On Moral Authority

I don’t disagree. But surely moral authority is a topic worthy of discussion in itself? As far as I can see, you cannot have a society, a school, a court system, or any mode of formation for the young, etc. without individuals exercising such authority. One question then is “in virtue of what is authority proper?”

But my point was more to the denial of authority, which in turn, as far as I can see, doesn’t not lead to an end to the wielding of authority (nor would this be desirable) but simply to covert assertions of authority.

Now, we can justify appeals to limited authority by appealing to some higher authority, and ultimately to some principle. The problem peculiar to voluntarism is that, at the limit, all such principles become objects of constraint, and so are themselves to be rejected in favor of the higher good of freedom. I think Ockham saw the implications particularly well, even though I don’t agree with him. The problem with pathological skepticism is that all such principles are to be rejected as uncertain. In either case, all authority becomes improper authority, either because the assertion of authority is itself an evil (because it entails constraint) or because it always flows from ignorance.

Funny enough, on the skepticism front, it seems possible to have intellectual hubris in the form of skepticism. If it is possible to inappropriately conclude that knowledge in some area is impossible (which does seem possible), then holding to this unsupported position would itself be a sort of hubris. Part of the problem with skepticism them is that it is conflated with humility per se, whereas it seems possible for the two to come apart, especially when skepticism is itself used as a grounding for authority (as it often is in contemporary politics).

There are different kinds of skepticism. Going back to the etymology, skepsis means inquiry or investigation. From there the meanings diverge.

The three alternatives in your OP leave out the middle ground. We can put aside the question of what we can and cannot in principle do and instead start with what in fact we have not done, that is, come to universal agreement. This is not a pathology, it is a condition for moral deliberation. Rather than decisive knowledge of the good, moral deliberation sets the bar lower, at what seems to be best. If it becomes clear that we have good reason to reject what had seemed best, we modify our position.

From a political perspective, it seems best that there be a moral authority. Most people are not self-governing. That authority, however, is not absolute. If and when it becomes evident that this authority creates more problems than it solves, it should be challenged, modified, or rejected in the marketplace of ideas.

This is helpful. I can see that we’re using “authority” differently. I think of a moral authority as someone who knows a great deal more than most people about the subject, just as the authority on butterflies does. Your use is, in my lexicon, more like “is willing to act on their opinions, and believes them well-formed.” In that sense, I hope we are all moral authorities to some degree . . . but is that really the word we want to use? Don’t we want “to take on authority” to mean more than “to exercise leadership we believe to be beneficial”?

Yes. That is very much part of the “why?” question I had to defer earlier.

The difference is structural. The butterfly authority does not get to decide what counts as being an authority on butterflies. That is decided by the community of lepidopterists. If a self-declared authority said to that community, “You’re wrong about the criteria; not only am I a butterfly authority, I also know how to determine what it means to be one, and you all are mistaken,” this individual would get, at best, a perfunctory hearing before being ignored, and rightly so. For this person is claiming there is some standard or criteria outside the lepidoptery community to which they, the alleged authority, can appeal. Whereas the fact is that if there is anything that can be known about how to be a butterfly authority, lepidopterists and only lepidopterists will know this.

The moral authority, in contrast, does have the onus of declaring not only what is moral, but how they know this – what the criteria are. There is no other community which can step in and correct them, because the terms of “being a morality expert” are not shared and understood.

So I’m skeptical of anyone who claims to be a moral authority (in my sense of “knowing a great deal more about the subject than most people”) because such people almost always fail to explain why their view of morality must be correct – though of course they try.

Also important, though, is what tends to happen when individuals are viewed as moral authorities. History shows us a few positive examples, but by and large the results are dreadful. After all, ask yourself: If someone comes to you and claims to know right from wrong better than you do, or to tell you how such a question should be addressed, what will your attitude be? I hope “skeptical” is the answer, because there are thousands of them out there.

And then there’s the problem that moral authorities, unlike butterfly authorities, are often attracted to imposing their authority . . .

Here’s a logical problem with moral authority, for consideration.

Suppose we have some acknowledged authority. When we have a moral decision to make, we ought delegate that decision to the authority.

Ought we do as the authority say?

Now if that is a moral decision - and it seems that it is - the way to answer this question is to ask the moral authority. But now we have a clearly circular answer, that we ought do as the moral authority says because they say so.

And if we have to decide to follow or ignore the moral authority on some other grounds, then that authority is not itself authoritative.

Now I have difficulty in working out what Tim is saying in the OP, but perhaps it is related to this little conundrum. That we must in some sense accept this sort of circularity as non-vicious in order to accept any sort of moral authority.

This by way of agreeing with your rejection of moral authority as a way to decide what we ought do.

Do you think Socrates was regarded as a moral authority by his interlocutors? And did he see himself as such? I think the answer is ‘yes’ and ‘no’, respectively, but I’m interested to hear other opinions.

