The Fine Tuning of God

[noAxioms]

@Materialist

EVERY possible universe would have some unique consequence.

The whole point of FTA is no, this is not the case. Most collapse in moments, or expand in short order into heat death, or cloud of non-interacting radiation, all without building anything useful such as matter from which other stuff can be formed.
Your assertion suggests that universe with different tunings form different observers, kind of like what might evolve on a different planet, or even Earth with one electron difference in the early days. This is not the case, but it was kind of the case when the original FTA argument noted the fine tuning of Earth. The rebuttal was the same one: there’s more than one planet, something not presumed back then.

@Materialist

From a purely philosophical point of view, metaphysical foundationalism (which I embrace) assumes that physical reality has some rock bottom layer - and it’s characteristics can only exist as brute fact, because there is nothing deeper.

That view kind of reflects human biases: They always make their universe as small as possible and resist any suggestion that there’s more, leading to geocentrism and even more localized models. Every time they put a fence around the world, it eventually gets demonstrated to be bigger.
So no, I would not be able to get behind a model with some rock bottom brute fact layer that restricts that which is from that which isn’t.

@Materialist

@noAxioms

And by ‘there is’, I would add that all those other universes with different tunings share the same objective ontology as our own, regardless of what that objective ontology is.

That is the underlying premise behind this particular fine-tuning argument,

I don’t think you understood my words at all if you think that simple disclaimer is in any way a premise of FTA, implied or otherwise. FTA concludes that this universe has preferred ontology over the other ones, so that disclaimer as a premise would directly contradict what the argument is trying to demonstrate.

@Materialist

There are more than 2 multiverse hypotheses

Greene counted at least 9, so I agree that if you’re referencing ‘the multiverse hypothesis’, you need to specify which one.

@Materialist

A multiverse rebuttal is a good reason to reject the FTA, but it leaves the theist with the option of “agreeing to disagree”.

Sure, just as Darwin left the theists with that option, which some still take. Darwin had evidence on his side, as do all the multiverse hypotheses. Question is, where is the evidence (in each of the 9 cases) that the hypothesis is false? For some of the 9, I think the evidence (of it being false) is there, but for most, probably not. String theory is responsible for some, and since the ‘theory’ seems to produce nothing testable, the evidence ‘for’ is thin. For others like MWI, the evidence is raw simplicity over the crazy complications the other interpretations require to avoid that kind of multiverse.

I’m not an MWI fan, but it’s not the multiple worlds that turns me away, it’s the realism. I have issues with realism, so I prefer a relational interpretation which doesn’t have those problems.

@Materialist

There are infinitely many type of things that do not exist because the universe that would have produced them did not win.

I actually have a big problem with the concept of any universe winning. My model is a big basket of lottery tickets, not one of which is purchased. There’s one winning ticket, but nothing that wins it.

[Materialist]

@noAxioms

The whole point of FTA is no, this is not the case. Most collapse in moments, or expand in short order into heat death, or cloud of non-interacting radiation, all without building anything useful such as matter from which other stuff can be formed.
Your assertion suggests that universe with different tunings form different observers, kind of like what might evolve on a different planet, or even Earth with one electron difference in the early days. This is not the case, but it was kind of the case when the original FTA argument noted the fine tuning of Earth. The rebuttal was the same one: there’s more than one planet, something not presumed back then.

There is SOMETHING different in each of the universes otherwise they’d all be identical. There may be different sets of quantum fields, or at least different relations between the quantum fields. If they collapse immediately, the exact reason for that collapse will be a consequence of their structure - which is, by definition, unique.

So no, I am not equating consequences with “observers”. I mean it literally: different things happen, and different sorts of things exist - irrespective of how brief the existence is.

@noAxioms

I would not be able to get behind a model with some rock bottom brute fact layer that restricts that which is from that which isn’t.

My position is consistent with that of theists, who consider reality to be grounded in God. This gives me a common “ground” for a discussion with them, narrowing what we’d need to discuss, and I suggest that this makes for stronger arguments against their position. That may not be relevant to you, but debating theists is what got me interested in philosophy, so it’s very relevant to me.

