That’s fine, but does that mean multiverse theory offers no rebuttal to the fine-tuning argument? If it does offer some sort of rebuttal, I renew my question - how?
Sure it does. I literally just explained to you why it explains the phenomenon of fine-tuning better than your “brute fact” approach. You’re not actually offering an argument in response.
Sure, but we’re starting from the phenomenon, not the intelligence. If there were no phenomenon then there would be no point to posit the intelligence in this way. So what…?
Yep. The intelligence wanted life. That’s the idea. The fine-tuning argument is not positing an intelligence that did not desire life.
Why? Do you have an argument, or just an assertion? Remember that an argument requires at least two premises and a conclusion.
By the way, I don’t even like fine-tuning arguments, but you aren’t providing any reasoning for your claims. I even tried to produce an argument for your position and you ignored it.
I think the background is the theological traditions of the world, many of which involve intelligences that have a desire to create. So you have 1) the fact that seeming coincidences can often be explained in terms of purposive action; and 2) the fact that the vast majority of people who have ever lived believed that there do exist intelligences of this magnitude. Defining the theological as “baggage” is prejudice unless there is an actual argument for why religious-theological background should not count, or why a higher intelligence is de facto implausible.
Again, the interesting thing is that the scientific community rejects your “brute fact” approach, and there is a considerable camp which considers the “higher intelligence” claim plausible, even among atheists (i.e. they do not view the higher intelligence as God).
Do you understand that you are literally offering nothing more than an argument from your own authority? Do you recognize that appeals to your own authority are not very strong?
Again, try to produce some arguments, recognizing that arguments require at least two premises and a conclusion.
Suppose you bet on ‘2’, roll the roulette wheel, and it comes up ‘2’. This is seen as fortuitous because there is only a small chance that it would happen. The multiverse theory flattens all such probabilities, asserting that all possibilities play out in the vast multitude of universes. On that view everything that can happen does happen, and therefore no matter what happens it is not fortuitous. The fine-tuning argument depends on this appeal to fortune, and therefore the multiverse theory nullifies it.
And yes, I agree that it is rather dumb. There’s a fair bit written in favor of the idea that the multiverse theory is dumb.
To me, the whole thing feels odd. The fine-tuning argument is strange and problematic in its own way even before you get to the response of the multiverse (which was not solely motivated by the fine-tuning argument, but by a constellation of related ideas).
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In my view the whole ‘fine-tuning argument’ needs to be understood against an historical background. Until quite recently, Creation was widely accepted, the implication being that nature was the expression of the ‘divine Architect’. With the decline of religious faith and the shift towards science, then this belief fell away. But the issues is that science is, after all, ‘natural philosophy’. It’s based on what can be observed, encountered, detected, sensed, and measured. So it puts aside metaphysical questions in favour of observational evidence. But when it comes up against these foundational issues, such as the ‘six numbers’ of Lloyd Rees, then it’s no longer doing natural science at all. It has shifted, knowingly or otherwise, into the subject of metaphysics. And there’s a lot of metaphysical questions left open in science, which science itself has no authority nor provenance to explain, if indeed there can be explanations, which is by no means certain.
So, as many have observed, science assumes the order of nature. It can hardly do otherwise, as the entire discipline depends on it. So science observes the order of nature, but without having an account of the nature or origin of that order. They’re questions of different kinds.
When it comes to natural theology or ‘proofs of God’, that is another matter altogether. One anecdote worth recounting relates to Georges LeMaître, the discoverer of the so-called Big Bang theory (although he did not call it that.) It’s an interesting fact that during the 1930’s there was considerable resistance to LeMaître’s ‘theory of the primeval atom’ because it sounded mystical. And indeed, the idea of the entire vast universe springing into existence in an instant does sound mystical (although it shouldn’t be thought of as an explosion, because there was no space for it to explode into.)
And indeed, in 1951 we find Pope Pius XII saying:
Indeed, it seems that the science of today, by going back in one leap millions of centuries, has succeeded in being a witness to that primordial Fiat Lux, when, out of nothing, there burst forth with matter a sea of light and radiation [… Thus modern science has confirmed] with the concreteness of physical proofs the contingency of the universe and the well-founded deduction that about that time the cosmos issued from the hand of the Creator.
As it happens, LeMaître was also a Catholic priest, and you might expect that he would be gratified by such a pronouncement. But in fact he was horrified by it, saying that by no means should faith and science be co-mingled in such a way. He asked Fr Daniel O’Connell, Director of the Vatican Observatory, to have a quiet word to His Holiness, who thereafter agreed not to voice this sentiment again. (You have to admire his temerity, telling the Pope what not to say.) According to Paul Dirac, in later conversation, LeMaître expressed the view that religion was closer to the science of psychology than to cosmology.
Let’s assume there are 3 constants, A, B, C.
Let’s assume each of these constants has the range [1, 10]. Only whole numbers allowed please.
Let’s assume the life-supporting range for A is [2, 3], for B is [5, 6] and for C is [8, 9].
Assuming pure chance, what is the probability that we get a universe with life?
There are 2 \times 2 \times 2 = 8 possible universes that can support life.
How many total universes can we create?
