Western Secularism and Christianity

General Philosophy
102

When I was briefly looking into Lloyd Gerson’s work (much of it highly specialised), it was interesting to see how he regards Platonism as the most fruitful philosophical framework for understanding and referring to God’s nature. He sees Platonic concepts such as unity, goodness, and intelligibility as providing the best way to organise our thinking about divine reality.

Secularism, by contrast, treats such metaphysical structures with suspicion (resentment?), obviously opting to prioritise explanations grounded in the natural and empirically accessible. This reduced role for foundational metaphysics in how reality is understood is surely the biggest difference? You would probably say that the curtailing of metaphysics and the retreat into pragmatic problem solving is ultimately inadequate to human concerns and therefore secularism’s essential flaw, hence Vervaeke and McGilchrist et al?

103

I was referring only to Augustine in the language you quoted.

104

Isn’t it the loss of any real — I hesitate to use the word ‘objective’— basis for values? I drafted a post earlier in this thread which I discarded, about how secular culture, insofar as it takes science as normative, has a deficient conception of reason. Reason is either instrumentalised or understood as a pragmatic tool. There is no reason for, in some basic sense, other than antecedent causes and conditions. Hence these movements to revitalise and revisit classical philosophy and philosophical spirituality but without calling into question the indubitable discoveries of science. It’s a very difficult needle to thread.

It’s also why this historical dimension (that Timothy brings in) is important – to understand how we arrived at this world–picture and how we got here — the geneaology of modern culture. I think the faultline has something deeply to do with the victory of nominalism in late middle ages, to the point where it is simply part of what everyone assumes is simply the case.

Also, I hear you about Gerson. I dearly wish some editor in a publishing house would produce a single volume Gerson reader which presents his main ideas without all the interminable skirmishes with his professional peers that seem to occupy so many of his pages. His is a voice that needs to be heard more clearly in current culture. Join the Ur-Platonist Alliance!

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105

The cause of all those skirmishes is the reaction to his opinions. Other scholars do not agree with him.

106

It seems there’s always been some uneasiness among Christian thinkers arising from their recognition of the merits of pagan philosophy and the worth of the moral virtues practiced and preached by pagan philosophers. How account for them and the fact that Jesus was born centuries after Plato and others wrote and taught?

Some explanations provided were simply silly, like the claim Plato learned everything from Moses. Some were rather surly and required a certain amount of contortion, like that of Augustine. Some were more charitable and of the “Christians before Christ” variety you mention.

There’s an interesting book by John Marenbon called Pagans and Philosophers which reviews what Christian thinkers wrote on this topic over the years.

But that’s just what I think. We must await comment by the Count before we come to any conclusion regarding the true worth of that book.

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107

Hey, at least one of us read some of it right, instead of just inaccurately rendering an inaccurate Wikipedia summary of it phrase for phrase, so there is that. The more you know.

Now, had you read even the introduction to the chapter on the persecutions (most of the book is on particular martyr narratives) you’d also have been aware of the other persecutions since she mentions them up front, and wouldn’t have to express doubt about them.

108

What’s your view of Gerson?

109

Are we including the First Republic, or any of the Marxist revolutionary movements or states here, or fascism? Those were all secular, but hardly pluralist. The first two engaged in wholesale religious purges, whereas the latter displaced religious categories into the more “scientific” categories of race.

You could say the Anglo and Northern European traditions tended to do better about this, but the Anglo tradition tended to use racial/ethnic disability as a proxy for the same sort of thing, although often in milder forms. So, they didn’t exclude Italians because they were Catholic or Greeks because they are Orthodox, but because they were “swarthy.” Or the same thing with Chinese exclusion laws. But that’s precisely because these were seen as more empirical and scientific grounds for exclusion, as opposed to the superstitions of the past.

110

Only some. Many more of them, from my scattered readings, are him taking issue with prior interpretations, which in studies of Platonism stretch back millenia. And also taking into account the lay of the land in the period in which he is writing, where’s he’s contesting not just other scholarship about Plato, but philosophers who would rather relegate the entire subject to the museum.

111

That does look a very worthy book, although I imagine requiring considerable concentration as it seems to cover a lot of ground.

