Great summary.
Ultimately, the fine-tuning argument is one flavor of god-of-the-gaps. Except it’s one where even the existence of the gap itself can be challenged.
I believe God is offline, but exists.
In my opinion, being a part of the environment evidences an offline God. It’s possible to register ones self, as part of the environment. God is the reason this is possible, the force which links us together.
Relate it to a lottery that is rigged or not. This transforms your statement to:
P(John wins|rigged) > P(John wins|not rigged) —which is correct
but it does not imply:
P(rigging|John wins) > P(¬rigged|John wins)
Here’s why: John’s winning does not constitute a reason to believe the lottery was rigged, because he’s no different from any other contestant. So the probablilty of rigging, given John’s win, is not greater than the probabilty of not-rigged, given John’s win.
Rigging is possible, but it’s likelihood can’t be assessed on the basis of any particular outcome.
Let’s look at premise 1 of the argument you presented
It’s unlikely that this happened by chance.
What is “this?” “This” could be considered “life” or it could be considered the specific set of constants that this world has. Let’s take worst case, and assume there is exactly one set of constants that produces a Life Permitting Universe (LPU). This set of constants is no more, and no less, probable than any other possible set. There are N possible sets of constants, so it’s guaranteed that the winning set will have had a probability of 1/N. There’s no statistical anomoly - this set of constants had the exact same chance of winning the universe lottery as any other.
Suppose there are multiple LPUs. In that case, the probability of a LPU is even greater - still low, but there’s still no anomaly.
To ask “How likely is it that a God exists?” is equivalent to the lottery question: “How likely is it that the lottery was rigged?” In either case, the outcome does not give a clue to the likelihood.
In the case of a lottery, if you have some knowledge of the group that operates it, and know that this group has a vested interest in John winning - then absolutely, his winning is a clue to rigging.
Similary, if you have some knowledge that a universe creator exists, and can show that this universe creator is likely to desire intelligent life (knowledge that is independent of fine-tuning considerations) - then our existence is a clue to it’s designing this universe for us. Of course, theists think they DO have this external knowledge of God’s existence. But it is that external “knowledge” that is guiding the judgement, not the fine-tuning analysis. One’s subjective epistemic probability of God is not changed by the analysis.
We need to distinguish between two different lotteries:
- There are 1,000,000 unique tickets, each with a 1/1,000,000 chance of winning if the numbers are picked at random
- There is 1 ticket, with a 1/1,000,000 chance of winning if the numbers are picked at random
The probability that there is at least one winning ticket in scenario (1) is 1 and the probability that there is at least one winning ticket in scenario (2) is 1/1,000,000. This is an important difference and is what makes multiverse theories relevant.
So although it is true that a winning ticket in scenario (1) is not best explained by the lottery being rigged it does not follow that a winning ticket in scenario (2) is not best explained by the lottery being rigged.
Now, it might be that a winning lottery ticket in scenario (2) is also not best explained by the lottery being rigged, but we need to make care not to defer to scenario (1) to argue this point.
Perhaps a clearer analogy is to flip a coin 100 times. If it lands on heads every time then what’s the most likely explanation; that you got very lucky or that the coin is weighted to always land on heads?
The FTA is based on treating the sets of constants as a lottery ticket. It’s not a question of whether or not there is a winner at all, because THIS universe is established as the winner. So your second scenario doesn’t apply.
Sure, the likely explanation is this scenario is a weighted coin. But it’s not analogous, because we only have knowledge of the result of a single coin flip. One coin flip that comes up heads does not constitute evidence the coin is weighted.
No, that’s the rebuttal. The FTA argument says John is the only contestant, and the conclusion is that the winning ticket was selected deliberately, not randomly. The rebuttal (multiverse) says that all the tickets are bought, so the winning one being purchased is not improbable at all.
In actuality, there are not a million tickets, but you have to pick ~250 digits in order, and only if you get them all right do you win.
Barnes sneaks in an extra premise there without stating it explicitly. He calls our universe ‘the universe’ implying it’s the only one, and there are not universes with different ‘ultimate laws’ as he puts it. The argument totally falls apart without this extra premise.
I agree that god (or whatever) is the conclusion. Of course it makes matters even worse since the god is even more improbable than the designed thing.
