What Political Power Ought to Be

Political Philosophy
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Power is, roughly defined, the ability to make change. We all have power as a result.

What I am concerned with is political power. The ability to make institutional change in a nation-state form.

A classical rule of power is that power begets power. Power helps power that helps itself. Hence it forms the idea of an interest.

I would argue that the interest of power is that of justice. Justice is a topic that is up for debate, since some say it is trivially a result of power. I would argue that justice defines the “highest good” of the political system. In light of this, the self-justice of any power system tends toward self-power, hence furthering systems of power. It is a recursive system.

I would argue that the end goal of any system should be morality, or else there would be a higher good. I would argue that this would orient the power of the government towards the ends of the people, independent of government form. Thus any moral political system is justified i.e. produces justice.

I would argue that political forms have positive and negative statements. Liberty is a positive statement. No crime is a negative statement.

In the basis of Kantian epistemology, I would argue that power ought to be the appearance of justice. Since, as we know from basic logic, any system is either complete or consistent, it will inevitably fill the void of “all” roles and hence err from time to time with inconsistent statements.

Systems that don’t appear moral, or use morality as an inconsistent statement for the ends of power have arguably voided the “ought” of any governmental system, regardless of moral stance. This is the “moral” argument of revolution.

Since there is no agreed upon universal morality, the political forms are free to choose and likewise the people. The USA is arguably based on enlightenment thinking, Europe humanistic and enlightenment, and China socialistic/communistic and somewhat market oriented.

I would argue that political forms do not owe itself to the will of the people, even in democratic forms. What is paramount is how the power is wielded, not towards where it is oriented. That is my argument that allows for criticisms of current political action, regardless of government form, but rather instead government morality and philosophical stances. This allows for arguments of hypocrisy and such and so forth, and necessarily revolution.

I would argue that the current problems of power are a result of letting power decide what justice is. You see this internationally. This leads to self-justification and therefore an unchecked growth of power over the long term. Versus morality, which is inherently subjective and hence pluralistic.

I am not sure what political form should occur as a result of these discussions though. They are rudimentary discussions on moral political philosophy.

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I like the amount of thought that went into this OP. That being said I have a couple of questions.

I’m not sure what higher good you could be referring to. Are you saying that if morality, and then I suppose justice, does not take the place of ‘higher good’, something else will inevitably fill the gap? Even if that is the case, I don’t see why that means that any moral political system becomes justified merely because it produces justice. What if the version of justice that is produced is profoundly, arbitrarily unjust? Does that mean the ‘highest good’ of any given political system could become to just reinforce concentrations of power via the recursion you describe? That seems trivial.

I think you need to expand on the criteria determining what moralities are acceptable for the purposes of producing justice or we end up with something incomplete or, perhaps worse, circular.

I don’t understand this. Are you suggesting here that power is the phenomenon and justice is the thing-in-itself?

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This is actually really hard to parse. I feel like a German philosopher, with somewhat abstruse concepts.

My basis in morality in this argument is Socrates “We are discussing no small matter, but how we ought to live” in Plato’s Gorgias. Thus in a political area, the moral systems defines how the political system ought to live. In such case there can be no higher good, since it is the principle by which the system takes on action and effectively “lives”. I would argue systems that don’t err towards life violate the living principles mentioned implicitly in Socrates argument. Note that this can be contradictory as well, since there is debate on what constitutes “living” and even moral agents, but I am really trying to do the best I can.

I would argue that arbitrary action is not moral and therefore not subject to the same arguments, nor are arguably unjust systems. They provide no basis for living, and hence are self-destructive. This explains why certain systems “live” and others “die”. I lean into evolutionary theory for this justification, hence life and death.

Despite the fact that power begets power, it’s powers are multitude and multifaceted. Since justice is the highest good, the principles by which it lives, it must incorporate other interests effectively in order to maintain power. This is done via elections in democracies: the power is chosen by the people and thereby their powers.

I don’t understand this. Are you suggesting here that power is the phenomenon and justice is the thing-in-itself?

I would argue that we should treat justice as thing-in-itself. We must believe in justice, as it something unintelligible to us (imagine trying to comprehend the categorical imperative). Truly. I have realized that justice, as a result of being unsound (not based on any consistent system with necessarily true results) will always be inherently contradictory. Thus it is a concept that we will merely approximate rather have as an indisputable concept. And power, yes, is the thing we will have, the phenomena. I think this aptly explains the concept quite well.