@noAxioms

I don’t think you understood my words at all if you think that simple disclaimer is in any way a premise of FTA, implied or otherwise. FTA concludes that this universe has preferred ontology over the other ones, so that disclaimer as a premise would directly contradict what the argument is trying to demonstrate.

I’m referring specifically to the sort of Fine-Tuning Argument defended by apologists like William Lane Craig, Christian physicist Luke Barnes, and to the reasoning that apparently convinced Antony Flew to accept Deism: all rooted in the values of the 20-odd constants. I gather you are thinking more broadly, but then I wonder what (if any) constraints you have. In the absence of constraints, there are infinitely many ways the world could have existed, and infinitely many would support life: it’s like taking a subset of the real number line: there’s just as many points between 0 and 1 as there are real numbers.

@noAxioms

My model is a big basket of lottery tickets, not one of which is purchased. There’s one winning ticket, but nothing that wins it.

I agree with that, even though it might be for different reasons.

[Materialist]

@Michael

Yes, but it was much more likely to land on something other than 1.

Although any individual outcome is as unlikely as any other, if most outcomes do not allow for life then we’d expect it to land on one of the outcomes that does not allow for life. That’s the statistical anomaly.

How’s it a statistical anomoly, when this universe has the exact same probability of occuring as any other? The probability of life is greater than or equal to the probability that THIS particular set of constants would be present.

@Michael

John is the only player and buys 999,999 unique tickets. There are 1,000,000 possible outcomes. He loses, which had a 1 in a 1,000,000 chance of happening. Some, perhaps reasonably, suspect that his unlikely loss is evidence that the lottery was rigged against him.

Sure, John’s loss is very unlikely, statistically.

@Michael

The multiverse analogy of this is that 1 trillion players each buy 999,999 tickets. Given the number of players it’s likely that someone will lose, and so their loss is not evidence that the lottery was rigged against them.

I don’t understand. There are (1 trillion) * (999,999) = 9.99999*10^17 tickets sold. Since this is your multiverse scenario, there are multiple tickets drawn, right? Why wouldn’t every player win? I don’t get your point.

[Michael]

@Materialist

How’s it a statistical anomoly, when this universe has the exact same probability of occuring as any other?

If there are 100 possibilities and only 1 supports life then even though each individual outcome has a probability of 0.01, the probability that the outcome is one that doesn’t support life is 0.99, and so we’d expect the outcome to not support life.

@Materialist

I don’t understand. There are (1 trillion) * (999,999) = 9.99999*10^17 tickets sold. Since this is your multiverse scenario, there are multiple tickets drawn, right? Why wouldn’t every player win? I don’t get your point.

For the moment just forget the universe and the multiverse. This is an ordinary lottery with two draws, and for each draw a random number is selected between 1 and 1,000,000. Each player in each draw may buy one or more numbers. They may not buy two of the same number but multiple players may buy the same number.

Draw 1
2 people play and each buys 999,999 numbers. The probability that any given player loses is 0.000001 but the probability that at least one player loses is 0.000002.

Draw 2
10,000,000 people play and each buys 999,999 numbers. The probability that any given player loses is 0.000001 but the probability that at least one player loses is 0.999955.

In Draw 1 we would not expect anyone to lose but in Draw 2 we would expect someone to lose. So, if John were to lose in Draw 1 then we might be inclined to suspect that the lottery was rigged, but if John were to lose in Draw 2 then we might be inclined to accept that John just got really, really unlucky — even though the probability that he loses is the same in both draws. What matters is not the fact that John lost but the fact that someone lost.

[noAxioms]

@Materialist

There is SOMETHING different in each of the universes otherwise they’d all be identical.

With that I can almost agree.
Counterexample: Universe 1 works via Bohmian mechanics, and universe 2 works via Copenhagen interpretation. The two universes can be identical in state, yet there is very much something that differs between them.
But this is a discussion of tunings, and I agree that most of the time, different tunings make for non-identical universes. There are some tunings that might not matter if other tunings ‘tune them out’. E.G. suppose we have a universe with zero spatial dimensions. Given that, would two universes with different values for c be in any way distinguishable? It would seem that c gets tuned out without meaningful space. I may be wrong about this.