10 \times 10 \times 10 = 1000
Pr(a universe with life) = \frac{8}{1000} = 0.008 = 0.8 \%
Pr(universe without life) = 1 - 0.008 = 0.992 = 92.2 \%
I don’t think that’s a quite accurate account of multiverse theories.
For Everett’s many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, it’s only in cases of quantum superposition that there are “branches”, and it’s not clear that a spin of a roulette wheel is influenced by quantum phenomena — and certainly not to the extent that all outcomes are possible.
For eternal inflation theories, it’s just the case that the Big Bang is one of many — perhaps infinite — and that if infinite there are universe “regions” that are almost identical to the one we live in. There’s no relevant difference between there being 1,000 roulette wheels in one universe or 1 roulette wheel in each of 1,000 universes; that this roulette wheel in this universe landed on a 12 is fortuitous to the person who placed that bet.
Fine-tuning arguments require that the probability without an intelligent designer is so small that an intelligent designer is the most likely explanation, so multiverse theories refute the premise by arguing that because all possible universes exist, the probability that at least one can support life is 1.
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- The contant pi has a range that supports circles, and this range is exactly 0, so it would seem that pi was fine-tuned by a god who specifically wanted a universe with circles.
Is there really a need to explain where this reasoning goes wrong?
If you can fine-tune a constant, then it’s not really a constant anymore, is it? Now it becomes a parameter or a variable. And it can be anything it wants to be. It can be 1 over here and 2 over there and 3 in the spot that you haven’t even considered.
The apparent contantness of these numbers is derived from observations, and these observations are limited in a miriad of different ways. For all we know, once we hit the horizon of causal influence, these constants might be completely different.
And how exactly does the fine-tuning of these constants show the interference of a god? Because the way I see it, it should be the exact opposite way around. If these constants would have a broader range, deviating all over the place, and then life would still persist, that would indicate a more powerfull god than the god who could only do it in a limited way, no?
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The debate about cosmic fine-tuning in the sense in which it is used here takes place almost entirely outside the fields of physics and cosmology. For a theoretical physicist or cosmologist fine-tuning usually comes up in the context of effective field theories (which is what all our fundamental theories of physics are) and means a violation of “naturalness” - a kind of theory choice principle or esthetics, which is itself somewhat controversial. All of this is interesting in its own right, but takes us far from the topic.
If there wasn’t a goal, then what is left of the fine-tuning argument?
Says who? You could argue that the exact form of life as we know it, would be impossible. But does that exclude other mechanisms of life? Who decides what is life and what is not? After hundreds of years, the debate is still ongoing.
Not going to continue this.
I’d reply to the OP, except he seems to have existed the topic almost as soon as it was created.
It does not. It presupposes that this world with life exists, and that other worlds do not. But the argument never posits that life is a goal, even though those that wield this argument typically also presume not only that life is a goal, but that humans are the goal. But even perfect fine tuning of the constants does not likely produce humans, so one must also posit that wave function collapse is not random, but guided, resulting in guided evolution among other things.
Right. It argues why the universe is the way it is, not at all why we are part of it. The universe must be fine tuned in order to create the complexity necessary for life. That’s as far as it goes.
Right, it’s dependent on universe’s conditions, hence the argument. Different conditions, no life, not just different life. If the constnts were different, atoms cannot form, or the universe explodes into a cloud of ratiation, or collapses in seconds. A fine balance is needed to give time/stability for the appearance of life.
Because God is a human creation, or worse, a creation by some specific small subset of humans, a God that has a ‘chosen people’, let alone a chosen species?
Only very tiny subset of them (1**). The rest lack the time or complexity to evolve anything even as complicated as a molecule.
Right. There are many (I saw over a dozen listed) kinds of multiverse theory, but the relevant one is what Tegmark classifies as a level II multiverse. But even given that, one has to realize that QM still works in all of them, so why QM at all instead of an entirely different set of rules? So Tegmark level IV multiverse also must be leveraged.
MWI is level III. Levels I && III don’t help since the constants are no different from one world to the next.They just serve to multiply the finite observable universe to infinity, meaning anything that can happen, however improbable, will happen.
Without the fine tuning, life is impossible, not just improbable, in a typical world.
That’s always been a strong counter to any God argument. If the theists can (and do) wave away the necessity of God needing a creator, it’s far simpler to wave away the necessity of the universe from needing a creator.
Some very much are functions of others, and a few might be without our knowing it. Even if they’re thus folded, the improbability of our tuning remains. This is a poor counter.
- There could be a multiverse, hence all values of the constants exist
This is the standard counter, and the ID argument has teeth only if this point is explicitly denied, completely without justification.
- The universe doesn’t look very fine-tuned, given that the vast majority of its volume is extremely hostile to life.
Tuned yes, but far too much resource waste, especially if only humans are the goal. The constants do not yield humans. Guided evolution must also be posited if humans are special. If God wanted only humans, creating a universe of a single star with Earth orbiting would be sufficient. Somewhat different physics so the star never burns out. No entropy.
But an entire universe just to create a targeted species that lasts only for a few moments is really poor design. So I like this counter.
