The Oxford Dictionary describes consciousness as ‘The state of being aware of and responsive to one’s surroundings, as well as the fact of awareness by the mind of itself and the world’.
However, I believe this definition contains 2 crucial flaws;
As per its Oxford definition, the mind is exclusive to humans. Meaning that anything inhuman can not be conscious. But what if there were to be a near-identical species? Not quite human, but close enough to share the biology and brain function that results in our consciousness. Surely now they would be conscious. But according to the given definition, they would not be-because they are not human.
Translation: The current definition means that even with everything required for consciousness, a species can not be conscious unless it is human.
The first half of the definition seems to carry little weight towards consciousness. A piece of elastic fulfills the requirements-it can perceive its environment through physical changes, and respond physically, and yet I believe many would agree is not conscious in the sense that we are trying to describe. If these are not where the line for consciousness is drawn, then why use it within its definition?
Translation: Perception and response to surroundings don’t equate to the consciousness we are trying to describe, so why use them within the definition?
So how should we define consciousness?
My first recognition is this; a conscious being doesn’t seem to require the ability to interpret external information. Take a Boltzmann brain for example, despite the fact it would experience no external inputs into its sensory/experience register, it would still experience consciousness ( assuming it is upheld in existence for long enough). Consciousness has arisen despite there having been no external sensory experience.
Translation: Consciousness does not require a being to be able to experience anything outside of itself.
My second recognition is as follows; a conscious being must be able to think about itself and its own existence. This sense of being seems to be required for consciousness- or at least how I think of it. For this there appears to be no justification, as it is the 1st principle to which there is no deeper. My justification is simply what I feel and what I believe others feel and experience. Despite its seeming lack of validity, this subjectivity problem is inevitable when describing experiences-and yet we have managed to accurately depict many.
Translation: A conscious being must be self-aware. When defining experiences we will always run into subjectivity, but this hasn’t stopped us from creating effective definitions.
Finally, I believe that a conscious being must be capable of metacognition(thinking about thinking). This appears to be what consciousness is related to most, and where the line is so often drawn. Most animals don’t seem to have this ability, and hence we do not think of them as conscious. The mouse knows the cat may pose it danger (thinking about self) , but not that it is thinking. The man knows that reading is likely to be beneficial for him, and that he is thinking about reading and its benefits for him. He is aware of both himself and his thoughts.
Translation: The key to consciousness is the ability to think about thinking.
This is also why some people may be considered more conscious than others, why we feel we are sometimes more conscious than others, and why there may be various levels of consciousness-an idea i look forward to exploring shortly!
Final definition:
Consciousness: The ability to think both of one’s self and of one’s own thinking.