@Materialist

That may not be relevant to you, but debating theists is what got me interested in philosophy, so it’s very relevant to me.

What got me in is an almost complete lack of philosophers that know modern physics. So much bad philosophy is taught in classes from guys presuming all these naive views of the world, which cannot be helped for those centuries back, but is not really excusable for modern philosophers.

@Materialist

Fine-Tuning Argument defended by apologists like William Lane Craig

For the record, I don’t consider Craig to hold a belief in what he evangelizes. There’s too many deliberate mistakes made for somebody as smart as he is.

@Materialist

and infinitely many would support life

But all in that incredibly narrow (1 / 2²⁵⁰ probability) range. Yes, the constants (most anyway) have a range of values that work, and any range at all implies infinite variety, but that doesn’t lower the odds.

@Materialist

@noAxioms

My model is a big basket of lottery tickets, not one of which is purchased. There’s one winning ticket, but nothing that wins it.

I agree with that, even though it might be for different reasons.

I rather think you don’t understand that, since your postings do not reflect such a view.

@Materialist

Regardless, it’s established that this universe won - despite the low probability.

@Materialist

There are infinitely many type of things that do not exist because the universe that would have produced them did not win.

Suggesting our universe to have ‘won’ is a suggestion that there are tickets (values the constants could be) and then there are one or more contestant real universes potentially winning or not.
This is an assertion of different ontologies, rather than identical ontologies that you claim to agree with.

@Michael

So, we know that our universe can support life (there was a winner). There are three main ways to explain this:

1. There is a single universe, and we just got really, really lucky
2. There is a single universe, and it was designed to support life
3. There are many universes, and as per the anthropic principle ours must be one of those that can support life

Or we can deny the premise; either the constants could not have been otherwise or most possibilities in fact support life.

This is a good summary, indicating that we don’t really fundamentally disagree.
1 is ridiculously implausible.
2 is FTA, without going so far as to claim what the designer is
3 is the M word. Strong anthropic is another version of option 2. Weak anthropic does not say ours must be anything, but it says that only the universes with observers get observed.

Denials: Constants being necessary has not been justified in the absence of intent. If you posit that most settings allow for entities capable of gleaning the nature of their own universe, then you’re denying all evidence and knowledge of mathematics.

[Materialist]

@Michael

If there are 100 possibilities and only 1 supports life then even though each individual outcome has a probability of 0.01, the probability that the outcome is one that doesn’t support life is 0.99, and so we’d expect the outcome to not support life.

For the moment, set aside the issue of life and focus solely on the “universe lottery”: It consists of “drawing” the constants. Clearly, every possible set of constants has an equal probability - so no particular winner can be considered an anomaly from this perspective. Do you agree or disagree? If you disagree, then explain why.

It’s still the case that if we focus on one particular set, that set should not have been expected to win. Just like in a real-world lottery: you should never expect to win.

@Michael

In Draw 1 we would not expect anyone to lose but in Draw 2 we would expect someone to lose. So, if John were to lose in Draw 1 then we might be inclined to suspect that the lottery was rigged, but if John were to lose in Draw 2 then we might be inclined to accept that John just got really, really unlucky — even though the probability that he loses is the same in both draws. What matters is not the fact that John lost but the fact that someone lost.

No. You’re conflating the probability that SOMEONE will lose with the probability that JOHN will lose. His probability of losing is unchanged by the presence of other participants.

(for the record, your math is wrong in Draw 1. The probability that at at least one player loses =
1-P(both players win)
=1-(999999/1000000)^2
=1.99999900007963*10^-6

[Michael]

@Materialist

You’re conflating the probability that SOMEONE will lose with the probability that JOHN will lose.

I’m not, because I very clearly explained the difference.

The probability that John will lose is 0.000001.

The probability that someone will lose if there is one player is 0.000001.

The probability that someone will lose if there are two players is 0.000002.

The probability that someone will lose if there are 10,000,000 players is 0.999955.

The argument is that if someone loses when there are only one or two players then their loss is evidence that the lottery was rigged, because the probability of someone losing is so low, but if someone loses when there are 10,000,000 players then their loss is not evidence that the lottery was rigged, because the probability of someone losing is so high.

