I ask myself: “What if scientific explanation is the most plausible, or most likely, logical explanation for the internal coherence of a logical paradigm in an artificial system?”
Even before being metaphysical, the question is profoundly epistemological, and I pose it in that sense.
Because if we accept the idea that scientific explanation means “the method science uses to interpret a model of reality” (which inevitably becomes “the model” of reality), and that to do so it is based on the triad of observation-experimentation-falsifiability, and if we consider this sufficient based on the acceptance that its limits are exhausted by the contingency of scientific immaturity, lack of knowledge, and technical inadequacy, then it could be argued that it represents the most plausible logical explanation within the current paradigm of human knowledge. However, the concept of logical plausibility may not have these margins that we consider unique, given, and decisive, but may be relative, for example, to a broader system or an artificial construction with its own paradigm of internal coherence that can impose specific subdomains of coherence. If we imagine an artificial system with its own autonomous internal logic, with its own method of inference, what appears plausible or plausible might not coincide with our scientific conception and even derive from different rules, perhaps based on different axioms. In a similar system, what is “plausible” to us might not be, or vice versa.
This is, therefore, a question concerning the role of science as a method of knowledge and the possible existence of metascientific methods capable of evaluating it from the outside. The reflections thus far lead me to formulate an even more specific question: is science the most plausible explanation simply because we are inserted into a specific epistemic framework, or is it intrinsically the most plausible explanation in an absolute sense? I ask this because, to believe that science is objectively descriptive of reality regardless of the system in which it is placed, I would have to adopt a position of strong scientific realism, but I see nothing that can prove or guarantee that that position is actually the “correct” one, and in particular the only correct one. So the further question might be: is it conceivable that a metascience exists, that is, a superior method capable of evaluating science itself in relation to other possible systems? To question a metascience is, in essence, to ask whether there is a superior criterion for evaluating our criteria, and here (if only because of a strong connection with his work) I think of Gödel, but to acknowledge that, as far as reality and what reality “is” are concerned, we have no superior method that can evaluate science itself in relation to other possible systems to tell us whether it is a subset of a larger truth or, indeed, a crude approximation of a further reality whose scope is beyond our capacity to comprehend. It’s not my intention to be a “barroom Godelian,” since I fully understand that the reference to Gödel, however suggestive, must be used with caution (also because this same objection I raise today to myself I raised many years ago to a priest who tried to exploit Gödel’s work under the pretense of proving God in an online discussion). Incompleteness theorems concern sufficiently expressive formal systems (arithmetic), but not “reality” as such. In any case, they are useful as an epistemic metaphor and indicate a precise internal limit: no powerful system can guarantee both completeness and coherence. Similarly, Tarski’s truth indefinability theorem suggests that the truth of a language cannot be defined in that language: a metalanguage is needed.
Could all this, then, be an indicator that this reality is not primary, authentic, and original? I would say yes, but not only that: the same reality could derive from a further reality that is itself derived, since the dilemma of primordial authenticity would arise for any level higher than ours, falling irremediably into the abyss of recursion.
But would it make sense to ask this question, and above all, why? A collateral philosophical question therefore arises: is the discourse on the search for authenticity “necessary”? Which, upon closer inspection, is the dilemma that asks what differentiates the natural from the artificial in the biological realm. The ultimate question, therefore, is whether this knowledge of primary authenticity is fundamental (and therefore imperative), or whether it can be included within the scope of human knowledge, or whether it cannot be included within it. Personally, I think not; I consider it superfluous knowledge if understood as urgent, if understood as a duty to act, as a duty to investigate, as a fundamental question. I think that any awareness of human activity and its actual further possibilities would bring nothing. But this is my very personal perspective on the dilemma. The open perspective is instead twofold: either we suspend judgment (and therefore accept the impossibility of determining the ultimate origin), or we employ a pragmatic criterion, whereby, regardless of the nature of the origin, we continue to rely on what is operationally stable and coherent at our level (predictions, technologies, value systems, ethics), without the shadow of artificiality becoming a tool of paralysis. In any case, on a purely probabilistic level, it is more realistic to think of being within a simulation rather than immersed in the primary reality. Secondly, here, as already highlighted, we fall into periodicity: not even our hypothetical simulators would have any certainty per se that they are the authentic ones and not, in turn, simulated. Regarding the anxieties induced by the thought that simulated reality could be interrupted for the purpose achieved (study, observation, etc.), it is assumed (and at least hoped) that the potential creators, being so technologically advanced, have also developed an ethical system that takes into account the fate of any sentient entities generated (and it is precisely on this specific aspect that I will propose, in the coming days, another reflection of mine, in a dedicated post).
