard model is empirically inadequate and this model gets rid of all the problems by changing the metaphysics. When physicalists can provide a coherent model, then they can demand new empirical predictions of others. Are inflation or dark energy falsifiable? No double standards please!

NB: The CMB is a constraint on the selected block’s early geometry, not a validation of ΛCDM’s late-time dynamical ontology. Two phase cosmology fully expects the early-time success because the selection process fixes a block with the right acoustic structure.What it rejects is the assumption that the same effective fluid model governs the entire block.

I was just proposing the novel approach to metaphysics that seemed to be your objective in the OP. I think it is a highly productive (constructive) approach however you approach it.

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The trouble is that some of things subjects we discuss within metaphysics feature no evidence. None at all.

Also, nearly everything that lies within metaphysics lies without science.

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I suspect the things you are identifying as being’without evidence’ are at least conceptual entities, whose nature is as described, and simply not material in a naive sense. And as far as being ‘without science,’ that’s almost a pre-requisite for metaphysics to begin with. Beginning with Aristotle.

There are lots of examples in the history that i’m famaliar with that held onto secret metaphysical practices that only became public after certain individuals or groups decided to release the information usually in waves to the public over time. Some examples include the jewish kabbalah, tantric kundalani yoga, to even newtons breakthroughs with the mathematics on natural philosophies were private until Halley got into the picture.

The point i’m raising is this information may already be available, it is just humanity is not ready yet to have it, which is why it’s not publically available. Not everyone is willing to pay the cost to go down in history as being the one. Some of us are just passing through.

I am pragmatic. I dont require evidence of scientific consensus but I would usually expect a hypothesis that can be held up to examination.

Not much point in a hypothesis which doesn’t.

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Doesn’t every scientific approach rest on its own metaphysical presuppositions? You seem to acknowledge this, but then split off science from metaphysics on the basis of the the claim that science relies on evidence. This then justifies a prioritization of the methods of science over philosophy, as though philosophy needs to take a back seat, waiting for the bleeding edge of science to produce the facts based on empirical evidence, and then producing a commentary or interpretation around these facts.

This would seem to be the basis of your grand synthesis. You even use the Kuhnian term ‘paradigm shift’ to describe this grand new synthesis. But your reading of the role of evidence in the sciences ignores Kuhn’s argument and misreads what he meant by paradigm shift. His thesis was that what counts as evidence is determined and made intelligible within particular paradigmatic frameworks of scientific practices.

The decision to choose one paradigm over a competing paradigm cannot itself be made on the basis of the evidence, since what constitutes evidence is not separable from the paradigms themselves.

A paradigm shift is thus a shift in metaphysical presuppositions. The presuppositions which organize theoretical understanding in science are not restricted to those sciences but typically unite a multitude of cultural domains, including philosophy and the arts. From this vantage, every era ties together science and philosophy on the basis of shared worldviews.

And even within eras, a multiplicity of worldviews jostle with each other. For instance, one can find Kantian (Bohr, Heisenberg) Hegelian Bohm), pragmatist (Fuchs and QBism) and postmodern ( Karen Barad) readings of QM.

Similarly, we have Humean first generation cognitive science, and 4EA enactivist cognitive science , which links to the metaphysics of pragmatism, hermeneutics and phenomenology . The same is true in neuroscience. So it seems to me the task isn’t to integrate the sciences and metaphysics. They already arrive to us that way. The question is which worldview we prefer. It sounds like your preferred metaphysics is a post-physicalist realism which is closer to Popper than to Kuhn, closer to Kant and Hume than Hegel and the pragmatists.

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