@Materialist

(for the record, your math is wrong in Draw 1. The probability that at at least one player loses =
1-P(both players win)
=1-(999999/1000000)^2

Yes, and 1 - (999,999/1,000,000)² = 0.00000199999900008, which I rounded to 0.000002 for convenience.

@Materialist

Clearly, every possible set of constants has an equal probability - so no particular winner can be considered an anomaly from this perspective.

Yes, but this perspective is a short-sighted perspective, and misses the forest for the trees; if all but one tree is red and we cut down a tree at random then we’d expect to cut down a red tree, so it would be surprising if we happened to cut down the solitary white tree.

[Materialist]

@Michael

The argument is that if someone loses when there are only one or two players then their loss is evidence that the lottery was rigged, because the probability of someone losing is so low, but if someone loses when there are 10,000,000 players then their loss is not evidence that the lottery was rigged, because the probability of someone losing is so high.

OK, sorry - I misread it. I agree with your stated conclusion, but I see no relevance.

@Michael

Yes, but this perspective is a short-sighted perspective, and misses the forest for the trees; if all but one tree is red and we cut down a tree at random then we’d expect to cut down a red tree, so it would be surprising if we happened to cut down the solitary white tree.

You’ve identified a tree that is objectively special: it’s white.

In the universe lottery, there’s nothing objectively special about this universe: it has a unique set of constants, just as does every other possibility. The fact that it produces life is not objectively special, unless there’s something like a God, who regards life as special.

Consider a lottery with a million tickets sold, and the winner is a one-eyed, intersexual dwarf who is one of a pair of siamese twins. No one would have expected a one-eyed, intersexual, dwarf siamese twin to win. This uniqueness of the winner is not evidence the lottery was rigged. The one-eyed, intersexual, dwarf siamese twin had exactly the same chance of winning as did every other unique individual. If you dig deeply enough, you can find SOMETHING unique about every potential winner. There’s no evidence that the selection process has considered the characteristics of the contestants.

Similarly, a life-permitting universe had the same chance of winning as did every other universe. There’s no evidence the selection process considered that it was life-permitting - UNLESS you assume there’s a God who did the picking.

[Michael]

@Materialist

OK, sorry - I misread it. I agree with your stated conclusion, but I see no relevance.

So, to substitute terms to make it relevant to the topic:

The argument is that if some universe supports life when there are only one or two universes then it supporting life is evidence that the universe was designed, because the probability of some universe supporting life is so low, but if some universe supports life when there are 10¹⁰⁰ universes then it supporting life is not evidence that the universe was designed, because the probability of some universe supporting life is so high.

@Materialist

You’ve identified a tree that is objectively special: it’s white.

In the universe lottery, there’s nothing objectively special about this universe: it has a unique set of constants, just as does every other possibility. The fact that it produces life is not objectively special, unless there’s something like a God, who regards life as special.

You’re equivocating on the meaning of the word “special”.

There’s nothing special about the colour white, if “special” means something like “better” or “more important”. The white tree is just rare/unique. The same with a life-supporting universe.

It’s this rarity that prompts the suggestion that the outcome wasn’t random.

@Materialist

you dig deeply enough, you can find SOMETHING unique about every potential winner.

Yes, but there are also similarities.

Say there are 1,000,000 individuals. They are identical in every way except a) each has a number between 1 and 1,000,000 tattooed on their back and b) all are black except one who is white.

Given the uniqueness of the tattoos and the fact that no tattoo is more likely to win than another, the tattoos are irrelevant, but given the non-uniqueness of the skin colours and the fact that someone who is black is more likely to win than someone who is white, the skin colour is relevant.

If #999 wins, and he is black, then we have no reason to suspect that the lottery was rigged.

If #123,456 wins, and he is white, then we might have a reason to suspect that the lottery was rigged.

This is true even though #999 is as likely to win as #123,456.

So we need to look past just the fact that every set of constants is unique. We group them into “can’t support life” and “can support life”, note that the former is much, much bigger and so that a randomly-selected universe is much, much more likely to belong to this group, which is why it’s surprising if it belongs to the latter.

[Materialist]

@Michael

if some universe supports life when there are 10¹⁰⁰ universes then it supporting life is not evidence that the universe was designed, because the probability of some universe supporting life is so high.

