Doesn’t every scientific approach rest on its own metaphysical presuppositions? You seem to acknowledge this, but then split off science from metaphysics on the basis of the the claim that science relies on evidence. This then justifies a prioritization of the methods of science over philosophy, as though philosophy needs to take a back seat, waiting for the bleeding edge of science to produce the facts based on empirical evidence, and then producing a commentary or interpretation around these facts.
The boundary between science and metaphysics is currently very confused, and has historically moved (usually in the direction of science taking ground from metaphysics). If the theory I am defending is correct, this will be another movement – this time with physics being forced to cede ground, because anything which currently looks like science but depends on hidden physicalist assumptions can no longer stand unchallenged.
This would seem to be the basis of your grand synthesis. You even use the Kuhnian term ‘paradigm shift’ to describe this grand new synthesis. But your reading of the role of evidence in the sciences ignores Kuhn’s argument and misreads what he meant by paradigm shift. His thesis was that what counts as evidence is determined and made intelligible within particular paradigmatic frameworks of scientific practices.
Kuhn was specifically writing about paradigm shifts in science. I am broadening its scope to include metaphysics, but the dynamics of the shift remain the same. And yes, what counts as evidence will change, especially the need for a theory to make holistic sense. The new paradigm must prioritise coherence across disciplines rather than reductive, fragmentary focus on fine details.
A paradigm shift is thus a shift in metaphysical presuppositions. The presuppositions which organize theoretical understanding in science are not restricted to those sciences but typically unite a multitude of cultural domains, including philosophy and the arts. From this vantage, every era ties together science and philosophy on the basis of shared worldviews.
Yes, I agree.
So it seems to me the task isn’t to integrate the sciences and metaphysics. They already arrive to us that way. The question is which worldview we prefer.
I disagree. If we had multiple holistic coherent worldviews to choose from then we could choose which we prefer. What we actually have is a large number of fragmentary and incoherent worldviews – an infinite menu of inadequate (partial or incorrect) models of reality. If we can find a combined scientific-metaphysical model which actually accounts for all of the empirical evidence, is internally coherent, and doesn’t leave anything critical out (e.g. Consciousness), then we will have precisely one coherent model of reality. At that point, everything else must be judged as empirically inadequate, and/or incompleteable.
The “old paradigm” is not physicalism but epistemic anarchy – the normalisation of fragmentation of knowledge, and a cultural addiction to being able to choose which worldview we prefer from an almost infinite menu of nonsense. This has reached a zenith with the advent of AI, meaning anyone who can type can invent their personal pseudoscientific theory of everything. Peak Nonsense. The new paradigm must consign most of the menu to history.
It sounds like your preferred metaphysics is a post-physicalist realism which is closer to Popper than to Kuhn, closer to Kant and Hume than Hegel and the pragmatists.
I think I am closer to Kuhn than Popper, but I am certainly closer to Hume and Kant than I am to either Hegel or the pragmatists. Also very close to Whitehead and Wheeler.