Western Secularism and Christianity

Ah, I almost forgot about those others, even though they are always on TV.

But, seriously, I don’t want to be Elon Musk. Dude doesn’t look healthy or happy. I’d rather be some unknown guy with half a mill and 1000 acres, hosting campfire parties for old friends. Life ain’t much without genuine relationships.

Understood. We might understand the secular as the restriction of religion to the private sphere. I think a case could be made that this secular attitude arose as a solution to inter-Christian conflict. But I’m tempted to see this origin as not that important. What future policies do people seek when they emphasize this origin ? How might an atheist be moved by this view on history toward such a policy ? Or will the atheist be cured by the historical inquiry ? This atheist already finds our Christian heritage fascinating, and considers Feuerbach to be a key transitional figure from Christianity to humanism. Do we retreat from humanism ? Because a rational case was made for doing so ?

Right, her rhetoric (which frankly would get someone fired if they were writing about Jews, Muslims, African Americans, etc.) flies high, but she routinely caveats it by allowing that lynchings, property seizures, legal disabilities, torture, executions, and even region-wide violence was occuring. Those events aren’t rendered fictional by failing to meet some arbitrary bar. She just says this isn’t “persecution” because it doesn’t meet a maximalist standard. Indeed, she mentions executions and torture (too sporadic to be a persecution I suppose) and then a sentence later claims that because of these, Christians merely “thought” they were being persecuted. It’s bizarre.

Now, if tomorrow, Moss was stripped of her job by the Trump administration for this sort of work and had all her property seized, we would hardly complain that she wasn’t being persecuted because no one is dead. Or if she and her family were executed, we would hardly say it wasn’t persecution because people weren’t dying in each and every state in the union, in numbers large enough, with a proper level of centralized coordination.

The rhetoric relies on the “received view” to be debunked being some unnamed maximalist Christian caricature, the Church of the Catacombs and what not. No doubt, such real life strawmen exist, but not in serious scholarship. That’s why my judgement is so harsh. None of the facts recorded here are remotely surprising (and indeed it seems largely pulled from other’s work). You can find this same sort of caveat in even explicitly religious Catholic histories. What seems new is the frankly callous language and attempts to wrap it all in a contemporary political agenda that takes up a fifth of the book.

The oddest part of the whole book, which showcases the agenda (which is explicit from the opening pages), is to bookend it in modern concerns and then to use Middle Eastern Christians (who were demonstrably undergoing genocide as she wrote) and well-documented violence against African Christians as case studies to try to show how myths were making them think they were persecuted. Surely there is a more careful way to disentangle someone like Newt Gengrich abusing appeals to violence against Christians abroad, and the legitimate grievances of populations that are literally undergoing ethnic cleansing from 1,800 year old communities as you write. But here they are collapsed into a polemic with some history attached in the middle.

Now, if the goal was a polemic about contemporary misuses of persecutions, that seems like a fine topic. People do misuse them. What I find offensive is collapsing them together. Serious revisionist history argues that the evidence has been misread or that sources are unreliable, or that that causation has been misattributed, etc.. It doesn’t record the events, acknowledge their horror, and then reclassify them out of existence by definitional fiat. That’s not historical argument; it’s a rhetorical operation dressed as history.

Whether your judgment of her is too harsh is something we needn’t debate here. Obviously, I think it is.

But whatever your opinion of her may be, she seems to have done quite well for herself in the world of the Academy (judging solely from the entry about her in Wikipedia, which I confess I resorted to in this instance).

This is why we should distinguish between Plato and Platonism. Plato was a Socratic skeptic, knowing that he did not know. His metaphysics is speculative, contemplative play. We do not know the Good, the Whole, the One.

There is not, however, a clear divide between secularism and Christianity, or more generally secularism and theology. There are some theologians for whom our ignorance of the divine is fundamental.

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He is an earnest disciple of Plotinus. He defended Plotinus’ readings of Plato and Aristotle that developed an explanatory system of the world. For example:

The divine constitutes an irreducible explanatory category. An essential part of the systematic hierarchy is a divine principle adduced first and foremost to explain the order of the sensible world or the world of becoming.
Gerson, Aristotle and Other Platonists, 33.

