Truth exists potentially in reality

There is no such thing as a “potential apple”.

I mean: A seed is potentially an apple, but an actual apple is already made of matter. And it exists whether you are there to look at it or not.

Apples do not sit “in potency” waiting for you to walk up and count them.

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…Consider that you are looking at a scene. What appears in the field of your experience is a continuum of forms and colors. There are mental objects in the field of your experience, which you cannot recognize unless you focus on each object. So, the mental objects exist potentially in the field of your experience…

I am unsure if you are drawing an analogy here, or actually talking about the objects’ representations in our minds. I will assume you are talking about the latter.

The difference there is that there actually is sense data and an entire mental image prepared relating to those mental objects that you do not focus on. I am unsure whether I would describe the unfocused mental object as “existing potentially”, but we need not go into that yet as I do not see that case as similar to our situation with truths.

I am not including the laws, what it is, or how it behaves, about such an entity in the truth. So truth is not a set of all true statements, but the set of true statements that we can achieve by thinking…

Then what you are talking about isn’t really the truth, though? Even if we accept that your argument works, you would be talking about “knowable truths” rather than “truth”.

That is possible. I am not arguing that humans are the only thinkers here. So, I don’t understand what your objection is.

My disagreement was with P3. I stated it. And you responded: “I don’t think that there are such things as unthinkable true statements.”. So I gave a few cases that come to my mind. If you agree that P3 needs elaboration, yes, that was my initial point.

I studied Turing machines a long time ago, and I don’t remember too many details about them right now.

My argument there was basically this: Think of Turing Machines as algorithms/code. Such that T is a machine that takes in an input and outputs either 0 or 1 - or simply loops indefinitely.

Imagine a sequence like (1,2,3,4…). We can talk about individual elements of this sequence. But we can also talk about the entire sequence, via an algorithm that describes it. Imagine T(n,x) is only 1 when the n’th number in the sequence is x. There is a truth about the sequence, and it can be expressed by us in the form of an algorithm.

It turns out, that there is no algorithm for figuring out the problem “(on an arbitrary input) which algorithms actually end and give us an answer, rather than looping indefinitely?”. Imagine we list the algorithms in alphabetical order:
(T1, T2, T3…).
And write a sequence; 1 for the ones that halt and 0 for the ones that loop. It would look something like this:
(1,1,0,0,1,…)

It can be said that there is a truth about that entire sequence. No matter who thinks about it, it is the same and it is exact. Yet we cannot express it, as it is infinite and no algorithm describes it.

I think not all fields of mathematics have a direct application in reality, or they are the result of mere reflection on reality…

The Collatz conjecture, for example, is born out of simple arithmetic. You do not need complex mathematical constructions to reach the problem I am talking about.

What I was noting there was this: It might be the case that some things are true and not even infinite like in the Turing case. Assume a simple truth in the form “The Collatz conjecture is true”. It could be that argumentation is not exhaustive of truth. Such that there simply is no logical route to confirming the statement even though we observe its effects.

Correct. The act of measurement is the actualization of the potentialities in physical substance.

Correct. The realization of a triangle is the actualization of three circles as a new form in the field of your experience.

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You are talking about grammar though. Being-knowing-truth cannot be expressed in a linear sentence moving from a subject, through a predicate, towards some measure of meaningfulness. Simply by positing a subject, being-knowing-truth is/are present already.

So I am not disagreeing with you about the problems the grammar of “exists” can create in sentences about “truth”. I am saying that the “being” or “existing” that is referenced in being-knowing-truth, can only be broken out (for grammatical analysis) in more positing of being-knowing-truth triads (so you are no longer talking about what I am talking about, but trying to make what I am talking about into a coherent sentence, which I am saying is a waste of time, misconstruing the being-knowing-truth that is present in the objectification of “is” or “exists” as a predicate in a sentence.)

We don’t ever actually ask “does truth exist”? We always ask “Is the being I know true?” So when we attempt to ask “does truth exist” we are making the truth node of the triad into the being node, treating truth as thing in itself, like truth alone could be the being; That would mean a dyad could describe this. But the question, “where the being I seek to inquire is ‘truth’, as I ask 'Is the truth I know true?” sounds like tautology seeking nonsense.

The being in being-knowing-truth is only ontological, not linguistic. “being-knowing-truth” isn’t a statement; it is speaking and what is spoken about, at once.