He was accused and convicted for corrupting the youth and impiety. Ethikos has to do with custom and habit. While his friends did not question whether or not he was just, the examined life is not the life of custom and habit. Questioning rather than accepting the authority of others plays a central role.

That doesn’t really answer the question posed, though.

Do you think he would have been convicted if he hadn’t been regarded as a moral authority by those who convicted him?

Interesting points. I’ve never really identified a moral authority but I guess when I was a kid I tested boundaries and actions in practice with feedback from older people. And I would have heard stories and read novels and histories which would have attracted or repelled me and informed my personal values.

As a pernicious influence on the young. Would his critics have seen him as the opposite of moral authority, as a false sage and corruptor of youth?

But if he wasn’t at least taken to be a moral authority, then he would have been no threat, right? Wasn’t it the fact that he was taken to be a moral authority the very reason for his condemnation?

If it means influence or point of reference then sure. Sounds like being a moral authority could include Pol Pot, John Lennon or Gandhi.

Or Trump, who is currently usurping moral authority from the Pope.

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Right! Perhaps the abuse or the exploitation of moral authority is the real issue at back of the question.

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There’s The Moral Landscape, a book written by a prominent atheist. It’s a vision of morality as a world with peaks of wellbeing and valleys of misery. The idea is to work towards peaks of human flourishing and steer clear of the valleys of doom.

It’s premised on scientific objectivity brought to bear on ethics. In a talk, the author propounds moral objectivism and moral realism. This view I find very attractive.

Ah yes. Classic text in scientism.

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I don’t think it’s reductionism to science that the author is advocating. He wants to bring some objectivity to the subject of ethics and science, in his opinion. is just what the doctor ordered. By the way he includes the soft sciences like social science and psychology and is especially interested in neuroscience (I suppose he’s a physicalist). He’s also an advocate of spiritualism without religion, spent time with Tibetan Buddhist gurus and practices/promotes meditation.

He criticizes Humean is-ought ethical dichotomy because science informs ethics with its emphasis on measurement. Morality, in his weltanschauung, is about wellbeing and flourishing.

Excluding science from ethics may not be a wise decision, but who’s to say that doing so wouldn’t be the biggest mistake we ever make?

With AI here, it’s lamentable that he takes a pessimistic view of this wonder of human ingenuity.

Maybe we who rely on both?

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I think that’s right – it’s certainly what I worry about – but now that the question has been raised, we do have to ask what a non-abusive or exploitative moral authority would be, in practice. I confess I’m not sure what @Count_Timothy_von_Icarus has in mind. As I queried earlier: What does moral authority give you the authority to do? And must it involve justifying the grounds for your authority?

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I do not think he would have been convicted if he had been regarded as a moral authority. He was a threat to the Athenian way of life, which is to say, the ethical way of life.

Lots of replies, I will have to go through them later. One thing I will say though is that I think the replies perhaps speak to what I was trying to point to.

Do only world historical figures act as authorities as to what is good and worthy of choice, or on issues of justice, etc.?

I hardly think so. Even a sixteen year old camp counselor has to—and indeed is expected—to serve as something of an authority on this respect, as well as every teacher and aide, every police officer (indeed, we tend to get exceptionally upset about their injustice because of the authority entrusted to them), every judge, every small town magistrate and board member, every politician, every military officer, etc.

To @Fooloso4 point, I don’t think recognizing authority has anything to do with foreclosing on debate or inquiry. Surely Abraham recognizes the authority of God, but he debates and wrangles with him, as does Saint Peter with Christ after declaring him Lord. And even today, the most clear declaration of authority still widely acknowledged on the West would be the authority of the Catholic Church among its members. But Catholic teaching is itself that individuals must always follow their conscience, not that they must obey as slavish automata.

It’s a good question whether an authority who abuses their authority or who lacks true understanding is truly an authority or only equivocally and apparently so. However, make any authority necessarily:

A world historic figure;
Demanding unquestioning obedience; and
Infallible.

Seems to me to set the bar far to high. In particular, it sets the bar too high because any society will still have to ask parents, teachers, civil authorities, etc. to act as moral authorities in some capacity (even if limited), and so undermining the notion through an unmatchable standard seems, in some ways, like a straw man.

If you want a good example of a moral authority, I’d say maybe Gandalf, or less well known but maybe better, Ogion in the Wizard of Earthsea and Ged in the two books that follow. Gandalf does assert authority as such at times, even early on when he somewhat bullies Bilbo in trying to get him to give up the ring, but in context this is clearly to help him (if I recall the lore correctly he is also like a 3,000 year old celestial being, so that always helps with life experience).

But these people are fictional, which allows them to only confront the problems their authors wish them to confront.

Can you name a few real-life moral authorities?