This is a large topic that has been argued for at least a decade on this site. I have argued against the system but won’t go into all that here. I will only note that Augustine considered Plotinus to be a better Platonist than Plato himself:

But with these more estimable philosophers we have no dispute in this matter. For they perceived, and in various forms abundantly expressed in their writings, that these spirits have the same source of happiness as ourselves–a certain intelligible light, which is their God, and is different from themselves, and illumines them that they may be penetrated with light, and enjoy perfect happiness in the participation of God. Plotinus, commenting on Plato, repeatedly and strongly asserts that not even the soul which they believe to be the soul of the world, derives its blessedness from any other source than we do, viz. from that Light which is distinct from it and created it, and by whose intelligible illumination it enjoys light in things intelligible.
Augustine, City of God,Bk10, sec2

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Beyond what @Count_Timothy_von_Icarus said, I would only add two things. First, I would say that secular notions of freedom & pluralism do derive from Christianity given Christianity’s emphasis on grace and free assent. The Western notion of conscience and personhood descends from Christianity and is philosophically buttressed within that tradition. Second, rationalism as we understand it is a Christian inheritance, coming proximately from the Medieval and late Medieval period. Secular ears may find it strange that the Modern period emerged as a reaction to the excessive rationalism of the late Medieval period, first with The Renaissance and Reformation but then also in Empiricist paradigms.

It’s a good question.

One thing that comes to mind is the Baconian desire for power over nature. Another is the privatization of religion (and the attendant coining of the concept of “religion”). Another is Descartes’ form of autonomous rationalism and the subsequent pendulum-swings to skepticism. Another is sociology and social engineering. Another is Hobbesian anthropology and the fruition of the Hobbesian State. These are things that strike me as more inherently secular and novel, albeit not entirely.

Note that in a broad sense there are three options when we search for that which is secular and not Christian: 1) secular inheritances from a pre-Christian era, 2) secular inheritances from non-Christian cultures after the dawn of Christianity, and 3) novel ideas derived from secularism itself (or from the birthing period that generated secularism). I was trying to focus on that third option.

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Paul claimed that we are slaves to sin and saved by grace. We cannot be both slave and free, and we cannot be free if we are powerless against sin and in need of a savior.

Can you cite sources? There is no single agreed upon notion of conscience or “personhood”.

Wise words. There are many rich folk who would be so much happier if they had less and had a few friends. Epicurean solutions appeal to me.

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Yes, I think that was a useful choice. Thanks for the useful answer. I wouldn’t mind teasing out the point you made about Bacon, does this have implications for our behaviour towards the environment?

My lawyer friends insist that secularism’s primary function is to keep government neutral toward religion so that people of all faiths and none can participate as equal citizens. Thoughts on this?

The underlying difficulty here is the division between the democratic and economic ideal of freedom and the religious ideal of salvation. I mean, it’s quite possible to live in a democratic society and enjoy a decent material standard of living, and yet still be slaves to, if not sin, then at least deleterious psychological drives and habits. I suppose seeking the optimal psychological state in civil life is the goal of eudomonia and virtue ethics.

But the religious aim is something more than that. From American Idealist philosopher Josiah Royce, paraphrased here by ‘Maverick Philosopher’ Bill Vallicella:

The religious person perceives our present life, or our natural life, as radically deficient, deficient from the root (radix) up, as fundamentally unsatisfactory; he feels it to be, not a mere condition, but a predicament; it strikes him as vain or empty if taken as an end in itself; he sees himself as homo viator, as a wayfarer or pilgrim treading a via dolorosa (way of suffering) through a vale that cannot possibly be a final and fitting resting place; he senses or glimpses from time to time the possibility of a Higher Life; he feels himself in danger of missing out on this Higher Life of true happiness. If this doesn’t strike a chord in you, then I suggest you do not have a religious disposition. Some people don’t, and it cannot be helped. One cannot discuss religion with them, for it cannot be real to them. It is not, for them, what William James in “The Will to Believe” calls a “living option,” let alone a “forced” or “momentous” one.

