Truth exists potentially in reality

How do you know that object X and object Y don’t cause the same subjective perception?

This is an artifact of language, making “potential” seem a thing that can exist. Why not just say “Many things are possible”? That way it doesn’t get confused with some existential statement about “potentialities.” The “to be” verb in that sentence isn’t meant existentially, and no one who knows English takes it that way. Yet it expresses the same idea as “There are many potentially existing things”. The latter sentence does mislead, though.

Right, but the rock can be here, can be here+1, can be here+2 . . . n; can be sculpted into A, into B, into C . . . N. Hence, infinite potentialities (though of course I prefer “possibilities”). To have infinite potentialities is not the same thing as having all the potentialities, as I’m sure you know. Infinity is weird.

That’s a good question that brings out the best part of the distinction!

The idea is that a potentiality isn’t nothing, hence it does exist, as potency. That’s what I was hoping the privation example would shed some light on. We do not call a rock ignorant because it fails to know important things, but we do say this of a person. A person has a capacity for knowledge. This capacity exists, just as a sighted person has the capacity for sight.

Act and potency are two principles of being. They explain change in being, the move from mere potentiality to full actuality, not a transition from non-being to being (non-existence to existence).

Consider your sculpture example. A rock can potentially become many different sculptures. This is a real power. By contrast, you cannot make a sculpture out of hydrogen gas, and you certainly cannot make a sculpture out of nothing, or nothing in particular.

Nothing has no potential for anything. It is not a potency that can receive act; it is nothing, total non-being.

Here is another: Salt is “water soluable.” However, salt only ever actually dissolves in water when it is placed in water. This is otherwise a power/potency that must be actualized through interaction.

We talk about potentiality existing because the converse would be to say something like: “the property of water solubility comes into being when salt and water interact” as if some new element of the being of salt were just starting to exist.

You could say the same thing about possibilities. To say “there are possibilities” would seem to be to suggest that they exist in some sense, whereas to say “that possibility does not exist” seems like a way of saying “that is impossible,” no?

Note that talk about dispositions in contemporary thought do roughly the same thing, it’s just that questions of existence are passed off to the possible worlds, and their status is handled differently by different thinkers. Some say they exist. Some say only the propositions that describe them exist. Others say that they are merely useful ways of talking, fictions, or the like. But then this last one doesn’t answer the metaphysical questions about things and their capacity for change, it just avoids them by pushing it one step back to the follow-up question “why are these particular fictions useful?”

Anyhow, they do different things. Potency and actuality attempt to explain change itself, as metaphysical principles, not mere categories. Logical or even metaphysical possibility alone do not explain anything. If change is just a transition from “not-X” to “X,” the possibility of this transition, taken by itself, does nothing to explain it. Structured potencies such as sight, soluability, or appetites do. Something in the world has to be ordered toward the change/motion; that’s the role of a “power.”

This is Aristotle’s move against Parmenides—change doesn’t come from being (it already is, as potential) or from non-being (ex nihilo nihil fit), but from being-in-act interacting with being-in-potency. Potency is a mode of being that is real, yet not fully actualized, not merely a modal sentence that isn’t obviously contradictory. We say it exists precisely because we want it to have ontological import.

I would add that possibility is itself parasitic on actuality. After all, what grounds the truth that something “could” happen? The “possible” is either a bare logical space (which means it grounds nothing causally) or it’s rooted in the real powers of actual things. With the former, possibility floats free of reality and is metaphysically inert. Hence, many discussions of possibility in metaphysics collapse back into something that looks very much like potentiality plus act (which isn’t even unique to the West, it shows up in Eastern thought as well).

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Again, an excellent brief for the “potential as existing” case. And the sentence I quote above is as good an explanation for the intractability of this question as any I’ve seen. It does come down to what we want to have ontological import. You recognize that this is a choice, as do I. And for my part, I don’t want “potentiality” to have ontological import! I prefer to reserve quantification for other uses.

To go into that issue . . . I’m not sure I have the zest for it, but I know you’re familiar enough with some of the literature to have a pretty good sense of where I’m coming from.

Gotcha. However, that wouldn’t be a strictly act/potency thing. Most contemporary analytic metaphysicians allow for some theory of powers, capacities, tendencies, propensities, dispositions, etc., variously formulated.

No, the intellect only has access to the field of experience, which is a continuum of forms, color, etc. Many separate, unrecognizable mental objects exist as potentiality in this field, including the mental object of the apple. The intellect then actualizes/recognizes the apple in the field of experience by focusing on the mental object of the apple. So the apple exists in the field of experience as a potentiality, and it is the duty of the intellect to actualize it.

