I don’t disagree. But surely moral authority is a topic worthy of discussion in itself? As far as I can see, you cannot have a society, a school, a court system, or any mode of formation for the young, etc. without individuals exercising such authority. One question then is “in virtue of what is authority proper?”
But my point was more to the denial of authority, which in turn, as far as I can see, doesn’t not lead to an end to the wielding of authority (nor would this be desirable) but simply to covert assertions of authority.
Now, we can justify appeals to limited authority by appealing to some higher authority, and ultimately to some principle. The problem peculiar to voluntarism is that, at the limit, all such principles become objects of constraint, and so are themselves to be rejected in favor of the higher good of freedom. I think Ockham saw the implications particularly well, even though I don’t agree with him. The problem with pathological skepticism is that all such principles are to be rejected as uncertain. In either case, all authority becomes improper authority, either because the assertion of authority is itself an evil (because it entails constraint) or because it always flows from ignorance.
Funny enough, on the skepticism front, it seems possible to have intellectual hubris in the form of skepticism. If it is possible to inappropriately conclude that knowledge in some area is impossible (which does seem possible), then holding to this unsupported position would itself be a sort of hubris. Part of the problem with skepticism them is that it is conflated with humility per se, whereas it seems possible for the two to come apart, especially when skepticism is itself used as a grounding for authority (as it often is in contemporary politics).