If there are no correct opinions, also the claim that ‘all humans who have been to mars’ has no extension and it makes perfect sense is incorrect. Again you are making no sense.
Applying a category presupposes criteria that allow one to say if/when the criteria correctly apply or not , this constitutes its discriminative semantic value. And the fact that you keep repeating that your nonsense makes perfect sense to you doesn’t make your views rationally compelling to me.
But from that definition doesn’t follow that “all our opinions are biased”, right? So repeating the claim that “all our opinions are biased” doesn’t make it correct.
How did you assess likelihood in this case? I get what you wish to claim, but you didn’t provide any compelling argument to support it so far.
No idea what you are trying to say. You wrote “Claims of the form ‘all X are Y’ have no logical or semantic issues and are completely normal intelligible claims” but I offered a counter example “all cats are dogs” are of the form ‘all X are Y’ but they make no sense. And I offered that example to show that the semantic contrastive value of the word “cats” and “dogs” do not allow one to claim “all cats are dogs”. The same goes for the syntactic form “all X are Y” that makes sense if “not all X are Y” makes sense.
Also the word “unicorn” has no extension in the real world, but we can say what a unicorn would look like if it existed and what would make the difference between unicorns and other creatures. The same goes with “bias”.
I was talking about evidences in relation to claims I actually made not in relation to claims I didn’t make. I offered a definition of “politics” I didn’t cite any experts.
That definition of politics doesn’t promote any particular political agenda at all, neither explicitly nor implicitly. As I argued, all political views (capitalism, communism, islamism, christianity, nationalism, anarchism, humanism etc. you name it) have to do with competition over scarce resources and competing views over such competition. As an example, I mentioned the communist views which theorise the competition between classes, and promote Communist propaganda competes against Capitalist propaganda in the political struggle. And again “natural” state is not my phrasing it’s yours. If “natural” state means that there is “permanent” competition I already argued that the claim doesn’t even make sense to me nor it’s implied by my definition. With the expression “the nature of politics”, I’m simply referring to what all those pushing a particular political agenda converge on in their understanding of the political task. Even humanist who may push for cooperation to overcome competition presuppose the existence of competing interests among human beings which may lead to conflict, unless they will succeed in pushing cooperation, with the help e.g. of shared knowledge. Unfortunately they must also deal with the fact that there are non-humanist political views which they have to politically struggle with, if they can’t cooperate with . And I guess there are limits to such cooperation: to what extent humanists can cooperate with nazis?
My point was that since in your examples it’s unclear what is the role of cognitive criteria wrt non-cognitive criteria in assessing people biases, your examples didn’t help me much understand our divergences on the notion of “bias”.
No, we do. The fact that we rely on people’s expertise is not an argument against the rationality of such a reliance as a part of our understanding of “shared” knowledge (which BTW humanists may wish to promote, right?). Besides today more than ever scientists must rely on scientific equipment (including computers, accelerators, microscopes etc.) and a wider scientific community to pursue their research. All of which is grounded on knowledge that goes beyond their expertise. In other words, even expertise is grounded on “shared” knowledge. So “trusting” in the context of “shared” knowledge is not necessarily irrational however fallible. And trusting expertise may have its more or less reliable cognitive rules.
Not crazy but it seems you wish to imply from that fact more than you can afford. For example, there are cross-domain methodological approaches that can be used in questioning domain specific expertise. A physician may question the relevance of the findings of a biologist on the ground of statistical notions which both may have, even if biology is not the domain of expertise of a physician. Not all cross-domain methodological approaches need to be so advanced, so there might be different degrees of reviewing means depending on the educational background: e.g. if in a scientific paper findings are reported without citing sources, providing evidence, describing methodology and similar things one can reasonably get suspicious about the scientific value of the paper, without being an expert of the field.
Your question was this not mine. Mine was “what do we mean be ‘politics’?” when we talk about people pushing a “political” agenda whatever that agenda might be? There you have my answer.
I don’t know what “natural state” means. “Natural state” reminds me of a biological state or historically primitive stage of humanity. In any case there is no permanent state of competition, clearly human beings can cooperate over many things. So what? This fact doesn’t change nor contradict my definition of “politics”.
BTW, do you believe that cooperation is a permanent state? A natural state? If not, also the political view you wish to push has to deal with the fact that there are competing interests and views prior to the kind of cooperation you see missing. Your objections go nowhere really. Worse, they are self-damaging.
Who said anything about there being no correct opinions? We’re talking about the intelligibility of claims. Intelligibility and correctness are not the same thing. A claim can be intelligible and incorrect. You’re confusing three principles.
The claim ‘all opinions are biased’ does not require non-biased opinions to exist to be intelligible - this is demonstrated by the fact that ‘all humans who have been to Mars’ is an intelligible category despite having no members
A claim does not have to be true to be intelligible - this is separately demonstrated by the example ‘all cats are dogs’ which is an intelligible claim (we know what the claim wants to be the case), but incorrect.
A biased opinion is not necessarily an incorrect one. Bias is a tendency to judge in accordance with a prior preference. It’s not the same as being wrong.
None of this entails that there are no correct opinions.
But from that definition doesn’t follow that “all our opinions are biased”, right? So repeating the claim that “all our opinions are biased” doesn’t make it correct.
Indeed. You asked for a definition. Not proof of a theory.
How did you assess likelihood in this case? I get what you wish to claim, but you didn’t provide any compelling argument to support it so far.
Again, we’re disentangling your misconstrual of the argument. We haven’t even gotten to supporting evidence yet. In St his instance, however, the theory that all opinions are biased has a long history in the psychological literature, which we could get into, but it’s not the point here. Your shifting the burden of proof. It is not a given that your mode of analysis surmounts bias until I can prove otherwise. It’s your claim that it does, it’s up to you to show that.
I’m simply pointing out here that, according to many highly regarded theories of psychology, bias pervades all opinion forming and, as such, your notion that you could step outside of your political ideology to perform some meta-analysis of how politics works is on shaky ground.
I would have thought, for someone interested in “intellectual gym” the chance to demonstrate the evidence for your view would have been welcomed, not foisted onto the challenging party.
You wrote “Claims of the form ‘all X are Y’ have no logical or semantic issues and are completely normal intelligible claims” but I offered a counter example “all cats are dogs” are of the form ‘all X are Y’ but they make no sense.
Intelligible != correct. Look it up.
I was talking about evidences in relation to claims I actually made…
Then “what evidence do you need” is the expression you’re after, not “what evidence would you need”. I do not need any evidence to prove the claims you’ve currently made are not motivated by political ideology. Currently your claims have been limited to things like the nature of intelligible classes and the value of an analytic approach to politics.
As I argued…
You didn’t. You stated.
No, we do. The fact that we rely on people’s expertise is not an argument against the rationality of such a reliance as a part of our understanding of “shared” knowledge (which BTW humanists may wish to promote, right?).
No one said anything about ‘understanding’. The argument was about adjudication.
So “trusting” in the context of “shared” knowledge is not necessarily irrational however fallible. And trusting expertise may have its more or less reliable cognitive rules.
Nor was the argument about ‘trusting’. Again, it was about adjudication.
A physician may question the relevance of the findings of a biologist on the ground of statistical notions which both may have, even if biology is not the domain of expertise of a physician.
Once more. The argument is not about ‘questioning’ either. It’s about adjudication. A physician may not claim “Biologist A is correct and Biologist B is incorrect” because their grasp of statistics is merely equal to that of the biologists in question. He may offer critique. Critique is not what we’re talking about here.
if in a scientific paper findings are reported without citing sources, providing evidence, describing methodology and similar things…
… then there is not a shadow of doubt it would not be published. I have no naive trust in the infallibility of the peer review process, but I’m damn sure its not going to miss a paper with no citations, no method, and no evidence.
I don’t know what “natural state” means.
The way things are. Your claim is of the form “politics is…” This is claim about the natural state of things. As opposed to a claim that, say, ‘politics’ is just a word with no fixed meaning. Which would make claims about politics not about a natural state, but normative ones.
(Sorry, didn’t notice your remark earlier, so a late reply.)
I agree totally with this.
There are many Russians that don’t like at all Putin and what he has done to the country. And here I really find a real tragic issue if that really would happen:
Let’s say that finally the Russians have had enough of all this imperial bullshit they have been forced to suffer under the Putin years and have had enough of the toxic jingoist imperialism and the corruption and cronyism of the Siloviki. And assume these new “Westernizers” who hate with all of their guts Putinism, the Siloviki and the Slavophiles come into power in Russia. And they would want to join the EU and make a dramatic change to the older Russia.
Great. And how much would we in Europe trust them to stay in power? How much we would fear about a new Putin coming into power or seizing power? How much people would fear that Russians would going back on their old ways? Would we trust this “New Russia” to stay on a new path and not reverting back to it’s former ways?
In fact in the other thread I made I posted a similar question about the US and Trump. Yes, many Americans don’t like Trump. He’s not very popular today. Yet the fact that you cannot go around is that Americans voted Trump to power twice. Which means that his policies are supported at least by an important portion of the voters. That means that it can happen again, perhaps with one more capable populist.
It’s really going to take a long time if that change would happen that the Russian border would be something like the Swedish border to us. Trust doesn’t grow in trees. It simply would take time.
You said it: “‘correct opinions’ makes sense as a category of opinion even if it has no members”.
First, as I said the problem is not the extension of a term, but the intension of a term. I made the example of the unicorn. Even unicorns do not exist but I can specify criteria to establish if unicorns exist or not. So I asked you to provide criteria to establish what distinguishes biased opinions from non biased ones. This is what I called the contrastive/discriminative semantic value.
Second, in the absence of requested clarifications from your side, I found legit to understand the claim “all opinions are biased” in light of my understanding of “bias”. To me “bias” qualifies opinions as cognitively defective. And according to that understanding claiming that “all opinions are cognitively defective” is ultimately self-defeating, because also the opinion “all opinions are cognitively defective” would be cognitively defective. That’s why I find it unintelligible to claim that all opinions are biased.
Third, if “bias” generically refers to the idea that opinions can express some non-cognitive preference, the claim that “all opinions are biased” is not made evident by the definition of “bias” itself (as “all cats are not dogs”). But most of all, notice that your talk of bias was a rebuttal to my questioning psychologically-ethically loaded analysis on cognitive grounds. So it’s not clear to me why the appeal to “all opinions are biased” would make both analytical approaches equal on cognitive grounds, if the qualification “biased” holds independently from their cognitive value.
Not much empirically incorrect, but analytically incorrect. That’s why I claimed it makes no sense if you understand the words “cats” and “dogs”. And even if analytical false claims can be claimed to be intelligible while being analytically false, as you do, fine with me. Still it’s the contrastive meaning of “cats” and “dogs” that excludes the possibility for “dogs” to be “cats” and makes it analytically false. So this example again illustrates my semantic principle.
Still unclear. Here a list of opinions I have:
“I have 5 fingers in each of my hands”
“Today is the 4th March”
“Paris is the capital of France”
“2 + 2 = 4”
“Snow is typically white”
“All cats are not dogs”
“Jokes often make me laugh”
“Somebody called me yesterday”
“Bits value can be either 0 or 1”
“Words are made of letters”
“Watermellon is a type of fruit”
“I’m a human being not a plant”
“There have been no humans who have been to Mars”
“Political views can differ”
Show me how these opinions are biased in the sense you have defined “Bias is a tendency to judge in accordance with a prior preference”.
I wouldn’t expect from somebody claiming “The common ground we have (hopefully) is that of rationality, that X, Y, and Z provide reasons to believe A, B, and C.” and “I’m saying if you choose to believe one narrative over another you must give reasons why otherwise we’ve git nothing to discuss.” the need for much solicitation. Still you claimed “all opinions are biased” without clarifying what you mean by “bias”, despite my solicitations, and without providing evidence, despite my skepticism about the truth of that claim given my understanding of “bias”.
There is no argument to misconstrue. You just made statements unclear to me. I can’t bring up counterexamples to a theory which I do not understand. My idea of partiality in politics doesn’t exclude the possibility of convergence for mutual intelligibility. An example of this is the notion of “politics” but I think that holds for many other more or less interconnected concepts used in geopolitical analysis like “security dilemmas”, “power relations”, “national interest”, “sovereignty”, “ideology” etc. (all of which can figure in pattern of reasoning with practical implications for decision makers) which transcend any particular political agenda and “inform” political competition between particular political agendas.
Part of my intellectual gym is providing definitions. For example, I reported my definition of “politics” to explain my approach to political analysis and why I find political analysis based on the “shared rules” of political competition more enlightening than a psychological-ethical analysis. I also provided reasons to support such a definition after you challenged it (see the example of “communism” and “humanism” versus “capitalism” or “nazism”, see the clarifications on the notion of “power”, and on the notion of “knowledge” as a scarce resource, see my counterargument about the irrelevance of “all opinions are biased” if that doesn’t compromise cognitive efficacy also in the context of political analysis, see my rebuttal “do you believe in permanent cooperation” as a presupposition of some political agenda?). I’m still waiting for you to counter my arguments instead of repeating your questionable statements. Said that, I could elaborate my views further (as I did in the old forum on many occasions) but that’s for now enough to me.