To me, you are saying there are better ways to say “truth exists”. But I am staying comfortable in the space where our grammar doesn’t work, and still trying to talk about talking. So I don’t need to figure out a better way to say “truth exists”; I am just pointing out that in every step we take in the analysis of “truth”, being and knowing will remain in lock step. Just like in every analysis or statement about “being”, knowing and truth remain, and every statement about “knowing”, being and truth are demonstrated just as well. So isolating “truth” and pondering its existence, is an isolating of being-knowing-truth and pondering its being-knowing-truth. There is no logical way to say it. I just throw it out there, and find that it was already there, and already here before I threw it.

I am talking about what I mean by potentiality and actuality when it comes to mental objects in general, such as the image of an object, concepts, true statements, and truth.

I think we should agree on the terms before going further, since, to my understanding, actualization/realization of the image of an object, actualization/understanding of a concept, etc., are due to the activity of the intellect on the field of experience only. Mental objects potentially exist in the field of experience; it is a matter of mental activity to actualize them.

It depends on what we mean by reality. If by reality I mean a set of physical objects that can be experienced, then it is better to use the truth; otherwise, it is better to use knowable truth if by reality I mean whatever exists.

I Don’t know what the Collatz conjecture is about. I need time to study it to make sure that we are on the same page. I am so sorry for the inconvenience.

Mental objects potentially exist in the field of experience

First of all, I suppose I should ask if these mean different things to you:
existing potentially / potentially existing / having potential to exist

I would agree, for example, that mental objects have potential to exist in the field of experience. I could, in my mind, build something that I haven’t really seen before - say, a T shape via magenta wooden blocks. I am not sure I would say that this construction had already “potentially existed” or “existed potentially”. I would say it had the potential to exist, in the sense that it was the case that there was a legitimate way to me conceiving of it. But otherwise, the construction was just made by me and did not exist prior to me thinking it, at least not in my own mind. (Say that I haven’t really seen/pictured a wooden magenta T before). If you use those three different terms in the same way, however, then sure. I would agree with you that it “exists potentially”.

If by reality I mean a set of physical objects that can be experienced, then it is better to use the truth

Hmm, maybe I understand, but at the same time I don’t, exactly.

I want to say that perhaps you are talking about experience and the inferences we can make from it, and you don’t necessarily comment on anything outside of that. But I don’t see how this is exhaustive of truth.

I Don’t know what the Collatz conjecture is about.

It can be seen as a very simple game. You start with a number, any number. And you repeatedly do these:

  1. If the number is even, you divide it by 2.
  2. If the number is odd, you multiply it by 3 and add 1. (3n+1)

For example: 10 → 5 → 16 → 8 → 4 → 2 → 1 → 4 → 2 → … (loop)

The conjecture is about whether all numbers enter this loop. of “4 2 1”. It claims that they do.

Very interesting reply.

I think I see the distinction you’re making, but I don’t understand it completely. Could you say more about the hallmarks of the ontological “being” versus the linguistic “there is”? I’m paraphrasing a little but I take the latter to be more or less the same as quantification?

Not exactly. I’m suggesting that, since quantifying over “truth” is optional and causes so many problems, let’s just not. We don’t need a better way (and I’m not sure I can imagine what that would be, anyway); rather, we should stop trying to treat “truth” as thing/item/property/predicate which can be affirmed or denied based on whether it exists.

I have a hunch we may be groping toward the same point. “Isolating truth and pondering its existence” is very close to what I mean by “the unwelcome consequence that ‘truth’ either would or would not exist, depending on how ‘being’ is construed, and statements about being would be true or not-true depending on how ‘truth’ is construed, etc.”

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This is close to Heidegger, who uses “truth” for disclosure or revelation. Such truth is not a property of expressions. The “truth” of the apple is its “being.” The apple-as-apple is already a “sign” because the world is “immediately” significant and “articulated” as a system of intersubjective objects.

The “knowing” in the sense of the “being there qualitatively as intelligible unity” is ( now in my lingo) a “moment” or “face” of the apple. A stream of “experience” can be understood to be constituted by the “moments” of objects. So “subjects” and “objects” are two ways of “arranging” or “unifying” the same entangled “pieces” of experience/world.

RQM gives us a nice analogy for this, IMV.

Relational quantum mechanics (RQM) is an interpretation of quantum mechanics which treats the state of a quantum system as being relational, that is, the state is the relation between the observer and the system. It is inspired by the key idea behind special relativity, that the details of an observation depend on the reference frame of the observer…

The essential idea behind RQM is that different observers may give different accurate accounts of the same system…RQM argues that this is a complete picture of the world because the notion of “state” is always relative to some observer. There is no privileged, “real” account.

source

As I read this, the object is always “from-a-POV.” A “state” is a “moment” or “aspect” of the object. There is no object “behind” all possible states/moments ( relative revelations). The subject is likewise not a “box of pictures.” Experience of the object is not “internal icon stuff.”