The act of knowing that there is an apple is the actualization of the existence of the mental object of the apple, which exists potentially in the field of experience.

It depends on what you mean by knowing them potentially. Do you mind elaborating? I already mentioned what I mean by potential knowledge of an apple in the field of experience.

We have these things involved in our discussion: Objective reality, then the sensory system, then the intellect. Material substance exists in objective reality. They have a form. The sensory system is the border between objective reality and the intellect. We don’t know what objective reality is or what it looks like, but whatever it is, it appears to us as a field of experience, after exposure of the sensory system to objective reality. There is a mental substance that exists as a continuum, and it has form, color, etc. so-called the field of experience. Intellect constantly experiences this field as far as the person is aware through the act of experience. The act of experience is the actualization of the potency that exists in mental substance within the intellect. An apple, as a mental image, is the actualization of the mental object that potentially existed in the field of experience. Concepts, like an apple, are abstract mental objects which may or may not refer to an object in objective reality.

To my understanding, there are two main domains: outside the intellect and inside the intellect. Outside of the intellect is mainly the domain of physical substance, whereas mental substance mainly exists within the intellect. Both mental and physical substance have different forms.

We have direct access to the field of experience rather than objective reality. We don’t know what objective reality is and what it looks like, but we know that there is a one-to-one mapping between mental objects in the field of our experience and physical objects in objective reality.

They could produce the same subjective experience if they are different types of things and can fool our sensory system, so they appear as the same thing to us, although they are different in objective reality.

The question was how’d you know.

How do I know that? I don’t know that!

So there are 2 perceptions A and B and they look the same. You say that some X causes A, but you know nothing about X. You then say that some X causes B. Then you say you don’t know if it’s the same X that causes A and B.

How do you know some X causes A and B and how do you know if the X that causes A and the X that causes B aren’t so dissimilar that one X isn’t actually a Y?

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P1) Thinking actualizes true statements from experience of reality
P2) Whatever is actualized exists potentially before its actualization
C1) Therefore, true statements actualized through thinking exist potentially in reality (from P1 and P2)

You note in P1 that they actualize true statements from “experience of reality”. But move to “reality” in C1. Why would we not say they “exist potentially in experience of reality”?

A more general criticism of this sense of “existence”: I wouldn’t say the crane exists potentially, just because I can fold the paper to “actualize” the crane. The paper has the potential to be a crane, sure. But saying the crane “exists” here itself is quite debatable, I think.

P3) Truth is the set of all true statements that can be actualized by thinking

There might be statements which are true, but are nonetheless unthinkable. As in, there is no way in an ideal thinker sits down and manages to conceive of it.

P4) If every member of a set exists potentially in reality, then the set exists potentially in reality

Perhaps nitpicky, but people could disagree with this in a reasonable manner. The set is a separate object. One can believe everything in the set has property X, while the set itself does not have that property. One example could be:

X -> The property of being a finite set.
Let A be a set of every set that has this property.
A = {{1},{2},{1,2,3},...}
A does not have the property X.

There are two objects in objective reality; let’s call them X and Y, each of which causes a different mental object in the field of your experience, let’s call them A and B, respectively. All I am saying is that the subjective experience A could be the same as B, but what I mean is that some of the mental properties of A are similar to those of B. For example, there could be two apples in my field of experience. This means that they look like apples, but they are at different positions. Moreover, X could not be the same as Y if we could somehow cheat my sensory system.

I think there is a one-to-one mapping between mental objects in the field of experience and the objects in reality. This is due to two facts: 1) Coherence in our field of experience and 2) Our subjective experience is caused by objects in reality.

I recognise what you’re articulating here. Consider this article from Science News (Quantum Mysteries Dissolve if Possibilities are Realities) which proposes something similar in the context of quantum physics.

Drawing on Aristotle’s concept of potentia, physicists Ruth Kastner, Stuart Kauffman and Michael Epperson argue that reality encompasses not only actual events and objects (res extensa), but also real possibilities (res potentia). Quantum measurement, on this account, transforms potentialities into actualities. The article explores how this expanded conception of reality might help resolve some of the apparent mysteries of quantum mechanics.

It notes that this idea was anticipated by quantum pioneer Werner Heisenberg, who wrote in his 1958 book Physics and Philosophy ‘Quantum physics introduced something standing in the middle between the idea of an event and the actual event, a strange kind of physical reality just in the middle between possibility and reality.’

I think it’s quite compatible with what you’re saying.