The role of ‘savior’ (‘soter’) is as an intermediary or bridge between the normal human state of imperfection and error (be it conceived of as sin in the Semitic religions or as avidya in the Eastern religions) and this ‘higher life’. In the Christian world, any attempt to ‘save yourself’ will be futile due to the ‘original sin’, faith in God being the sole means of redemption (although there turn out to be many inconsistencies in that formulation.)

Implicit in all of this is the understanding that existence ‘in the world’ is itself a deficiency or a plight:

In order to always have a secure compass in hand so as to find one’s way in life, and to see life always in the correct light without going astray, nothing is more suitable than getting used to seeing the world as something like a penal colony. This view finds its…justification not only in my philosophy, but also in the wisdom of all times, namely, in Brahmanism, Buddhism, Empedocles, Pythagoras […] Even in genuine and correctly understood Christianity, our existence is regarded as the result of a liability or a misstep. … We will thus always keep our position in mind and regard every human, first and foremost, as a being that exists only on account of sinfulness, and who is life is an expiation of the offence committed through birth. Exactly this constitutes what Christianity calls the sinful nature of man ~ Arthur Schopenhauer, quoted in Urs App, Schopenhauer’s Compass.

It is true, of course, that this is not meaningful absent any conception of what is ‘higher’ or ‘beyond’ the natural human state. However the idea itself is by no means limited to Christianity but rather is universal amongst nearly all the higher religions.

I think that’s exactly right. But as I commented above, when secular philosophy becomes an ideology is a different matter - science as a substitute for religion.

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The claim I was responding to is:

How is freedom and pluralism derived from the religious ideal of salvation or the perception that our present or natural life is deficient?

It’s not deficient in its own terms, as I acknowledged. But the ideal of freedom in the Christian context amounts to something more than civil liberty, even if civil liberties were originally derived from the Christian value system. But as I also said, for that to be meaningful, there has to be some conception of (or awareness of) the possibility of liberty in a different sense again. Of course, explaining quite what that is, in the absence of any sense of it, is probably beyond any power of argument.

This does not address the issue, it just repeats the claim in question. What support is there for the claim that:

[quote=“Wayfarer, post:133, topic:1124”]
civil liberties were originally derived from the Christian value system
[/quote]?

The view that this world is deficient may be one common to religions, but if so this world suffers and we who live in it do as well. I think one of the ways the rise of Christianity changed the pagan empire and the history of the West was to divert concerns from this world and living in it to a supposed world beyond it. If we define “secular” as involving worldly concerns, then Christianity is inherently contrary to what is secular.

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Yes, this is definitely a self-conception of secularism. It gets into the problems of classical liberalism which we have discussed in the past. In the liberal (and secular) mindset the liberal state is the referee that reigns over all of the individual players, which in this case are the particular religions. So what happens is the liberal state elevates itself above every other group and every other ideology, presupposing that the others must play by its own rules and its own notion of “equality.”

But that self-conception is definitely a mark of secularism. It’s basically what I meant when I said, “Another is the privatization of religion (and the attendant coining of the concept of ‘religion’).” In the past “religion” was not a phenomenon which was seen as intrinsically subordinate to the dominant culture or the state. That mark or lens is definitely central to secularism.

Sure. I think so, yes. The Baconian doctrine seems directly tied up with the degradation of the environment, primarily because the modern period had very little with which to balance and attenuate that telos.

With all of these issues we are basically asking when a substantial change occurs (to use Aristotle’s language). For example, it is no coincidence that Bacon’s doctrine emerged in a theistic society rather than a pantheistic society, and therefore it bears a resemblance to Christianity. But to say that it is more than a continuation of Christianity is to say that it constitutes a substantial change and not an accidental change. Similarly, to say that Christianity constitutes a substantial and not merely an accidental change from Greco-Roman culture requires the idea that there are essential differences between Greco-Roman paganism and Christianity. In a nutshell we might say that the heart of that substantial change was the introduction of Platonism+Incarnation, as least as far as the West is concerned. In a broader sense Judaism is also a key component. The question always revolves around whether and to what extent the two things differ (e.g. Christianity and Secularism, or the Baconian doctrine and Christianity, or Greco-Roman paganism and Christianity).