Sure, and this provides a reasonable justification to reject the FTA. However, it depends on two assumptions: 1) there is a multiverse; 2) the constants differ among the various universes. Neither of these is established. You then must argue that any natural assumption is more plausible than a supernatural assumption. That’s fine, but the theist will disagree.

I’m engaging in a deeper attack- showing the reasoning is flawed. If the reasoning is flawed, then the multiverse card doesn’t even need to be played.

@Michael

You’re equivocating on the meaning of the word “special”.

There’s nothing special about the colour white, if “special” means something like “better” or “more important”. The white tree is just rare/unique. The same with a life-supporting universe.

It’s this rarity that prompts the suggestion that the outcome wasn’t random.

You’re claiming there is some quality of the winner that makes the win stand out from the other participants, such that if the winner possesses that quality, it constitutes evidence of a rigged lottery. That’s what I mean by “special”: it’s special because it (somehow) constitutes evidence of rigging.

In the case of the trees, you identified this special quality as being white. Trees differ from one another in many ways: height, width, configuration of the branches, number of leaves, shapes of the individual leaves, species, age… but you focused exclusively on its whiteness, and treated the rarity of whiteness being evidence the outcome wasn’t random. There’s something unique about every tree: no 2 are alike, but you imply there’s something “special” about whiteness that constitutes a reason to suspect rigging. Why is whiteness evidence of rigging, but number of leaves is not?

@Michael

Yes, but there are also similarities…So we need to look past just the fact that every set of constants is unique. We group them into “can’t support life” and “can support life”, note that the former is much, much bigger and so that a randomly-selected universe is much, much more likely to belong to this group, which is why it’s surprising if it belongs to the latter.

In your tattooed-individual lottery, you depend on the premise that the probability of rigging is greater if the white guy wins. Explain why.

Does the same reasoning apply to the one-eyed, intersexual, dwarf siamese twin in my example?

[BitterCrank]

Is God fine-tuning our understanding? Or are we fine-tuning our understanding? Certainly the latter, whether or not the former is happening. The more we know about the universe, the more fine-tuning that is required on our part. Of course we don’t know, can’t know, won’t know, have never known what God is up to.

The soundest approach is that God is unknowable–but that’s not very comforting.

[Michael]

@Materialist

Sure, and this provides a reasonable justification to reject the FTA. However, it depends on two assumptions: 1) there is a multiverse; 2) the constants differ among the various universes. Neither of these is established. You then must argue that any natural assumption is more plausible than a supernatural assumption. That’s fine, but the theist will disagree.

Material conditionals do not assume their antecedent. The premise “if A then B” does not assume A, and so the premise “if there is a multiverse then we would expect at least one universe to support life” does not assume that there is a multiverse.

What matters is that if this material conditional is true then “the universe was designed to support life” is not the only — and perhaps not the best — explanation for a universe that supports life, and so the teleological argument is weakened. It’s not refuted, but we now have an avenue to avoid positing the existence of an intelligent designer to explain a prima facie unlikely occurrence.

@Materialist

Why is whiteness evidence of rigging, but number of leaves is not?

Whiteness was just an example. We can use the number of leaves if you like; if every tree has 200,000 leaves but one which has 0 leaves then if the tree with 0 leaves is the one tree we cut down then we might suspect that the tree wasn’t cut down at random.

@Materialist

In your tattooed-individual lottery, you depend on the premise that the probability of rigging is greater if the white guy wins. Explain why.

The probability that a white man wins is 1/1,000,000. The probability that a black man wins is 999,999/1,000,000. Therefore, it is much, much more likely that the winner will be a black man than a white man.

If the white man wins then we can either accept that a very unlikely occurrence happened or we can suspect that the lottery was rigged in his favour. I’m not arguing that the latter is more likely; I’m simply pointing out that it’s not an unreasonable claim to make. If this were to happen in real life then would you not think an inquiry into the outcome warranted; an inquiry that wouldn’t be warranted were a black man to win?

