I’ve made the case here many times that when it comes time to commit to a metaphysical position, the appropriate standard to use is what I call “usefulness” and R.G. Collingwood calls “logical efficacy” for application “by this or that person or group of persons, on this or that occasion or group of occasions, in the course of this or that piece of thinking.” Although I stand by that characterization, I am currently listening to William James’ “Pragmatism.” In the first lecture in the series, he proposes an even more basic criterion.
The history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain clash of human temperaments. Undignified as such a treatment may seem to some of my colleagues, I shall have to take account of this clash and explain a good many of the divergencies of philosophers by it. Of whatever temperament a professional philosopher is, he tries when philosophizing to sink the fact of his temperament. Temperament is no conventionally recognized reason, so he urges impersonal reasons only for his conclusions. Yet his temperament really gives him a stronger bias than any of his more strictly objective premises. It loads the evidence for him one way or the other, making for a more sentimental or a more hard-hearted view of the universe, just as this fact or that principle would. He trusts his temperament. Wanting a universe that suits it, he believes in any representation of the universe that does suit it. He feels men of opposite temper to be out of key with the world’s character, and in his heart considers them incompetent and ‘not in it,’ in the philosophic business, even tho they may far excel him in dialectical ability.
Yet in the forum he can make no claim, on the bare ground of his temperament, to superior discernment or authority. There arises thus a certain insincerity in our philosophic discussions: the potentest of all our premises is never mentioned. I am sure it would contribute to clearness if in these lectures we should break this rule and mention it, and I accordingly feel free to do so.
What James wrote is certainly true in my own case. I think the mental and temperamental factors that lead me to be an engineer also underpin my pragmatic philosophical understanding of how the world works. The lesson I take from this is that no one should be too certain of the universal and eternal truth of what they believe. Neitzsche wrote “It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy up till now has consisted of—namely, the confession of its originator, and a species of involuntary and unconscious auto-biography…” I agree with him that the philosophies we adopt say as much about ourselves as they do about the world.
And finally, an ironic summation:
And, in general, when philosophy is all compacted of delicate intellectualities and subtleties and scrupulosities, and when every possible sort of combination and transition obtains within its bounds, what a brutal caricature and reduction of highest things to the lowest possible expression is it to represent its field of conflict as a sort of rough-and-tumble fight between two hostile temperaments!
Very good. I’d downplay it a little, perhaps to say that a philosopher should always consult their “temperament type” when a clash of premises arises, to be sure they’re not only just giving voice to a personal bias. Perhaps unlike you, I do think we can take the impersonal as a goal upon which to converge.
That there is such a bias seems to me beyond question. I wonder, though, if “temperament” covers it. What do you think James might answer if we asked him, “What forms a person’s temperament?”
Like @jay, I’d want to know more about how James understands temperament. If he is associating it with affect, emotion and feeling, then is he positioning himself among those philosophers who find it necessary to split off affectivity from cognition, reason and knowledge? And in doing so, to fall back onto the notion of fixed personality traits?
I have engaged in and witnessed probably thousands of debates on philosophical subjects. I have honestly held and debated in favor of views that over time that were diametrically opposed to later held views. Here’s some observations and analysis:
The difference between an idealist and a realist is mostly attitudinal. An idealist wishes to make humility and skepticism their foundation, while a realist wants to make reason and evidence their foundation. Personally, in light of this, outside of a specific context, I don’t have much of a preference between them. I value humility, skepticism, reason and evidence.
Similarly, rationalism vs empiricism seems to be about trusting in what is innate vs what is learned. To my eye, lots of philosophically minded people lean strongly toward rationalism, and I think that’s likely selection bias. If you’re good at reasoning and logic, then you’ll probably value it, and probably prefer subject matter that holds it foundational. That was, I think in retrospect, my journey. It was really only when I felt I had gone down every logical road, and didn’t feel as though I got anywhere, that empiricism started to make sense to me.
I suspect free-will/determinism has a similar temperamental aspect.
I try to remember that on most of these subjects, adopting the best version of the other side of the argument wouldn’t change a thing about how you lived your life, so maybe the debate isn’t as important as we sometime pretend it is. I firmly hold that most of philosophy is answering the question “what is the best way to talk about X?” The fact that there is no definitive answer shouldn’t surprise anyone given that framing.
I respect William James and his pragmatism. It’s a very sensible position to adopt. There seems to be 2 kinds of realism according to a now deceased philosopher, i) factual realism (facts/truths) and ii) practical realism (e.g. belief in god). These 2 kinds of realism emerge from 2 distinct temperaments, as you so correctly identified. One is exemplified by figures like the Pope (have you seen the investiture ceremonies of bygone days?) and one perhaps by Jesus himself (his story didn’t end well as everybody knows). The irony is the Pope is the Vicarius Christi. I suppose recent Popes have adopted James’ pragmatism in ways that would’ve raise an eyebrow or two a century before the present. It’s a positive development IMHO. I’m sure there are quite a few surprises down the line as time marches on. William James was a smart man.