In any case, I’m not sure what your “intellectual gym” is hence my requests of clarification. And what’s most puzzling in your intellectual gym is the fact despite being seemingly supportive of political agendas promoting cooperation over competition you’ve got quite an uncooperative and confrontational attitude in debates. So good luck with your political agenda, dude.
If equal experts can diverge that means that also expertise is not enough for adjudication either, right? So what is the point of your appeal to domain-specific “expertise” when your ad-hoc example implies that domain-specific “expertise” doesn’t let one adjudicate? As I said, if we really can’t decide on cognitive grounds we can suspend judgement instead of choosing one over the other based on non-cognitive preferences (would our suspension of judgement prove that we are unbiased to you in this case?). My point is that, depending on our background education, it’s not impossible for us to adjudicate reliability to one expert over another on compelling cognitive grounds even though we lack domain-specific expertise.
That depends on how you construe your example. But “Yes, yes, and a dozen times, yes” I find it empirically possible that certain cross-domain notions of statistics can help e.g. a physicist understand that “Biologist A is correct and Biologist B is incorrect” . Now what?
Mine was just an example and, as I said, such criteria vary depending on the background education. Besides, in science there is a phenomenon called “predatory publishing” where standards are less strict than other more qualified publishing channels, so even average background knowledge may be enough to spot problematic papers in such cases.
It’s irrelevant if words (including the word “politics”) can change or their usage can be stretched, I’m interested in focusing on what political views I know of have in common despite their particular agenda.
You said it: “‘correct opinions’ makes sense as a category of opinion even if it has no members”
Again, that’s an argument about the way categories work to explain why your counter failed. The key word is if.
In the case that there were no correct opinions, the category ‘correct opinions’ would still be intelligible. Therefore your counter that ‘biased opinions’ isn’t intelligible without there being some ‘unbiased opinions’ is demonstrated false.
Nowhere in that dialectic is there a claim that there actually are no correct opinions.
I asked you to provide criteria to establish what distinguishes biased opinions from non biased ones.
And I provided the APA definition.
the claim that “all opinions are biased” is not made evident by the definition of “bias” itself (as “all cats are not dogs”).
No, it is made evident by decades of research into the matter by scores, if not hundreds, of psychologists. Research which I will not repeat here because;
the burden of proof is on you, it’s your idea I’m critiquing
I’m giving you the credit of assuming you’ve done at least a modicum of research into the field you’re making sweeping claims about and so will already be aware of such theories
I don’t (as expressed before) believe we’re in a position to adjudicate between experts, so the mere existence of such theories is sufficient to reduce the power of your argument from necessity
this is a thread on Ukraine, not psychology
I’m not a psychologist, if you want an explanation of these theories you’re better off going to the source
But most of all, notice that your talk of bias was a rebuttal to my questioning psychologically-ethically loaded analysis on cognitive grounds. So it’s not clear to me why the appeal to “all opinions are biased” would make both analytical approaches equal on cognitive grounds, if the qualification “biased” holds independently from their cognitive value.
Because there’d be no non-biased way to test the cognitive value of the conclusions, so judgement of such would merely repeat the judgements that would have been made in the “psychologically-ethically loaded analysis”, just with the veneer of a pretence at ‘higher level’ thinking.
Show me how these opinions are biased in the sense you have defined “Bias is a tendency to judge in accordance with a prior preference”.
No.
a) again, I’m not a psychologist; I know these theories exist because I have read them, I am not your best source for explaining them
b) this is not the place to demonstrate theories in psychology, this is a thread primarily about the war in Ukraine
c) I neither need, nor want, to demonstrate such theories, it is entirely sufficient for me (and should be for you) that they exist; you don’t have to agree with them, you have to demonstrate how your approach deals with their objections
My idea of partiality in politics doesn’t exclude the possibility of convergence for mutual intelligibility.
We’ve been through this. It’s the likelihood that’s in question, not the possibility.
I think that holds for many other more or less interconnected concepts used in geopolitical analysis like “security dilemmas”, “power relations”, “national interest”, “sovereignty”, “ideology” etc. (all of which can figure in pattern of reasoning with practical implications for decision makers) which transcend any particular political agenda and “inform” political competition between particular political agendas.
You’re begging the question.
You asked us to define such terms. My claim is that any process by which we do so would only lead to definitions biased in favour of our predetermined preferences (in this case political ideology). You can’t answer that charge assuming the answer.
If equal experts can diverge that means that also expertise is not enough for adjudication either, right?
Correct.
So what is the point of your appeal to domain-specific “expertise” when your ad-hoc example implies that domain-specific “expertise” doesn’t let one adjudicate?
Because that’s the bare minimum standard to even be allowed a seat at the table. There’s no point discussing ideas which don’t even meet that standard. My point about adjudication relates to ideas which have met this standard. Think of it as the difference between the qualifiers and the final in football.
My point is that, depending on our background education, it’s not impossible for us to adjudicate reliability to one expert over another on compelling cognitive grounds even though we lack domain-specific expertise.
How?
You can’t do so on the quality of their argument or evidence (that’s the exact domain-specificity they exceed your level in).
You can’t do so in some tangential related field like statistics (again, you will not exceed their level here such as to sit in arbitration, you’ll only, at best,
equal it, meaning their opinion is of equal value to yours.
You can’t do it on some philosophical-logical grounds either. Again, your authority there would at best match theirs since there’s no independent measure of such a body of knowledge to act as arbitrator.
So I can’t see a mechanism. Certainly interested to hear if you think you have one.
I find it empirically possible that certain cross-domain notions of statistics can help e.g. a physicist understand that “Biologist A is correct and Biologist B is incorrect” . Now what?
Well then your counterargument is pointless. As I repeatedly said the problem is not the extension of a concept, but its intention. I already gave you the example of “unicorn”, you already gave the example of “men being in mars”, but I countered that these are not arguments against the principle that words have to have discriminative/contrastive value to be meaningful and showed why.
The reference to the impossibility of having all incorrect opinions came from the fact that you didn’t clarify the notion of bias, and my notion of bias implies that correct opinions and inherently cognitively defective from which it follows that is conceptually impossible that all our opinions are cognitively defective.
So it’s not my misinterpretation the problem, but your lack of intellectual cooperation (no definition of “bias” provided when solicited) and your persistent failure to get the semantic point I was making, and you wished to object.
Yes later you offered a definition. But unfortunately it wasn’t enough to establish that “all our opinions are biased”. It wasn’t an analytical truth. Nor I found it evident. Therefore, if you are here to provide reasons to believe what you believe then you should have been compelled to provide reasons given my skepticism. You are the one pushing for cooperation, right or not?
Then quote an example of decades of research claiming that “all our opinions are biased”.
You are critiquing my views not in light of my own assumptions but in light of your own assumptions which I find questionable either because they are unintelligible to me or uncorroborated.
What are the sweeping claims I made about such theories? Quote me.
What is the argument from necessity you are referring to? Quote me.
Well if you were to claim that my opinions on the Russo-Ukrainian conflict are biased, and “bias” is a psychological notion then I’d like to understand what you mean by that.
Yes I thought so. Unfortunately, I have no idea which theories or experts you are referring to, you didn’t cite even one single theory, expert, paper claiming that literally “all opinions are biased”.
So what? are you implying that a non-biased way to test the cognitive value of the conclusions is cognitively defective? But then we will go back to square one namely that “bias” refers to a cognitively defective opinion. If that is not the case, any accusation of bias is irrelevant to me, since I attribute greater cognitive value of a political analysis grounded on shared rules of different political agendas than the cognitive value of a political analysis that is grounded on non-shared rules of a particular political agenda. The cognitive distortion is more likely to affect the latter kind of analysis than the first kind of analysis. In order to counter my views, focus on what I do care: namely cognitive criteria and their efficacy. I do not care about non-cognitive preferences.
Well, then I think that is very much likely that’s called geopolitical analysis. Tons of research on this for centuries. Are you unfamiliar with the literature? Now what?
I asked you to provide an alternative definition to “politics” that I think it’s shared by different political views. You tried to associate my definition to capitalist and conservative views. And failed because also communism, humanism, islamism, christianity and nationalism must share that definition to make sense of their political task in a way that is intelligible to themselves and their competitors. And you too believe that definition is quite correct: indeed, you too do not believe that cooperation is a given natural permanent state between all human beings, right or not?
I have no idea what you are trying to say. This is how I read it: only if we are able to adjudicate equal experts’ disputes which their level of expertise can’t adjudicate, then we are allowed to discuss ideas.
In other words, only experts should discuss ideas and only the ones that are top expertise, because they can adjudicate the other experts’ disputes. And if among the top experts there are disputes then they shouldn’t discuss ideas.
Meanwhile you are claiming that all opinions, including expert opinions, are biased. Including the one whose expertise enables them to adjudicate equal experts’ disputes. They are biased if they agree and they are biased if they don’t. But that’s irrelevant wrt the adjudication issue based on expertise so on cognitive grounds.
If this understanding of your views is correct, I don’t find anything rationally compelling or enlightening in them. But most of all I have no idea why you are torturing yourself with such self-defeating ruminations. Nor am I sure whether they help you promote your political agenda, or promote cooperation over competition. Let me know if they do.
I told you how. Construing ad-hoc examples to make my argument look more and more unlikely is methodologically questionable. In real life, there actually are cross-domain methodological criteria (including statistics or logic) that, depending on background education, can do the magic (one can find also scientific articles that corroborate the plausibility of my claim: like “Why the Empirical Sciences Need Statistics So Desperately“ by Olle Haggstrom or “The application of statistical physics to evolutionary biology” by Guy Sella , Aaron E Hirsh ).
Besides, as I said, also hard science is grounded on “shared” knowledge: namely, even domain-specific expertise may rely on other domain specific-expertise. So for example, a computer scientist could detect that some paper by biologist A is grounded on some faulty machine learning libraries while another biologist B isn’t . While both based on the their academic background can be considered equally experts. So, even a computer scientist who has no domain specific expertise in biology can spot the faulty biologist. Again, all depends on one’s background education. But, for example in the case of “predatory publishing”, there might be papers that can be legitimately questioned also on the basis of an average background education, if one takes time to seriously review the paper.
Finally, if I am really unable to adjudicate between two experts on cognitively compelling grounds (that can happen, and even more often than I wish), I can suspend my judgement. And will focus on things the experts can agree on.
I take your claim to be that we can find some common meanings and understandings of politics and political terms (like ‘coup d’etat’) by a process of analysis which avoids the ‘psychological’ aspects of more emotive arguments about who’s to blame and what moral boundaries they’ve transgressed, right?
In our discussion, you keep wanting to bring my critique of that argument back to the possibility of finding such agreement or such common ground existing.
That’s not my critique.
My critique is that the process used to find those common understandings will be no less affected by the ‘psychological’ aspects than the process of establishing blame, or moral transgression.
I’ve raised that critique because considerable psychological research has shown how pervasive our biases are - from microsecond first impressions, fake memories, implicit racism, … to the construction of sensory reality itself. These are well established principles and I don’t expect to have to defend their mere existence here.
You have, thus far failed to counter that critique.
A counter to that critique does not consist of an argument over terminology, or a claim that empty sets are unintelligible.
It consists of some reasons why you think the commonly held principles of pervasive bias in psychology would not apply to the process you’re advocating.
Anything less than that is a distraction.
On the subject of expert adjudication…
I have no idea what you are trying to say. This is how I read it: only if we are able to adjudicate equal experts’ disputes which their level of expertise can’t adjudicate, then we are allowed to discuss ideas.
Why would discussion of ideas be limited to adjudication between experts. There’s lots more to discuss beyond who’s correct.
In real life, there actually are cross-domain methodological criteria (including statistics or logic) that, depending on background education, can do the magic (one can find also scientific articles that corroborate the plausibility of my claim: like “Why the Empirical Sciences Need Statistics So Desperately“ by Olle Haggstrom or “The application of statistical physics to evolutionary biology” by Guy Sella , Aaron E Hirsh )
These all offer critique. They do not establish one author is correct and the other incorrect. Who arbitrates?
(And thanks for the references by the way; fascinating looking papers)
there might be papers that can be legitimately questioned also on the basis of an average background education, if one takes time to seriously review the paper.
There might. As I mentioned before the argument is not about ‘questioning’, it’s about adjudication.
Finally, if I am really unable to adjudicate between two experts on cognitively compelling grounds (that can happen, and even more often than I wish), I can suspend my judgement. And will focus on things the experts can agree on.
