We see things that don't exist (Radical Construcitivism)

I am not particularly fond of ontological questions in philosophy, but I would like to clear up a misunderstanding surrounding so-called “radical constructivism,” and in order to do so, I have to refer to an ontological perspective.
Ontology has always concerned itself with the question of what exists and what does not.
I have a thesis to contribute which may sound audacious at first, but which is based on scientific principles.

The core of the thesis is this: Some of the things we believe ourselves to be observing do not exist.
The reason is that they are perspectival misconceptions. Some are simply ruled out by physics; others are merely misrepresentations produced by the particular perspective of our minds.

My most important object of consideration is a beam of light emitted by a laser.
If I move a laser pointer faster than 44.7° per second, assuming a rotational motion, I could produce a spot of light on the Moon that moves faster than light.
Since nothing can move faster than light, the consequence is this:
The spot of light I observe does not exist.
Ultimately, this simply means that the spot of light is not an entity.
The apparent unity of the light spot is a construct of our minds. We attribute an existence of its own to it, but in reality there are only individual photons raining down on the lunar surface. None of these photons has moved faster than light.
The superluminal motion of the light spot results from an attribution that we make: namely, the attribution that the point, or spot, is a “thing” - something that can be considered in its own right and treated as a whole.
Ultimately, the same applies to the laser beam itself. The spot of light is merely its endpoint. Depending on the speed of rotation, beyond a certain distance the beam itself would appear to move faster than light. But this is physically impossible. Ergo: the laser beam has no self-contained existence of its own. Only the individual photons exist.

The same is true of shadows. A shadow is the non-existence of photons.
To assert the existence of darkness is like dividing by zero:
How many times do zero photons exist at a given point of complete darkness?
The quantity of zero photons exists infinitely many times at every point in the darkness, if one insists on putting it that way. The calculation is meaningless - not incorrect, but meaningless.
Darkness is not a thing and not an entity, and as such it does not exist.

The same, in this sense, applies to the future.
By definition, the future cannot exist, because it cannot exist in the here and now.
I know there are arguments according to which the future, in some faraway galaxy, already exists because of relativistic effects, depending on the direction in which I am moving.
But these are fallacies. In such arguments, physicists use our language for something that language was simply not designed to express. In the same way, one cannot simply draw a hat and then claim that it is a hat. It will never be a hat; it will always only be the image of a hat.
Such semantic pitfalls are readily ignored by physicists when they claim that the future exists, using the present tense like a child innocently playing with a real, loaded gun.
Very few physicists who use the word “exist” in such a context have ever used the word “ontology,” yet they speak about “existence” like a child playing with a real weapon.
There is therefore no need to be overly impressed when cosmologists claim that the future or the past somehow exists in an immutable way.

What does all of this have to do with constructivism?
It provides one possible point of entry for understanding that our brains are constantly making attributions and declaring apparent things to be entities. These attributions are constructs that lead to a distorted perspective.
The misunderstanding is this: It is often claimed that the constructivist denies the existence of reality. That is a recklessly reductive characterization.
The constructivist sees the laser beam just as we do, and they will not deny that this phenomenon exists. But for them, the beam’s status as an entity is an illusion.
Likewise, they acknowledge that the stage we call reality exists. But for them, the attribute “reality” is an illusion.
The construct of reality is so saturated with erroneous implications that it could serve as a good example of Maya - the veil that prevents us from seeing things as they truly are.

You seem to be talking about cognitive constructivism. The color magenta is my favorite example of this.

I could imagine that the term is different in english. I had to translate it from german and actually i would prefer to call it cognitive since the attribute ‘radical’ seems to be such a misfit.
Radical does have a negative connotation in both languages.
Also i have to admit that my description does not exactly stick to the playbook of the constructivists. They derive it from a merely cognitive perspective indeed and they might not even want to get this physical approach mixed with their idea.
But i think it makes the illusion so drastically obvious that it would be a shame to just leave it lying there.
Would you like to explain how the colour magenta fits into this picture?

The natural light spectrum only goes from red to violet and the human eye is only equipped with red and blue photosensitive receptors. The phenomenological experience of magenta is the union of two receptors firing together and producing a combined color that doesn’t really exist in nature. Only in the mind.

As Kant demonstrated, everything we perceive comprises a synthesis of perceptions and conceptions. The mind interpolates many elements including the identity of the object, what it means to the observer, how it relates to the sorrounding environment etc. So ‘things that exist’ are always already intertwined with our conceptual apparatus and interpreted according to experience and the a priori structures of the mind. Put another way, we don’t see anything as it exists in itself, but as experienced and interpreted by the observer.

This is one of the main influences behind constructivism although there are of course many more as these lines of analysis have developed in the period since Kant published his major works.

See Is Everything Real Something that Exists for elaboration.

From the absence of a specific wavelength, it doesn’t follow that the colour doesn’t exist in nature. Lots of colours are more complex than those that arise under one or a mix of wavelengths.

Also, the idea that magenta only exists in the mind is, I think, a mereological fallacy. Seeing magenta is a biological phenomenon, it has a causal history, magenta appears on real objects (not hallucinations) etc.

The laser appears exactly as it really is. The error is not in the perception but in how you interpret the object of perception.

When you tilt the emitter, you don’t make a bundle of photons travel sideways. You emit new photons. None of them moves faster than light.

By the way for anyone interested there’s a rather good open-source journal called Constructivist.info. More can be read about its aims and ideals here.

In other words: other than orange or purple who lie between 2 base colours, magenta does not have a frequency of its own on the spectrum of electromagnetic waves?
I didn’t know that and it’s interesting.
I would have to say a lot more about colours indeed.
That the evolution of our brain chose them kind of arbitrarily and that a different animal may see a much larger or narrower range of colours but still not perceive a single one of them the way we do.