The object can have “incompatible faces.” As Protagoras saw long ago, the object is hot-for-Sue but cold-for-Sally. Einstein pointed out that the object has no “true” length. Even length is relative. An operational or empirical concept is necessarily relative, as empirical. So my existence is “truth” but only partial truth and may be “lie” relative to you. In other words, we are all “in truth” but this “truth” need not be without dissonance. Indeed, the plurality of subjects is only genuine of we are not in the same partial specified-exclusive truth/disclosure.

“On those stepping into rivers, other and other waters flow.” The “othering” of the water is the relatively and partially of truth as revelation/manifestation. Yet we intend and discuss the same river. So this same river “synthesizes” difference. The same woman is both beautiful and plain, depending on the eye, but the beauty is not therefore in the eye. That kind of talk utterly betrays the lived value structure of the world. This betrayal is itself motivated and “sentimental,” because it’s part of a desire to “force” reality into a single “face” or “voice.” For “ontological pragmatism,” the value structure is not “painted on” but rather more “foundational” than the rest, because lived time is a scheming or navigation through the world as a temporal depth. The institution of a public clock is “derivative” with respect to our caring about meeting up at the same place at the same “time”-as-number. The time-number “signifies” for me as “running-late-for-work,” and so on.

Right ! And note that we even more automatically grasped each “circle” as a unity. In retrospect, we could count each circle as a pair of half-circles. Or each as an infinite set of points, etc.

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A very simple example of what Kant means by ‘synthesis’, isn’t it?

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Plotinus wishes to speak of a thinking that is not discursive but intuitive, i.e. that it is knowing and what it is knowing are immediately evident to it. There is no gap then between thinking and what is thought— they come together in the same moment, which is no longer a moment among other consecutive moments, one following upon the other. Rather, the moment in which such a thinking takes place is immediately present and without difference from any other moment, i.e. its thought is no longer chronological but eternal. To even use names, words, to think about such a thinking is already to implicate oneself in a time of separated and consecutive moments (i.e. chronological) and to have already forgotten what it is one wishes to think, namely thinking and what is thought intuitively together ~ Plotinus (class lecture notes).

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That sounds right to me. But I think synthesis is the fundamental ontological concept — the “form of the one.” So I’d go all the way back to Heraclitus.

“The ( same ) sun is new each day.” For what it’s worth, this is what I mean by saying that even apples are “ideal.” Why do I see a unified apple and not a collection of items like peel, flesh, and seeds ? Or even just two halves of an apple that happen to be stuck together ? I take the unity of the apple for granted when I discuss it with others. I don’t need to specify its exact boundaries or know its chemical composition. All further inquiry depends on the “synthesis” or “idea” that makes that qualitative thing a unified thing. The “form of the one” is the “form of good” because it’s the basic intelligibility of the world, which a philosopher will of course find good indeed.

Good quote ! When are immersed in a non-thematic “perception” of an object, the world “is” the “qualitative presence” of that object as that object. Only later do we “invent” a subject apart from the object, for valid practical purposes. For me this means that “concept” is not “inside stuff” but is rather the articulation of the world itself, that tends to get “injected” into a conjured isolated “mind stuff.”

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I appreciate you sitting with this and not just chopping it down. It’s a relatively new idea to me that I want to see how long it holds.

I think we are making the same point about the term “truth exists” as part of a meaningful statement.

I am saying meaningful statements tell us “X exists truly”, which tell us the same thing as “I know X.” If referencing knowing qua knowing, it is equivalent to say “I know X” and “I know X truly” because we don’t have knowledge without a true unification of knowing and being in the first place. Like it is superfluous to say “X exists” but add “X exists truly” because if X didn’t exist truly in the first place, we couldn’t have said “X exists”. And it is impossible to say “I know the truth” without simultaneously saying “I know what exists”.

These being-knowing-truth nodes are all tied up in each other. We humans get to (or are forced to, depending on how your day is going) move among them, as the knowing node, and with all three as we are self-aware of the act of knowing.

And we need the third truth node otherwise there couldn’t be a motion from disconnected existing things and knowers to connected up knowledge of the truth of being (or true knowledge of what is, or just knowing, back to the grammatical redundancies…). Truth is the bridge overlapping what is with what we know.

I like what you bring up here.

I agree. Quantifying over truth is what I meant by making “truth” a “being”. I am saying being-knowing-truth is a three-node mechanism, that, so far, doesn’t seem capable of uncoupling (un-tripling I guess). So if we quantify truth like it is being, we make a truth-knowing-truth triad, or really just break the whole function of the truth node into meaninglessness (at least on the first side of the truth-knowing-truth mess I’ve just made).

