I am a Moral Nihilist

Ethics
361

I’m not sure how this doesn’t just commit the same error. It seems to rely on the premise that: “if anything is normative at all, it about command and obligation (i.e., sin).” Because of this, it’s using “good” equivocally between the two contexts.

Again, this is incredibly parochial, it takes a modern Western notion of normativity based originally on sin and divine command theories, and demands that any invocation of normativity must exist according to this narrow philosophy (theology really, except ironically Western atheists have become its biggest advocates).

362

The normatively we are dealing with is there in your account; that a broken leg is not good. If it is based on original sin and divine command theory - and oddly revealing assertion - then that’s down to you.

On your own account, people with disabilities are not good, in an absolute and cosmic sense - and now you add god…

Tom’s question goes to a logical point about the architecture of Tim’s position, not a claim about Western theology.

This is a side issue anyway. What’s really is hard to understand in your account is the hiding of the step from is to ought. You seem to think you have a way to read norms straight off from nature. This remains unclear.

363

So you think being blinded or having cancer is good? I am struggling to see what the real objection is here, less the equivocation between analogous uses of “bad.” If being kicked is not bad for puppies in any general sense, from whence comes the judgement “one ought not kick puppies?” If it is not grounded in any knowledge of what is actually good for puppies, why ought we affirm it?

You claim to want to secure the ought statement, but deny that anything about what is good or bad for puppies can be understood from what puppies are. In that case, in virtue of what do different ought claims gain warrant? If we cannot come to understand what one ought to do from nature, then from what do we learn this? Is it innate knowledge? The supernatural or some supernatural moral sense? From the declarations and inclinations of one’s own will and sentiment or the collective will?

How does one reason about what is good or bad from things if this can never be “read off” from knowing about them?

No, historically, that is where your demand that “not good” can exclusively be understood as something like “sinful” comes from. Whereas, on the earlier view, this is absurd, as I have pointed out.

Because the is-ought gap only follows if one makes roughly Humean metaphysical assumptions. Rejecting such a distinction is a fairly common move, even in modern thought. Weren’t you just citing Foot as inspiration earlier? This is precisely her project. And the claim that it is simply bad for a plant to lack water, or to be watered by gasoline, because of what a plant is is one of her central points. Hence, Natural Goodness.

Anyhow, it’s not that all non-Western philosophers and all pre-modern philosophers somehow missed Hume’s gap, it’s that the gap appears for Hume because he is writing in the context of mechanism, nominalism, and voluntarism. These metaphysical assumptions generate the gap. So too, the demand for ethics to take on the form of universal laws/commands, to be framed exclusively in terms of obligation and sin, this is inherited from particular Western theologies, particularly, but far from exclusively, Protestant ones. In Hume’s case, its the Calvinist tradition that looms particularly large.

Anyhow, weren’t you also citing Anscombe as inspiration earlier? The most famous thing she ever wrote makes precisely this historical point.

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364

I wouldn’t be so sure. Take a post like this one. What is happening there? It looks as if you are priming the pump on the ad hominem machine by taking @Banno’s favorite subjects for ad hominem and wafting them before him. It’s like sprinkling blood in the area where Count is swimming, and specifically using blood that is coded to the local shark. You set the stage for personal attacks on @Count_Timothy_von_Icarus, and the ensuing defensive/offensive dynamic between Count/Banno was no coincidence at all. Count is by now accustomed to this tactic, and he knows how to ward off the insinuation that he thinks protected classes of people are morally evil, but that doesn’t really change the problematic nature of facilitating the ad hominem. These are the seeds that sprout into the low-effort mudslinging which degrades a philosophy forum.

The difficult fact is that we don’t always do our best. I don’t always to my best; you don’t always do your best. For example, when answering Amadeus’ question about the philosophical currents of the exchange I forgot that I had recently criticized your appeal to people who “Just don’t give a fuck,” and I didn’t account for what might result from that overlap. If I had been doing my best I would have seen that.

365

Yeah, this is a great point. And @Banno has often cited Anscombe’s thesis approvingly.

It’s good to see that he is now trying to argue that there are moral truths which do not come from divine commands, but literally no one in the thread thinks his reasoning holds good. There are outstanding replies regarding the invalidity of Banno’s reasoning from @Michael, @Count_Timothy_von_Icarus, @AmadeusD, and myself, all of which Banno has thus far chosen to ignore. That central premise has been a central problem for his attempt at justifying moral realism.

366

I think the question makes some sense with Aristotle, given a lack of familiarity, since the ancient Pagans tendency to simply murder children born with birth defects is well-known. Not, of course, that the malformed were generally considered guilty of any moral defect (which is absurd), but the idea that they were seen as somehow be less worthy as people in various respects makes sense.

But even a cursory familiarity with historical Christian thought would make ascribing this position to Christian teleology impossible, I would think. The prohibition on infanticide was one of the most sweeping changes in the rise of a distinctively Christian culture, and moreover, it remains a live issue to this day.

