Lots of interesting thoughts here. But I repeat my plea, not just to you but to anyone here. Please tell me: If I claim to be a moral authority, what am I claiming I can actually do? If I exercise moral authority, what am I actually doing? Please be specific, really imagine the situations, just as you did with your vivid abortion example.
It’s difficult to know what a term like “moral authority” means when the discussion is abstract. I need examples that you (or anyone who responds) would endorse as exemplary and typical of what they’re referring to.
Notice the word “consent”? One chooses between authorities. Your abortion example shows the conflicting “authorities” nicely; it also points towards the simple truth that there need be no one correct answer to such issues; and yet she must act.
That’s stretching the use of “authority” somewhat. But it is good to see oyu agreeing that ethical decisions are communal, since informed by fact gathering, reason, authority, and nature.
I would say that if someone is a moral non-realist then a fortiori they reject moral authorities (i.e. if one rejects morality then they also reject moral authorities). But I think there are ethical systems that are not based in appeals to authority, such as utilitarianism or virtue ethics. Even Kant’s ethics is supposed to stand in light of reason and not authority.
So while normative ethics does require a standard by which ethical judgments are measured, I would not say that every standard is an authority.
An authority is someone whose word is taken as a good reason to assent, and this form of assent is traditionally called “faith.” So if Stephen Hawking says that the universe began from a singularity, and you hold it to be true that “the universe began from a singularity” because of Stephen Hawking’s word, then you are taking it on faith that the universe began from a singularity and you are accepting Hawking as a scientific authority. A moral authority would be the same, except in the moral sphere. The key thing at stake is an argument from authority, where you do not directly know something yourself but you believe it on the authority of another. Common moral authorities would be figures like the Pope, the Dalai Lama, etc.
A moral authority presumably makes a statement of this sort: You ought do X
As has been pointed out, in order for such a statement to carry any weight, it has to be presupposed that one ought do what this moral authority says.
Now, on what basis do we decide this? If on the basis of the moral authority, then the account is viciously circular. If on some other basis, then what?
And so we see that our choices cannot be grounded in moral authority.
That’s a pretty simple argument, and despite the squirming protestations, it stands. The place of moral authority must be secondary.
I think it is good that someone finally came out and said it, but your conclusion is not, “moral authority must be secondary,” it is, “our choices cannot be grounded in moral authority,” i.e.: “moral authorities do not exist.”
I should say, that it’s good you see the communal as an external source from which what is good is drawn (as opposed to ascribed by valuation), like an authority or nature. That’s a start.
Just noting the non sequitur in your account: that our choices cannot be grounded in moral authority does not imply that there are no moral authorities.
But yes, our choices cannot be grounded in moral authority, since choosing to follow a moral authority is itself a moral choice.
One can of course choose whatever one wants as a moral authority. Doing so is making a moral choice.
I was packing authority on the side of the real and just saying if you reject moral authority, you have really already rejected morality.
I mean “greatest good and least bad” is the authority for utilitarians in a broad sense. And categorical, reason and logic is a sort of authority in a subject who may be lead by passions and other forces.
But I certainly am not trying to defend any particular philosophy (hate utilitarianism - it’s barely ethics at all as well, probably because it provides such scant authority).
Maybe I’m just saying an authority isn’t just a person, it can be baked into the command, like it’s in the good thing the command is begging be enacted.
I think it can be seen to be even more problematic when the choice is placed with the authority themselves, as I was saying earlier, in terms of performative contradiction. Can the supposedly moral authority tell you what you ought to do? Is that a moral choice? What if this person has learned that it is immoral to do that, and that an important aspect of morality is to let each person discover (not invent) morality for themselves? To me, this isn’t far-fetched at all. The “humility problem” is baked into the whole structure of “being an authority” in moral matters, in a way that should make just about anyone uneasy.
That’s why I still want some actual examples. What might be an instance of someone exercising moral authority that stops short of an offense against humility? There may well be one, but let’s hear it. (I’m not entirely convinced a traffic cop is “exercising moral authority,” but this is a step in the right direction, in terms of the sort of example I want.)
Well, I have a Monsignor friend whose wisdom I trust, and with whom I have sometimes discussed what to do. I approach him. We discuss the issues, and he usually provides a perspective that I hadn’t considered. I chose to pay attention to what he has to say, or not.
Does that amount to his being an authority? What he does not do is to insist “You ought do X”. If he did, I would walk away.
Claiming to be a moral authority means “do what I say.” Exercising moral authority might mean “or I’ll put you in jail.”
But you are right “it is difficult to know what a term ‘moral authority’ means”. I just posted the below on @Banno’s thread, but I think it belongs here too. I use “authority” like this:
If you are solely focused on the role of the policeman, that sense of ‘the authority’, asking how they make a claim to having authority over me, or what happens when they exercise that authority - that all comes after where I am. Authority first arises, where the good arises. The authorities have their authority, because what they claim and what they exercise, is in line with what is good.
Only the individual can give someone or something authority over themselves. This doesn’t diminish what authority is, it just positions it during the ethical act - this consent occurs after deliberation over goods, some goods found based on the authority of others, some on authority baked into the situation (natural good ends discovered), etc.