The general argument is that the ancient Greek prosopon had little of the connotation that we now associate with “person,” and meant something like mask, appearance, or role. Our concept of personhood was developed primarily through the long centuries of Trinitarian debates over the personhood of God, which was itself the religio-cultural focal point, particularly for a religion in which humans are made in God’s image. Our current notions of personhood, conscience, human rights, etc., are bound up with the notion of person qua transcendent. We actually hold that the essence of a person transcends masks, appearances, roles, gender, ethnicity, etc. This obviously includes things like freedom and autonomy, grounded in theological doctrines of God. Cyril captures this concisely:

Man, from the origin of creation, received control over his desires and could freely follow the inclinations of his choice, for the Deity, whose image he is, is free.

(St. Cyril, Glaphyra on Gen. 1)

This is markedly different from the Greco-Roman notion of Fate and a view where even the gods were bound by their passions.

Ironically, a central move of Christianity is a relativization of the current age (saeculum). For example, the Roman citizen had civil rights and status inherited from their place in the state, the cosmos and their relation to the Roman gods. Their status naturally correlated to the strength and status of the Roman gods. Similarly, for the modern naturalist the human status correlates to nature, and in our current time, evolution.

Christianity relativizes notions of empire and god precisely through “God most high.” The invocation of “God most high” is precisely what provides for notions of personhood, conscience, and rights which transcend the saeculum. For the Roman, appeals to “human rights” or “natural rights” or “God-given rights” would have been ridiculous. They would have been similarly ridiculous for the Christian, at least in the absence of God most high. Christianity has access to transcendent rights only because it has access to a transcendent God—a God who cares for his creation, creates humans in his image, and calls them towards the transcendent end of theosis.

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There are two interrelated beliefs in early Christianity supporting this. The first comes from the Judaism of Jesus’ time, belief in a Messiah. The second is the belief that the kingdom of God on earth was at hand.

It is, rather, for a religion in which either God is made man or man is made God. Both sides of the Nicene debates about the divinity of Jesus have their roots in paganism. Whether the Son and the Father are homoousios or Jesus became divine, that is, deification or theosis. In either case, these are pagan ideas that found there way into Christianity. They are not found in either the words of Jesus or the writings of Paul. It is based on a misunderstanding of what it means to be a son of God.

In either case the secular concept of a person is not a divine being.

This is markedly different from the teachings of Paul.

Deification is a universal idea. My point was that the central difference is the understanding of God. This is also what makes Christian deification different from pagan deification.

Most of your arguments could be boiled down to the presupposition that Christianity and Calvinism are just the same thing. That <1% of Christianity = 100% of Christianity.

Not in Judaism! A son of God as used in the Hebrew scriptures is not what it meant for the Gentiles. A son of God, the term in both the singular and plural, is used several times in the Hebrew Bible, is not a God.

My arguments for Christianity are based on what is said in the New Testament . The little I know of Calvinism- predestination and the elect, is not even close to anything I have said.

My presupposition is that both Jesus and Paul were observant Jews. This may seem strange to those unfamiliar with the interpretation of Torah and the different Jewish sects at the time of Jesus.

Are you able to point to any specific element of secularism that we would not find in some form in Christianity? And it’s obviously a given that there are Christianities, plural, and perhaps secularisms too. Or is the question unrealistic, given that human beings tend to form similar codes of conduct across time and culture?

One unique feature of secularism I keep hearing about is its special negative impact on the spiritual life of humans: the “meaning crisis” (e.g., Vervaeke and MacGilchrist) and the reduction of human existence to a bland consumerism. However, I’ve known quite a few Christians, and one might say precisely the same thing about their orientation. It just looks like materialism with a social club (church). Prosperity gospel stuff is also bereft. One of the problems is precisely what a “true” lived experience of Christianity even looks like. Is this perhaps harder to unpack than a lived experience of secularism?

By the way, isn’t the interminable debate about what “true” Christianity looked like and what the pagan world believed essentially a no-win strategy, because there is no fixed, accepted account, just interpretive and often polemical ones?