The conclusion must be reached in two steps. P1 is clearly true: if you imprison a person, no matter how intelligent, in a place where s/he cannot have a single experience, then this person cannot develop a single thought. P2 is also clearly true given the definitions of actuality and potentiality. So C1 follows.

I mean, for what is relevant to this discussion, there are two modes of existence: something could exist potentially or actually. A sculpture exists potentially in marble until it is actualized/built by a sculptor.

I don’t think that there are such things as unthinkable true statements. There might be true statements which are very hard to come by given the finite amount of thinkers and time. Given the fact that the truth is a set of interrelated true statements, one can always find the missing statements that are very hard to come by.

Thank you very much for the article and comment. I think the act of experience (measurement in the context of quantum mechanics, for example) is the actualization of the potentiality of mental substance by the mind. Here I am talking about thought, though, and not only about experience in general.

P2 is also clearly true..
I mean, for what is relevant to this discussion, there are two modes of existence…

In the way you mean it here: Exists potentially =/= Has potential to exist. Everyone would agree, I think, that the sculpture has potential to exist. And they could also agree to the wording “exists potentially” due to them thinking you are using it in this manner. But you seem to be using “exists potentially” as something that it does actively, and has an ontological basis for. That, I claim, does no follow from common sense or intuitions of the typical person at all. It would need deliberate argumentation.

I don’t think that there are such things as unthinkable true statements.

For your definitions here to work, the true statements have to be so in a way that we have a reason for believing them to be true. Through some sort of argumentation or justification. Otherwise, we would merely be “actualizing statements”, and some of them would turn out to be true, and thus we would have actualized a true statement. I think you want to argue that we actualize true statements through not random chance but by a properly functioning system, which is ours.

  1. A truth may genuinely be disconnected: A fundamental law, for example, might actually be in such a way that it has no effect on anything else. So the thinker has no way to figure it out.
  2. A truth may be inconceivable due to the faculties of the thinker: Consider truths about the qualitative properties of other species. What things feel like. There might be statements about these that hold true once we know what it is like to be them.
  3. A truth can be unstatable: Consider Turing Machines, where there is indeed a complete truth about which machines halt and which ones don’t, yet we cannot state that truth. Or consider an example that doesn’t involve infinity, the Busy Beaver function on an input x - there is a truth of the matter here for each x. Yet, the complete truth cannot be stated by us for all x’s. One may claim, though, that there is thus no truth about this matter. And that we can only think about the specific inputs, while the general case itself amounts to having no truth. (this is not how I would understand truth, but it is a reasonable counter argument)
  4. In mathematics, it is known that things can be true in a system which are nonetheless unprovable in the system. This can be a more general structure: Godel’s incompleteness theorems show an example of how formal systems can fail to reach truths. It is unclear as of yet, whether we live in a world in which something like the Collatz Conjecture is true - yet unprovable. Proving it false amounts to finding a counter example. While proving it true amounts to a clever argument. It might just be the case that the conjecture is simply true, yet we cannot reach that truth via any argument. I of course don’t mean this specifically for Collatz, I hope it gets solved. But we have no reason to assume that the world is in such a way where every fact of the matter will be reachable via argumentation.

I of course cannot give a direct example of a truth which we cannot reach for obvious reasons, but I think there is enough material here that one would at least have to argue for a premise like “Truth is what can be thought”.

However, the objects of analysis in physics can’t really be understood as ‘mental substance’, can they? And for that matter, what would ‘mental substance’ mean?

Going back to your original post:

I agree that understanding that there are ‘two apples’ (or two of anything) is an intellectual act, something that requires a mind capable of grasping the idea of number or quantity. As I put it in another post, consider this diagram:

On the one hand, it comprises three circles (you might think of them as coins). But it also makes a triangle. So are there three things, or four? I think can’t help but see the triangle as an object in its own right, making four objects altogether.

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Ok, let me elaborate things further. Consider that you are looking at a scene. What appears in the field of your experience is a continuum of forms and colors. There are mental objects in the field of your experience, which you cannot recognize unless you focus on each object. So, the mental objects exist potentially in the field of your experience; by this I mean you cannot recognize them separately, and to recognize them separately or actualize them, you need some extra work of intellect.

Yes, we need some sort of justification to agree that a statement is true.

I am unsure what you are trying to say here. There may exist some sort of entity that is not interacting with other things, so it is somehow hidden. Obviously, we cannot say anything or think about such an entity. I am not including the laws, what it is, or how it behaves, about such an entity in the truth. So truth is not a set of all true statements, but the set of true statements that we can achieve by thinking. Thinking here is a sort of mental activity that requires constant interaction with reality. Given the fact that we cannot think of such an entity that is somehow hidden from us, I exclude it from the argument. So my argument is coherent.