I went looking to see if he had defined “temperament” specifically either in “Pragmatism” or elsewhere. I didn’t find anything. He mostly just provides examples. In “Pragmatism” he focuses on the differences between rationalism and empiricism and claims it is the difference between a “tender-minded” and “tough-minded” temperament. Here’s how he lays it out:
THE TENDER-MINDED
Rationalistic (going by ‘principles’),
Intellectualistic,
Idealistic,
Optimistic,
Religious,
Free-willist,
Monistic,
Dogmatical.
THE TOUGH-MINDED
Empiricist (going by ‘facts’),
Sensationalistic,
Materialistic,
Pessimistic,
Irreligious,
Fatalistic,
Pluralistic,
Sceptical.
In my judgment, his use of the word here and elsewhere is consistent with my own understanding and with it’s common meaning— A persons persistent mental, physical, and emotional traits that influence their thinking and behavior—natural predispositions.
I asked myself the same question and went looking for an indication but didn’t find anything specific. As I see it, much of our temperament is inborn and I think he would agree with that. He was a strong Darwinist and a believer in the evolutionary continuity between animals and humans, including in their behaviors.
I don’t know a lot about the history of the church, but historically Popes are as much heads of state as heads of religions. They have to be worldly, pragmatic, and maybe even Machiavellian.
Yes, Machiavelli wrote on the topic with quite a fervor. He knew which wheel to grease and what were dead ends. Next to a jackdaw, another jackdaw. Temperamental unity of some kind I guess.
Temperament is a vague term and there’s a chance that it’s being employed derisively here. As if to say that the best option is pragmatism. I surmise that W. James’s comments are meant for a time when the rationalism-empiricism debate was raging in the world of philosophy. I think W. James made a good call. If philosophers had only heeded his message they wouldn’t be facing the current lack of interest in and even open hostility against philosophy. The flow of funds has slowed to trickle and a degree in philosophy is not going to be worth the paper it’s printed on.. Does this make sense?
No, I don’t think so. I think he was just reporting something he saw as factual. If I remember correctly, he talked about a pragmatic temperament also.
I wonder why you said “Popes are” rather than “Popes were”
Y’all know that Machiavelli wrote 500 years ago?
This tends to suggest - within the Western tradition -
A survey of philosophies that encompass for example - the Chinese traditions, or the American Indigenous traditions - would show that culture plays a larger role.
For me it was a series of situations that lead me to be an architect. In philosophy I’ve changed my stance at least three times depending on the ideas I’ve encountered and thought of. My temperament can certainly be helpful in some of the situations, but it seems fairly clear, I think, that the situations are more influential than my temperament.
Was it your temperament or reading James and Nietzsche that lead you to your conclusion: that it is your temperament that lead you to be an engineer and pragmatic thinker?
I’ve often thought that disposition (same thing?) accounts for what we are drawn to and what we value. By extension this shapes life choices and beliefs. So I probably agree, but there are further quesions. I’ve often said that theism or atheism may be a little like sexual attraction, you can’t help what you are attracted to. It may be more like a preference supported by post hoc reasoning?
I tend to think that my disposition has remained fairly constant over the decades. But is this accurate? @Joshs alerts us to the essentialist implications of this thinking. I’d like to know more about that and how it might be a limitation on this idea.
Can you say some more about how you critique this idea of “fixed traits” and why? Also, would it be fair to consider our affective relationship with ideas as operating alongside, informing, and perhaps even forming our reasoning?
It seems W. James makes distinctions that haven’t been brought out in the OP or in the ensuing discussion. Temperament is our personality (traits) and depending on what that is for a person, he makes a choice. Should I be tender or should I be hard or should I be pragmatic?, is the question he has to answer. His personality will determine his choice. William James himself was a pragmatist I suppose.
Someone mentioned a specific country and pragmatism. In my experience, no matter how praxis-oriented a country is, its leaders tend towards espousing tenderness (in a William James’ sense) in their thoughts. I suspect they want to be remembered or leave a legacy and one doesn’t get that with pragmatism.
I was just reading James, and I think you’d find him congenial in this context.
WHAT is the task which philosophers set themselves to perform; and why do they philosophize at all? Almost every one will immediately reply: They desire to attain a conception of the frame of things which shall on the whole be more rational than that somewhat chaotic view which every one by nature carries about with him under his hat. But suppose this rational conception attained, how is the philosopher to recognize it for what it is, and not let it slip through ignorance? The only answer can be that he will recognize its rationality as he recognizes everything else, by certain subjective marks with which it affects him. When he gets the marks, he may know that he has got the rationality.