You can’t do ethics without goods found in the world, and the authority they support.
As long as there is an appeal, it is external, and we have a start to finding ethical authority, so we can decide what is good, do it, and hopefully be right.
Without all the moving parts (agent, deliberation, decision, act, good) it all falls apart. The authority has to align with the good, by consent of the agent. This good authority, now chosen by the actor, is what the actor may use to justify his consent to do the good act (because it has been deemed good authority already by me).
But, if the authority holds a gun to my head, then they would be attempting to remove my free ability to choose. If they were holding a gun to my head to force me to do something even worse, then I might have a duty to fight them and risk my life, and we start over again with the deliberation, seeking the good, reason, decision, act. Etc., etc…
Okay, but my concern is that if appealing to a principle is the same as appealing to an authority, then every act of reasoning would be authority-based. Generally we would want to say that an appeal to authority or an argument from authority is one kind of reasoning. If an appeal to a principle or a standard is an appeal to an authority, then every act of reasoning would by definition be an appeal to an authority. In that case “appeal to authority” or “argument from authority” would seem to have lost its meaning in having become everything. Note too that in this case not only all practical reasoning but also all speculative reasoning would involve appeals to authorities (such as truth, consistency, entailment, etc.).
The other point I want to make is that an argument from authority or a faith-based argument is in some sense derivative, insofar as the authority’s authority must ultimately be derived from knowledge proper (scientia) rather than faith. So even if we all take Hawking’s claim on faith, it remains true that Hawking himself must have a direct understanding of the truth in question. If he did not then one’s faith in him would be futile. If all reasoning were an appeal to authority, then this derivative nature of the argument from authority would also be obscured.
Okay, I see what you are saying. Regarding this, then:
The basis for authority—moral or otherwise—is a human ability to recognize expertise without at the same time directly recognizing the truths that the expert or authority espouses. I can know that Stephen Hawking has scientific expertise without knowing that the universe began from a singularity. In particular I can know that Hawking has significantly more scientific expertise than I do, and that his opinions are therefore more weighty than my own.
The interesting thing is that Anscombe’s quip that Foot focuses on is arguably centrally related to moral authorities:
In the older sense “moral” has to do with persuasion as opposed to coercion. The authority that a police officer wields is precisely the coercive authority of the government, and this is why it is a bad example. If I acquiesce to your command for fear of the coercive power you wield, then you are the opposite of a moral authority. You are rather someone who has been granted physical/coercive authority by a powerful ruler.
Now I suppose one could assent to a police office in view of some expertise they possess, or simply for the sake of a societal function, but the fact that coercive power is at stake makes it a fraught example.
This is probably one of the basic errors you are laboring under. To exercise authority is not to put on a performance. It’s not that in the military, it’s not that in morality, it’s not that in science, it’s not that in academia. Try to stop thinking in terms of charlatans selling snake oil. Try to stop thinking in terms of strawmen.
Aren’t you just trying to change the subject and have a different thread? You seem to want a thread on tyranny, not moral authorities. Or do you think that every moral authority is a tyrant? Is it okay to have a thread on moral authorities, and to talk about moral authorities without assuming that all moral authority is tyranny?
It’s not moot unless they are required to teach you everything they know, and obviously they are not required to do that in order to prove their expertise. So your argument is actually invalid.
I’m not sure your second paragraph above doesn’t sort of revive my idea that you refuted in the first paragraph.
But I think I agree with the first. I’ve been using “moral authority” too broadly.
Are you saying a moral authority can only be a person? So that, for instance, the Bible as source of moral guidance only has any authority based on a belief that God is the author? Meaning, the Bible itself shouldn’t be called a kind of moral authority, only God through the Bible, or a burning bush, can be the moral authority?
That is the slide into the now contradictory position I was getting at was about. I was saying that for the Utilitarian, “what is greater good” and “what is least harm” have to be determined from science (knowing things in the world) to become authoritative. So the Utilitarian principle isn’t itself the authority, (and all reasoning from principles isn’t enough to establish authority) but ‘what is greater good and what is least harm’ found in the world outline a source of authority.
But that’s an abuse of the word authority.
So the direct understanding is the source of authority, but only Hawking can be the authority, the direct understanding itself isn’t authoritative (hawking is authoritative).
Thanks, that’s just the sort of example I wanted. In my parlance, your friend might be called an “expert.” He’s a go-to guy, someone who’s likely to have helpful insights. There’s nothing bizarre about wanting such people in our lives. As you say, a move to being an authority that involves telling me what I ought to do would be unwelcome, except under extraordinary circumstances.
On this construal, moral authority is clearly undesirable to experience. Do you think there might be an exercise of moral authority that is not punitive? Or is punishment and reward built into the concept?
Maybe I should have been clearer: This is “the sort of example I want” because it is specific and imaginable in real life, not because cops are good examples of moral authority, necessarily. I think cop-like authority may actually be a step in the wrong direction, concept-wise. Sorry for any confusion.
Maybe I should have been clearer: This is “the sort of example I want” because it is specific and imaginable in real life, not because cops are good examples of moral authority, necessarily. I think cop-like authority may actually be a step in the wrong direction, concept-wise. Sorry for any confusion.