I feel as though at the basis of many of the vexed debates on this subject is the basic Christian belief in the ‘one truth faith’ — with the implication that to differ from it is to be condemned. That anyway is the basis of ‘exclusivism’ (that Christianity is the only path to truth). That informs even the vehemence of a lot of atheist polemic, as it is forced dichotomy in some sense. After all, many have suffered in times past for straying from the orthodox path, where orthodoxy means ‘right belief’ or ‘right worship’, created against the background of a very narrow path.

Here I will refer to an essay by James S. Cutsinger, Professor of Religious Studies (died 2020) a discipline which is nearer my own orientation than either philosophy or theology. He has an entry in this book called Perennial Philosophy and Christianity, which takes issue with the ‘exclusivist’ view which (some will say) typifies Christianity.

The philosophia perennis, he says, was a term coined in the early modern period and taken up by Liebniz:

Comparing this truth to a perennial flower, a perennialist asserts that there is one divine Source of all wisdom, which has repeatedly blossomed forth throughout history. The major religions, including Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, are different forms of that wisdom and are sometimes referred to as paths leading to the same summit or dialects of a common language.

It was the subject of Alduous Huxley’s popular book of that name (published 1946) and greatly elaborated by a diverse group of 20th century scholars and historians generally known as the traditionalist school. But the point the essay makes, is how to square the universalism of the perennial philosophy with the ‘one true Faith’.

Cutsinger argues that the exclusivist reading of Christ — which ties salvation exclusively to the historical events of first-century Palestine — rests on a Christological error. The true subject of Christ’s words and actions, as established by the ecumenical councils, is the eternal Word or Son of God, the second Person of the Trinity, not a particular historical individual. This means the famous “I am the way” declaration of John 14:6 is spoken by the pre-existent, cosmic Son — the same Person who says “before Abraham was, I am” — and cannot be straightforwardly confined to a singular historical manifestation. Drawing especially on Cyril of Alexandria’s reading of Chalcedon, Cutsinger insists that the Jesus of history is the cosmic Christ: there is no separate historical person standing alongside the eternal Son. What the incarnation presents is not an individual man but human nature as such, assumed into and divinized by God. It follows that the saving work of this one Son need not be restricted to Christianity: the Word may be salvifically operative in other authentic traditions as well, appearing personally in figures such as the Hindu avatars and impersonally in the Qur’an — not as a demotion of Christ, but as a recognition that his power and scope are vastly greater than a narrowly exclusivist reading had allowed.

I daresay an interpretation that not many Christians, especially those leaning towards fundamentalism, would accept, but I think makes a better background for the kind of pluralistic understanding that today’s secular culture requires.

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112

I suppose it’s possible that there is a difference in the definition of “persecution” but I think your characterization of what Moss says is just a bit disingenuous. You may disagree with her, of course (you gently hint that’s the case) but I think my reading, which wasn’t limited to Wikipedia (how often do you make use of this sad gibe?) Is more accurate than yours.

I wish I knew how to insert quotes from the Moss book in this post, but I don’t, so must merely type them out myself for the most part. I’ve tried not to make any errors. In any case, these are from the Introduction, the portion entitled The Myth of Christian Martyrdom:

*"As we will see, the traditional history of Christian martyrdom is mistaken. Christians were not constantly persecuted, hounded, or targeted by the Romans. "

From “The Myth of Persecution: How Early Christians Invented a Story of Martyrdom” by Candida Moss.

“But, as we shall see, although prejudice against Christians was fairly widespread, the persecution of Christians was rare, and the persecution of Christians was limited to no more than a handful of years.”

“Scholars of early Christianity agree that there is very limited evidence for the persecution of Christians.”

“For the first two hundred and fifty years of the Christian era there are only six martyrdom accounts that can be treated as reliable.”

“Before Decius, the prosecution of Christians was occasional and prompted by local officials, petty jealousies and regional concerns.”

113

So those are what you think of when “Western Secularism” is mentioned? That’s what Holland has in mind, and Tim, in the OP?

:face_with_diagonal_mouth:

114

Is this talk about grounds related to being able to give reasons ? I can only demand a reason safely if I have the right to demand a reason.

What I’m getting at is the deep connection between freedom understood in terms of individual rights and rationality itself.