Let me know if you need anything more.

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I like the topic, but I may be a bit lost.

I would argue that the interest of power is that of justice. [
] I would argue that justice defines the “highest good” of the political system.

In what sense is the interest of power justice? Do you mean the interest of power should be justice?

Since, as we know from basic logic, any system is either complete or consistent

This doesn’t seem true to me. If this is about Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, the theorem only applies to formal proof systems, not “any system.” It is only about the relation between true and (formally) provable statements. So, I am not sure what you mean by this.

Since there is no agreed-upon universal morality, the political forms are free to choose, and likewise the people.

What do you mean by “free to choose”? Is it in a descriptive sense or a normative sense?
If it’s in a descriptive sense (“political forms can do whatever they want”), then it doesn’t matter whether there is an agreed-upon universal morality. Even if there was, the political form could simply go against such universal morality.
If it’s in a normative sense, then it doesn’t follow. The fact that people disagree on what’s moral and what isn’t doesn’t affect what is moral and what isn’t. So, it could be wrong for political forms to do certain things regardless of what people think.

I would argue that the current problems of power are a result of letting power decide what justice is.

I would tend to agree. I have this quote I really like:

And thus, not being able to make what is just, strong, one made what is strong, just.

— Blaise Pascal, PensĂ©es

Well, it’s a bit open whether this means we forced what is strong to be just or we just convinced ourselves that whatever is strong is just. I prefer the latter interpretation. Pascal goes on to say that this enables peace. Maybe, but I think it also enables injustice.

I am not sure what political form should occur as a result of these discussions though.

Well, it seems the political form that should be is one that is just, but we haven’t really touched on what is just, so I am not sure you could deduce one yet.

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What I actually mentioned was an arbitrary and unjust application of ‘justice’ such that the main function of the political system becomes the recursion you mentioned. I think the following example reconciles that and your stance on morality: what if power were increasingly concentrated in the hands of the wealthy by virtue of, say, some sort of collection of non-arbitrarily applied, purportedly moral religious arguments that are convincing to laborers that might make them easier to manage? In that situation moral actions are undertaken that are non-arbitrary while potentially serving the purpose of reinforcing concentrations of power along largely arbitrary lines; why should the money and power continually be consolidated in the hands of the wealthy over the impoverished even if there is some sort of acceptable afterlife or something?

Given all that, I don’t think saying that morality defines how the political system ought to live confirms what you say in the quote of you above. Just because it is how certain systems ‘live’ according to Socrates’ argument, that doesn’t mean that systems with unjust or arbitrary consolidations of power can be disregarded on grounds of being likely to ‘die’. It is very much the case that unjust systems could survive quite well. Once again, I think you need to constrain either what constitutes justice or what is an acceptable morality.

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To address some people in this discussion.

@Suny In what sense is the interest of power justice? Do you mean the interest of power should be justice?

Yes I would argue such. My basis is an ontological one, essentially, that we are subject to power and hence it needs to define a “highest good” and hence my argument for morality.

Furthermore, addressing the incompleteness. I sorta hammed this out without thinking about it more, but I am arguing that a complete system of morality would be consistent. Or else it would produce contradictory results, hence it would be undesirable morality since it doesn’t effectively argue. That morality tends to be consistent and hence subject to this principle is primarily an empirical one, where people argue where life begins and ends, for example, because I am arguing that people are arguing for a consistent system implicitly. Who would want to be ruled by a moral code that cannot determine whether one should live or die, for example? And I am implicitly arguing that only a consistent moral code can do this effectively.

@Suny What do you mean by “free to choose”?

I primarily mean this as somewhat normative. I mean this as in there is not a universal morality, so there is some freedom within the relations that political power can exist in. But this is naturally constrained by moral relativism of the 21st century.

Now addressing @Toothy_Maw. Honestly religion is an easy one to debate since it contains dogmas that are rigid. Hence easy to polemicize. What we are up against in the 21st century is a whole socio-political regime that self-justifies. Hence. The abstract nature of the morality in which I posit. I would like to posit natural morality, which would be nice, but it veers often into egoism or collectivism, both of which leave unsatisfactory results. Really I am trying to challenge the political and economic classes of my era, the 21st century, but to make such broad arguments of the Enlightenment (my inspiration) is very difficult to do in such a diffused, efficient atmosphere. Especially with support for hierarchy. I am struggling to comprehend an alternative. Instead I appeal to moral relativism of the 21st century, since it provides some basis for replacing one system over another. It is an immensely difficult project.