That is possible. I am not arguing that humans are the only thinkers here. So, I don’t understand what your objection is.

I don’t understand what you are trying to say here. I studied Turing machines a long time ago, and I don’t remember too many details about them right now. It would be nice of you if you could elaborate and explain things further. It is late here now. I will try to study it tomorrow and see what you mean after your elaboration.

I think not all fields of mathematics have a direct application in reality, or they are the result of mere reflection on reality. To me, truth is a set of true statements about reality. So, to me, this objection is not valid.

I always back up to find my footing.

“Truth exists” is misleading.

Everyone on this thread is referencing being or what exists, knowing or the conceptual experience of being a human among the other things that exist, and the truth. We have to reference them all, in order to reference any one of them, or to distinguish them from each other. If existence is to be distinguished from the knower, and further, these are to be distinguished from the truth, we will at each moment avail ourselves of the being-knowing-truth triad.

This is reflected in our grammar (X is Y truly), which is why @Jay has a point that we might be leading ourselves astray by not acknowledging the guard rails of the grammar.

The truth doesn’t exist, qua truth.

“Existence” or “being” refers to whatever is the focus, the subject, the object, we are knowing of, or talking about, or sensing, truly or mistakenly.

So by referencing “being” we already include the referrer, the referring act - which I summarize as “knowing”. We can’t be over here talking about what exists over there, without incorporating two separately existing beings, in the act of being separated, and in the act of interaction (uniting).

“Truth” refers to a correspondence (uniting) between what the knower is knowing, and what the object is that is known.

So there is an apple on the table. This is a hypothetical statement about being, because I haven’t referenced whether anyone knows of the apple. But then I go into the room and see, and therefore, know of, the apple. So now I’m referencing being and knowing.

Then someone says “you are seeing a mirage of a pomegranate, and therefore your statement ‘I see (know) the apple is on the table there’ is false.”

What happens to being? What happens to knowledge? What happens to truth?

One can convey the same situation from the three nodes involved as follows:

  1. There is no apple. (being node)
  2. Knowing “the apple” was knowing nothing of the sort. There is no knowledge.
  3. There is no truth to the being of the apple on the table, nor any truth to the knowledge of the apple.

So when we ask about the existence of truth, we can never escape the fact that we are asking about existence, knowledge and a correspondence between the two, all at once. Each loses its meaning together where the others are held in suspense.

This doesn’t make “truth” a property of knowledge, or a property of sentences. It makes it just as present to knowledge as it is to being. This doesn’t make existence a property at all - existence remains that of which we might truly know and that of which our knowledge might correspond. This doesn’t make knowledge a thing-in-itself; knowing doesn’t happen if it is not knowing of something else. (Here in this post, my idea “being-knowing-truth” is the object, the being; so this is a meta-object, or abstract ideal object, but it stands in for the real being nonetheless. I am conveying what I know of this conceptualized object; and asking if you see anything similar, or true, as well).

Is this idea, that breaking up the being-knowing-truth triad is counter to grammar and a conceptual exercise fraught with error because any disconnection among being-knowing-truth is a failure to know, so a failure to receive something knowable, and so a failure to connect in truth, from the start? “Truth exists” misconstrues the place of “existence” and “truth” at the same time.

We don’t make moves as knowers absent incorporation of being-knowing-truth. An individuated being does not stand out from the table as an apple, absent it’s true knowability (intelligibility, potential as knowledge). There either is an apple or there is not. We either know either of these options or we do not. Our knowledge is true knowledge of the true apple or it is no knowledge and there is no truth to “the apple is”.

We conceptually distinguish the nodes in order to see how one single connection can be or ever is, but we have to recognize that our conceptually separated objects are each then taking the position of the “being” node which is sort of an experiment with experimentation itself. We never really suspend the connection, or ever really conduct an experiment that could hypothesize that experimentation might not exist.

I think this is largely right, though rather than “misconstrues” I’d be more inclined to say that “Truth exists”, if accepted into our metaphysics, brings with it some awkward, even paradoxical consequences which we can avoid with a different use of “exists.” We can still preserve your being-knowing-truth triad, since (if I understand you) that triad is not meant to have a self-referential aspect – it doesn’t lay down the rules for the validity of its own terms, which, if it did, would have the unwelcome consequence that “truth” either would or would not exist, depending on how “being” is construed, and statements about being would be true or not-true depending on how “truth” is construed, etc.

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