When did we start thinking in first person?

Am I the only one who hoped that the thread title referred to the grammatical form of verbal thoughts?

Maybe this was indeed irrelevant for Jaynes. (Can’t say, as I lent my copy, and it hasn’t returned.) But I recall that he wanted to identify a suitable lobe of the brain that might have been (at some point in history or prehistory) repurposed for unspoken speech, which would have been ‘heard’ as external. In which case I would think the grammatical category becomes at least a question?

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What grammatical category?

First person. As opposed to second and third, and none.

I’d already explained my point, or question. This was just a burp.

Oh good. I was about to try to answer you.

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I think the definitions of thinking and consciousness are missing in the OP. Without these definitions, we cannot conclude anything. I think consciousness is much older than humanity. There are many different types of thinking, such as perceptual thinking, conceptual thinking, etc., each of which we obtained during a period in our evolution. So perceptual thinking is very old, in my understanding; without it, we could not survive. Conceptual thinking comes after perceptual thinking, though. When and how, I don’t know!

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In addition to emphasizing the economic infrastructure, neo-Marxism stresses class conflict (which is political). Nonetheless, neo-Marxism is a very popular anthropological approach (or it was when I was in grad school, several decades ago). A very popular book like Marvin Harris’s Cows, Pigs, Wars and Witches “solved” the mystery of sacred cows, taboos against eating pork, etc. with economic “explanations” (which I found unpersuasive).

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But what you said that I responded to was:

This original argument regarding presence (having the structures) was the one addressed. Now you’re substituting an argument concerning action ( activity of the structures). That’s called “shifting the goalposts”, so all you’ve done is replace one fallacy with another.

But seeing as you now want to make the stronger claim. Prove it.

Provide evidence that:

a) The coordinated neuronal action you speak of always and only results in introspection.
b) It always occurs in the same way across human groups regardless of their culture. And more pointedly, seeing as this is what relates to Jaynes: it has not changed since human beings arose.

Then your response to this:

is:

I would suggest that basic culture and history is something you must be unfamiliar with if you think hunter gatherer groups and others over history have been subject to a comparable amount of information as we moderns, e.g. via media, or that something like identity politics must be common across all groups over all history.

You are either completely unaware of the fact that cultures can be very different both synchronically and, especially, diachronically. Or, you are arguing in bad faith.

Cool. Neo-marxism can be a very useful analytical tool, but it ought not be overextended. I don’t see much relevance to the Jaynes claims anyhow.

Your seem unaware of the basic structure-function paradigm in all biological systems

The structure and function of any any biological system (including brain regions) are interdependent and mutually shaping

Introspection is supported by the same neural systems in all humans, this is well established, and there are no known biological differences in these systems between any two groups of humans.

Literacy is not a prerequisite for introspection.

Writing may change how it is expressed, but not that it happens.

Anthropologists working with hunter-gatherer groups, such as the Hadza, !Kung, Inuit, and Aboriginal Australians, document rich reflection on motives, dreams, moral dilemmas, grief, and personal identity, often expressed through storytelling, ritual, and conversation rather than writing.

You made the claim that there is not as much introspection in hunter-gatherer groups. The burden is on you to offer evidence of that.

(I reject Jaynes’ premise)

There are different kinds of information besides the written kind.

Now you are throwing out big words that are unrelated to the discussion, so who is arguing in bad faith?

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Got it. I tried to access that paper but I couldn’t for some reason.

Right. Well, the claim as Jaynes makes it there would be far too strong for me in any case. One problem that jumps out is the use of the term “significant”. It seems to completely polarize decision making into two utterly distinct realms. We make decisions all the time and they occur on a spectrum of importance. At what point do the voices take over and become so deterministic, and why that point in particular?

I’m sympathetic to that too. One obvious reason is evolution in its traditional biological sense, but more salient, seeing as it has the potential to happen much more quickly, is the evolution of language, which is what gives us subjective awareness as we know it. Jaynes, from what I’ve read, seems to be proposing a kind of combination whereby language takes root at a certain point, but the brain continues to evolve such that humans and language fully come together only after a transitional period of separation in awareness. That general idea is plausible.

It’s also plausible to me that culture affects the nature of subjectivity, that subjectivity is to an extent learned. I’ve talked, for example, about the possibility that levels of introspection may vary in some significant way according to different modes of life, both synchronically and diachronically, and there is evidence for that. But it’s contestable due to the nature of the phenomenon. Ethnographic work needs to rely on a degree of self-reporting, for example, which requires introspection about introspection and so on.

Another problem with even discussing this is that some will falsely presume you are making a kind of normative claim, or a claim about intelligence or something, as if it’s better to introspect more in some objective sense, so that the very idea of establishing differences involves positing a hierarchy among groups. Whereas, from my perspective, introspection, or at least excessive introspection, is, if anything, a problem that doesn’t serve the human organism but language at the organism’s expense.