[Esseus11]

Unfortunately, it seems to me that both the theory of god/fine tuning and the theory of the multiverse are both in their core essence neither provable or disprovable. In the case of God, we cannot prove his/it’s existence because the majority of us have not been able directly engage with God. Some have claimed to, but if they have, then they will never be able to prove it to anyone else. God’s silence can always be taken as evidence either that God does not exist or is not interested in proving their existence to us. Similarly, no matter how much we are able to uncover about the universe, we will always be able to make it fit within a model where God does exist or one in which God doesn’t exist.

In the case of the multiverse, we have come up with all sorts of fancy variations of the double slit experiment, suggesting that someday with the right theoretical understanding and experimenal tweaking we could find a way to show that the multiverse does or does not exist. However, it seems to me that if other universes are outside of our own and we can only percieve one branch of quantum outcomes, then probing alternate universes in anyway just isn’t possible.

One thing I would say for the many worlds theory is that it aligns nicely with how other aspects of the universe work on the principle of large numbers. For instance, the extremely low probability of earth harbouring life in the first place seems to balanced out by the sheer number of planets that exist in the universe. In the case of human level cognitive complexity, the low probability becomes less improbable when we consider how many genetic mutations can occur in the course of 4 billion years, and how many organisms have existed between those that still persist and those that were evetually “selected out”.

If there are a massive number of universes, we would of course live in the one which can support us, just as we exist on earth and not on one of the other billions (trillions?) of planets that are out there but can’t support life. It seems like most apparent “miracles” we come upon are really just extremely small probabilities that have been multiplied by an even larger numerator.

Plus, I imagine that any universe that didn’t support the conditions for life would be irrelevant from an existence standpoint given that it could not be percieved. Universes that are not observed can start and end an indefinite number of times, without the passage of time actually meaning anything, until there is a universe where life can emerge.

[Michael]

It’s worth noting that Everett’s Many Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics is not the only type of multiverse.

There’s also the inflationary multiverse, which suggests that the Big Bang was just the rapid expansion of a small region of a much larger (even infinite) spacetime, and that the conditions that allowed for this to happen once must also allow for it to happen many (even infinite) times elsewhere in this greater spacetime.

Of course, like everything else outside our light cone it’s impossible for us to have direct evidence of it, but like everything else outside our light cone we might be able to determine that the existence of such things is a necessary, or at least highly probable, outcome of our best mathematical models.

I certainly think it less parsimonious to suggest that something like the Big Bang could only happen once. If it could happen at all then I think the default position should be that it could happen again or could have happened before, until we have a good reason to believe otherwise.

[Materialist]

@Michael

Whiteness was just an example. We can use the number of leaves if you like; if every tree has 200,000 leaves but one which has 0 leaves then if the tree with 0 leaves is the one tree we cut down then we might suspect that the tree wasn’t cut down at random.

Before knowing the characteristics of any tree, we’re told some tree will be chosen randomly to be cut down.

Scenario 1: After the tree has been cut, we notice it’s unique in some way. Perhaps it’s the white tree, or the one with a prime number of branches, or the most leaves, etc. Every tree is unique. So uniqueness is not evidence the lottery was rigged.

Scenario 2. Now let’s say you examine all the trees before the lottery, and identify the set of characteristics for each tree that makes it unique from the others. You choose to bet that the one with set A of characteristics will be cut down. Low and behold, that’s the one that is cut down. Does that suggest the lottery was rigged for the tree with that set of characteristics? I presume you would say yes. We’d want to examine the selection process to see if you have some connection to it.

Which scenario is more like the universe lottery? I argue that it is scenario 1: we’re identifying something unique about this universe AFTER the lottery has occurred.

It’s the same with the white man/black man lottery. Suppose every man is cloaked, and their color is unknown by anyone prior to the lottery. One is chosen and it turns out to be white. There’s no basis to consider the lottery rigged.

[Materialist]

@Esseus11

Unfortunately, it seems to me that both the theory of god/fine tuning and the theory of the multiverse are both in their core essence neither provable or disprovable.

Two points:
1) we can consider which is more likely: 1) an unknown natural reason, or 2) an omniscient/omnipotent being just happens to exist?

The answer one chooses will have absolutely nothing to do with the fine-tuning argument.