Reason must subject itself to critique in all its undertakings, and cannot restrict the freedom of critique through any prohibition without damaging itself and drawing upon itself a disadvantageous suspicion. For there is nothing so important because of its utility, nothing so holy, that it may be exempted from this searching review and inspection, which knows no respect for persons [i.e. no person bears more authority than any other—GW]. On this freedom rests the very existence of reason, which has no dictatorial authority, but whose claim is never anything more than the agreement of free citizens, each of whom must be able to express his reservations, indeed even his veto, without holding back. (A738f/B766f, translation modified)

source

If we want to trace the secular as individual liberty from Christianity, then perhaps we can look at translations of the bible into the vernacular. If I get to decide what scripture is saying — and make a case for that reading without being burned for it — then I am already beginning to be free.

In my view, philosophy in the strongest sense presupposes this freedom. What I might call reactionary nostalgia is tolerated to the degree that it tolerates.

Folks can call Stalin’s communism “secular” because it is atheistic. I don’t want to get caught up in verbal games. So use whatever word you like.

The threat is any mob, lead by fanatics or cynical manipulators, with this or that doctrine, supernatural or ideological, that cancels or violates the freedom of individuals. (O selfish secular me, caring about my own freedom instead of History or God.)

115

As far as I understand, the idea that Christianity lies deep at the foundation of Western culture is a fairly common point. At the very least, early modern philosophy was built on the basis of scholastic philosophy. The development of the scientific method was also strongly influenced by the work of alchemists.

But it would be wrong to say that our modernity is literally Christianity without God. The influence worked not only through continuation, but also through negation, as well as through the influence of other religions. Besides, different religious traditions emerged on the basis of Christianity itself. Byzantine Orthodoxy and American Protestantism have almost nothing in common, apart from some shared symbolism.

116

That’s an interesting idea. Are you seeing this as a gradual process to secularism? It suggests a form of liberation?

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117

I think I picked this up from Hegel’s lectures on history. Reading Gadamer and others, I found that hermeneutics evolved from the interpretation of scripture. Authorial intention is especially important when the author created the universe and threatens you with hellfire !

I also read a brief history on the emergence of religious tolerance, which was only tolerance of this or that flavor of Christianity. Locke was tolerant in this sense but excoriated atheists.

Maybe we can sum up secularism with this quote from Jefferson:

But it does me no injury for my neighbour to say there are twenty gods, or no god. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.

I need my property and flesh protected. So do you. The rest is mine and yours to decide. ( Cue the undeniable tensions between private property and the larger infrastructural welfare of the community, which I don’t deny. Yet I also don’t trust fanatics to put things right.)

118

There’s an entire world in this. I don’t trust the fanatics either. But let’s leave that for another time.

“But it does me no injury for my neighbour to say there are twenty gods, or no god. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.”

But of course we know that beliefs can lead to actions (and injury). Planes can be flown into buildings, or supreme courts stacked, on the basis of a belief in God. The lives of millions can be irreversibly damaged when beliefs are weaponised.

What did Popper say about the paradox of tolerance? If tolerance is extended with no limits, it can enable the intolerant to take power and eliminate tolerance itself. A tolerant society may need to withhold tolerance to protect itself. And of course, paradoxically, those who remain vigilant in this way may themselves be labelled fanatics and dogs… and so it goes.

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119

Well this is indeed a difficult issue. I tend to err on the side of free speech. I don’t trust the faction in power. I don’t trust the faction not in power either. Both preach freedom for their own speech and the curtailment of the other’s. It might be better for people to watch their own backs, and not also worry about maniacs with badges.

What do we make of the attack on Al-Qaeda attack on Charlie Hebdo ? An obnoxious rhetorical attack on a religion was met with violence. Do we reluctantly side with the right to mock the religion of others against the “right” of the offended to murder those who insult them ? If the French feds silence the “assholes” at Charlie Hebdo, out of fear of violent reprisal, is that a retreat from the commitment to individual liberty ? Complicated, because then the feds are tacitly OK with this looming threat. “Jesus, sure, but don’t do Mohammed.”

What if a Christian group had attacked Charlie Hebdo ? Would people be as eager to blame the rude victim ? Is the secular mainstream more comfortable with laughing off the discomfort of Christians ? Is the mockery of Christians sophisticated rather than xenophobic ?

120

Yes indeed. No string of words can substitute for concrete decisions. I do not in the least pretend to have any political solutions to suggest. Politics is the infinite game where everybody mostly loses.

121

And mostly those with no money or connections.

Well, if people view a cartoon and decide it warrants mass murder, I have no problem with identifying the killers as the problem here, along with the beliefs that led to such a disproportionate response. But I’d prefer not to turn the thread into an examination of fundamentalism.