I consider language, and the symbolic in general, to be something we can be more, or less, steeped in, concerned with etc. Traditional societies tended to be concerned with what they faced and what they faced was local, immediate, and concrete and therefore more prone to local and immediate processing leading to concrete action. What we face is very often remote and abstract. And just recognizing that should be enough of a starting point for further reasonable speculation concerning cognitive orinetation and capacity.

I’m writing now, for example, about something because it is “on my mind”. It has no practical relevance to my surroundings. It is merely language running about in my head and demanding to be processed and analysed. By writing this post, I’m in a sense paying a debt I didn’t ask to be burdened with. But If I don’t pay the debt, I’ll feel annoyed and the ideas will continue to run about in my head like untamed and unwelcome ferrets. This, to me, is not a “natural” state of affairs, it’s a cultural one. It’s learned and contingent, not pre-determined and necessary. And the idea that pointing that out should be some sort of sin against human equality is odd to me.

That rings a bell, but I’m not sure, where, if it all, I came across it. The most recent work I’m familiar with on hemispheric variation is McGilchrist’s “The Master and his Emissary” and only through summaries. I haven’t read the book yet. Anyway, all this is fascinating and it should be possible to have an open conversation about it. I think part of the problem is that people project their own state of consciousness as natural and any discussion of variation across human groups in the cognitive realm is taboo.

But we ought not presume that because we moderns think a certain way, it sets a kind of inviolable normative standard. Perhaps we are just trapped in an ignorance of different forms of subjectivity that are richer perceptually, maybe even proportionately to being “impoverished” linguistically—not in the structure of the language but in how a particular culture relates to its language, how much hold the abstract has in relation to the concrete, for example.

Maybe we should stop worshipping our words and see them more as—to use a religious metaphor—a cross we bear that other groups in human history who were not as overwhelmed in abstract rumination would not necessarily voluntarily take on.

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Those terms are standard in the social sciences, as well as concise, precise, and very obviously relevant. They also only take a few seconds to Google and understand. This is a philosophy forum, so technical terms are going to be used sometimes. There is no relationship between doing that and arguing in bad faith.

The rest of your post appears garbled to me, so let’s just agree to disagree. I will only say I am completely aware of the rich traditions of storytelling and so on in all human groups and I never made any blanket assertions concerning all hunter gatherers. I put forward a fairly modest conjecture which in my view, you reacted to with conflation, confusion, and fallacy. But, leaving that aside, feel free to read my most recent post if you want more clarification, and as I said, we can leave it there.

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I know what they mean

If this is your reaction to what I have posted, some introspection of your own might be in order.

Hmm, what if the “voices of the gods” are still speaking within us today, and what we now call “subjectivity” is merely an interpretation that was invented 3,000 years ago?

Incidentally, the idea of ​​"voices of the gods" in our minds seems simpler and more natural than our modern, complex conception of consciousness. Yet, being simpler does not necessarily mean being more erroneous or flawed.

Contemporary gurus often preach that one should “tune one’s mind to the right frequency”—a state where it is not “I” who acts, but rather the “vibrations of the universe” that guide me. How is this any worse than the notions of “choice,” “responsibility,” and other such concepts dreamed up by existentialists? At the very least, in terms of alleviating personal anxiety about the future, this approach doesn’t seem foolish at all. After all, if there is no need to worry about tomorrow, there is no need to suffer in advance—much like the “birds of the air” that “neither sow nor reap,” right?

The very notion of possessing one’s own subjectivity—at least among the general population—is a relatively recent development. I suspect that as recently as 100 or 200 years ago, most of our ancestors knew nothing of such a thing.


Upon reflection, I might even propose a comparison between two sets of perspectives—the past and the present:

God guides me / I trust my intuition (or feelings)

Fate decides / Circumstances define the possibilities

My ancestors speak through me / I have internalized the norms prevalent in my environment

The gods send desires / My brain generates motivation

I follow a higher will / I make my own decisions

This raises the question: which of these is better? In terms of productivity, perhaps the latter set (though this is debatable); but in terms of reducing anxiety or the mental energy required for thought, the former set is clearly superior.

I even have a tongue-in-cheek hypothesis: since thinking requires a colossal amount of the brain’s resources, the very idea of ​​"agency" was introduced to the masses by evil capitalists who want to drive up consumption =))

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It’s relevant because the bicameral mind is associated with pre-civilized people, and because you associated it with hunters/gatherers (I thought). Hunters/gatherers are not culturally monolithic (although the economic infrastructure is shared).

