Its 20 years since Pluto was downgraded by Scientific Commununity from a full Planet but only 21 percent of the population would now describe it as a dwarf planet.
What do you philosophers think?
An ideal philosopher would be informed about science, the division of labor between themselves and other experts, and would conclude Plutoâs inability to clear the debris from its orbit is a good enough reason to downgrade it. Eris was also upgraded to a dwarf planet and others have been named since.
I have no idea what Wittgenstein would say since I avoid following any philosopher too closely. Something unhelpful about a ladder, perhaps.
Good to see this! Iâve used the Pluto question before as an example of how to understand the relation of terms and references. For what itâs worth, hereâs my version:
Were We Wrong to Say that Pluto Is a Standard Planet?
In 2006, Pluto was reclassified as a dwarf planet, not a standard planet like the other eight. Letâs agree, as I think we ought to, that it would now be wrong to say that Pluto is a standard planet.
Hereâs my question: Prior to 2006, were we wrong to say âPluto is a standard planetâ? Please note the way the question is phrased. Iâm not asking whether Pluto was or was not a standard planet, nor am I asking whether our belief that Pluto was a standard planet was wrong. The question is, were we wrong to assert as true that âPluto is a standard planetâ? Iâm deliberately not specifying an exact sense of what the âwrongnessâ would be; you can interpret it any way you like, and thatâs part of what I hope makes the question interesting. And depending on whether the response is Yes or No, some interesting corollaries follow concerning âtruths about word usageâ vs. âtruths about states of affairs,â so I guess it is kind of Wittgensteinian.
Short answer: Yes.
Long answer: Not necessarily since scientific knowledge is always provisional and the data was insufficient; the intention was right, at least.
Your post doesnât mention science so I donât know if you see it as an authority.
I think Wittgenstein would say âIt depends on the contextâ. I mean thatâs sort to the point. Meaning doesnât exist independent of context, so there is no context-free ârightâ answer.
1 Like
âDonât for heavenâs sake, be afraid of talking nonsense! But you must pay attention to your nonsense.â
â Ludwig Wittgenstein, [Culture and Value]
1 Like
- The truth of certain {kinds of} empirical propositions belongs to our system of reference.
- Moore says he knows that the Earth existed long before his birth. And, put like that, it seems to be a statement about himself, even though itâs also a statement about the physical world. Now, it is philosophically irrelevant whether Moore knows this or that, but that and how it can be known is relevant. Had Moore told us that he knew the distance between certain stars, then we could infer from this that he had been conducting special investigations, and we should want to find out which ones. But the case chosen by Moore is precisely one in which we all seem to know what he knows, without being able to say how. I believe, for example, that I know just as much about this business (the existence of the Earth) as Moore, and if he knows that things are as he says, then I too know that. For itâs not as if he had arrived at his proposition by a route thatâs open to me, but which I didnât take.
- So what belongs to knowing this? Knowledge of history perhaps? He must know what is meant by âThe Earth has already existed for soâandâso longâ. Not everyone who is adult and competent has to know this. We see people building and demolishing houses and are prompted to ask, âHow long has this house been standing here?â But how does one come to ask this about a mountain, for example? And does everyone conceive of the Earth as a body that can come to be and pass away? Why should I not think of the Earth as flat yet endless in every direction (including downwards)? But then one could still say, âI know that this mountain existed long before my birthâ â but what if I met someone who doesnât believe this?
Wittgenstein,On Certainty, translated by P.M.S Hacker
OK. Would this mean that we were right to assert, pre-2006, that Pluto was a standard planet? That is, did our system of reference show us that the proposition was true?
We seem to be discussing the nature of science without ever saying âscienceâ.
I donât think Wittgenstein is willing to split the baby.
In so far as a fact is treated as common knowledge, it is not being treated as a result of a âspecial investigation.â Nonetheless, âspecial investigationsâ do remodel our âsystem of referenceâ, sometimes gradually over the course of years, sometimes suddenly.
One might think that there are propositions stating that chemistry is possible. And these would be propositions of a natural science. For what should they rest on if not on experience?
I believe what people communicate to me in a certain way. Thatâs the way I come to believe geographical, chemical, historical facts, etc. Thatâs the way I learn the sciences. Of course, learning rests on believing.
ibid.
This would seem to do little to illuminate what Wittgenstein would say about Pluto.
I agree. There is no âspecial investigationâ that would have discovered a sign hanging around Pluto that said âI am a standard planet.â So: Were we right to assert, pre-2006, that Pluto was a standard planet?
You seem to have concluded that scientists have a special authority to define language. That might be true but there is another question
Does it change the meaning of the word?
When people say look at all those planets
Do we assume that they mean all the planets including Pluto.
If they do. What should OED record.
We assume what we know about the speakerâs knowledge regarding the specific example theyâre commenting on regarding Pluto, or its lack thereof, because we should know the speaker and the example well enough to make an accurate assessment of what they mean. If theyâre a stranger looking at a dated diagram of the solar system, they will also mean to talk about Pluto as a planet. Anyone who speaks of ânine planetsâ in the present year is technically incorrect unless one wants to define âplanetâ anew, which is a laborious and needless process.
And the OED is constantly being updated in light of the sciences, just like any current dictionary. Language is like nailing the tide to the shore. The actual entity which we refer to as âPluto the dwarf planetâ is just the same as it ever was in reality, unlike the language we use to describe it.
Do Pluto care? Only the ones who categorize celestial bodies care about the emotions they have toward Pluto⌠the rock itself doesnât care.
The better contextualized the question is, the more mundanely obvious the answer is. When evaluated by the standards available at that time, we were right. When evaluated by current astronomical standards we were not right. So long as we agree that there is no static and definitive standard that exists abstracted from all context, then there is nothing further to know that isnât captured by the contextualization of the question.
1 Like
How should we explain to someone what a planet is? I imagine that we should describe planets to him, and we might add: "This and similar things are called âplanetsâ ". And do we know any more about it ourselves? Is it only other people whom we cannot tell exactly what a planet is? â But this is not ignorance. We do not know the boundaries because none have been drawn. To repeat, we can draw a boundary â for a special purpose. Does it take that to make the concept usable? Not at all (Except for that special purpose.) No more than it took the definition: 1 pace = 75 cm to make the measure of length âone paceâ usable. And if you want to say âBut still, before that it wasnât an exact measureâ, then I reply: very well, it was an inexact one â Though you still owe me a definition of exactness.
It is a pseudoproblem. It doesnât concern our knowledge of the planet itself, but is purely a debate about a classification system which has revolved around our own solar system. If the same classification system has to apply to all solar systems then I suspect the distinction would dissolve entirely, because so many âorbital bodiesâ fall into a grey area between planet and non-planet according to our system.
Youâve got it. Itâs a debate about a classificatory scheme, not some feature of the planet itself that weâve discovered has changed. No âspecial investigationâ has revealed that Pluto is really a dwarf planet.
And now we can apply this to a more interesting problem, which is why I brought up the example in the first place:
For âPlutoâ and âstandard planet,â substitute ânumberâ and ârealâ. If a group of philosophers were to call numbers real, but then âdiscoveredâ that numbers are not real after all, what is the debate about? What have they learned about numbers? Were they wrong the first time?
This is only one of many possible abstract nouns and quantifiers we could use, but I think it makes the point: A good way to classify an item is often mistaken for something essential about the item itself, a feature the item actually possesses. Pluto has a number of such actual features; so do numbers; but âdwarf planetâ and ârealâ are not among them.