You are way far off track here. You started raising objections to my views, not the other way around. In particular, you found questionable my view that geopolitical analysis more enlightening than psychological-moral analysis. So I explained why I find it enlightening. I gave you 2 arguments grounded on cognitive reasons: one is that geopolitical analysis offers a conceptual framework (like politics, security dilemma, national interest, power relation) where competing political views can converge despite being grounded on different moral-political agendas. And when I say “can” I’m not referring to mere logical possibility but to the actual disposition of political decision makers and advisors (see Brzeziński or Kissinger to name a few) to converge on such conceptual framework. It’s this framework that lays the ground also for understanding of some political patterns that can not be explained by shared moral-ideological principles: for example the alliance between nazis and Soviet Union during the Second World War. The second argument is that moral-psychological agendas are more prone to confuse cognitive factors and non-cognitive factors, as for example in the case were expectations about how things can go are based on desired outcomes suggested by psychological-moral grounds. This predicament can also lead to the political weaponisation of the “bias” notion as a cognitive distortion which rival political agendas suffer from but not ours (and this argument should suffice to show that I’m certainly not the one claiming that geopolitical analysis is by default unbiased).
So, obviously, if you want to make compelling objections to my views first make an effort to understand what I’m talking about instead of making random objections based on non-shared assumptions of yours, which I don’t find even intelligible.
Besides, I didn’t claim anywhere that “empty sets are unintelligible”, that’s your confused phrasing. And the fact that you keep putting into my mouth your misunderstanding of my claims is rather telling of your intellectual honesty. I said that it’s conceptually impossible that all opinions are biased, if “bias” ultimately refers to cognitive failures because it’s a conceptually self-defeating claim. And this argument should make you understand that the claim that “the class ’correct opinions’ is empty” is unintelligible while “the class ’unicorn’ is empty” is intelligible: in both cases it’s the discriminative semantic value of those words that grants their intelligible vs non-intelligible usage.
I never claimed that “bias” doesn’t apply to my process, indeed you can not quote me claiming this. Nor anything I said implies such a claim. I questioned your notion of “bias” when I read the claim “all opinions are biased”: because either the notion of “bias” is cognitively grounded then it doesn’t make sense or it’s analytically self-refuting, or it’s non-cognitively grounded, then it is irrelevant wrt what I was arguing. People, politicians, analysts can be biased all you want (in the sense of supporting one political agenda over another) and still converge on a conceptual framework to make their political decisions/actions/cost-benefit reasoning reciprocally intelligible.
After all these counterarguments of mine, instead of addressing them pertinently, you still repeat your initial random objections as if I was compelled by them, which I’m not for the reasons you keep ignoring (and challenging questions that you keep dodging).
I have no idea, you brought that up not me. And you brought that up wishing to make a point which I don’t get. Your ad-hoc pointless example is even more self-damaging than it looks. Indeed, you not only are unable to adjudicate between “equal” experts’ disputes if you are not an equal expert. You are not even able to identify “equal” experts on domain-specific expertise grounds ex-hypothesis. So in your ad-hoc pointless example you must assume a non-expert “shared” knowledge background (e.g. about academic titles, number of articles published, scientific magazines where articles where published, etc.) which may be cognitively irrelevant to asses “equal” expertise if such and adjudication can be justified only on domain-specific expertise.
I told you repeatedly. Cognitive criteria to arbitrate, adjudicate, judge who is right or wrong in experts’ disputes depend on the educational background of people. Those who have an adequate cross-domain methodological background to spot failures in the experts’ research despite lacking domain-specific expertise and adjudicate, arbitrate, judge with cognitive compelling reasons who is right and who is wrong.
But I still don’t see the point of your argument. How is this argument useful to support your objections against my view that geopolitical analysis is cognitively more enlightening then psychological-moral analysis or to prove that “all opinions are biased” (indeed also those who are able to adjudicate according to your high standards of expertise would be biased anyways ) or that I’m not here to convince you about my personal political agenda (which I didn’t even expose).
Who adjudicates that claim “2 + 2 = 4” and not “2 + 2 = 3” ? You yourself if you learned how to sum numbers right? The same goes for all claims made by domain-specific experts. If you have enough pertinent background knowledge, even if it is not domain-specific, you can provide compelling reasons to invalidate the findings of one scientist over the other. If you do not have it, you can suspend your judgement and focus on what they agree on. Or not. So what?
make an effort to understand what I’m talking about
I perfectly well understand what you’re talking about. Your explanation above is quite clear, and doesn’t change my objection. You claim…
geopolitical analysis offers a conceptual framework (like politics, security dilemma, national interest, power relation) where competing political views can converge despite being grounded on different moral-political agendas.
I disagree. I have neither seen evidence of that convergence, nor does the psychological literature seem to make it likely. You’ve given no reasons whatsoever why defining concepts is more likely to lead to ‘convergence’ than talking about ethics. there is widespread agreement on ethics (with peripheral disputes). There is widespread agreement on terminology and conceptual frameworks (with peripheral disputes). There’s no default reason why one would lead to more convergence than another and you’ve given none.
the actual disposition of political decision makers and advisors (see Brzeziński or Kissinger to name a few) to converge on such conceptual framework
You’ve given no evidence of their having done so. They agreed on a course of action. Who’s to say they didn’t also agree on a shared ethical approach - such as minimising risk to the ordinary populations of both countries)?
It’s this framework that lays the ground also for understanding of some political patterns that can not be explained by shared moral-ideological principles: for example the alliance between nazis and Soviet Union during the Second World War
Again, the Soviets and the Nazis agreed on a shared course of action. You’ve given no evidence this was ‘explained’ by anything, and, as per my objection, any ‘explanation’ you give is likely to arise from your own political preferences.
expectations about how things can go are based on desired outcomes suggested by psychological-moral grounds.
Again, you’ve provided no evidence that this is the case. But also this gives a very good example of the kind of biased statement masquerading as analysis that I’m talking about.
What’s actually happening, I suspect, in these discussions, is that someone (most likely on the left) is proposing a peaceful, anti-war, perhaps socialist solution. you don’t like that because is clashes with your personal ideology. But in stead of arguing the actual disagreement, you try to gain the ‘high-ground’ by claiming they are suffering form a ‘cognitive confusion’ about what what they ‘want’ to be the case and what actually can be the case.
The problem is that what actually can be the case is not an established fact like gravity or the speed of light, it’s hotly disputed. People are not mistaking desired outcomes from possible ones. They are disagreeing with you about what the possible ones are and you’re using a cheap rhetorical tactic to sidestep that debate.
I never claimed that “bias” doesn’t apply to my process, indeed you can not quote me claiming this. Nor anything I said implies such a claim.
You said
moral-psychological agendas are more prone to confuse cognitive factors and non-cognitive factors
which implies alternative approaches are not. Confusing cognitive and non-cognitive factors, claiming an out come is more possible than it is because you want it to be (the exact thing you claim these approached lead to) is a bias.
If you are not claiming your approach avoids this, then what are its merits?
you still repeat your initial random objections as if I was compelled by them
No, I repeat them because they remain pertinent. I’ve no idea whether you’re compelled by them. As we’ve established. I do not read minds.
which I don’t get
Evidently.
Cognitive criteria to arbitrate, adjudicate, judge who is right or wrong in experts’ disputes depend on the educational background of people. Those who have an adequate cross-domain methodological background to spot failures in the experts’ research despite lacking domain-specific expertise and adjudicate, arbitrate, judge with cognitive compelling reasons who is right and who is wrong.
… and I’ve already pointed out that this is a very large pool who will disagree among themselves. So again - who arbitrates.
If you can point to a single example in history where the scientific process has been “Professor A points out flaw in paper and all other scientists in the field immediately agree”, I’d be surprised. I’ll eat my hat if you can provide evidence this any kind of general trend.
I read academic papers all the time for my work. I can count on one hand the number of times arbitration such as you describe has taken place. More generally the pattern will be that some reviewing academic will point out a flaw, another reviewing academic will disagree that it’s a flaw, the original academic will defend their position. If it’s a big issues, a few more academics might weigh in offering a range of opinions.
It’s vanishingly rare that a simple and obvious error is picked up at this stage. Especially nowadays with the popularity of pre-print servers. Even if an error is spotted late it’s usually corrected in the following journal publication and likely to be either part of a corrigendum or the paper will be retracted.
Who adjudicates that claim “2 + 2 = 4” and not “2 + 2 = 3” ? You yourself if you learned how to sum numbers right?
As I said above, no paper is going to make it through peer review, pre-print, and potential correction/retraction with an error like 2+2=3 in it.
The overwhelming majority of dispute between academics is unresolveable by non-experts and generally onyl resolved over long periods of time by the experts themselves.
But again, this provides us with a good example of the appeal this kind of analysis has. You want to be able to see a paper saying something you don’t like and pretend you can use your Very Smart Logic to show it’s wrong. You can’t. You have no authority to arbitrate in such cases.
The convergence I’m referring to is simply about a conceptual framework. Such a conceptual framework emerges from the clash of competing political views and allows reciprocal intelligibility among competitors, because what competitors share—if not ideology—is the competitive environment they are in: the struggle over scarce resources to attain non-shared desired outcomes. This conceptual framework doesn’t ensure convergence in the sense of cooperation between competing political agendas, nor does it ensure that one is safe from cognitive distortions triggered by non-shared assumptions. But it still allows one to identify common patterns of reasoning and common patterns of danger detection and response that transcend in-group, ideologically driven thinking, no matter what political views one supports. We all are rationally compelled to rise above our own ideologically driven reasoning in order to, at the very least, make sense of the competitive environment we all find ourselves in, to detect risks and opportunities and deal with them in the pursuit of non-shared desired goals. Such cross-ideological patterns of reasoning can then pave the way either for cooperation to overcome ideologically competing interests (see the example of the alliance between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany) or for polarizing divisions within the same political front (for example, between maximalist vs. minimalist, hawkish vs. dovish, and idealist vs. pragmatic views).
[quote=“Pseudonym, post:132, topic:65, full:true”]
there is widespread agreement on ethics (with peripheral disputes). There is widespread agreement on terminology and conceptual frameworks (with peripheral disputes). [/quote]
So you mean that Nazis, Zionists, capitalists, communists, Muslims, and Christians all agree on the same ethical principles? Or that their disagreement is just a peripheral dispute?
I’m literally saying that the conceptual framework (including notions like “national interest,” “power balance,” “security dilemmas,” “international order,” “territorial sovereignty,” etc.) I’m referring to is indeed the type of conceptual framework used in geopolitical analysis. To illustrate the point, here some bibliographical hints: regarding Kissinger, the notion of ‘national interest’ is central, for example, in ‘Diplomacy’ (1994), where he argues that effective statesmen identify their country’s national interests and act accordingly, even when moral or ideological norms pull in other directions. In ‘Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century’ (2001), Kissinger discusses the U.S. national interest in key regions (Europe, Asia, the Middle East, the Western Hemisphere, and Africa), attempting to formulate policies based on these interests. In ‘A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812–1822’ (1957), he offers a historical case study of how 19th-century statesmen reconciled balance-of-power politics with what they viewed as their national interests and the ‘legitimacy’ of the order.
Regarding Brzezinski, ‘The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives’ (1997) is a key statement on U.S. strategy in Eurasia, advocating the preservation of American primacy as a national interest. In ‘The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership’ (2004), he contrasts strategic options for the United States, emphasizing which paths best serve long-term American interests. In ‘Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power’ (2012), Brzezinski revisits U.S. national interests, considering a more multipolar world and the challenges that come with it in a post-crisis context.
Geopolitical research can investigate “national interest” like psychological research can investigate “biases”.
There is also a reason why I mentioned Brzezinski and Kissinger instead of, for example, Mearsheimer: unlike Mearsheimer, Brzezinski and Kissinger were directly involved as official advisors to political decision-makers (especially in executive roles) and in shaping actual policy decisions.
I have no idea why you are bringing this up. Whether Brzezinski or Kissinger agreed on a course of action or on ethical views is totally irrelevant with respect to what I’m arguing.
But since we are on the subject, and more directly related to the topic at hand, we can say that Brzezinski and Kissinger agreed that the USSR/Russia was the central strategic problem, but they diverged sharply on how hard to push it and how much weight to give to values and national self-determination versus stability and accommodation. For example, Kissinger tended to see the Soviet Union as a durable great power that had to be managed and accommodated through détente, arms control, and tacit respect for its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, whereas Brzezinski saw the USSR more as a “fragile” empire built on suppressed nationalities and believed it could be weakened by supporting national and democratic movements in its periphery and satellites.
In any case, my focus here is not on Brzezinski’s or Kissinger’s specific geopolitical views. I mentioned them only as examples of geopolitical analysts.
You can consult online summaries on this: Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact - Wikipedia or German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact | History, Facts, & Significance | Britannica. Hitler and Stalin justified their 1939 Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact (a non-aggression treaty enabling the division of Eastern Europe) as a pragmatic necessity for national security (for example, avoiding a two-front war) and strategic advantage, despite their ideological enmity (“a pact with the devil”). In other words, notions such as “national interest,” “sphere of influence,” “national security,” “political strength,” and “pragmatic necessity” guided their decision-making process, and such notions cannot follow from their non-shared ethical or ideological assumptions.
