Absolutely. And it is still beyond me how this wasn’t my interpretation of you previously (although, a lot of that has to do with being unable to review those conversations for correction).
The ought is still out of nowhere. There’s some hidden criteria here too: I do not want to get burned. It all boils down the same.
One could ask: “Why ought one pursue what is better instead of what is worse?” I suppose.
At some point though, practical reason must terminate in the intelligibility of the good itself, just as theoretical reason terminates in the desirability of truth over falsehood.
Rejecting “x is most worthy of choice, therefore choose x,” seems to me on par with rejecting “p is true, therefore affirm p, and reject not-p.”
One can certainly ask, “why pay any attention to reason at all?” But one cannot then expect reasons for deciding the issue, since these are the very thing being rejected.
I think on @Banno s terms we can. Not on yours.
On yours, we have to ask how we get from “I don’t like this” to “I ought not do this”. That’s still lacking.
I understand. But it isn’t, because there is no logical connection of x being worthy of choice. If P is true, -P is not available.
Pretty much.
The ought is sitting in the teleology. The SEP article on teleology goes in to this in some detail. it’s pretty dense , though.
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Where are you getting “I don’t like this” from?
Whether you personally reject facts about values has nothing to do with the fact that the is/ought gap doesn’t exist in a teleological context. The premise isn’t “I don’t like burning” but “burning is (truly, objectively) bad…”
Claiming such facts are actually really just subjective tastes is just asserting anti-realism. Which, sure, if subjectivism is simply assumed to be true, teleology is false.
A fact is a true statement. We’ve established that there are true ought statements. Hence there are normative facts.
Unless you want to use the word “fact” so as to exclude any evaluations, in which case “It is bad (not choice-worthy) for a man to be burned” is not a fact.
So you are off to a bad start.
So explain why you think
“X is better than y”
Can never imply “choose y”?
Of course it can. There are evaluative truths. “X is better than y” is an evaluation.
Is “x is better than y” an ought statement?
It doesn’t seem to be.
But “choose x” or “you ought to choose x” is clearly an ought conclusion. So see, you can derive and ought from an is if there are facts about values.
This syllogism derives an ought from an is and an ought. That’s fine.
No sequence of Is-statements alone implies any ought-statement.
There is no “ought” there though? So is the claim that “good” is a synonym for “ought” or what?
That explains your confusion.
Ever read Hare? good introduction to normative logic. Saying something is good is performing an evaluation. Is says, other things being equal, you ought prefer not being burned.
While there is a great deal of equivocation between the is/ought distinction and the fact/value distinction, many would agree that your syllogism violates the fact/value distinction without agreeing that it violates the is/ought distinction (on the grounds that (2) involves an ‘ought’, at least in fieri).
At the bottom of these debates is the fact that terms like ‘is’, ‘ought’, ‘fact’, and ‘value’ are always ill-defined. Depending on how they are defined, most every tradition can affirm or deny the distinctions. For example, Thomists will generally agree that there are sciences which prescind from the goodness of being, such as mathematics, and that mathematical premises will therefore not be sufficient to ground the conclusion of a practical syllogism. They would agree that mathematical premises will be unable to generate conclusions about goodness, “morality,” and “ought” in general.
It would seem to me the reason kicking puppies is wrong enters directly into the criteria for understanding and identifying exactly what constitutes kicking a puppy. It’s not as though ‘kicking a puppy’ is an undisputed fact, while only the reasons are subject to interpretation and debate. You’ll have just as many disputes over what constitutes kicking a puppy given the multiplicity of reasons as you would in a community where the dispute centered over whether kicking a puppy is wrong.
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It is interesting that, given @Banno’s basis in Hare, your redefinition of “good” as “choice-worthy” becomes problematic. As one of the later contributors to the debates about Moore’s “open question argument,” Hare had ironed out some of the wrinkles. The problems that remained were the more foundational ones, such as Hare’s presupposition that “good” was exhaustively divided between the evaluative and the descriptive. Defining “good” as “choice-worthy” falls into the same sort of trap, where the ontological aspect is ignored. For thinkers like Moore, Stevenson, and Hare, it was more or less due to a linguistic blindspot that they failed to realize that “good” is not a purely extrinsic concept (because they lacked a robust theory of the transcendentals). Some of them were aware of the lacuna, but the bracketing of that semantic range gave rise to faulty assumptions about the nature of goodness. See the link I gave above for more information.
…This gives insight into the reason why Banno has not been able to justify his “ethical truth” above, namely because his ethics can do naught but derive from human will or a collection of human wills. Your points about the absence of a ground for the claim in the puppy’s own being basically highlighted this problem. But there is a parallel issue when one is limited to the “choice-worthy,” because in that case the objects are always human choices or human acts, rather than the objects of those choices or acts. What is worthy of choice is a particular option for action, but what is never worthy of choice is a dog qua dog. Yet the dog qua dog can be good, even though he is not worthy of choice.* Maybe this helps explain why I don’t follow you in that “choice-worthy” definition. It overcomes some of the objections but cuts us off from the deeper grounds.
* Except in the metaphorical sense in which someone might say, “That is a choice specimen!”
But that goes to my point. Translating “good” into commendation or prescription isn’t metaphysically neutral. It’s a broad metaphysical claim. The gap is downstream of that claim, which is what sets up the fact/value distinction in the first place.
That is, there is a fact/value dichotomy because the nature of goodness (a metaphysical question) is said to be merely a matter of commendation or prescription.
Just to clarify, I never intended to define the good as choice-worthy, rather I said that what is better will be more worthy of choice. Perhaps this was confusing because I used it in the argument, but I used it in the argument only because I think it is more obvious that “x is more choice-worthy” clearly implies “choose x.”
Choice-worthiness is derivative of goodness (and not vice versa). It is a common error, I think, to collapse:
The ontological
The desirable (“evaluative”)
Choice-worthiness (relating to choice); and
Prescription/duty
Something can be desirable, e.g., “an amazing cake,” and it can not necessarily be choice-worthy. But when it comes to practical reason, if a choice is better, then it is more worthy of choice.
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It is not a metaphysical claim if the concept of ‘good’ is truncated beforehand. So I agree that it’s a false translation, but what comes out the other end of that translation is for Hare metaphysically neutral in a certain sense.
I think that’s right in 20th century moral philosophy. But I’m not convinced that for Kant (or Hume if you like) the fact/value distinction generates the is/ought distinction.
Okay, but from my point of view it seems that you regularly explain the motivating power of goodness precisely by way of choice-worthiness. If this is right then you are leaning into the non-ontological aspect of goodness to explain it. If something is choice-worthy because it is good and not good because it is chosen, then good must be the more fundamental of the two. I don’t doubt you understand this, but the emphasis on “choice” favors that part of the meaning of goodness which relates to concrete acts of human will. The domain of good things shifts from ontological objects to objects of choice, and this is similar to the way that Hare reduces the actionable part of goodness to evaluation. It concedes much to Hare that Medievals would not.
Maybe put it this way. Obviously Banno’s inability to wade into metaphysical waters is what prevents him from accessing genuine moral truths. He must make an ontological claim about the puppy itself, or about its pain, or about its wellbeing, etc. His failure consists in his inability to do this.
Whereas the Medieval would say that the reason everything else holds up is because of the foundation which says that the puppy is good, or that pain is bad, or that wellbeing is good, etc. We could try to say, “The decision to abstain from kicking the puppy is choice-worthy,” but this is a bit of a halfway house. The real justification must be found in the puppy himself, as you so ably expressed above. So at the end of the day I would want to talk about the puppy itself, rather than remain a step removed by talking about possible human choices.