No not “potentially” reduced. Clearly and objectively reduced – I gave 3 specific examples already. Increasing our explanatory power and decreasing the number of arbitrary constants is the polar opposite of kicking the can.
I don’t know why you aren’t getting this, unless it’s just that you’re dug in now.
Let me start again since you have a valid point. There’s no point in tuning something if there is no goal that works better with one tuning than another. So yes, there has to be a goal, intentionality, and rather than taking the route of not knowing exactly what that goal is, those that support FTA (or ID, a more general version of the same thing) tend to assert (not conclude) that they themselves are the goal, despite humans being so insignificant and if you ask some biologists, not particularly well designed, which is to be expected since our evolution was sort of cut short before working out all the kinks.
A less anthropocentric assertion would be, well, something the god can be god to, which probably would at least be able to observe since it’s kind of meaningless to boss around plants. Hence ‘observer’ being a minimal goal even if humans are not the ‘chosen species’.
As I posted a couple back, eternal inflation bubble theory and/or Hawking’s suggested superposition of constants, either of which explains the fine tuning we observe.
Clearly it does have practical value since it has significantly explanatory power. It not being testable makes it an interpretation, not a theory, but it does not render it impractical.
Potentially because we don’t know if any further reduction is possible. A lottery of 10^100 odds has no explanatory power over a lottery of 10^90 odds, with a single ticket that just turns out to be the winner. It’s far more explanatory to suggest that nobody won the one ticket, and the simple fact is that one of the tickets is a winner, not improbably selected at all. It isn’t improbable at all that the one (OK, not just one) tuning works. It only gets improbable when you suggest picking a random ticket, and only one of them.
No; if something has reduced, it’s reduced. We do not need to make the claim that further reductions are going to happen in order to make that observation.
You have an ongoing habit, when the topic touches strongly on your preconceptions, to give no arguments at all and simply assert that you are right. In these cases you need to try to give actual arguments, where an argument requires at least two premises and a conclusion.
The first step to giving real arguments is recognizing that the issue is not as self-evident to you as it is to others. Once one sees this they are freed to provide reasons for their claims.
The ‘No’ in front indicates that I said otherwise. I did not.
That’s one of the lines Mtarin Rese (Astronomer Royal) takes. For example if the ratio between electric force and gravitational force (N) was higher then stars wouldn’t form and heavier elements that are the basis for the complex chemistry of life wouldn’t form. If it were lower then the universe would’ve collapsed too quickly for evolution to occur.
If nuclear efficiency \varepsilon < 0.007\% then also heavier elements would not form and the universe would be lifeless. If it was too high then stars would have shorter lifespans.
The cosmological constant \Lambda is also fine-tuned. If it were higher then stars and galaxies wouldn’t form and if it were lower the universe would’ve collapsed too quickly.
The value of \Omega \approx 1 (the ratio of actual density of matter in the universe to the critical density) is just right for life to take hold. Lower and the universe would’ve experienced runaway inflation and higher and the universe would’ve collapsed too quickly. Both are anti-life events.
The density fluctuation in the early universe, Q, is also at the sweet spot for life. Higher and the universe would be dominated by black holes and violent physics; lower and the universe would fail to develop complex structures like galaxies.
The number of dimensions, D = 4. If it were less then life would be impossible and if higher than gravity would be unstable.
Of course you have. Every time I’ve mentioned how, when we show a former physical constant has been shown to be derivable, it’s a reduction in the number of arbitrary constants, you’ve “corrected” me that it is only potentially a reduction.
If you’re now saying you agree that it’s a reduction, then I take it you no longer have an objection to this argument against fine tuning?
I’ve never correct you on that point. Perhaps a quote (with context) is in order.
I do still have an objection, since despite all the reductions that have been made over the years, the universe is still very improbably (presuming one roll of die) tuned.
Yes, quote is below, but in any case: if you didn’t have this objection, then what is your objection to this argument?
What is your reasoning for originally saying it’s a “poor counter”?
Good example. I was wrong there, since you said there that reduction has been done. My potential referred to future reductions.
This:
My objection to the FTA is very similar. The FTA assumes life (or perhaps human life) is a design objective. The constants would indeed have to be finely tuned to achieve that objective.
This is closely related to a general argument for design:
P(X|design for X) > P(X)
This reads: the probability of X occuring, given a design for X, is greater than the general probabilty of X occuring.
It’s superficially compelling, but it overlooks the background probability that there is design (or a designer).
So the probability of life, given a design for life, will obviously be greater than the base probability of life occurring randomly.
Similarly, the probability you will win a lottery is greater if the lottery was designed for you to win. Your winning does not serve as evidence the lottery was designed for you to win. You winning is not a statistical anomaly: every participant had the exact same (low) probability of winning, so it was a certainty that the winner will have had that low probability.