Show me how that explanation conceptually follows from my political preferences. Then give me your explanation of the Soviet–Nazi alliance as it conceptually follows from your own political preferences, so we can see the difference.
I take it to be common knowledge that people can occasionally engage in wishful thinking, where expectations are driven by desirable outcomes. Wishful thinking starts as a sort of infantile reflex: the communication of a desire (such as basic survival needs) and the empathic care of others (such as parents) are often enough to get those desires satisfied (no matter how).
This sort of infantile reflex to form naive expectations that desired outcomes can be achieved (again, no matter how), especially if one desires them strongly enough can spill over into adult life, manifesting itself in one’s private or public life, in ourselves and in others (think of religious beliefs in God and prophets, think of in the epic hero narratives). Also in politics we may see similar naive expectations: there is hardly a more infantile cognitive reflex in collective life than taking political leaders or political elites or political gurus as saviors—the ones who are going to fix all our problems (no matter how). So I’m surprised that you need evidence for that—especially if wishful thinking is a phenomenon actually investigated in psychological research on bias, something you claim to be familiar with, right?
Anyways, since we are on the subject, here are some sources:
“Knowing Versus Caring: The Role of Affect and Cognition in Political Perceptions” https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/0162-895X.00224
“Partisan Wishful Thinking in Polarized Times” https://osf.io/download/wc4qh
“The Heart Trumps the Head: Desirability Bias in Political Belief Revision” https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5536309/
(Make no mistake, I’m interested in engaging in a conceptual investigation rather than an empirical one. I therefore take the findings of empirical studies only as illustrative for the conceptual investigation I’m interested in.)
Let’s dive a bit more into your very confusing, if not confused, conceptual framework.
Concerning your scenario: what is “But instead of arguing the actual disagreement” supposed to mean? If everything were just about personal preferences, what would there be to argue about? A likes ice cream, B hates ice cream—what is there to argue about? Someone on the left proposes a peaceful, anti-war, perhaps socialist solution, and someone else rejects it—what is there to argue about in such a disagreement? If you believe that geopolitical analysis is as biased as ideologically driven analysis, and that your arguments make sense, why do you keep arguing with me or with anybody else who disagrees with you? Why is there a need to argue at all when all opinions merely express what one likes? Once the disagreement is acknowledged, what is the next argumentative step? Toward what goal? You list the things you like to believe, and I list the things I like to believe; some of the beliefs you like to believe match some of the beliefs I like to believe, and some do not—now what?
Is the claim “all opinions are biased” merely an expression of what you like to believe? Is the claim that gravity or the speed of light are established facts simply something you like to believe? Are physicists’ opinions biased because all opinions are biased? Does “well-established fact” mean something more than merely what one likes to believe? If so, what else?
Is your appeal to the psychological literature on bias a way for you to gain the “high ground” and then claim that “all opinions are biased” is a well-established fact in the psychological literature, even though you are not a psychologist (and therefore do not have the domain-specific expertise to assess the accuracy of psychological research, levels of expertise, or adjudicate expert disputes that may affect research on bias), and even though, according to your view, domain-specific expertise is biased just as non-expert views are?
Why would someone be “proposing” to someone else a peaceful, anti-war, perhaps socialist solution to the Russo–Ukrainian war? Why couldn’t he simply fix the Russo–Ukrainian war by himself if that is the political outcome he likes to believe possible, without proposing anything to anybody? By the way, if all opinions are just expressions of what one likes to believe on non-cognitive grounds, and the leftist dude likes peaceful coexistence between Russia and Ukraine, then why doesn’t the leftist dude simply believe that Russia and Ukraine are already at peace—that is, that there is no ongoing war between the two countries? Does that mean that he likes to believe that Russia and Ukraine are at war?
Concerning claims such as “you don’t like that because it clashes with your personal ideology” and “you’re using a cheap rhetorical tactic to sidestep that debate”: are these accurate descriptions or explanations of what I am doing, or merely something convenient for you to believe because it confirms your belief that I am not a leftist, pacifist, socialist dude, and that you are more intellectually honest than I am? Are these descriptions or explanations “established facts” like gravity or the speed of light? Are such descriptions or explanations promoting cooperation or overcoming competition between you and me, or between pacifist, leftist socialists and their political counterparts?
My argument goes as follows:
If reasoning in terms of “national interest,” “sphere of influence,” “national security,” “political strength,” “pragmatic necessity,” “territorial sovereignty,” “strategic alliances,” etc. is what makes competing political decision-makers and advisors reciprocally understandable, then we can take this conceptual framework as the “shared rules” of the geopolitical competitive game and use it to understand how the game is actually played, independently of one’s own desired outcomes or ideological preferences—even when desired outcomes and ideological preferences are still present. Why? Because the analysis focuses on cross-ideological concerns, patterns of reasoning, and cognitive and practical challenges. Indeed, every political agenda, independently of one’s own political leaning (communism, Nazism, Zionism, Islamism, capitalism, feminism, pacifism, Christianity, etc.), is concerned with: internal cohesion within the political base and/or leadership; the degree of material and emotional sacrifice their base is ready to tolerate in order to politically “fight” for the cause; the margins for negotiation or compromise depending on power relations; the need to promote convenient propaganda that is self-promoting and/or discrediting of competitors (for example, denouncing competitors’ biased views while sparing oneself the same treatment); the struggle for power projection while avoiding overstretch; and the struggle to bridge the gap between desired objectives and the available means to achieve them.
A shared conceptual framework that allows one to establish and assess political facts, goals, and expectations, without grounding them in non-shared ideological assumptions, can explain political outcomes that would otherwise not be expected from ideological premises alone—for example, divisions among political actors within the same or ideologically proximate political front, or alliances between political actors belonging to ideologically opposed fronts.
A shared conceptual framework for establishing and assessing political facts, goals, and expectations—one that is not grounded in non-shared ideological assumptions—also offers cognitive criteria for better detecting distorted perceptions or expectations grounded in ideologically driven reasoning. Here an analogy with chess may help: in chess there are shared rules that allow one to understand facts, goals, and strategies in a given situation. Of course, misjudgments are possible: one can blunder a queen due to “tunnel vision,” “overconfidence,” or tactical miscalculations. But it is again with the help of those rules that people can become aware of such misjudgments or detect their own cognitive distortions. Perhaps people do not detect such distortions in time; perhaps they never detect them because they never engage in post-game analysis; or even if they do, they may not be expert enough to do it properly. Still, it is in light of those shared rules that one can learn to identify cognitive distortions. In other words, even if it is true that people can be biased, or that biases are so pervasive that we can even find them in chess games, this fact does not prevent people from understanding a chess game in light of its shared rules (that is, recognizing that what they are seeing is a chess game, not a basketball game) and using that understanding to detect biases, cognitive distortions, and limits of knowledge. The same applies to the geopolitical game.
Despite the fact that ideologically driven reasoning can introduce cognitive distortions (and, as cognitive distortions, they must in principle be detectable), talking about bias is not the primary focus of geopolitical analysis in the way it is in ideological critique. Why? Because such reasoning can still be politically functional in promoting in-group loyalty, cohesion, and/or consensus around a political leadership. Once again, this is true for all particular political views (communism, Nazism, Zionism, Islamism, capitalism, feminism, pacifism, Christianity, etc.), independently of non-shared ideological assumptions.
In light of these considerations, ideological critique is misleading with respect to geopolitical analysis in three ways. First, because of its intellectual dishonesty: appeals to cognitive distortions are typically directed at rival political views, not at one’s own—amounting to a self-serving double standard. Second, because such intellectual dishonesty itself emerges as one of the common cross-ideological features that ideologically driven political views share while clashing with one another. It is part of the fabric of political competition that geopolitical analysts aim to describe and/or explain independently of the militant impulses of ideological critique.
And make no mistake: what I am saying does not amount to claiming that, as you suggest, “all opinions are biased.” If bias refers to epistemic distortions, then there must be opinions that are not biased, in light of which biases are detected. If bias refers to ideological preferences, not all opinions reflect ideological preferences. Nor does my argument deny the possibility that ideologically driven reasoning can be grounded in genuine and unresolved domain-specific expert disputes, as you suggest. On the contrary, your appeal to clashes of deeply held preferences (such as the disagreement between pacifists and non-pacifists) or to clashes of epistemic views (genuine but unresolved expert disputes) actually reinforces my background understanding of political competition—the very understanding you intended to question.
Third, even if all cognitive distortions triggered by ideologically driven reasoning were removed, that would not necessarily eliminate the reasons for political competition. Our domain-specific expertise and/or shared knowledge about how to produce and redistribute scarce resources effectively may still fail to provide ways to overcome in-group versus out-group competitive reasoning through cooperation.
Again, I have no idea why you keep bringing this up, since it is totally irrelevant with respect to what I’m arguing. But since we are on the subject, my approach is still the same: can two experts honestly and compellingly disagree while still being intelligible to one another? If they are intelligible to one another, on what grounds? I would say that they share enough methodological background to enable them to understand their different views and the related cognitive challenges.
Think about the theoretical revolution that Einstein brought about in physics: how could physicists in Einstein’s time understand the cognitive challenges that Einstein’s theory posed to Newtonian views even before seeing it empirically confirmed? It is again shared epistemological or methodological assumptions that grant reciprocal intelligibility, not non-shared assumptions.
The same goes in politics. For example, there are competing geopolitical analyses of the Russo–Ukrainian war—for instance, neoconservatives versus Mearsheimer. Yet how can they understand the cognitive challenges that one analysis poses to the other? Again, by relying on a shared geopolitical conceptual framework.
Once again, as far as I’m concerned, the appeal to domain-specific expert disputes is totally irrelevant, since my argument focuses on “shared” rules for reciprocal intelligibility. Indeed, even in the case of domain-specific expert disputes, reciprocal intelligibility must be grounded in shared epistemological assumptions. Likewise, in politics we can investigate “shared” patterns of reasoning that emerge in the political struggle between competitors, independently of their non-shared ideological views. As for geopolitical expert disputes, which go beyond my background knowledge, I do not need to adjudicate them, and it does not matter if there is no adjudicating authority to resolve the dispute. In such cases, one can simply suspend judgement or choose according to non-cognitive preferences, without thereby introducing cognitive distortions. Even then, however, one can still frame the dispute, and the inability to adjudicate it, in light of a shared conceptual framework that makes the dispute reciprocally intelligible (e.g. Mearsheimer talks about American security dilemmas and national interests in a way that differs from the neocons’ because of x, y, and z). Thus, the purpose of the “Very Smart Logic” I am referring to is not necessarily to adjudicate expert disputes, but to make the dispute intelligible in light of certain shared assumptions, even when adjudication is not possible.
As far as you are concerned, the dialectical force of your adjudication requirement in cases of domain-specific expert disputes is undermined by your own background assumptions. Indeed, the appeal to domain-specific expertise is made moot by the fact that such expertise is not sufficient to prevent honest disagreement between equally qualified experts ex hypothesis (a possibility that I never needed to deny). At the same time, any appeal to equal expertise, or to an expert authority capable of adjudicating expert disputes, is made moot by the claim that “all opinions are biased” anyway. Indeed, this would render non-expert assessments of equal expertise, appeal to expert authority, and the expert disputes adjudication by an expert authority itself biased as well. Not to mention that it remains mysterious the reason that rationally compels anybody to even rely on domain-specific expertise. One can just go about his day by believing whatever is consistent with one ideological preferences with or without any expert backup.
So you claim. What I’ve yet to see is any evidence.
I mean that they are no less likely to share ethical principles than they are conceptual frameworks, or semantic understandings.
Your example, supposedly proving such ‘convergence’ was the Nazi-Soviet alliance. You failed to provide any proof that any conceptual convergence took place. They just agreed on a course of action. That’s all.
All these illustrate is that both authors used the terms. Not that they had any mutual understanding of what they meant. They may still have used those terms and meant almost completely different things by them (within reason - they’re both competent English speakers).
I bet there is…
I’m sure it’s a Very Smart and Logical reason and the fact that Mearsheimer happens to disagree with your personal ideology is a complete coincidence.
…is not …
Justifying a course of action politically is not the same thing as the actual thinking behind the strategy. Notwithstanding this, there’s still no evidence they actually had the same understanding of those terms.
But all of this is besides the point since I’m not arguing it’s impossible to share concepts. I’m arguing that attempts by one party to analyse another’s are just thinly veiled attempts to push an agenda. As you’re proving here.
Of all the people posting on this thread, you’ve raised the need for ‘conceptual analysis’ with only two. The two who’ve been critical of the Western narrative.
Although I’m sure that’s just coincidence too, just like dropping Mearsheimer.
This is a common tactic of yours and it wastes your time and mine.
No one is arguing about the possibility. I’m arguing about the ability to determine, to judge, to arbitrate. It’s pointless you providing reams of evidence that people can engage in wishful thinking because the argument is about whether anyone can reliability judge whether they actually are engaging in wishful thinking at any given time.