However, the discussion about colours can easily draw the conversation into a passionate qualia discussion, which today I’d rather avoid. Not that I wouldn’t appreciate a discussion about qualia,
however I want to direct the focus on something different here.
Because consciousness suffers from some similar misunderstandings. I ever so often hear or read about “consciousness being an illusion”. Like neuroscientists say that consciousness was an illusion. That makes it sound like there is no such thing as consciousness, which would be a sentence cut off in the middle.
Neuroscientists see the laser beam just as we do. They simply point out that, strictly speaking, we have a misconception about it.

Our brain spends a lot of energy on creating the illusion that our consciousness is one indivisible entity which we identify as our self, when in reality our brain is made up of modular sections that compete with one another permanently.
It is primarily this apparent wholeness that is an illusion.
The construct itself, however, is functionally active.
We notice this most clearly when it accidentally breaks down: depersonalisation would be one of the possible effects and a serious psychological condition. The dispersion of the illusion of one’s unitary self is a great danger to a person’s psyche.
From a functional point of view, this consciousness exists and has an effect on reality.
But once we do lift the veil of Maya, we see that our brain is constantly deceiving us.
Fortunately for us.

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That is a lot to digest. Thanks for the contribution, i will return to this.

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Forgive me, but this doesn’t come to terms with the ‘subjective unity of perception’. This is the fact that we experience ourselves as a unified whole. When something hurts us, we don’t learn about it second-hand; pain is first person. Likewise all of the disparate organic sub-operations that the brain and body perform are un- and sub-consciously merged into a cognitive whole which is the ground of what we understand as ‘self’. So I don’t think it’s all established that this is an illusion. The loss of that unified sense of self typically manifests as dissociative personality syndrome (known colloquially as ‘split personality’).

And that, in turn, is involved with a further phenomenon, that of the ‘neural binding problem’. This refers to the fact that neurology has been unable to identify the neural faculty or faculties which are responsible for ‘binding’ all of the disparate elements of perception into such a cognitive whole. This is subject of this scientific paper, which points out that:

That there is no place in the brain where there could be a direct neural encoding of the illusory detailed scene (Kaas and Collins 2003). That is, enough is known about the structure and function of the visual system to rule out any detailed neural representation that embodies the subjective experience.

This is because detailed studies of vision show that highly detailed perception is only possible in a tiny 1-degree region around the fovea, with high-acuity coverage dropping off exponentially in the periphery. There is no place or circuit in the brain that holds a complete, high-resolution, stable scene of what we apparently see. Our eyes make roughly three rapid movements (saccades) per second, constantly shifting what tiny area gets processed in detail.

While a functional explanation exists—the brain uses peripheral vision to detect changes, relying on memory, touch, and sound to fill in the rest—there is still no known neural mechanism to explain how these fragmented inputs produce a seamless, unified conscious perception.

So the ‘subjective unity of conscious experience’ remains an outstanding issue in philosophy of neuroscience.

I mean there is no correspondingly real electromagnetic wavelength for magenta. It’s a cognitive construct.

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Colours are biological phenomena, not wavelengths. Talk of correspondence between a colour and a wavelength makes little sense.

Spectral colours have single wavelengths among the conditions under which they appear. Non-spectral colours have mixed wavelengths, or variations of brightness etc. Magenta is the visible effect of a combination of spectral blue and red.

Cognitive constructs, however, are not even visible. There are no invisible colours.

Maybe not … until you add a human to the mix. Then you will see — or the exemplary “human” will — the correspondence you deny, yes?

You seem to be telling me what I tried to tell you and then telling me I’m wrong.

It should be mentioned that Ernst Von Glasersfeld, the founder of Radical Constructivism, defines his approach in opposition to yours. For Von Glasersfeld, knowledge is not a copy or representation of an independently existing reality. Knowledge is instead something that works; it allows an organism to orient itself successfully within its experiential world.

You claim that we construct things that aren’t really there. By contrast, Von Glasersfeld says the fact that we construct our experience doesn’t give us the epistemic right to say what is really there independently of those constructions. Our experience and knowledge are constructions. Their viability doesn’t establish correspondence with an independently accessible reality. Therefore we should not infer an ontology directly from the structure of our experience.

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@Xebeche

A few points for you.

Point n) your example with the laser and the moon is a poor choice because it doesn’t violate physics as you seem to be portraying to the readers. If you haven’t grasped this concept yet, it is not recommended to talk about special relativity until you have. There are many online tools that can help you understand this many available for free.

Point b) you’re constantly confusing ontology with phenomenology. One example: “Darkness is not a thing and not an entity, and as such it does not exist.” This is equivalent as saying that coldness isn’t real because it’s not a thing and so on.

Point a) the dunning-kruger effect is a real phenomenon. Stating that leading theories in physics today that introduce concepts like block theory and stating that these are children playing around only works from a theological framework. Example: solipsim you are all in a simulation and are not real and so on…

Language. What a corrupt little tool it can be.

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Where’s the correspondence between say 550 nm (green light) and the green that appears when you’re looking at yellow and blue dots of paint from a distance? If there is no correspondence, then does it follow that the green is a cognitive construct? I don’t think so.

Colours are neither wavelengths, nor cognitive constructs, but biological phenomena that arise under various conditions of observation, including wavelengths and capacities to respond to them.

They both appear to me to be green. That’s the correspondence. Nothing more or less than that. :+1:

Cognitive constructs, however, are not even visible. It’s not a cognitive construct.