On Moral Authority

[Leontiskos]

@Banno

But yes, our choices cannot be grounded in moral authority, since choosing to follow a moral authority is itself a moral choice.

Okay, I see what you are saying. Regarding this, then:

@Banno

Now, on what basis do we decide this? If on the basis of the moral authority, then the account is viciously circular. If on some other basis, then what?

The basis for authority—moral or otherwise—is a human ability to recognize expertise without at the same time directly recognizing the truths that the expert or authority espouses. I can know that Stephen Hawking has scientific expertise without knowing that the universe began from a singularity. In particular I can know that Hawking has significantly more scientific expertise than I do, and that his opinions are therefore more weighty than my own.

The interesting thing is that Anscombe’s quip that Foot focuses on is arguably centrally related to moral authorities:

@Leontiskos

Anscombe writes, ‘[G]etting one another to do things without the application of physical force is a necessity for human life, and that far beyond what could be secured by . . . other means.’[18] Anscombe is pointing here to what she has elsewhere called an ‘Aristotelian necessity’: that which is necessary because and in so far as good hangs on it.[19]

(Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness, 15)