Let’s dive a bit more into your very confusing, if not confused, conceptual framework.
… is about as obviously a prejudicial attempt at ‘analysis’ as it gets. the framing is sneering from the start, you’ve deliberately used the least charitable, and in some case outright fabricated, versions of what I’ve said to make it sound as absurd as possible.
These are pretty standard rhetorical tricks, used in debate worldwide - I’ve used more than a few myself. What they’re not is dispassionate anaylsis aimed at mutual understanding free from ‘psychological cognitive errors’. You want waht I’m saying to sound rubbish so your ‘analysis’ of it sytarts from that premise and is biased by that objective.
Exactly the same will happen with an analysis of my use of terminology, my ‘understanding’ of mutual concepts, etc. You want what I’m saying about the Ukraine war to be wrong so any analysis will be biased by that objective and used, not in the aim of mutual understanding, but exactly as you’ve done above, as a rhetorical trick to ridicule opposing views.
You might think you’re playing 4D chess but I’m afraid you’re about as transparent as an open window.
I know. You’ve repeated it quite clearly before. You’re just not providing any evidence for it.
Using those temrs is not evidence that anyone is reasoning in those terms. The very ‘conceptual analysis’ you suggest we carry out takes as it’s base assumption that people can use those terms without having reasoned using an understanding of the concepts.
Even if we were to grant that people reason in those terms, it also does not follow from a fact that reasoning in those terms makes decision-makers and advisors reciprocally understandable, that we can then understand anything about how the ‘game’ is played by doing likewise. Understanding a thing and being reciprocally understood are two different mental activities.
Lastly, even if we grant this last fact, that we can understand how the ‘game’ is played by reasoning in those terms, it does not follow that we will actually do so in preference to using such semantics as a mask to cover further ideological promotion. For example…
there are competing geopolitical analyses of the Russo–Ukrainian war—for instance, neoconservatives versus Mearsheimer. Yet how can they understand the cognitive challenges that one analysis poses to the other? Again, by relying on a shared geopolitical conceptual framework.
No one’s disputing the existence of shared frameworks. We all use English and are understood. This has nothing to do with the plausibility of being able to ‘analyse’ those frameworks without the same bias and irresolvable disagreement that arises in ethical disputes.
my argument focuses on “shared” rules for reciprocal intelligibility.
As for geopolitical expert disputes, which go beyond my background knowledge, I do not need to adjudicate them, and it does not matter if there is no adjudicating authority to resolve the dispute. In such cases, one can simply suspend judgement or choose according to non-cognitive preferences, without thereby introducing cognitive distortions.
One could…
…or… one could do exactly as you did and come up with the first plausible sounding reason to dismiss academics who you don’t agree with, raise up those you do and thus confirm the biases you came into the discussion with.
Choices, choices…
the appeal to domain-specific expertise is made moot by the fact that such expertise is not sufficient to prevent honest disagreement between equally qualified experts ex hypothesis (a possibility that I never needed to deny).
Not at all, the ideas of academics are discussed all the time in academia. The ideas of the university gardener are not. It’s uncontroversial that there is a difference between ideas sufficiently qualified to be part of academic disputes, and ideas sufficiently authoritative to actually resolve those disputes.
At the same time, any appeal to equal expertise, or to an expert authority capable of adjudicating expert disputes, is made moot by the claim that “all opinions are biased” anyway.
Again, “biased” does not equal “wrong”. This is not a difficult concept to understand. Two academics may well have chosen their preferred theories about the biological origins of life as a result of re-existing biases. That is not the same as a person believing life was started by a race of interstellar aliens. Choosing one of the available plausible, well-evidenced theories is not the same as choosing a crackpot theory with no evidence.
The choice is a result of bias. The pool from which to choose is a result of meeting standards of academic rigour.
… but you already know that, further demonstrating how any attempt at ‘analysis’ is nothing but a smokescreen for ideological rhetoric.
If you are blind, there is no evidence you can see.
No, they do not have the same impact in politics. For example Capitalist and Communist disagree on ethical grounds when debating work exploitation, but they both converge in understanding that Capitalist and Communist have political competing interests. Nazis and Zionist disagree on ethical grounds when debating anti-semitism still they converge in understanding even Jews can find convenient agreements with Nazis (Haavara Agreement - Wikipedia). Zionist and Pro-Palestinians disagree on ethical grounds when debating over genocide, but they both understand the imbalance of military power. Ukrainian and Russians disagree on ethical grounds when debating over Ukrainian national self-determination, but they both understand that, under the current circumstances, Ukrainian national self-determination has greater chance to survive outside the Russian sphere of influence than inside Russian sphere of influence. Isis and Catholic Church disagree on ethical grounds on matter of decapitating enemies’ heads, still they agree that muslims are more prone to follow muslim leaders than Christian leaders in case of conflict between muslim and christians.
On the other side, even though the political spectrum places extreme left and extreme right on opposite sides, and this reflects their ethical disagreement on lots of subjects (like immigration and gender equality), still they can politically converge when it’s matter to fight common political enemies (leftists socialist pacifist can politically oppose the Western support to Israel as much as anti-semite Neo-nazis).
Geopolitical reasoning helps understand that the prospects of political cooperation and rivalry between competing political agendas go beyond what one would expect assuming shared ethical principles.
When you talked about “bias” and referred to the psychological literature, did you provide proof that they had any mutual understanding of what they meant instead of using that term and mean almost completely different things by them (within reason - they’re both competent English speakers)? Or that your usage of the word is the same they use?
Most importantly, you do not seem to take my conceptual analysis for what it is. I’m not an historian nor am I interested in militant political debates as you seem to be. Nor I’m claiming that the conceptual convergence is always granted and complete. I just pointed out that that there is a basic and shared conceptual framework that emerges while competing political agendas clash and which is apt to describe the competitive environment independently from ethical or personal preferences. But I also specified on many occasions that the convergence I’m referring to is dispositional and conditional: competitive agents are compelled to converge for mutual understanding. And this holds true for the political language as ordinary language. Even the one we use to talk about “bias”, so much so that as soon I had the impression we didn’t use the word in the same way I asked you to clarify what you mean, assuming that at least we converge in our understanding of the words you use for clarifying what you mean by “bias”. And notice, I’m still not sure we understand each other on this issue. I’m not sure that you use the word “bias” in the same way psychology does.
That’s possible but rather unlikely. Neither accused the other of misunderstanding the word “national interest” or other geopolitical analysts. The point is that such conceptual framework is about convergence in usage but to what extent they converge can be matter of empirical investigation (which I’m not engaging in). For example, politicians never offer an analytical definition of what “national interest” is supposed to mean, still they use it to make themselves understood to others, including competitors:
Trump: “Our new strategy is based on a principled realism, guided by our vital national interests, and rooted in our timeless values”. (Remarks by President Trump on the Administration’s National Security Strategy – The White House)
Putin: “Our position is clear: if you want to discuss security and stability issues that are critical for the entire planet, this must be done as a package including, of course, all aspects that have to do with our national interests and have a direct bearing on the security of our country, the security of Russia.” (Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly • President of Russia)
Xi Jinping: “Confronted with drastic changes in the international landscape, especially external attempts to blackmail, contain, blockade, and exert maximum pressure on China, we have put our national interests first, focused on internal political concerns, and maintained firm strategic resolve.” (https://www.idcpc.org.cn/english2023/tjzl/cpcjj/20thPartyCongrssReport/)
Natanyahu: “They failed because they did not strike the right balance between Israel’s vital security and national interests, and the Palestinians’ aspirations for self-determination” (Full text of Netanyahu's speech: Today recalls historic day of Israel's founding | The Times of Israel)
Khamenei: “he said inspectors would gain access to these sites only “when Iran perceives a national interest” in allowing it.” (https://www.iranintl.com/en/202510199120)
I don’t know if you wish to argue that they all are equivocating each other when using the English words “national interest” in official speeches, due to lack of English proficiency or because they are all biased. But I’m just fine to assume that there must be enough convergence to make them mutually intelligible: for example, whenever political leaders talk about “national interest”, anybody expects them to set priorities in their domestic and foreign policies in line with what has been labelled as national interest, anybody expects human and material resources are going to be drained in support of those policies, anybody expects that foreign countries threatening what is labeled as “national interest” (like “national security”) is perceived as “provokation” and that is of paramount importance to energetically counter (diplomatically, economic, and/or military) depending on available means and strategies. Then geopolitical analysis can investigate or elaborate further or generalise the notion of “national interest” as Mearsheimer did (in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001). “Great powers are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals… because having more power enhances a state’s chances of survival. States therefore act to maximize their power and protect their national interests in an anarchic international system.”) or make comparisons, between what is taken to be the national interest for the US, Russia and China. Or different US administrations over time. Still the usage can not be equivocal the way you speculate.
And clearly you do not seem to realise how self-defeating your attempt to question my claim is. Indeed, many people including Mearsheimer (https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Why-the-Ukraine-Crisis-Is.pdf) support the claim that Russia has been “provoked“ by NATO enlargement and by the Western promise to expand further to include Ukraine, that the Russians have always told the West what the red-lines were “Putin’s pushback should have come as no surprise. After all, the
West had been moving into Russia’s backyard and threatening its core strategic interests, a point Putin made emphatically and repeatedly”. What does that mean? That when Russia was expecting to be equivocated, nor pacifists critical to Western policies believe that Russia was equivocated.
Again you don’t seem to realise how self-defeating your argument is.
First question: is it true or not that Brzezinski and Kissinger influenced US policies more than Mearsheimer ever could? Yes and the reason to point that out is to counter a potential objection (geopolitical analysts may talk about “national interest”, “security dilemma”, “power balance”, “territorial sovereignty”, “alliances” but that doesn’t mean that actual political leaders take their analysis into account).
Second question: is it true that this favours what you believe to be my pro-war ideology? No, because I mentioned Kissinger and Brzezinski, and Kissinger disagreed with Brzezinski, about Russo-Ukrainian issue, and believed that: Ukraine should remain independent but militarily neutral, It should not join NATO. Western policy should acknowledge Russia’s security concerns and national interests. The goal should be balance among great powers, not the strategic defeat of Russia.
Besides, one could “blame” people like Brzezinski for the war in Ukraine precisely because they were official advisors and regret Mearsheimer wasn’t official advisors who could have prevented the Russo-Ukrainian war.
BTW I appreciate the insights of Mearsheimer’s offensive realism (which I suspect you know nothing about), so much so that he is one of my sources as my posts in the previous blog can prove.
What is the difference? Hitler’s speech: 01 September 1939 - Adolf Hitler – speech to the German Reichstag
“You know that two different doctrines govern Russia and Germany. There remained but one question to be resolved: as Germany has no intent of exporting its doctrine, and at the moment that Soviet Russia no longer contemplates exporting its doctrine to Germany, I no longer see any compelling reason why we should continue to take opposing stances. Both of us are aware that any struggle between our two peoples would merely benefit third parties. Hence we have determined to enter into a pact which shall preclude the application of force between us for all time. It also obliges us to seek mutual consultation in certain European questions. Moreover, it shall render possible economic cooperation and, above all, ensure that the strength of the two great states is not squandered in rivalry with each other.”
Is it a justification of a political action or the actual thinking behind the strategy?
And what would constitute evidence that Hitler and Stalin had the same understanding of “national interest”? And what would constitute evidence that pacifists understand the reasons of Putin’s push back of Nato enlargement in Ukraine the same way Putin does? What constitute “evidence” that I and you have the same understanding of the word “evidence”? I can play dumb too, you know.
I gave you the summaries, that should have been enough to illustrate the point. Of course, one can investigate further but I don’t care about empirical investigation.
Again, you keep embarrassing yourself. My first comment and defence of geopolitical analysis was to Punsssh who is in favour of the Western military support to Ukraine, as far as I remember from our exchanges in the old blog. And I’m focusing on conceptual analysis because I take this as a philosophy forum not as a political forum. Since I know the other user nicknames from the old blog, clarifying my starting points to people I never exchanged with previously seems to me fair.
At any given time no, otherwise people wouldn’t engage in wishful thinking at all. And if you do not question the possibility, still you wish to argue for the impossibility to identify “wishful thinking” at any given time, right or wrong? If that’s your conviction then what I still find puzzling is: how can someone who keeps talking about biases and handwaving at psychological literature on biases account for the fact that empirical investigation on “wishful thinking” is possible? BTW wouldn’t many pacifist call Ukrainian hopes to join NATO or to win against Russia “wishful thinking”?
The question is not if we can claim infallibility (we can’t), but on the built-in confidence in a shared methodology of knowledge production and revision we have been trained to apply. The fact that a psychologist can manipulate a scenario to test and actually detect people’s wishful thinking in an experiment, doesn’t ensure that a psychologist will be able to detect wishful thinking at any given time, for himself and others. But he’s background knowledge as a scientist could help him be more prudent in forming his judgement of how things are and offer some guidance in the detection of biases in everyday life.