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I am arguing that a complete system of morality would be consistent.

Oh, this seems quite different from saying a system is either complete or consistent. Here you’re saying a system of morality could be both.

I primarily mean this as somewhat normative. I mean this as in there is not a universal morality, so there is some freedom within the relations that political power can exist in. But this is naturally constrained by moral relativism of the 21st century.

Okay, so this is assuming moral relativism is true, not directly because of what people think. The fact that people disagree doesn’t mean there isn’t a universal morality.

Instead I appeal to moral relativism of the 21st century, since it provides some basis for replacing one system over another.

Can you elaborate on this?
Would you agree that moral realism also could provide some basis for replacing one system over another?

If your goal is to challenge the current political regimes, what do you think of anarchism? You say “with support for hierarchy,” so I guess you don’t agree with classic political anarchism, but what about philosophical anarchism? For example, through a voluntarist lens, which upholds a great moral importance to individual autonomy or free choice, you can challenge the current political systems as being fundamentally very coercive without necessarily challenging the broader idea of a hierarchy (depending on how you define it).

I would agree with @Toothy_Maw: you need a clearer conception of what is just (what actions are just). And then you could critique current systems for being unjust.

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Oh, this seems quite different form saying a system is either complete or consistent. Here you’re saying a system of morality could be both.

You are correct in saying that. That is naturally a problem of logic. I suppose I am not clear in my terminology. What I mean is that a comprehensive system of morality would be consistent. Because people want laws of morality that always are correct, thereby being a supposed law of morality. A famous one is people are not means to an end. I see this one pop up with what constitutes death and means, so then one can argue about how to properly facilitate people towards moral ends. This one is actually quite a popular account, but instead of saying “means towards ends” people usually dress it up as the golden rule or perhaps you should not kill. Colloquial morality is very vague and thus hard to interpret, so I am taking some liberty with this one.

Okay, so this is assuming moral relativism is true, not directly because of what people think. The fact that people disagree doesn’t mean there isn’t a universal morality.

Can you elaborate on this?

Essentially in modern incarnations of moral relativism (that of the 21st century denoted by Velleman and David B. Wong) argues a sort of naturalism to moral relativism (Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). That positions of morality are held to be held by accounts of anthropology, history, and frameworks of morality. With this, the same framework can adapt different reasons for the same moral ends, thereby “improving” the system.

I would like to say naturalism altogether, just as Voltaire did, but this is a very loaded thing. He mentions Epictetus, Cicero and Sophocles, for example, but these people held very different views. He even argues about the virtuous pagan (though he didn’t call it that) and that virtue found outside of religion. In that sense I am doing the best I can, trying to appeal towards other systems. But people want real change with these ideas and unfortunately while I can identify the problems I don’t have any solutions (yet).

I also looked into Comte for some brief inspiration, since he was trying to construct French society after the revolution. His ideas seem rather primitive, which I suppose is why they weren’t picked up.

Anarchism is something in my mind but it doesn’t hold power and justice to ends. Moral systems are self-justifying in that people believe them so people adhere to them. Hence it is a stable thing for power to rest itself in, should people want to replace it.

I would like a justice, free, and prosperous society. We can put it into words. Why can’t we achieve it? I suppose people argue what justice and freedom and prosperity really means. Hence my appeal to moral relativism.

I have come to a conclusion. I have thought about it. I have realized that you can have a charter-based multi-government form. You have a central authority, which is where the power is held for necessarily inter-charter matters like trade. Then you have multiple charters that are liquid and allow for free association within the main government. These charters act as semi-independent governments. The charters then come together to form a government when necessary. Now this presents a problem of how? To make a governmental form of these charters (a central government) and to legitimize charters. I will leave it for discussion for now. But I feel like I have a real breakthrough with this one.

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I will keep the discussion about your proposal to the other thread.

But I am not sure what the critique of anarchism is here. Anarchists do hold justice to an end, it’s the entire reason they are anarchists. As I said, the voluntarists think what’s just is respecting individual autonomy for example and that’s why states are unjust.
Maybe the egalitarians will want political power to be equal between people and therefore prefer anarchy to states where some have more power than others.

Moral systems are self-justifying in that people believe them so people adhere to them

Yes and if people adhered to anarchism, the anarchism moral system would be self-justifying.