Anyway, the first premise is unjustified.
Premise 4 is also unjustified since there are other entities that can exercise said intention, such as the simulation hypothesis. Of course one can consider that which is simulating us to be a god, which it would essentially need to be in order to accomplish what is claimed.
I disagree. The FTA argues the 20+ parameters had to be “finely tuned” to make the universe life-permitting, and that’s BECAUSE it is a low probability that they would be life-permitting by chance alone. My rebuttal is to analyze the probabilities. The probability at issue is the probability across the range of values for those constants. This makes it parallel to the lottery scenario I described.
I agree that IF there is a multiverse, and the parameters in question vary in each universe. then the fine-tuning claim evaporates. But we don’t know that there is a multiverse at all, much less that these parameters vary in each universe. My rebuttal doesn’t depend on those assumptions, so it’s a stronger rebuttal.
In his paper, Barnes is dismissive of the multiverse as a counter because it isn’t established science, and no current multiverse hypothesis entails varying all the parameters. This is a special pleading, because God’s existence is also not established science (or established fact). For purposes of the FTA, God’s existence is pure speculation, because it’s just proposed as an answer to the “fine tuning”.
Step 3 suggests God exists based solely on the fact that the probability of life is low. A proper analysis would compare the probability of God to the probability of life occurring by chance.
So although the argument doesn’t have God’s existence as an unstated premise, it does have as an unstated premise that P(God)> P(life).
It does if there isn’t a multiverse and this universe is the only universe. If your reasoning works even without a multiverse then it works even if there’s just a single person playing the lottery.
Then a 2100-sided die, where we win if it lands on 1.
Sure, but then the same reasoning applies to the people who made the simulation; their universe must have been created with intention. Unless it’s simulations all the way down, eventually we must reach a “first” designer, and the premise is that this “first” designer must be God.
Yes, that’s one of the places where the FTA falls apart. It requires that the designer be exempt from the very reasoning that attempts to show that there is a designer, so it’s special pleading at best and contradictory at worst.
Step 3 doesn’t mention God at all, nor does it say anything about probability. It’s effectively equivalent to the following:
- Either the universe was created by chance or it was created by intention
But if this dichotomy is true then if “created by chance” is unlikely then “created by intention” is likely, as the two probabilities must add to 1.
Although, as noAxioms says, “created by intention” does not necessarily entail “created by God’s intention”, and so additional premises are required to get from “there was likely an intelligent designer” to “there is likely a God”.
The respective liklihoods are apples and oranges: a numerical probability can be considered for a set of constants, but not for an intentional being.
A low numerical probability for the constants does not translate to a high numerical probability for an intentional being. For the math to be applicable, there would need to be a set of all possibilities {s1, s2,…} such that sum{s1,s2,…} =1. The probability of an intentional being is independent of that set, because there IS a set consisting of all possible combinations of constants - and the sum of their probabilities is 1.
The only feasible comparison would be in terms of epistemic probability. But the FTA includes no epistemic analysis for the existence of an intentional being, so in terms of this argument, it’s just a bare, logical possibility. A finite numerical probability trumps a bare possibility.
One might provide some reasons to give more credibility to such a being. However that’s just the beginning. You’d need to supply rationale to think it likely this intentional being has the power and knowledge to execute its intentions. How did this knowledge come about? Does it just happen to exist, uncaused? That’s a much wilder assumption than constants just happening to be what they are and life being an unintended consequence.
Not sure where ‘I disagree’ comes into that since none of your description of FTA is anything I disagree with.
You agree that the probability is low given a random ticket, but hopefully agree that the probability of the winning ticket being bought is 1 if all the tickets are sold.
But the tuning is very much evidence for it, is it not? Proof? No. Evidence? Definitely.
And by ‘there is’, I would add that all those other universes with different tunings share the same objective ontology as our own, regardless of what that objective ontology is.
Nothing in science is fact, but it kind of is established, since any competing hypothesis is far more outlandish and involves magic and even worse improbabilities. As for the latter statement, there are two, not zero hypotheses: One being the eternal inflation bubble model (referenced by Tegmark level II multiverse, but the model is not his), and also Hawking’s singular collapse into any arbitrary tuning hypothsis, something which I find more plausible since the inflation thing seems to already require some of the parameters to be set before the inflation is meaningful.