So the “ability to determine, to judge, to arbitrate” depends on the reliability of the epistemological methodology and training. But I also argued that in politics it’s hard to circumscribe problems and it only allows for heuristics (the kind of heuristics geopolitics analyses), so I’m certainly not naive about the fact that knowledge has its severe limits. While you seemed to be very confident that “knowledge” is not a scarce resource and solutions come from knowledge, right?
Indeed, your arguments sound absurd to me, I was quite open about it. But I also asked questions for you to answer and ensure your claims are not absurd as they sound. But you kept dodging them , and prefer to use ad-hominem attacks as if they weren’t rhetoric tricks for convenient diversion.
You are confused, I get it. But you can take our exchange as an opportunity for you to clarify your own ideas, as I do with mine, instead of using them as a hammer to hit imaginary nails but ultimately always landing on your own thumb.
A part from the fact that the distinction between using those terms and “reasoning” in those terms is unclear to me, you provided no definition and no evidence to illustrate how this distinction applies. If you wish to argue that people can use words without understanding their meaning or use words equivocally. That is possible. Also in politics. But political leaders and geopolitical analysts do reason in those terms (remember Brzezinski and Kissinger being an official advisor, remember Hitler, Stalin, Putin, Trump, Netanyahu, Khamenei, Xi Jinping?) in their official speech and in the backstage, and are unlikely to equivocate their meaning, but maybe they can miscalculate as chess players do. Acting skeptical on this is like me acting skeptical about the idea that the psychological literature on “bias” is grounded on mutual equivocation over the notion of “bias”. But most importantly geopolitical analysis is not esoteric like quantum physics, literally anybody politically invested is capable of understanding and reasoning in light of those concepts and patterns of reasoning if properly solicited. And I gave you examples: “every political agenda, independently of one’s own political leaning (communism, Nazism, Zionism, Islamism, capitalism, feminism, pacifism, Christianity, etc.), is concerned with: internal cohesion within the political base and/or leadership; the degree of material and emotional sacrifice their base is ready to tolerate in order to politically “fight” for the cause; the margins for negotiation or compromise depending on power relations; the need to promote convenient propaganda that is self-promoting and/or discrediting of competitors (for example, denouncing competitors’ biased views while sparing oneself the same treatment); the struggle for power projection while avoiding overstretch; and the struggle to bridge the gap between desired objectives and the available means to achieve them.” You too can understand that. Your reluctance to accept it, no matter how rhetorically convenient you think it is, is also an all-to-human compensation for the fact that you are a powerless nobody.
My conceptual analysis is about expliciting the implicit. People can talk a language without being able to explicit the grammar rules of their language. But that doesn’t mean they didn’t talk in accordance with those implicit rules. Conceptual analysis may also include conceptual comparisons or assessment the explanatory power of a conceptual framework over another etc.
Ideological critique is ideologically driven. So, according to your metaphor, it’s not unmasking anything. It’s putting the mask on. If one wants to reason more clearly one should leave the ideological critique where it belongs, to political debates and militant propaganda. Mutual understanding about political struggle can be granted only if one grounds analysis and reasoning that is conceptually independent from ideologically specific assumptions.
Besides ethics, as I understand it, is normative, it sets goals. Geopolitical analysis, as I understand it, is descriptive, it focuses on the nature of the political competition and the actual leverages to achieve political goals. Ethics conceptually presupposes description, not the other way around. If one wants to change reality according to certain norms, first one has to be able to detect reality for what it is and what real means one has to change reality according to the norms. Part of the political competition reality is that any political agenda has its own variety of “ideological critique”, because human cohesion behind a political agenda is a scarce resource that needs to be harvested, but that’s not the only factor that plays in the political struggle, not the only scarce resource to be harvested for leverage: money, weapons, intelligence, know-how, technology, allies, etc. are useful as well and must be taken into account relatively to competitors.
You can afford to think you can dispense yourself from such reasoning because you are a powerless nobody, so you can simply play your role of promoter and consumer of a certain political propaganda, live your life in your cognitive bubble, and just go about your day. Actual political decision makers can’t really afford to think the way you do.
…or… one could be misunderstood by ideological driven people on a mission to discredit what they perceive to be their political adversaries, at every step. As you just did.
You were repeatedly bringing up the case of domain-specific expertise disputes by equal experts and for which there is no way to adjudicate. I answered specifically to this scenario. In this ad-hoc scenario, appeal to domain-specific expertise is pointless.
But since we are at it, let me ask: do you mean that labelling ideas “uncontroversial”, “sufficiently qualified”, “sufficiently authoritative” do not serve your ideological biases? Or that they do not serve your ideological biases more than mine? I’m glad to read that finally “arbitrate, adjudicate, judge” is possible. And apparently you do not even need to provide evidence to support such possibility. Easy peasy.
First, if the choice is a result of bias but not the pool from which to choose is a result of meeting standards of academic rigour. Then the pool of options meeting standards of academic rigour can not be said to be biased. And it’s false to claim that all opinions are biased since opinions about research meeting standards of academic rigour must hold true independently from anybody’s biasing preferences.
Second, if the expression “standards of academic rigour” refers to epistemological standards, then, as I have argued, “geopolitical analysis” likewise has its own epistemological standards, which ideological critique typically fails to meet.
Third, it makes sense to talk about choices in light of preferences that go beyond the “standards of academic rigour” or “geopolitical analysis” only where those standards, due to knowledge constraints, allow choices non inherent to “standards of academic rigour” or “geopolitical analysis”. This does not constitute a bias in the sense of being a cognitive distortion that violates those standards.
Four, if engaging in “geopolitical analysis” does not inherently involve cognitive distortions (like ideology critique), then it cannot be said to mask ideological preferences—just as meeting the “standards of academic rigour” does not conceal the possibility of choosing in light of personal preferences where those standards permit it.
Five, our exchange started when I compared psychological-ethical analysis (the leftist ideology critique being an example of this approach) to geopolitical analysis and tried to explain why I find geopolitical analysis more enlightening, and I do so precisely because of those epistemological standards. Why? Because those epistemological standards do not inherently depend on anybody biased preferences.
What I acutally meant to write is “What does that mean? That Russia was not expecting to be equivocated, nor pacifists critical to Western policies believe that Russia was equivocated.”
I do wish you wouldn’t keep wasting both our time Googling a whole load of stuff that doesn’t bear on the argument. You have to look it up, I have to read it, and no-one is any better off afterwards.
I argued they are no more likely to disagree on ethical grounds than conceptual grounds. That’s a claim about likelihood. It is therefore not addressed by some examples is it? What you’ve done is addressed the claim “they always agree on ethical grounds and never on conceptual grounds”. A claim I didn’t make.
When you talked about “bias” and referred to the psychological literature, did you provide proof that they had any mutual understanding of what they meant instead of using that term and mean almost completely different things by them
No. Because I did not make the claim that they did have such mutual understanding.
notice, I’m still not sure we understand each other on this issue.
Right. So being…
compelled to converge for mutual understanding
… not all that strong then?
politicians never offer an analytical definition of what “national interest” is supposed to mean, still they use it to make themselves understood to others, including competitors:
Exactly. Nothing tells us they actually share, or even engage in an attempt to reach, any mutual understanding. They just use the word, like any other word.
I’m certain words like “justice” and “fair”, and “right”, and “blame”, and “wrong”, are also used. Is this evidence of a shared understanding of ethics?
And clearly you do not seem to realise how self-defeating your attempt to question my claim is
Indeed it would be if your claim were “people often understand each other” and my counter were “no, people never understand each other”. But again, since that’s not what we’re discussing, you’ve wasted you time and mine on a bunch of examples again.
You claim is that it is more enlightening to engage in attempts at mutual understanding of conceptual terms than in ethical discussion. More. That is a comparative claim and so supporting it would require measurement of both approaches and demonstration that one is greater than the other in some metric of ‘enlightenment’.
Simply providing examples of where there might have been some convergence in mutual understanding of conceptual terms does not give anything to an argument that one is more enlightening than another.
the reason to point that out is to counter a potential objection (geopolitical analysts may talk about “national interest”, “security dilemma”, “power balance”, “territorial sovereignty”, “alliances” but that doesn’t mean that actual political leaders take their analysis into account).
And it did not do so, because evidence of them using the terms is not evidence of political leaders taking their mutual understanding of the terms into account.
Is it a justification of a political action or the actual thinking behind the strategy?
A justification. All political speeches are geared toward moving the audience in an emotional manner because that works far better than trying to persuade them rationally. All political speeches are rhetorical, and it is a safe assumption that any time a politician speaks or writes anything down they are doing so with a mind that it might be used in such a way.
That’s why politicians are politicians and not academics.
I can play dumb too, you know.
I know. I’ve just spent the last few pages being met with “what do you mean by…?” every time I use a word.
I’m focusing on conceptual analysis because I take this as a philosophy forum not as a political forum.
Ethics is also in the field of philosophy. So is political philosophy.
how can someone who keeps talking about biases and handwaving at psychological literature on biases account for the fact that empirical investigation on “wishful thinking” is possible?
I really don’t know what more I can do to get this across since it seems you have some intractable mental block. We’ll try one more time.
A measure being impossible to adjudicate on does not make it impossible to actually be.
It being impossible to adjudicate on empirical investigations, does not somehow make it impossible for there to be any empirical investigations.
prefer to use ad-hominem attacks as if they weren’t rhetoric tricks for convenient diversion
No, I use them as if the were rhetoric tricks for convenient diversion. You still don’t get it do you?
literally anybody politically invested is capable of understanding and reasoning in light of those concepts and patterns of reasoning if properly solicited
Again, the counter is not that it’s impossible, so you can stop wasting your time demonstrating that is it possible.
one could be misunderstood by ideological driven people on a mission to discredit what they perceive to be their political adversaries, at every step.
Gee… I wonder what that would look like…?
do you mean that labelling ideas “uncontroversial”, “sufficiently qualified”, “sufficiently authoritative” do not serve your ideological biases?
They might, but since these concepts are universally shared, it would be the bias of everyone. Publication in a peer reviewed journal. PhD-level research. Professorial or research roles at an accredited university. These are all thresholds of qualification for entry into the academic debate on a subject agreed upon by all in academia. They may well be the result of bias, but since it’s a bias we all share we need not take account of it.
it’s false to claim that all opinions are biased since opinions about research meeting standards of academic rigour must hold true independently from anybody’s biasing preferences.
As I said above - us all agreeing on a matter does not refute the notion that that agreement is the result of a shared bias, it’s just one that is uninteresting in this context.
“geopolitical analysis” likewise has its own epistemological standards, which ideological critique typically fails to meet.
Indeed. Because ideological critique is not attempting to be geopolitical analysis. There are plenty of papers exploring Marxism, Socialism, Pacifism, Justice, and many ethical aspects of war, nationality, politics… all of which will have met the relevant standards for inclusion in the realm of academic theories.
And if, we do engage in geopolitical analysis we should indeed expect to exchange ideas from within the pool of ideas which have net these standards.
Just as if we engage in psychological analysis we should exchange ideas which have met the standards in that field. Likewise with political philosophy, ethics, …
it makes sense to talk about choices in light of preferences that go beyond the “standards of academic rigour” or “geopolitical analysis” only where those standards, due to knowledge constraints, allow choices non inherent to “standards of academic rigour” or “geopolitical analysis”.
Exactly. That is what discussions about, for example, the cause and progress of the war in Ukraine would do. There are experts in their fields who present pretty much the full range of views expressed here. As such our choosing between them is entirely outside of the realm of expertise. It is ideological preference.
Why? Because those epistemological standards do not inherently depend on anybody biased preferences.
Yes, but choosing between competing theories which have all met those standards does.
Wasting time is not as worrisome as your tendency to bring up issues that are irrelevant with respect to what I have been claiming from the outset and, worse, that end up undermining your own point.
First of all, I asked you how you assess “likelihood,” didn’t I? If “likelihood” is the result of an empirical investigation, I have already told you that I am not interested in empirical investigation. I use examples merely to illustrate my point. And if there were not sufficient convergence on certain notions, there would not be a literature of “geopolitical” analysis, just as there would not be a psychological literature on “biases” if there were not sufficient convergence on the notion of “bias.” I also specified that the convergence I am talking about is dispositional (not a mere logical possibility) and conditional. My claim is comparable to claiming that, in order for two people to understand one another in English, they must converge on the meanings of the words they use. To what degree, and under what circumstances, is something that can be investigated empirically, either case by case or more systematically. The same goes for the competitive environment in which politicians operate: if they want to reach mutual understanding of patterns of reasoning in a competitive environment, they must converge in their understanding of the conceptual framework adopted when processing that competitive environment. Here, “must” does not refer to an empirical necessity but to a rational requirement.