But I think it is clarifying to think of being-knowing-truth as a similar mechanism to “quantifying” itself. When we quantify, we say “there is one thing” and “I know it.” We’ve just invoked our knowing and the truth of it all simultaneously. Our ability to quantify at all, is the same ability to link our knowledge to being, and if the quantity holds strong as we link our knowledge to being, we have truly quantified, we possess the truth of the being that we know, etc., etc.

This is all how it plays out on paper, in ideal TPF world. This all has to be developed and tested to account for errors in knowledge, illusions in being, lies, etc.. But I can’t seem to make a move without dragging being, knowing and truth with me at every steps, which is back to the simple point I’m making (which has to agree with you that “let’s just not quantify over truth.”)

In the end though, the whole thing falls apart without each other, so it remains tempting to try to inquire about the existence of beings, the existence of knowledge and the existence of truth.

Truth does in some sense exist - we need three nodes. But here is where I think I am bumping into the impossibilities of language, because “X exists” always linguistically implies “X” is a thing, a being, and that is not how truth subsists, persists, shines, exhales (I give up..).

Yes, and no. First, no, because the point is, we have to invoke being-knowing-truth in order to understand anything, so if we are trying to understand being-knowing-truth, or just being, or just knowing, or just truth, we are chasing our own tail as if we didn’t think we could chase anything, while we are chasing…our own tail… Also, no, because we are trying to clarify what ‘is’ is - and the grammar just gets absurd.

In a way, I probably have to say less to clarify “being” or “truth”.

But if we can just sit with the absurdity, and not let the grammar distract us, ontological being is the unspoken thing, thereness, it, that which grabs the attention of our intention. In this sense, I personally define being as ‘becoming’ - living, ex-isting. I have no concern for how these sentences read, but only the ‘ing’ of reading - that is the ontology referenced by “being” in the being-knowing-truth idea.

All along I have been referencing three nodes - but even that division is confusing the ontology of this for sake of grammatical, linear grasping through sentences. Three nodes of being-knowing-truth misconstrues that this is really one unified occurrence. Me knowing what is, is a living unity, held together in me with the thing known. Removing one node, diffuses the others in the exact some moment. The grammatical “there is” doesn’t work that way. I can easily and meaningfully say ‘There is being’, ‘there is knowing being’, and ‘there is true or false knowing of being’. I can remove a couple things here and linguistically preserve the others, quantifying conceptual versions. But that isn’t how the being-knowing-truth mechanism functions. If I remove the being from being-knowing-truth, I know nothing truly. If I remove the knowing, true being is no longer there for anyone. If I remove the truth, should I still call it being, or knowing? They invoke and conjure up each other at once.

First, I would like to mention that we have three things that are important in our discussion, namely, objective reality, subjective reality (field of experience), and the intellect. To my understanding, there is a one-to-one mapping between physical objects (which actually exist) in objective reality and mental objects (which potentially exist) in subjective reality. By this I mean that when there is an object, such as an apple, that objectively exists in objective reality, then there exists a corresponding mental object, so-called image of the apple, in the subjective reality. The image of the apple, however, potentially exists in the subjective reality; by this I mean that the intellect has to work with the field of experience to actualizes/recognizes the image of the apple from the rest of the mental objects in subjective reality. I have to say that there are mental objects that have no counterpart in objective reality, like concepts and ideas. By this, I mean that they do not actually exist in objective reality but potentially exist. This is a part that requires further elaboration. Think of two apples in objective reality. In reality, there are only apple A and apple B that actually exist, each of which has a set of properties, like location, shape, etc. What exists in subjective reality is the image of apple A and apple B as well. There is no actual concept of twoness, the mental object of twoness, in subjective reality nor in objective reality per se. The intellect first focuses on the image of apple A to actualize/recognize it. It does the same thing with the image of apple B. The intellect then actualizes/recognize that these two images can be categorized as the same type, type apple. The intellect then focuses on both images, actualizes/creates a mental object of two apples. So, the concept of two apples does not actually exist in the field of experience unless it is actualized. It only potentially exists in the field of experience. But as we learnt, there is a one-to-one mapping between any physical objects in objective reality and the mental objects in subjective reality. Therefore, two apples potentially exist in objective reality as well. Twoness is a concept, a mental object on its own, which is the result of abstraction. This is a topic that I am currently thinking about, so to be honest, I don’t know how we abstract.

To answer your question, I will try to be more accurate and only use “potentially exists” in our conversation to avoid confusion, and I hope that I am clear by now about the meaning of “potentially exists”.