As I’ve also said, but those rationalizing god (as opposed to rationally concluding god) find ways to rationalize the necessity of the deity (and always the one ‘I’ believe in), thus raising the probability to 1. I have seen efforts to do the same with our universe, rationalizing the necessity of the tuning, a seemingly simpler task, but I’ve not seen one that seems to hold water.
Or a 2100 sided die which never lands at all, and the side with ‘1’ printed on it notices the ‘1’.
Maybe their universe is simple (but resource intensive), requiring far less reliance on tuning. Probably not. I mean, Earth can be simulated by a Turing machine (very simple rules), but such a simulation would not evolve naturally given such a machine, so we’re back to the improbable algorithm just happening. Likewise, the grand unified field theory is definitely encoded in some consecutive digits in the decimal expansion of pi, but nobody bothers to go looking for it.
Here’s what you said:
We agree on scenario (1).
The issue with scenario (2) is that you seem to be redefining the lottery,departing from my scenario. The tickets are the individual sets of constants. However many sets of constants we’re considering, each set is still a ticket. I’m not assuming multiverse, so I’m referring to a single drawing. There is one drawing, a win by SOME set is guaranteed. This universe (distinguished by its unique set of constants) is the winner. The prior probability (before the drawing) was 1/1,000,000 (assuming there are 1,000,000 possible sets of constants. Regardless, it’s established that this universe won - despite the low probability.
My contention is that there’s no statistical anomoly, because every possible winner would have had the same 1/1,000,000 probability of winning.
To be clear: life is not a contestant. Life is a consequence of the way the universe happens to be. Compare to a real-world lottery winner: John. John held 1 ticket out of a million, and he wins a billion dollars, then decides to buy a Ferrari. He drives it home fast (he doesn’t care if he gets a ticket- he can afford the fine). A 5-year old child darts in front of the car and is killed.
The child’s death is a consequence of John’s lottery win. In hindsight, prior to the drawing, the child’s death had a 1/1,000,000 chance of occurring - but the child’s death was not what was selected; a ticket number was selected- it was an unintended consequence of the drawing.
You are conflating tickets and outcomes. If there are 1,000,000 possible outcomes and only 1 ticket is sold (one universe) then it’s surprising if it wins (supports life). If there are 1,000,000 possible outcomes and 1,000,000 unique tickets are sold (a multiverse) then it’s not surprising that there’s a winner (one of them supports life).
This will be easier to understand if the lottery works as such: for each player (universe), 10 numbers (constants) are selected from the numbers 1-100. If the numbers 1-10 are selected then the player wins (the universe can support life).
If there’s just one player (universe) then the probability that he wins (it can support life) is 1 in 17,310,309,456,440 — it’s almost certain that there won’t be a winner. If I’m the player and I win then I’d consider the lottery suspect.
If there are 8.65 × 1013 players (universes) then the probability that at least one of them wins (can support life) is 0.99 — it’s almost certain that there will be a winner. If I’m one of the players and I win then I won’t consider the lottery suspect.
So, we know that our universe can support life (there was a winner). There are three main ways to explain this:
- There is a single universe, and we just got really, really lucky
- There is a single universe, and it was designed to support life
- There are many universes, and as per the anthropic principle ours must be one of those that can support life
Or we can deny the premise; either the constants could not have been otherwise or most possibilities in fact support life.
The fundamental problem with your scenario is that you’re treating “life” as the win. Life isn’t a contestant, nor is it a goal. It’s a consequence of a certain set of numbers.
If we were to define a lottery in which life is a potential winner, what would the other contestants be? What is life? It’s a type of thing. There are infinitely many types of thing. Each possible universe could produce some unique type of thing. In the present case, you’re taking a type of thing (life) that is unique to this universe, and declaring, after the fact, that this was what the lottery was all about.
Suppose John wins a billion dollars in a real-world lottery. He takes that money and invests in a new approach to cancer treatment, and it develops a universal cure for all cancers. Consider the odds that the lottery would produce a cure for cancer! This is the problem with your lottery scenario: you’re treating a consequence, one that is unique to this particular winner, as the goal.