Secondly, your claim is irrelevant with respect to what I am talking about, since my comparison between ethically- or psychologically driven analysis and geopolitical analysis is not grounded in a comparison of their levels of disagreement. Rather, it is grounded in epistemological requirements—such as the fact that geopolitical analysis can illuminate forms of political cooperation and rivalry that cannot be inferred from, and are not to be expected on the basis of, shared versus opposing ethical principles. This is where I find geopolitical analysis to have greater explanatory power than ethical-psychological analysis. I also find geopolitical analysis far more reliable than ethical reasoning, since ethical reasoning, as I understand it, is normative: it may establish what is desirable, not what is feasible. And if expectations are grounded in what is desirable rather than in what is feasible, then one suffers from a cognitive bias called “wishful thinking.” Geopolitics, by contrast, is descriptive, so it focuses on how things are and on what is actually feasible.
Third, regarding likelihood, you provided no evidence that “they are no more likely to disagree on ethical grounds than on conceptual grounds,” either. You merely assume—or find it plausible—that this is the case. And even if it were true, it would still not challenge my illustrative scenarios in which cooperation and rivalry cannot be expected to follow from shared ethical principles, which is all I care about when pointing to explanatory power.
Fourth, I remind you that you started by questioning my claims, not the other way around. And my feedback obviously stems from my own assumptions, which you may fail—and indeed keep failing—to understand. Additionally, I certainly do not accept the argument that the burden of clarification rests solely on my shoulders. Most certainly not in a philosophy forum.
So what is the point, then, of reminding me of the psychological literature on bias or of a dictionary—even if you are not an expert—when I ask you to clarify your own usage of the term, if your usage is not likely to correspond to that of a dictionary or the psychological literature? What is the point of referring to the psychological literature on bias to support your claim that “all opinions are biased,” if their usage is not likely to lead to mutual understanding?
Not sure about what you wish to say with this or infer from it. All I can say is that It’s as strong as a rational requirement can be, as strong as “in order for 2 people to understand one another in English then they must converge on the meaning of the words they use” can be.
So much so that when I started doubting we use the word “bias” in the same way, I myself asked you clarifications. Whenever such convergence is not sufficiently met, my expectations about a mutually profitable intellectual cooperation weakens. Failures like this, in political debates, can nurture reciprocal political rivalry. Equivocation doesn’t help cooperation, does it? And this predicament is something both sides can mutually understand independently from their ideological preferences.
Apart from the fact that you have completely ignored what follows that quotation, where I argue that offering the same analytical definitions is not necessary for conceptual convergence, and illustrate my point with examples of “national interest” usage in political speeches. Such convergence is not left to astrologists to establish, but it can be spontaneously and actively pursued by politicians (starting with using the same terms), as official speeches between political leaders prove (see Mearsheimer’s argument on why the war in Ukraine is the West’s fault, which many pacifists keep parroting). All of this contradicts your claim “Nothing tells us”. Those facts at the very least tell me, and others like me, that convergence is more likely than what you wish to acknowledge or are capable of acknowledging. If these facts tell you literally nothing, this may point to another issue, namely that we do not share the notions of “evidence” or “likelihood”; we do not attach to them the same epistemological criteria to assess them.
Concerning ethics, if the words “justice”, “fair”, “right”, “blame”, “wrong”, and “ethics” are used, there must be enough convergence in their usage to allow mutual (vs equivocal) understanding of them. That does not imply that a shared understanding of the notions “right” and “wrong” will lead to shared judgements in cases where those words occur. The fact that I converge with you in understanding the meaning of “my nose” does not imply that “my nose” refers to the same thing when you and I use it. The fact that I converge with you in understanding the meaning of “I like this” does not imply that “I like this” refers to the same thing when you and I use it. The fact that I converge with you in understanding the meaning of “national interest” does not imply that “national interest” refers to the same thing when American and Chinese political leaders use it. The fact that I converge with you in understanding the meaning of “right” or “wrong” does not imply that “right” or “wrong” refer to the same thing when Hitler and Jesus use them, etc. We can both share the rules of football and play according to them, yet that does not mean we will be playing on the same team. The application of many notions can have a shared meaning despite the fact that their usage can be relativized.
Also, mistakes show that meaning can be shared without necessarily leading to the same usage on every occasion. You and I may understand a mathematical formula, and yet one of us can fail to process it, even repeatedly so. That does not mean we have a different understanding of the formula. We can both share the rules of chess and play according to them, yet that does not mean we will be equally strategically or tactically successful.
That’s your personal phrasing of what you think my claim is, not mine. Indeed, “to engage in attempts at mutual understanding of conceptual terms” can apply both to political debate and to ethical debate (in ethics as well there are concepts to converge on, in order to ensure mutual understanding), so opposing “to engage in attempts at mutual understanding of conceptual terms” to ethical debate is unintelligible to me. Besides, if the expression “to engage in attempts at mutual understanding of conceptual terms” refers to my understanding of the genesis of the geopolitical conceptual framework, then that is not what explains my preference for geopolitical analysis over ethical analysis, as I reported it in the post you wished to object to.
My preference is grounded in epistemological criteria: geopolitics focuses on political reality as it is, and it tries to explain it through empirical investigation guided by a conceptual framework that is conceptually independent of specific ethical assumptions, and thanks to that can guide our expectations more reliably than ideologically driven reasoning.
Finally, if ideologically driven people feel more enlightened by engaging in political debates to judge politicians or political events from their moral tribunals or armchair psychology, I don’t care."
What is the evidence you are looking for? If you do not clarify this, I cannot even search for the evidence you are looking for. I am not even sure that you yourself understand what you write when you talk about evidence. Next time, provide examples to illustrate what you mean.
First of all, geopolitical analysts use a conceptual framework that is meant to describe the reality of political competition as it is seen by the actual political decision-makers. So expressions like “international order” are not popular in politics because some geopolitical analysts invented them and asked politicians to use them to make their speeches sound fancier.
Second, geopolitical analysis can serve as input to actual decision-making. In the case of Brzezinski we can be sure this is the case, since he was appointed as an official advisor; for Mearsheimer, not. So I feel more confident claiming that Brzezinski informed the political reasoning of the US administration concerning NATO enlargement in Eastern Europe, including Ukraine (and we also have documents to prove this verbatim; I am not going to google them for you), more than Mearsheimer did. And indeed, the Western trend of NATO enlargement, as it historically evolved, was more in line with Brzezinski’s input than with Mearsheimer’s. This is all I need to argue in order to make my point. If you have an explanation that is better or more evidence-based than mine, go ahead. Teach me a lesson.
Finally, concerning foreign policies, it is very unlikely that politicians would use expressions (like “national interest”) that, to the best of their knowledge and that of their expert advisors, would be likely to be equivocated by other foreign political leaders, if it is convenient for them to ensure a mutual understanding of certain political implications. Indeed, to repeat the argument you conveniently dodged, that is Putin’s argument too, reported by Mearsheimer as follows: “Putin’s pushback should have come as no surprise. After all, the West had been moving into Russia’s backyard and threatening its core strategic interests, a point Putin made emphatically and repeatedly”. So yes, as far as we can tell, Putin was expecting that the West understood his appeal to Russian national interests as he framed it and acted accordingly (that is, in ways conforming to Russian requirements).
If “all political speeches are geared toward moving the audience in an emotional manner because that works far better than trying to persuade them rationally”, than there is nothing inherently Nazis in using certain expressions (like “national interest”) for example to promote in-group cohesion and/or leadership support wrt foreign policies, nor is there any inherent difficulty to understand which expressions may play this role by virtually anybody, especially by politicians. In other words, you yourself are referring to a pattern of behaviour which is shared, conceptually singled out and repeatedly exemplified by different political agendas in the entire political spectrum. But that’s the kind of conceptual framework emerging from competing political agendas I was referring to.
BTW the distinction between rational vs emotional persuasion is hardly defensible if it is not grounded on epistemological considerations instead of ideological preferences.
Philosophical inquiry, as I understand it, is likely to be triggered when mutual intelligibility is compromised. I didn’t ask you to clarify every word, but words that you seem to be using in ways that I do not understand, like “bias” or “evidence”.
As far as I’m concerned I take the word “philosophy” mainly to refer to conceptual analysis.
So, to me, political philosophy means conceptual analysis of political concepts not engaging in political debates per se.
I have no idea what you are trying to say. Provide examples illustrating what you mean, instead of hiding behind your obscure phrasing and wording.
So you are claiming that there is empirical investigation on “wishful thinking”, but that it is impossible to adjudicate empirical investigations on “wishful thinking”? I’m not sure what that means.
Do you mean that if we have two scientific papers on “wishful thinking” with incompatible results, then it is impossible to adjudicate who is right or wrong? By whom? Non-experts? Domain-specific experts? The adjudicating authority? In principle? De facto? Do you have a concrete example of scientific papers on “wishful thinking” with conflicting results that you think cannot be adjudicated, so that I can have a clearer understanding of what on earth you are talking about?
I only get that you are admitting to use such rhetoric tricks for diversion.
So your labelling ideas “uncontroversial”, “sufficiently qualified”, and “sufficiently authoritative” is likely, not possibly, the result of bias, even though you have no evidence to support it other than the one provided to you by the science whose findings on bias are likely biased, as any opinion is? But you can discount that because it’s a shared bias? How is that a shared bias if you are not an expert and cannot assess psychological expertise? Is that just because you use the same words—“uncontroversial”, “sufficiently qualified”, “sufficiently authoritative”—as they do? But “nothing tells us” that this is enough to ensure mutual understanding, right?
It makes sense this claim if this is applied to beliefs studied by psychology. But it makes less sense to apply this very notion to the epistemological standards and the practices by which one detects “biases”. Besides, in science, calling a specific research “biased” means that domain-specific epistemological methodology has been compromised as much as its findings. In other words, it’s definitely unlikely that scientists are inclined to accept the claim their research is biased by default because psychology - as you seem to be claiming - has proven that “all opinions are biased”.
Therefore, I really doubt that we two share the meaning of “bias” and that you yourself have a clear understanding of what you mean by “bias”.
What’s your point? Physics, geopolitical investigation, psychology, literature analysis and theology do not have the same epistemological standards. The procedures to acquire and process the information, use evidence-based reasoning and the conceptual framework to delimit the domain of investigation according to that methodology are different. So what?
I can still find a geopolitical research more accurate and more reliable in forming expectations than investigations and analysis relative to ethical and psychological assumptions specific to a certain political ideology. Not surprisingly, the most compelling arguments leftist can provide about the Russo-Ukrainian war to me come from Mearsheimer, who is a geopolitical analyst and has the conceptual apparatus to make the point for them without Marxist ideology critique or anti-capitalism assumptions. If I want to know more/better about the actual laws of physics I go to a physicist, if I want to know more/better about what actually regulates interstate interactions I prefer to read geopolitical analysts more than a piece of leftist ideological critique or of any equivalent from other political ideologies.
I disagree. It is possible and maybe likely for militant people like you that ideological preferences inspire their choices between equally compelling theories. But I don’t find it likely for non-militant people like me: as I said one doesn’t need to take position if experts disagree and doesn’t have pertinent cognitive-criteria to discriminate the value of one research over another. Besides, not all preferences are ideologically driven. I can simply prefer one theory over another because I’m more familiar with it or I understand it better than another, and most importantly that doesn’t need to compel me to question the validity of the alternative theory or research program, or to accuse it to be biased. On the contrary, ideologically driven reasoning urges people to take theories opposing their preferred views as surreptitious instrument of the opposite propaganda, masking its evil intentions behind a vail of academic “high-ground” plausibility, as you yourself were so badly doomed to argue. In other words, the alleged expert equivalence doesn’t only lose relevance but it is taken as a cognitive distortion (i.e. “bias” is again understood as a cognitive distortion!). Eventually, it’s you who doesn’t believe in genuine epistemic disagreement by domain-specific experts. You used expert disputes only as a rhetoric expedient to ultimately promote only your own ideologically driven reasoning, not on the ground of genuine epistemological concerns. Q.E.D.
Which sounds to me pretty much like saying: choosing between competing political agendas which converge on a geopolitical conceptual framework for mutual intelligibility is still matter of personal ideological preferences.
I can still find a geopolitical research more accurate and more reliable in forming expectations than investigations and analysis relative to ethical and psychological assumptions specific to a certain political ideology.
So your claim is not merely that there is mutual understanding, because there is also mutual understanding in ethics, politics, psychology…
Your claim is that wrangling over the meanings of key terms gibes some measurably greater ‘enlightenment’ than simply discussing what is ethically right, or what biases might be motivating people.
You’ve yet to provide an argument for that increase in enlightenment rather than the the plausibility of some enlightenment.
Then you’ve misunderstood ethics. An nice feta and olive salad is “desirable”. Ethics is about what ought be the case. Not merely what we desire to be the case.
It is completely pointless to engage in an investigation of what is possible if you then have absolutely no clue about which of the possible options you ought take.