2) I have been arguing that the Fine-Tuning Argument utilizes flawed reasoning:

A) It is argued that the exact constants that are present in this (the only) universe is low probability. That much is true: there are n possible ways the constants could have come out, and n is very large number. The probability that any specific universe would win is 1/n. Imagine that! The winning universe only had a 1/n chance of existing, and yet it does! The error in this reasoning: every possible universe had a 1/n probability of existing, so OF COURSE the winner will have had a 1/n probability.

B) A common response to (A) is that TWO improbable things happened: the 1/n chance of this universe existing AND the existence of life - which is also improbable. The flaw: there is a 100% chance that life would exist in this universe, so this doesn’t make this universe any more rare.

Why think the chance of life is 100%? Because we exist.

[Michael]

@Materialist

Suppose every man is cloaked, and their color is unknown by anyone prior to the lottery. One is chosen and it turns out to be white. There’s no basis to consider the lottery rigged.

You’ve assumed as your premise that nobody knows the participants’ skin colours, which by analogy is assuming as a premise that there is no God (or that if there is a God he created the universe “blindly”).

The only premises we’re allowed are:

1. There are 1,000,000 participants
2. 999,999 participants are black
3. 1 participant is white
4. The white participant won

And the only premises we’re allowed are:

1. There are 1,000,000 possible sets of constants
2. 999,999 sets of constants don’t support life
3. 1 set of constants supports life
4. Our universe supports life

If this is all we know, it’s understandable that we might take the white participant’s win as evidence that the lottery was rigged by someone who wanted the white participant to win, and it’s understandable that we might take our universe supporting life as evidence that it was designed by someone who wanted the universe to support life.

[Materialist]

@Michael

You’ve assumed as your premise that nobody knows the participants’ skin colours, which by analogy is assuming as a premise that there is no God.

Fair enough, but this scenario is significantly more complex than the universe lottery, so not the best for drawing a parallel.

The universe lottery is parallel to the scenario 1 tree lottery I described. The universe has already won, and we’ve selected something unique about it after the fact. The presence of some uniqueness, identified after the fact, does not imply that this uniqueness was an intended consequence.

Your black man/white man scenario is different, in that you’ve identified some characteristics in advance of the lottery.

@Michael

1. There are 1,000,000 possible sets of constants
2. 999,999 sets of constants don’t support life
3. 1 set of constants supports life
4. Our universe supports life

I suspect you’re thinking that 2 improbable things happened: this set of constants + life. However, the probability of life given this universe is 100%. The existence of life doesn’t make this universe any less probable.

Life is being selected after the fact, just like the specific characteristics of the tree.

As I said many posts ago:
P(X|design) > P(X)
(the probability of outcome X is greater if it was designed to occur, than the base probability of outcome X)

And yet, it’s fallacious to assume that every low probability event was a product of intent.

[Michael]

@Materialist

Your black man/white man scenario is different, in that you’ve identified some characteristics in advance of the lottery.

I haven’t. Assume that we’ve just woken up and been told four things:

1. There were 1,000,000 participants in a lottery
2. 999,998 participants were black
3. 2 participants were white
4. The winner was white

We’re then asked a single question; do you think the winner won by chance or not by chance?

Those who favour the FTA will say that the unlikeliness of a white participant winning is evidence that the winner did not win by chance.

Many of those who sympathize with FTA reasoning but don’t believe in intelligent design will say that the unlikeliness of a white participant winning is evidence that there were multiple lotteries where every winner won by chance, but we’re only being told about one of the ones where a white participant won.

Whereas your reasoning seems to be that unless we have independent evidence to the contrary we ought just assume that there was one lottery and that the winner won by chance.

[Esseus11]

So, I sort of see the logic behind using this lottery analogy: that most of the universes that could have existed would not contain life, so the fact the universe which does exist ended up with life in it suggests something at play beyond pure probability. I’m less sure that we can properly compare lottery participants, which actually do exist and have a definitive number, to possible physical values in possible universes. It seems strange that we are treatig the idea of “winning” as comparable to existing in the first place.

I’m not an astrophysicist, but if we are running our lottery with the different possible values of physical constants, are there not an infinite number of values that these parameters could have been equal to? In which case, the probabilities we are working with are 1/∞ yes?