So while I can understand the concern to the effect of “if x is better than y, doesn’t that support poor treatment of y,” historically, it seems misplaced to me. The eugenics movements tended to be highly secular, or even anti-Christian, explicitly deriding Christian teleology and views on the sanctity of life as malignant superstitions.

Even today, as the age of first pregnancies has soared in developed nations, defects like Downs Syndrome have been, in some locales, almost eliminated in live births. Of course, because of rising maternal ages, conceptions of trisomies have actually been increasing, and so this shift has been achieved by terminating otherwise wanted pregnancies precisely on the grounds that the disabled child is too much of a burden on the state or parents, or would lead a life not worth living because of their disability. And indeed, the arguments for infanticide in such cases tend to be entirely from atheistic grounds, with Christians and Muslims generally being accused of superstitious dogmatism on this issue precisely because they won’t budge on the equal dignity of human life. Hence, it’s hard for me to see where this connection even comes from, given the types of groups who have actually argued for the euthanasia, sterilization, or termination of the disabled.

Or, more modestly, it seems entirely possible to justify eugenics, bigotry, etc. on utilitarian grounds, and obviously on anti-realist and sentimentalist grounds, so that pointing out that teleology conceivably could be read in this direction seems to miss that this seems true of all the major theories.

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367

Yes, I was thinking the same thing. And it is Aristotelian-type reasoning that gets in the way of such things, which is why it is held in contempt by many secularists.

Well, I find unserious the idea that we must convince ourselves that nothing is better than anything else in order to avoid [insert evil here]. That sort of thinking has become common in the postwar era, but it is too dilapidated to stand for more than a few generations. The notion that it is not better to be able-bodied than to be disabled is a great case in point.

But I have seen Banno misrepresent your position for years on end. If someone really believes that you think the handicapped are necessarily morally evil it is only because the well has been so thoroughly poisoned. So I am not convinced that these discussions are meant to go anywhere. Looking at some of your threads, I was encouraged to see more serious philosophy occurring on the new forum, and not just the same old ideological ruts that were carved into the old forum. I am going to try to turn my attention to those more substantive matters.

368

There’s not a coherent alternative, and it is th origin of almost all moral thinking. There’s no irony there.

I also reject Leon’s claim that I reject Bannos reasoning.

369

Then read your own post. :face_with_crossed_out_eyes:

370

There are several subsequent replies (such as this one) which evidence a change of stance, because I misunderstood hte move Banno was making, and have done for years.

Sorry mate. You really have to stop being so obtuse.

371

You are right, but we are human, we have to live in a community. And cause our communities are full of people, we can’t love or need everyone, so we made that, and why don’t we do that on purpose cause we have to live with others?

372

Well I’m glad to hear that you’ve abandoned your emotivism in favor of Banno’s reasoning about the existence of so-called “ethical truths.” A step in the right direction. :+1:

373

I’m not sure what you’re reading, but they are not in conflict.

I am an emotivist, and I accept @Banno s position - which, as you can see, does not actually address emotivism at base.
It says there are true ethical statements, and lays them out as statements about ethics. That, as I’ve clearly shown to Banno, is understood by me as an empirical observation. I simply had a hard time using the word “ethical truth” because the claim is not about either oughts, or moral reasoning. It’s about what people feel about certain propositions. And is clearly true. Most people do think that.
That’s not what a “moral truth” amounts to in almost anyone’s mind. A moral truth would be, tout court “kicking puppies is bad” and that this is “the case”. Not that most people think this is the case. Emotivism is about acts. Not opinions on them. I point you to this exchange to illustrate.

This encapsulates the truth being claimed in this “there are true ethical statements” claim. Within the above, obviously so. But this is a statement about actors, not acts. “Is it unethical to kick puppies?” The available answer is “most people think so”. And why would they think so? I’m sure I don’t need to go on..

This is emotivism writ large. I’m not suggesting Banno reaches that conclusion - we don’t conclude the same thing. But his reasoning is fine.

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374

No. We are talking past each other. At issue is from where were the evaluation derives. On your account, the horse’s broken leg is bad because that it a horse with a broken leg differs from how a horse ought be. It is a result of the horse not being sufficiently horsey.

Such an account gives the impression of finding good and bad lying around in the world, as if they were things we observe. That breaches the is/ought gap.

You haven’t much addressed any argument against the is/ought gap so far. What you have done is try to discredit Hume.

No sequences of statements about how things are can lead to a conclusion about how things ought be. This is a simple result of there being nothing in the conclusion of an argument that is not already implicit in its premisses. This is the formal result of a difference in direction of fit, were an “is” changes the sentence to match he way things are, while an “ought” changes the way things are to match the sentence.

So far as aI can make out, you have not addressed these arguments. That’s a shame.

The alternative presupposed came from @Tom_Storm , and uses the capabilities approach. The broken leg is not good because it prevents the horse from doing things it would otherwise be capable of. The advantage of this view over yours is that the move from is to ought is explicitly an evaluation. The horse ought be able to walk; it can’t; that’s bad.