- We don’t know if other constants’ values could also produce some kind of life, particularly if the constants are coupled
There may be some other tunings (actually different, not just close) that produce observers (not necessarily life), but it is very much known that most (to an awful lot of zeroes) of them cannot.
All the electrons in the visible universe are colored red, except one which is green. The green one is posited to be ‘selected’, at random. The argument suggests that it was selected deliberately since none of the red ones serves the purpose intended (whatever that is). The counter is that the green one is no more selected than any of the others. That’s multi-electron theory, denying that the green one has different ontological status than all those red ones.
I picked electrons because there are more ‘wrong’ tunings of the constants than there are electrons in the visible universe.
It’s a constant to us. Yes, it would be a variable over the multiverse. It’s similar to Hubble’s constant, which is a constant to humans (about 70 km/sec/mpc) but actually changes over time, being far larger in the past, and is likely to approach maybe 57 in the long run.
It explains observers, despite observation not being a goal.
I don’t understand your response, and I think most likely you misunderstood the argument. Which would be on me, because I was briefly alluding to the standard arguments, rather than going into them in detail.
So I will expand a little on it here:
There are many dimensionless physical constants, e.g. the vacuum permittivity, Boltzmann constant, Fermi constant etc that seemed like precise, arbitrary parameters of nature but were later found to be derivable from more fundamental parameters like the speed of light.
So, when it comes to the remaining fundamental constants, there’s clearly the possibility that they are also derived from more fundamental properties.
Now, it is true to say that we can’t know that and it’s speculation either way. But the point is, it is reason for us to be wary of pinning a god proof on this observation…it has a bad smell. In essence, it’s a microcosm of general “god of the gaps” arguments; the fact that gaps have been filled in the past doesn’t prove that this one will be…but it’s reason to be nervous about hanging our hat here.
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Hawking proposes that the initial condition of the universe before the Big Bang was a superposition of physical constants, so although many worlds after the Big Bang doesn’t “help”, it does before.
And I assume your levels are from Tegmark? From here:
Similarly, all Level II bubble universes with different physical constants can, in effect, be found as “worlds” created by “splits” at the moment of spontaneous symmetry breaking in a Level III multiverse.[71] According to Yasunori Nomura,[41] Raphael Bousso, and Leonard Susskind,[39] this is because global spacetime appearing in the (eternally) inflating multiverse is a redundant concept. This implies that the multiverses of Levels I, II, and III are, in fact, the same thing.
I agree that the superposition interpretation makes more sense than the inflation bubble view. Both would be level II.
And I assume your levels are from Tegmark?
Yes, and I said as much. Greene listed 9 (not the dozen that I mentioned), which includes us being a simulation, which would very much be a case of ID, but not a case of our designer necessarily being a world like the one we observe.
The counter to this is the turtle one: It explains our improbability by positing something even more improbable deliberately making things the way we observe.
Yes, I said as much. But I also said that the list isn’t just one constant, and even if it is, the tuning of that constant is still a number with an awful lot of digits. So sure, maybe derived from more fundamental properties, but those more fundamental properties still need to be ‘improbably’ tuned if there is but the one world.
My assessment of this one point is that it seems to be a weak falsification of the fine tuning (ID?) argument. The improbability can be reduced, but not eliminated by this means.
I think you’re still missing it. The point is, when we show a constant is derived from others, it is not that we’ve just “turtled” back one level. It’s that we’ve reduced the number of apparently arbitrary constants.
So a theist using an argument of “Look at these 20 finely tuned constants! What are the odds?!” would now need to say “Look at these 19 finely tuned constants!”.
As the number goes down it is a meaningful change, and the “odds” have reduced; it’s not just kicking the can.
In terms of where it ends, who can say, but it may be that there will be no super precise constants at all.
In the meantime, this particular variant of the fine-tuning argument is simply “god of the gaps”.
To accept the fine-tuning argument, one must be able to show that all forms of life are impossible if physical parameters are different. This is a very strong claim, and I don’t know how that could be done.
I never said otherwise. My turtle mention concerned the simulation interpretation, not related to one constant being function of another. For instance, the number of spatial dimensions is not plausibly a function of c, but c is arguably meaningless unless there is at least 1+ spatial and temporal dimension each.
It’s that we’ve reduced the number of apparently arbitrary constants.
Right. Potentially reduced, not eliminated. No amount of that kind of reduction will result in a probability that is plausible if there’s only one roll of the dice. So it does seem to be just kicking the can.
You lost me. How does the FTA explain observers again?
I feel people making the case for a naturalistic explanation of the Universe are expected to have the amswer to all questions about nature.
However, nature has not given up its secrets easily. Many of the questions being asked are about the unimaginably small, about events 14 billion years ago or a trillion years into the future and about things at distances far beyond those humans can ever reach
“What sort of multiverse?”
If we don’t know the answers its often because the answers are unknowable and ultimately not useful. Useful knowledge can almost by definition be tested. Whether or not there are many worlds is not a testable proposition and the amswer has no practical value. We are confined to one version of the world. The theory insists on that
We should therefore make no applogy for not knowing everything.
We can only give our best available account of the world and do so whether, or not, its the one most conducive to our argument.