As we’ve discussed now ad infinitum, the fact that it can is not the same as it actually doing so. Most people will still use geopolitical analysis to deliberately engineer only the outcome they wanted to be the case. You don’t like pacifists (you’ve made thay quite clear in your sneering derision), so your ‘geopolitical analysis’ will be engineered to make it seem like pacifism just won’t work. You get the gloss of pretending it’s all detached analysis, bit it’s just more rhetoric, it’s just another cheap trick to get one up on your political opponents.
You’re mistaking usage and mutual understanding. Two people can converse ‘using’ a word without a ‘mutual understanding’. Words do things, they’re not placeholders for some bit of mental furniture.
At this stage it would be quicker to list the words you do understand…
So how does analysing it enlighten us? You asked, right at the beginning of this, for use to explore the meaning of terms like “coup d’etat”. If, we’re going to end up with terms still not meaning the same thing, then what has the analysis done?
There can be none. You’re speculating on the content of someone’s mind.
We must, instead, rely on analysis of competing theories about what that content might be, about the relative likelihoods of mutual understanding driving international relations vs say, economic objectives plus placatory rhetoric. We can’t ever know.
Yea, that’s right. Despite your misunderstanding to the contrary I’m not attempting to argue no one understands one another. I’m arguing that mutual understanding is not compelled and so analysing terms confers no advantages over psychological or ethical discourse.
But you are engaging in political debates because you are selecting meanings in the course of that analysis which best support your political agenda.
Yes. That is exactly what I mean. It is why a survey of the academic literature on virtually any topic you care to think of will yield a wide range of competing views.
Good. So you do get it.
Right.
Exactly. You’ve decided, in advance of your investigation, who has the data you’re willing to accept and you done so in line with your political ideology (note - you don’t specify rejecting right-wing, or centrist ideological critique). There is a disconnect that you’re simply refusing to even look at between what the geopolitical analyst says and what actually regulates interstate interactions. That’s exactly the connection your derided ‘leftist ideological critique’ is targeting. The dominant paradigms within which this analysis takes place.
Q.E.D.
Except the ‘demonstradum’ is missing - you’ve just strung together a series of claims.
I’m not interested in empirical investigation nor measurability. The plausibility of my argument rests only on the plausibility of my premises like geopolitical investigation’s task is descriptive while ethical investigation’s task is normative , geopolitical investigation focuses on geopolitical competition per se independently from ideology-specific assumptions. These premises lay the ground for an analytical approach that has epistemological benefits precluded to ideologically driven analysis, and which conflicting political agendas can converge on. That this is not just a random logical possibility which I’m the only one to appreciate is proven by the fact that geopolitical analysis and reasoning have a long story in academic and political thinking, if such story is part of your background knowledge.
See we disagree also on the notion of “ethics”. “Ethics”, as I understand it, is a very broad terminological cap including ethical views grounded on emotions and pleasure, categoric and conditional norms, etc. So we can equivocate one another without mutually intelligible clarifications. And the reason why I take that wording to be still harmless wrt your objection is that one can make claim such as “it is desirable that people always acted in accordance to what they ought to do” without giving up the idea that “ethics” is ultimately about what one ought to do.
I didn’t argue anywhere that ethical analysis is not worth pursuing or that geopolitical analysis makes the ethical analysis pointless. My argument is more like the following: whatever goal one sets for himself, the likelihood for his success depends on what is feasible. And knowing how things are can help one better assess if his goal is within his means and capacity, or not.
It’s setting goals, whatever they are (so ethical goals included) in a competitive environment (where people can disagree one ethical matters too) that can rationally compel people (and likely does, given the story of geopolitical thinking and analysis) to better understand the political competitive environment per se, independently from specific ethical assumptions.
If that’s all you wanted to believe and you are convinced about it, why do you keep talking to me?
Concerning “You don’t like pacifists (you’ve made thay quite clear in your sneering derision)”, what I like is irrelevant wrt what I’m arguing. My focus is on argumentation, on how conclusions logically follow from the premises, and how plausible the premises may depend on background knowledge, and we can converge on this to the extent we share such background knowledge.
That “Most people will still use geopolitical analysis to deliberately engineer only the outcome they wanted to be the case.” is plausible for ideologically driven people, and your appeal to Mearsheimer proves it. But I do not care about this, I care about the geopolitical analysis prior to the engineer. And at most, I do care about why one geopolitical analysis fits better with one geopolitical agenda instead of its rival (e.g. there must be logical compatibility and convergence to relevant conclusions otherwise it would be irrational or arbitrary to prefer one geopolitical analysis over its geopolitical counter analysis, and that’s again an epistemological criterium independent from specific ethical-psychological premises).
BTW what is the purpose of relying on Mearsheimer’s analysis at all when all one socialist pacifist leftist can say could have been believed without relying on Mearsheimer’s analysis? Is this because it gives you a pretension of “detached analysis”? And if you really believe one can engineer whatever one wants to believe, then how is cooperation possible between people that have clashing ideological beliefs in politics? What is the purpose of politically debating with people whose views are ideologically clashing with yours? What’s the point of denouncing all these tricks that you discover so easily? It’s because I’m more stupid than you or more dishonest than you? Both? Do you wish me to join your political agenda because you showed me how stupid and/or dishonest I am?
Then explain to me how mutual understanding works, and what evidence anybody can bring up to prove mutual understanding instead of equivocation. Talking about “mistakes” presupposes a epistemic criteria, which you never provided.
By the way, “Words do things” what is supposed to do ? What are you supposed to do with your words when talking to me?
What?!
First, how do you know that “we’re going to end up with terms still not meaning the same thing” without engaging in such analysis? The assumption here is that we are not doomed to systematic mutual equivocation.
Second, I already clarified what is the benefit of using words like “national interest” in politics already twice. I’ll repeat if for the third time: for example, whenever political leaders talk about “national interest”, anybody expects them to set priorities in their domestic and foreign policies in line with what has been labelled as national interest, anybody expects human and material resources are going to be drained in support of those policies, anybody expects that foreign countries threatening what is labeled as “national interest” (like “national security”) is perceived as “provokation” and that is of paramount importance to energetically counter (diplomatically, economic, and/or military) depending on available means and strategies.
And this case is illustrated by Putin’s argument echoed by Mearsheimer, parroted by many pacifists like you and which you keep ignoring because it undermines your own point.
Our assumptions are getting deeper, way deeper than I feel like investigating (BTW how do you know that other people have mind at all?). I’m here to entertain myself not you.
BTW why on earth do you keep asking me for evidence if your assumption is that it can’t be provided none?!
Well then we can’t ever know relative likelihoods of mutual understanding either, if we do not have shared epistemic criteria to assess likelihood. Given your premises, “likelihood” of mutual understanding can not be evidence-based in principle, then what’s the point of talking about “likelihood” at all?
And what’s the point of talking about what other people’s like to believe? Or rhetorical tricks? Or that “pretending” that mine it’s all detached analysis? You have no evidence of anybody’s mind contents anyways.
Again you do not realise how self-defeating your arguments are. You should make my life harder not easier. It’s like I paid you to argue like this. Very anti-climatic, not gonna lie.
First, how is that squaring with the claim “The common ground we have (hopefully) is that of rationality, that X, Y, and Z provide reasons to believe A, B, and C.” doesn’t this claim presuppose that the concept of rationality is shared? And that “reasons to believe” compel beliefs?
Second, analysing terms is more about a philosophical task. I was comparing the benefits of geopolitical analysis (which may or may not engage in a straight conceptual analysis) vs psychological-ethical driven analysis. And I compared them in light of explanatory power and reliability. These benefits do not go away just because you speculate that the level of conceptual misunderstanding in geopolitical analysis and psychological-ethical driven analysis can be equal. Indeed if words do something then same terms can do trigger convergence in behaviour in the political competition.
Third, I gave you my compelling reasons to believe that geopolitical analysis is more enlightening than psychological or ethical discourse. You gave your confused reasons to believe it’s not the case, so the exchange should have been over a while back. But it isn’t. So why do you keep addressing, my counter arguments? It’s because you want to show yourself and others that you are smarter and more honest than I am and the political agenda is as well stupid and dishonest? Is this helping you grow cooperation in humanity through infinite division of knowledge? How close are you to end the war in Ukraine or the “genocide” of the Palestinians with your phenomenal rhetoric tricks detector?
And how do you know, since you have no evidence of my mind’s contents?
Your ethical-psychological analysis is grounded on your possibility talking about people’s intentions and beliefs. The problem is that you’re denying the very possibility of knowing anything about it. I can’t find a more catastrophic argument than this.
So what? You don’t believe in permanent competition, right? And thanks to infinite division of knowledge all knowledge can be shared. So everybody can share once’s competing views. Now what?
But you can not conceptually infer it from my epistemological reasons, can you? So you need evidences to “look at” supporting your views and then take them as reasons supporting your claim. Yet you did not provide any evidence that my preference of geopolitical analysis over ideologically driven analysis is grounded on my specific political ideology. Worse, you can not provide any evidence to me. Since you can not read my mind. So what is the ground of you beliefs? What you find convenient to believe or you wish to believe. This is how I detect cognitive biases. No compelling and pertinent evidence-based or logic-based argument, therefore persuasion comes from bias.
Your argument relies on it. That one is more enlightening than another is a measurement.
One could. But only the ‘ought’ part is ethics. Discussing what we desire is not ethics.
True. But you asked for an analysis of terms. This has nothing to do with an advantage (unless you’re enquiring of us - in which case I suggest you consult someone with greater expertise).
The exercise you’re advocating is not one of increasing knowledge, since neither of us has more knowledge on these matters than can be gained from books.
The exercise is about persuasion.
It’s obvious to anyone reading that you come on here to persuade. I come on here to persuade. It’s what debate is about.
Even if you want to play the ‘I’m just here to hone my arguments’ card, you’re still honing your arguments by making them better at persuading.
It’s silly to think you’ve come on to an internet discussion forum to learn what “coup d’etat” means.
Gads! There’s more to talking than exchanging certainties.
No. That’s why I said ‘hopefully’. It would be silly to be hopeful of something presupposed, wouldn’t it?
I don’t. Again, there’s more to talking than exchanging certainties.
I just did.
Yes. In someone who thinks themselves omniscient I can see how that would work out.
Normal people include the possibility they might be mistaken.
“Measurability” to me refers to the possibility of quantifying a parameter in numerical terms. That’s not what I’m interested in.
I wouldn’t worry too much about my harmless wording when your confused conceptual framework doesn’t even allow you to distinguish between “A ought to do B” and “X likes to believe that A ought to do B”, which makes “ought” claims collapse to “like” claims anyways, and quibbling over the word “desirable” again self-defeating.
If you do not see the advantage, that’s your problem. I already pointed out the advantages I see in engaging in philosophical investigations like clarifying one’s conceptual confusions.
Yes it does. Philosophy to me increases one’s own knowledge about one’s own conceptual apparatus. Do not confuse my arguments about geopolitics with my arguments about philosophy: the former is roughly about the nature of the political competition, the latter is about making explicit conceptual frameworks.
First, apparently you make sweeping claims about what “anyone reading” finds obvious without providing evidence and without being able to provide any at all since you believe people can not read other people’s mind, assumed they have one.
Second, “persuasion” as a perlocutionary act may be inherent to communication as such, which makes your claim obvious. But that is independent from the goal to be attained. In my case the goal to be attained is greater conceptual clarification. In your case the goal is to spread political propaganda.
Third, the biased idea that any discussion over politics automatically collapses into a piece of propaganda depends more on your confused conceptual framework and your militant attitude more than on my conceptual confusion and political preferences. Ideologically driven reasoning doesn’t only intoxicate emotions but it also confuses people’s mind.
Ok exchange with us your doubts about your own ideologically-driven assumptions.
The fact that you add “hopefully” after talking about a ground of rationality doesn’t make it any less of a requirement. And on you take to be shareable. That’s all I need for my counterargument.
Sweet dreams.
No omniscience is required. Actually one doesn’t even need to be a psychological expert to detect biases.
Except for your political beliefs, I guess. And no normal people do not include the possibility they might be mistaken at every step of their epistemic activities, they may if/when they have reasons to doubt. Your claim sounds more plausible only as a shared generic generalisation over human epistemic fallibility, which I’m way far from questioning.
Your analysis is more enlightening but not by any actual measure so we can’t disprove it.
You can’t defend your claim that ethical analysis is about preferences.
But you’re clear whilst you’re far too Smart and Logical to allow your ideological biases to affect your conceptual analysis, others cannot muster the same levels of sheer brilliance when doing ethical analysis, even though ethics and ideology are not the same.
If you point out advantages, that should be sufficient for all of us.
Philosophy increases your knowledge of your own conceptual apparatus (but apparently not by actually finding oneself initially mistaken - see below).
It requires no omniscience, nor expertise to detect bias, but if I attempt it in your analysis I cannot do so without mind-reading. Presumably, only you have this power to detect bias in others, but your own analysis is immune form such detection.
Normal people do include the possibility of being mistaken in their analysis, but you don’t need to because such a claim only applies to generic humans, of which you’re presumably not one.