I’m not. I’m simply saying that if there is a single universe and if its set of constants were randomly selected from the set of all possible sets of constants and if almost all sets of constants are anti-life then it is almost guaranteed that life would not exist.
Therefore, the fact that life exists suggests that one of these is true:
- We got really, really lucky
- Our set of constants is the only possible set of constants
- Most sets of constants are pro-life
- Our set of constants was not randomly selected from the set of all possible sets of constants
- There are many, many universes
The FTA argues that (4) is the most reasonable and that the best alternative to random selection is an intelligent designer who selected our set of constants intentionally for life.
No! It’s not evidence of it at ALL! Life is just a consequence of the way the universe is. EVERY possible universe would have some unique consequence. Life is one of (many) unique things about THIS universe.
The FTA is based on a corruption of the general problem of “fine tuning” in fundamental physics: a physical model of reality that depends on fine-tuning of parameters, to make the model correspond to reality (as measured empiracally), is considered suspect. Theoretical physicists indeed do research to understand if the physical constants can be explained by new, testable theory. But it’s a problem with models, not an issue with reality.
From a purely philosophical point of view, metaphysical foundationalism (which I embrace) assumes that physical reality has some rock bottom layer - and it’s characteristics can only exist as brute fact, because there is nothing deeper. Because I lean towards this view, I have no problem accepting the possibility that the constants have their value by brute fact.
That is the underlying premise behind this particular fine-tuning argument, but it’s actually problematic. Consider that there is no known physical mechanism that “sets” the constants. It may very well be that the actual set exists by brute fact - for no reason at all. In that case, there has been no actual “lottery” for the constants - they just are what they are. They could not have differed, because their values were not set by something prior. In that case, we can only say that it is LOGICALLY possible for the constants to have differed. But it’s also logically possible that an entirely different ontology had existed. Logical possibility means virtually ANYTHING is possible.
There are more than 2 multiverse hypotheses, but I agree that a scientific hypothesis is always a better explanation than one rooted in magic. A multiverse rebuttal is a good reason to reject the FTA, but it leaves the theist with the option of “agreeing to disagree”. The response I’ve seen is: “you’re pinning your hopes on a speculative hypothesis”. This seems a stalemate: the FTA fails to convince naturalists, but the theists continue to treat it as evidence (not proof) of a God. I believe it isn’t even that, and that’s what I endeavor to show with my rebuttal: the reasoning behind the FTA is flawed.
Yes, I’ve debated that point with theists. I respond that their position depends on making a metaphysical assumption that “necessary” is an intrinsic property that an existent may have. A common flaw in every theistic argument is that they depend on debatable metaphysical assumptions: instead of just admitting they accept God’s existence by blind faith, they construct a metaphysical framework that entails God’s existence - and support it with argument from ignorance. But I digress.
There are infinitely many type of things that do not exist because the universe that would have produced them did not win. You say you aren’t treating life as the win, so what is your point? My point is that life is one consequence of the way the universe happens to be. Each possible universe has a great many consequences.
1 had exactly the same chance as any of the 2100- numbers, so it’s not a statistical anomaly.
You are treating one of the many consequences of this universe differently than you are treating all other consequences of every possible universe. You value life, and so do I. But our valuing it has no objective signficance. That is, unless you believe there is a God that created this universe out of his love for us. That’s the background belief of the theists who embrace the FTA.
Yes, but it was much more likely to land on something other than 1.
Although any individual outcome is as unlikely as any other, if most outcomes do not allow for life then we’d expect it to land on one of the outcomes that does not allow for life. That’s the statistical anomaly.
That it’s incredibly unlikely unless either there’s a multiverse or it wasn’t random.
As you can’t seem to get past the word “win” in the analogy, I’ll rephrase the lottery:
John is the only player and buys 999,999 unique tickets. There are 1,000,000 possible outcomes. He loses, which had a 1 in a 1,000,000 chance of happening. Some, perhaps reasonably, suspect that his unlikely loss is evidence that the lottery was rigged against him.
The multiverse analogy of this is that 1 trillion players each buy 999,999 tickets. Given the number of players it’s likely that someone will lose, and so their loss is not evidence that the lottery was rigged against them.