What do you mean by “stable thing for power to rest itself in”, and why isn’t that compatible with anarchism?
Also, maybe it is “stable”, but does it matter? Or do you think stability is a component of what’s just?

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I think that with power we have to have safety valves. The most important safety valves are things like elections, that the citizens of a state can change their leadership and independent institutions, that power cannot be concentrated on a single person. The separation of powers is a safety valve as is a constitution and functioning institutions in a state. Without these safety valves and the understanding of the importance of these safety valves, power can concentrate to a single person.

This has been the basic problem with every radical revolutionary movement that has taken power and has wanted to change dramatically the whole society. The system ends up with a great leader and in authoritarianism basically out of necessity. It ends like this, because anyone opposing the “great plan” will be an enemy of the revolution. Hence democracy cannot work. Hence if the revolution is Marxist, fascist or religious as in Iran, the system ends up with a leader that basically cannot be questioned. We should remember that even the time when England wasn’t a monarchy after it’s civil war, the Lord Protector Oliver Cromwell was a de facto monarch. So this isn’t anything new.

Politics naturally ought to be about solving ethical questions and choosing what is best for the whole society. This should be the objective. And the legal system should be just about following the legislation given by the political sphere, perhaps with the ability to “check” judicial precedents, what former decisions have been made in the legal system. Here systems can differ. Is the system more about codified laws or more about judicial precedents or both? Yet I think this is more of a technical issue, as still in both systems there is the safety valve of the separation of powers.

Hence I think in your last comment I quoted here, that “power is deciding what justice is”, is in my view a breakdown in the separation of powers.

This is something that obviously is happening in the United States with the Justice Department and the FBI becoming personal tools for the president, even if the judicial branch seems not to be in the hands of the president. With the legislative branch being in a paralysis, this power grab can indeed happen and is happening.

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@Suny
To address your point. I understand that anarchists hold justice to an end. But perhaps I hadn’t thought enough about it and hence I should have just said power. Since we need power to actualize change in things. Thus anarchists don’t seem to value this sort of grand power that we need to effectively make change on a global scale, which is what is necessary for a global power. This concerns me since the powers-that-be want to have global power for effective trade, as I see it. This is merely an opinion, as various people will give various arguments of why we need global power. It really is hard to discuss. But I would argue for global trade it is necessary, and global trade brings about various good, and hence can be an argument that people can argue for. I don’t see anarchism doing this effectively.

Yes and if people adhered to anarchism, the anarchism moral system would be self-justifying.

Yes this is the strange relationship between power and justification. Power can justify itself, which is why replacing different power systems is one of the hardest things you can do. Power argues for power itself. Nonetheless. I would agree with your argument here. But then you have to make your power known, by arguing an anarchist position. And I don’t find that to be viable in a democracy, the predominant form of the latter 20th and early 21st century. And we have a lot of history of people arguing that. For some reason, people just don’t like anarchism. There are even utopias of anarchy, like arguably Comte. But it just never was attractive to the people.

@ssu

I appreciate your grounding of power in the classical separation of powers, argued from the Roman system and John Locke. For your first portion.

And yes I am realizing that the basis of what power wants to be is largely a basis of power. It is a bit recursive. But it does, inevitably, rest on the people. Hence the attempts of power itself to instill itself on people. Hence power for power’s sake is a dangerous concept, one of the most dangerous, and grounds me to argue where else should power be. I argue morality. Yours is more practical, in being between powers. I appreciate your approach.

Politics naturally ought to be about solving ethical questions and choosing what is best for the whole society.

I am glad you agree. You are a moral thinker as well, then, and hence you would think that power is not for it’s own sake. I somewhat agree with you “codified laws or more about judicial precedents or both?” is “more of a technical issue”. But I would argue that the basis of argument is what defines the moral argument, and hence moral system. I am not sure I agree with many governments about their moral stances, hence my argument. And there is always the argue of coming up with better moral reasons throughout history, which is naturally anti-code and anti-precedent in nature. The idea of moral progression is actually something that is very anti-Enlightenment somewhat, the arguing against codecs, and hence worthy of discussion.

I appreciate your views furthermore on the latter half. Perhaps it is simply “a breakdown in the separation of powers.” Something to think about. I would argue not though. I would argue that the separation of powers is broken, and was a flawed premise in the American government. It argues that these powers are separation, when in reality they are dependent, and without a constant construction based on these separations it is impossible to uphold. You must be conscientious with these ideas, which our republic has failed to do. Thus the failures we see. At least that is what I think in the moment.