I don’t remember what Jaynes said about (for example) native American or Australian hunters/gatherers. Had they evolved away from the bicameral mind 3000 years ago? If so, how did that change occur? Based on European reports, Native Americans hardly failed to think in the first person – indeed, Native philosophers influenced liberal European philosophers like Locke, Hobbes, Rouseseau, etc. The story of how that happened is told in Graeber and Wengrow’s excellent book The Dawn of Everything. The book contradicts neo-Marxist theories and similar approaches (like Jared Diamond’s). The authors argue that primitive societies – like our own – are self-aware and intentional, discussing and arguing about how a just social order should be devised.

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I have only barely looked at the theory, but it seems (?) that Jaynes was trying to point out a leap in conceptual self-consciousness.

In our post-Cartesian times, we automatically think in terms of a internal monologue. We automatically “interpret” imagined speech as our own. We automatically think of the world as “outside dead physical stuff” and “inside alive me-stuff.”

To put it playfully, this is our “crackpot” madness. Parts of this “madness” are common-sense sanity, but other parts are harmlessly “crazy.” For instance, philosophers “pretend” to believe that perceptions are “inside stuff.” But they forget all this when they wash the dishes in the kitchen sink or make a left turn at the stoplight. Or say “I do” to get married.

I note that even the convention of the “single self” that is associated with a single human body is indeed a meme. This body that “I” call “mine” has been trained to make this noise “I” and take responsibility for “it” self as a unified time-binding virtual something.

One can vaguely imagine a form of life or culture where each body had two or three “souls” that take turns.

What or who is it that says “I” ? Is “I” the name of a particular brain ? That doesn’t quite sound right.

I’m inclined to posit some kind of “animal” from-a-POV-ness as basic, an in the perceived entity is there as it is there in terms of its relation to the body that perceives it. A “bare sentience” would be something like the raw qualitative presence of the object. Perhaps this object is a remembered or imagined sentence.

Must be understand thinking to be “I-driven” ? We can decide that we won’t count non-I-driven sign-perception as “real” thought. So I am not looking for some “truth of the matter here.” I am trying to explore approach vectors. I can’t remember how “I” thought as a baby or as a young child. Perhaps because the institution of the “I” is a radical shift. Perhaps I need the meme of selfhood to synthesize and remember. All very difficult stuff !

Good point ! Reminds me of Platonic discussions of poets. Where does the poet get his or her stuff ? Who is this…muse ? I imagine that many artists can relate to this. Bukowski would often discuss how his being a writer was out of his control. Maybe the stuff would just stop being delivered. By the “god.”

And the modern “I” is arguably just another name of this “god.” Where empirically is this “I” character ? Yes the brain is of course related, but I don’t think we experience other “subjects” as brain-objects. There is something uncanny about “being in language” with other “people.” A “person” is a “being in language.” ( ?)

Well said ! The situation is there “implicitly” relative to a body at the center of that situation. Consciousness is the “being” or “being there” of the-driving-down-the-highway or the-dishes-being-washed. This is a big point in Heidegger’s work from around 1920. The “historical I” is “recessive.”

We get pointers like “[it] worlds.” Or maybe “worlding.”

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Right. So for me it’s interesting that our “sane common sense” basically makes a local, singular ego the god in question. For us it is crazy to attribute imagined/remembered speech to other gods. I am not saying that our way is bad. I am saying that — metaphorically speaking — we have a clash of theologies here. Our own “theology” is too “obvious” to us for us to call it a theology. A “cult” is the other guy’s weird religion.

I was somewhat struck by the apparent simplicity of this idea—a simplicity that, at the same time, conceals a stroke of genius.

Take a poet, for instance. I know one who says that a text seems to “emerge on its own” or is simply “given” to them. The fact that many poets like to describe it this way doesn’t change anything. I suspect that each of us is familiar with this sense of being “guided”—even if, in reality, you might still consider yourself an atheist.

But what if it isn’t actually “me” at all? And I don’t ask this merely to shirk responsibility; rather, how could one possibly prove that I—myself—truly willed something to happen?

I am not invoking metaphysics here. Indeed, it is difficult to establish this empirically (I haven’t figured out how yet). But what about an a priori approach? As Hume concluded, even an a priori path inevitably relies on certain axioms or empirical presuppositions.

So, can you offer a convincing argument that I was the one who wrote all this—rather than some voice in my head that picked up on “cosmic vibrations,” the voices of gods, or perhaps merely the habits and patterns shaped by my upbringing and the discourse I’ve been exposed to?

What is even more remarkable is that, once you relinquish the claim to authorship, the anxiety about the future—along with the capacity to take criticism personally—simply vanishes.

I find this to be a rather intriguing discovery, especially given my ongoing interest in existential questions…

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