I already elaborated extensively in my last comment about potentiality and actuality. By truth, I mean the set of all true statements that say something about objective reality, so I am not talking about concepts, like twoness, which is an abstract mental object on its own that neither exists potentially nor actually in objective reality. Twoness is an abstract mental object which exists potentially in the field of experience only and can be actualized through abstraction, which I don’t know exactly what the abstraction is.

I see. The conjecture is the result of intuition in my understanding. What intuition is requires a separate thread on its own. An intuition is a guess about the relation between concepts, like the game you demonstrated. Whether such a conjecture is true or not, of course, needs a formal proof; by formal proof, I mean working with the abstract mental objects to show that the conjecture is true or false. I am afraid that I don’t have a formal proof for the conjecture. The conjecture is about abstract mental objects that have instantiation in objective reality, so I believe it is true.

I think thinking is the process of actualizing a thought; a thought is an abstract mental object. Thinking happens within the intellect, while the actualization of a thought takes place in the mind only.

Does anyone else see this as not saying anything?

Thinking is thinking. A thought is a thought. Thinking is done by minds.

Ok.

Much the same fluff permeates this thread.

Just me? Fine.

You’ve put it quite succinctly. However, if I understand the reticence to accept this correctly, it comes from a representationalist/Kantian direction for some posters here. If we only know our own senses, experiences, thoughts, etc. (i.e., mental representations) then how can we ever know that the apple that exists “in here” (in our mind) also exists “out there?”

Yet, as Kant’s immediate successors pointed out, a distinction between appearances and reality requires that there be something on both sides of the dichotomy. If there are only appearances, than appearances just are the reality and there is no difference between being and seeming. The result of leaving things there would be a sort of phenomenalism or subjective idealism (a problem Kant acknowledges in some of his letters). The difficulty then is justifying the notion of a “reality” which appearances are “appearances of” while denying that this reality can ever be known as such. This is how you get a language of “potentialites,” “affordances,” “constraints,” “expectations,” etc. that lie prior to the “actualization” of appleness and oneness or twoness in the mind.

But to my mind this line just begs the follow-up question: why would appleness be in the mind (or in the senses) if it was not first in the apple? If effects are not determined by their causes in any intelligible way, why even call them effects of those causes instead of taking them to be free standing apparitions?

So, I agree with you. At the very least, I would change the wording. It might be fair to say that the actuality of an apple constrains our understanding of it (although it would seem to do more; it would seem to be the content determining cause of that understanding). I don’t think it makes sense to talk about an apple being in potency to the intellect though (that would imply that it is reduced to act by the act of knowing it, and why would we know it as an apple if it wasn’t already actually an apple?)

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Sure. We need to take our time with someone’s new ideas. A forum like this often works against that goal, since we’re eager to keep a conversation going and tend to reply too quickly – or at least I do.

Irad Kimhi puts it this way in Thinking and Being:

Philosophical logic cannot attain the sort of mutual illumination to which it aspires unless it is able to reveal that there is no logical gap between the premise and the conclusion . . . from 1 to 2:

  1. He is pale.
  2. We who think he is pale are right. (We think what is true.)
    (Kimhi, p. 5)

Is it a matter of a logical gap, though? Showing that there is no such gap may be a result of the position Kimhi espouses, but you’re suggesting that the position itself is not a question of logic at all, which I’m inclined to agree with. Kimhi too, perhaps – the issue is at the heart of his inquiry.

Yes. This would be one way of “untripling” the triad, at the cost of a deeper insight into how the triad actually works.

Hmm. I see what you’re getting at. But when we quantify, are we really claiming knowledge that “there is one thing”? Or is it closer to a postulate, a stipulation? We create a domain and then we can know true things within it. The broader knowledge you want to link to quantification perhaps occurs one level higher, at our decision to employ quantification at all: Maybe you should say that quantification would be incoherent without “one thing” – and that this is what we know.

No need to give up! “X exists” really doesn’t have to imply that X is a thing, or even a process. We get to decide what to quantify over.

Exactly.

This, and what you subsequently say about the unity of the item* characterized by the three nodes, is intriguing. (*I use “item” as the most neutral term I can think of to designate something we can quantify over.)

That there can be a “unified occurrence” such as this is, I think, evident. (It doesn’t have to characterize all our epistemic experiences, does it?). What the implications are, is very unclear to me. But rather than start raising concerns, I’ll just say Carry on!, keep showing us what you see.

I don’t understand! Do you have any opinion about what a thought, thinking, and truth are? People in this thread are engaging in a fruitful discussion, trying to communicate ideas. You are welcome to contribute!