I still do not think you’re connecting the correct ends of the wire here: That people have preferences (I’m happy to call these moral, although I think that begs the question somewhat) does not present us with moral truths. It presents truths about how people behave. If what you’ve meant, all these years, is that “morality is just how people act” rather thna some system for how people act, I’ve grossly misunderstood you and simply don’t think that says anything interesting while sincerely apologizing for having got that so wrong. If so, we do not disagree.
If, on the other hand and as it appears, you’re still claiming that facts about preferences and actions informs a concept of moral truth that is much, much harder to accept. “truth” does not seem to be something which can derived, as a further fact, from existing facts in another domain. Empirical facts about what people do, essentially in hindsight, about certain problems they face, is not sufficient to give us an a priori model for assessing morality, as that is a different domain. Again, unless the weaker claim above is what you’re getting it - in which case, 100% it does and again, I’m sorry for wasting so much of your time on this over the years.
For instance, this is obviously true. But it doesn’t, and no where are you able to show that it does, give us a reason to accept that “it is wrong” or even that we should even have the right to petition others about their behaviour. Again, it is true that this is what happens, most of the time. But there’s nothing special about this species of claim, from the taste ones you noted. Most people do not enjoy shit. But there are plenty of fetishists to whom shit tastes fantastic. We find the same problem.
That is your claim. There isn’t much support for it, except that it will cause that person to be ostracised etc.. which is just another set of facts, and doesn’t inform any concept of moral truth (again, based on the deduction above. If this is wrong, hopefully I’m only wasting my own time now).
The second is just you not wanting puppies to be kicked. As is the first. They are not different species of claim.
But this rests upon my conception of morality anyway, so I don’t expect assent or treatment of this point. It just seems pernicious in a discussion that is supposed to be about whether there are moral facts. This just discusses differences in the practical application of some preference. Doesn’t move the domain.
Its’ true this person thinks that, yes. Is that really what’s been asked about? I contend not.
I presume you meant to say “..that it is wrong to kick puppies is not here..” ? If so, this illustrates, very well, why it’s wrong to claim this is a “truth”: It meets no criteria for truth until we accept that truth can simply be a descriptor for things people believe. That, to my mind, is patently absurd.
This is essentially a perfect description of how morality works in communities. Good.
If the above is to be accepted (on your terms) then I’ve probably wasted several 10s of thousands of words on this discussion. The above being true makes this a hide-the-ball exercise.
Maybe that’s… not the point.. but the issue, perhaps.