John Earman has said (in “The SAP Also Rises”): "Imagine, if you will, the wonderment of a species of mud worms who discover that if the constant of thermometric conductivity of mud were different by a small percentage they would not be able to survive.”
The point is that (human) life is a consequence of the way the world happens to be. Had the world been different (had the constants differed) we would not exist; other sorts of things might exist.
It’s also not established that the fundamental constants COULD HAVE differed. There are speculative hypotheses that suggest these differ, in other universe of a multiverse ensemble - but this is pure speculation. This implies the set of constants is a brute fact: they just happen to be what they are, and these just happen to result in our existence. The deist alternative is the brute fact of a creator who just happens to exist, and just happens to have decided to create a universe with this set of constants. The alternative of a brute fact creator is considerably less parsimonious than the natural alternative - especially if you assume this being is omniscient.
The issue is for the basically overwhelming majority of all sets of universal constants, things like atoms could not form, or also the universe would collapse in on itself instantly, and other things like that, that would seem to make any kind of evolution of life impossible.
Yeah I totally see what you are saying here, and pretty much agree.
I’ve heard a lot of people make similar arguments which is just that God as an all powerful being should be able to make life in any conditions so he shouldn’t need to fine tune any constants.
I just posted this argument because I came up with it and thought it was something interesting to think about, and I also wanted to see if there were any holes in my logic or reasoning.
Idk how you are saying it’s more plausible that a multiverse of some kind would exist, because how could we measure that, but I still get what you are saying, and agree.
agreed.
Every version of the fine tuning argument I hear is some version of an argument from personal incredulity. I simply don’t find those sorts of arguments very compelling.
Here’s how I like to frame it: If I were to roll a 1 million sided die, it would be incredibly unlikely for it to land on a 7. If however, it did land on a seven, there is absolutely no reason for me to invoke any further explanation than noting that of all the possible outcomes of the die roll, one occurred. Invoking design or intent or a puppet master pulling strings seems silly in that accounting, right?
The only reason it’s different is that we personally, subjectively place value on our own existence. We privilege it. So we project that personal privileging onto the universe and suppose that us existing is some special kind of outcome among the innumerable possible outcomes… but there’s no reason to make this epistemic move. A universe in which we could exist is one possibility, and it turns out to be the one that happened. No different than winning the lottery. God didn’t make your numbers come, and some set of numbers were going to be drawn, so it shouldn’t require an explanation when it is the numbers on your ticket anymore than it would require one when it’s a set of numbers not on your ticket.
But don’t these sorts of argument depend on highly speculative claims about possible universes that are well beyond established physics? As someone without expertise in cosmology or theoretical physics, I don’t feel I’m in a position to judge how well supported such claims are, and I suspect most of us are in the same position. That applies not only to claims about how improbable our universe is, but also to any claims about what would or would not exist if the constants were different. Without some basis for assigning probabilities to possible universes, I’m not sure we can conclude that our universe is “highly improbable.” And without that, I’m also not sure how confidently we can say what kinds of structures, matter, or even forms of existence would or would not be possible under different physical laws or constants. So until I get expertise in this subject, all I can do is say, cool argument, but how do we know?
I mean yeah we don’t really know. But my argument here is meant to show even if any set of constants are possible, it doesn’t make god more likely.
More plausible because theoretical math and physics support that plausibility. There’s no similar support for the conclusion of God. It doesn’t mean there is a multiverse, but it is plausible in comparison between the two arguments.
OK, no problem.
The reason we’re having this ongoing back and forth is because your original statement was that this particular argument* against fine tuning was a poor one. And I think your objection now is basically that you personally don’t find it a good argument on the basis of your own speculation. That’s fine, but do you take back the original point of it being a poor argument?
* I’ll recap quickly, because this is quite confusing for anyone else to follow.
Basically my initial post to this thread was to quickly summarize some of the main arguments against fine-tuning.
One of those arguments is to point out that on several occasions, what was previously thought to be a constant of the universe was later shown to be derivable from physical principles.
@noAxioms claimed that that argument was a poor one, on the basis that when we derive a physical principle in that way, there remain precise constants of nature.
I’ll repeat a quote I gave earlier, from John Earman:
"Imagine, if you will, the wonderment of a species of mud worms who discover that if the constant of thermometric conductivity of mud were different by a small percentage they would not be able to survive.” - The SAP Also Rises
Was the thermometric conductivity of mud fine-tuned for the worm? Had it differed, this particular type of worm would not exist. So what?
Same with human life (or life in general): it’s a consequence of the way the world happens to be. That doesn’t imply the world was designed this way for the purpose of creating (human) life.