Continuing our reflection, however, it would be reductive to think that there is, in concrete terms, no difference between the two cases. This point is crucial, because the difference is very powerful and fully affects the value system. It is true that a simulation would not be “less real” phenomenally, but it would still be ontologically derived, dependent, and therefore not self-founded. This inauthenticity would have crucial consequences on the value level, particularly on the religious and fideistic level: in an original universe, the question of God is genuinely open, whereas in a simulation, the origin of existence is already fixed (by an architect, demiurge, puppeteer, programmer… call it what you will), even if inaccessible to the simulated. Therefore, there would be an objective flaw in the faith that postulates an absolute Creator of existence. That faith would be completely out of focus: not in subjective terms (since believers couldn’t know this), but objectively: faith would be ontologically flawed. Indeed, in an authentic reality, faith makes sense precisely because it is a free act in the face of uncertainty and thus, in the absence of certain answers, provides its ethical and existential value. Believing or not believing are legitimate choices only in an authentic context, where the unknowability of the origin is structural, not decided.
But if we were immersed in a simulation, even this freedom of choice would be lost. We could even be programmed to believe or be skeptical. And if God existed, he would no longer be God, but merely a higher level of reality,an engineer, for example.
Does the simulation hypothesis, then, annihilate every fideistic perspective? This is a question I would answer with a “neither.” On the one hand, theology could be saved by shifting the focus, for example by postulating a Creator God, the first cause and foundation of all levels. However, upon closer inspection, this would undermine the idea of a Creator God, so dear to monotheisms, because the perspective would quickly slide into polytheism, opening the door to the idea of many creators, each directly responsible for their own level. This would be unacceptable, because in monotheisms, “God” is not a limited demiurge, a kind of “internal craftsman at a single level,” but is the absolute foundation of all that is. Therefore, if we wished to preserve the concept of a monotheistic God within the context of the simulation hypothesis, then we should imagine Him as the one who simultaneously establishes all levels. In this way, the “local creators” would not be equal to God, but simply creatures operating within the overall framework willed by God. Therefore, God would not be “another programmer higher up,” but rather the creator of both the programmers and the programmed.
But then, even if God were the being that founds all demiurges, what would change for the simulated ones? Nothing, because they would still be inauthentic, not being God’s direct/primary creation. Only the “first authentic” ones would be authentic, so, even in this case, the problem arises again and again.
To try to save both the goat and the cabbage, let’s imagine a layered ontology, in which the beings at the first level are more authentic because they are directly created, while the derived ones are less so. But even this attempt immediately collapses when critically examined: who decides how “less authentic” they are? Furthermore, would their experience of existence be the same as that of the authentic ones? And how can this be verified? There really is no plausible answer here. We could then hypothesize an equal authenticity for all, because if God is the ultimate (and primary) foundation, then every entity that exists, even mediated, is authentic because it is rooted in Him. In this sense, the simulated would be no less authentic; their existence would still depend on God, even if not directly. However, here the term simulation, which we are discussing, would be emptied of any philosophical meaning, because everything would become equally authentic, without distinction. This is, in essence, an insoluble problem through infinite recursion, since every time we imagine a higher level, the question arises again: who is “truly authentic”? If by “authentic” we mean being first, then no one can be so with certainty, because the chain could be infinite and the only authentic being, at this point, would be God himself, and everything else relative.
I therefore believe the fracture that the simulation hypothesis creates in classical theology is irreparable because in the monotheistic paradigm I can affirm “I am willed by God,” but in a multilevel simulation I could at most say “I exist, and if God is the foundation of everything, then He includes me indirectly.”
I also believe that the simulation hypothesis raises unavoidable value issues, first and foremost the verticalization of ethics, which would shift both upward -with the responsibility of simulators toward the simulated-and onto us, with the responsibility of producing our own ethical system that takes into account any generated entities (a question that, among other things, seems more relevant than ever these days).
In conclusion? In conclusion, nothing, because there are no answers, only open questions. However, I’d like to know your point of view on all this “meat in the fire.”