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But I would argue for global trade it is necessary, and global trade brings about various good, and hence can be an argument that people can argue for. I don’t see anarchism doing this effectively.

Why won’t they do it effectively?

You have power in anarchy, this is just a fact. You can associate with others and have more power. There are international non-state organizations that could still exist in anarchy. So there is nothing in anarchist theory dictating that global power could not exist.

What’s missing? The only thing missing between state and anarchy is arguably state coercion, so maybe state coercion is needed for this effective global trade. In which case, why is it just to allow coercion for global trade instead of allowing non-coercion for no global trade?

Nonetheless. I would agree with your argument here. But then you have to make your power known, by arguing an anarchist position. And I don’t find that to be viable in a democracy, the predominant form of the latter 20th and early 21st century. And we have a lot of history of people arguing that. For some reason, people just don’t like anarchism.

Sure but taken to the extreme, this means the only self-justifying power is the status-quo. I don’t think people will easily prefer your proposal, so you’ll have to convince them but then what’s the difference? anarchists have to convince people too.

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Nikita Khrushchev once presumably said that the lust for women and other things fade away by age, but the lust for power never does. But it isn’t just the lust for power as a driving force.

I think it’s more than that. Especially when one takes power by violence or other illegal means. Then that person or persons don’t have their own “safety valves”: they just cannot retire and drop out of the game as they will be worried about retribution, ending up in jail or simply being killed by the next leadership. Once the political game ends up with people killing each other, you will have a different breed of people participating in the power struggle. A democratic system isn’t the only way to avoid this, one classic way is the hereditary succession of the monarch. The society avoids a detrimental violent power struggle, which even could lead to a civil war. Hence the holiness of the monarch is something practical and a regicide viewed as a taboo and in history usually a notable event.

[quote=“Bizet, post:12, topic:215”] I am not sure I agree with many governments about their moral stances, hence my argument. And there is always the argue of coming up with better moral reasons throughout history, which is naturally anti-code and anti-precedent in nature. The idea of moral progression is actually something that is very anti-Enlightenment somewhat, the arguing against codecs, and hence worthy of discussion.
[/quote]
What we say our moral stance is and what our actions show our moral stances to be are indeed different.

We want to think of ourselves and our times to be the pinnacle of that progression, but now it’s obvious that the whole world is backsliding. Some might argue that even I when talking about democracy being a practical and very useful “safety valve” shows this, because I don’t start from morality and ethics. Yet those morals and ethics do matter in so many ways. It has a crucial impact on a society that we humans build.

It starts with questions like is this society for me, or is it totally made for someone else? Is the society and the state just and functioning or corrupt and dysfunctional? Do I want to live in this society or am I desperately seeking to find a new better home for myself and my family? This effects things like social cohesion, which is extremely important in a functioning society. In the end these issue come back to the accepted ethics in the society.

So I would say that when people criticize or question the Enlightenment values, that’s worrying.

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@Suny

In which case, why is it just to allow coercion for global trade instead of allowing non-coercion for no global trade?

This is a fascinating topic that is actually at the heart of what power is. One effective, durable argument for power is indeed economics itself. This is at the heart of the British-American system. That we use contracts to enforce what are arguably economic systems that are voluntary. This form of power has proven to be predominant since the 20th century and still until now. People generally agree with this position, implicitly, without recognizing it is indeed power that fills out these “contracts”.

I don’t think people people will easily prefer your proposal, so you’ll have to convince them but then what’s the difference? anarchists have to convince people too

I am well aware of the argumentative form. Rather I want to account for all of power, which is a notoriously difficult thing, as to synthesize a new account of what power can be. I suppose I am just rather ignorant on the matter, truly unread, and presupposing certain things which may not be true.

@ssu

You said many things, many observations which I can agree on. I really have to think about what you said. You are determining the power systems, something which I was unable to perceive with my arguments. I suppose though that some people are questioning Enlightenment values, and that brings us to Foucoult, my latest readings. He argues that we now argue about genealogies. We are not arguing about total systems, but instead disparate facts, an amalgamation of systems rather than one system. This precludes any sort of total system (for now) and thus totalitarianism. But the argument of power brings us to a new idea, one which I am unsure of. I lend itself to ethics, sure, on how one ought to live. And this bears in mind the social contract and such and so forth. But alas I cannot seem to have a holistic stance. That is what I appreciate about your thinking, it appears to me to be very holistic.