Notice carefully that, that alternative is not the only alternative; what is on offer has two steps; the rejection of your account because it breaches the is/ought gap; and the positing of an alternative, from Nusbaum, a noted Aristotelian Scholar.

There is no equivocation on “bad” here. There is your failure to address what is a pretty simple argument. No doubt it is far easier for you to deal with what I have said if you begin by misinterpreting it.

The idea of direction of fit is from Anscombe. She has also argued separately that modern uses of ought are derivative of divine command; I have admired Foot’s account of the tram problem; she has argued for normative naturalistic claims. That one accepts one thing a philosopher argues does not imply that one must accept everything that philosopher argues. You know that. Your response therefore seems no more than rhetorical.

You owe us a direct response to the is/ought problem, to the direction of fit of your evaluations.

375

Yep. The reason that one thinks kicking puppies wrong is pretty much irrelevant to the discourse.

it might be an emotional response. It might be because God commanded us to respect Puppies in Deuteronomy. It might be from considerations of the greatest happiness. It might even be because puppy kicking is not in accord with the eternal forms.

It doesn’t matter. But if we agree that kicking puppies is bad, we are in a position to implement a communal retribution to discourage puppy kickers.

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376

You write “looks as if” which is all it is. Not guilty.

Leon, I don’t think we should mind some mistakes or omissions or hasty or poorly written posts. This is not Harvard, it’s just a conversation forum with a few people trying to improve their basic understanding of philosophy.

I was disappointed in the tone you adopted in response to some of my posts. I don’t think it’s worth rehashing. I have no expectations of philosophy beyond having interesting conversations. It isn’t a team sport for me, and I don’t mind being wrong. I have nothing to protect, so by all means point out alternatives to my position, challenge my assumptions, and explain why you think I’m mistaken, but try not to be nasty about it. That’s all.

For the most part, I thought we had a decent rapport, even if we don’t share the same presuppositions. I’m one of those people who genuinely enjoys hearing views that differ from my own, that’s kind of why I’m here. While we clearly approach these questions from different angles, I respect your rigor and the care you bring to philosophical discussion.

Are we cool?

And just to be clear, I’m not @Banno’s straight man or lapdog.

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377

Just to be sure, I do not think that Tim thinks disabled people are bad. However, that would appear to be a consequence of his account. He suggests that something is bad if it does not match some cosmic template that sets out the nature of that thing. The question to him then is to explain the nature of that cosmic template, and how the disabled, non-cis, and red haired fair in comparison to it.

No doubt he has a way. For my part, I accept Wittgenstein, Quine and Kripke’s arguments against the cosmic template

Again, it is a side issue, the main problem being how Tim’s account deals with the is/ought divide.

378

I think that post of yours speaks for itself. Obviously we disagree. That will happen.

I am happy to move forward. I am trying to avoid engaging TPF as if it were an instant-messaging forum, so don’t be surprised if I don’t engage these sorts of side-discussions about gays or gingers or what-have-you.

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379

Cool. Appreciate this. Looking forward to more conversations.

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380

The is/ought gap is a consequence of the position that there are no facts about values (the fact versus values distinction), or at least that facts about values are somehow of an entirely different order from facts about “nature.” Saying teleology is false because it violates the fact/values distinction is simply question begging; the gap assumes the very thing in question. It amounts to: “how do teleological accounts deal with the problem that teleology is false?”

Hume’s guillotine cannot be maintained if there are knowable facts about values.

Consider the argument:

  1. If I step into the fire I will be burned.
  2. It is bad (not choice-worthy) for a man to be burned.
    Therefore, I ought not step into the fire.

Or, more simply:

X is more choice-worthy than y.
Therefore x ought to be chosen over y.

This is hardly fallacious. Facts about values (and so facts about what is worthy of choice) lend themselves easily to syllogisms about what ought to be done. The fact/value and descriptive/normative dichotomy denies the sort of premises that make practical syllogisms possible, but this is a metaphysical claim.

Now, I suppose one could demand that we add another “ought” premise to the argument above, to the effect of: “one ought to choose the better over the worse—the more choice-worthy over the less choice-worthy.”

This seems redundant though. It would be like demanding that any syllogism of theoretical reason include the premise: “one ought to affirm truth over falsity.” But if this is a requirement, then every syllogism of any sort requires and ought premise.

And note, a hard normative/descriptive, fact/values dichotomy cannot, to my knowledge, be found anywhere outside modern Western thought. It is not a global assumption all other cultures and past thinkers simply missed. It’s a specific consequence of upstream metaphysical assumptions that, as I’ve noted before, comes from theology (roughly the idea that absolute divine freedom requires that values be imputed extrinsically from without by God, or later by man).

Now, we could argue about whether those metaphysical assumptions make sense. They certainly clash with many world traditions. In Neo-Confucianism, the normative elements of Li (pattern), are intrinsic to what things are, not some super added, sui generis category divorced from the descriptive, for instance. But claiming that teleology (be it Greek, Indian, or Chinese) needs to overcome the is-ought gap is makes little sense in that such a gap simply doesn’t exist in those metaphysical contexts.