Limitations of Reason

@j_j

I’ve realized that this question isn’t very clear.

The kind of help I’m referring to can best be understood in contrast to the kind of help that I think rationality provides. Borrowing from Habermas: When two or more people accept the (semi-Kantian) constraints of communicative action, they are agreeing to accept “the unforced force of the better argument.” Unforced, because the agreement to join the conversation must be willing; but forced, because the whole idea of a “better argument” creates a (rational!) obligation to accept its conclusions.

In contrast, two people who express different preferences do not enter that sphere at all. It’s debatable exactly what sphere they do enter, and as you know different philosophers have different takes on that. So what would be your take? How shall we handle the fact that some preferences – perhaps most – don’t lend themselves to simply being voiced and then left alone, when others express differing preferences? Often there are grave practical consequences under debate. What, then, is the nature of that debate, if “debate” is even the word you’d choose? Am I right in thinking that persuasion and rhetoric involve quite different conversational techniques from a genuine appeal to reasons? And what would be the goal of each interlocutor? What do you see them as trying to do?

I do call it into question. Fischer/Bataille provide a persuasive gloss on what we think we know so far about the animal world. Most of it is uncontroversial, and much of it I agree with.

But they give no reason to suppose that our very brief presence on the planet has propelled h.sapiens across a gulf, when it comes to reason and self-awareness. And that’s all I’m disputing. The enormous differences between what humans can do and what other animals can do are beyond question. But it doesn’t follow that because, for instance, animals don’t create religions, therefore some of them can’t think rationally to a degree, or be self-aware to a degree.

It’s the one-side-or-the-other boundary I object to, not the overall purport and direction of this way of seeing the important differences of h.sapiens.

As our species designation — sapiens— suggests, the defining attribute of human beings is an unparalleled cognitive ability. We think differently from all other creatures on earth, and we can share those thoughts with one another in ways that no other species even approaches. In comparison, the rest of our biology is almost incidental. Hundreds of millions of years of evolution have produced hundreds of thousands of species with brains, and tens of thousands with complex behavioral, perceptual, and learning abilities. Only one of these has ever wondered about its place in the world, because only one evolved the ability to do so.

Though we share the same earth with millions of kinds ofliving creatures, we also live in a world that no other species has access to. We inhabit a world full of abstractions, impossibilities, and paradoxes. We alone brood about what didn’t happen, and spend a large part of each day musing about the way things could have been if events had transpired differently. And we alone ponder what it will be like not to be. In what other species could individuals ever be troubled by the fact that they do not recall the way things were before they were born and will not know what will occur after they die? We tell stories about our real experiences and invent stories about imagined ones, and we even make use of these stories to organize our lives. In a real sense, we live our lives in this shared virtual world. And slowly, over the millennia, we have come to realize that no other species on earth seems able to follow us into this miraculous place ~ Terrence Deacon, opening paragraphs of The Symbolic Species, 1997.

He ascribes the difference to language:

The way that language represents objects, events, and relationships provides a uniquely powerful economy of reference. It offers a means for generating an essentially infinite variety of novel representations, and an unprecedented inferential engine for predicting events, organizing memories, and planning behaviors. It entirely shapes our thinking and the ways we know the physical world. It is so pervasive and inseparable from human intelligence in general that it is difficult to distinguish what aspects of the human intellect have not been molded and streamlined by it.

This was also Walker Percy’s thesis, drawing from Peirce and Langer.

That was about 30 years ago. Research has continued into how the rudiments of language are demonstrated by non-human species, with some surprising and delightful discoveries.

Rather than debate what other animals can or can’t do, here’s what I’m really curious about: What’s at stake for you in the claim that only humans can do X, Y, or Z? If it turned out that other species could do a little too, why would that conclusion be as disturbing as you appear to find it?

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Rudiments, yes. Precursors, absolutely. You seem to think my intent is to belittle animals, but it really isn’t that. What’s at stake is something quite different: the fact that human beings occupy a unique existential situation, and that failing to recognise this makes it difficult to appreciate either its gravity or the responsibilities it entails.

Unlike any other species, we have acquired the actual power to destroy all life on Earth (which I pray never occurs), and perhaps eventually to leave the Earth altogether (although I’m very sceptical about the latter). In that sense, human existence has become a predicament. We remain biological creatures, certainly, but we are no longer existentially at home in nature in the way other animals appear to be. The ancients had an intuition of this when they conceived the human being as occupying an intermediate realm — neither simply animal nor divine.

So I don’t find the discovery of animal precursors to language disturbing at all. What’s disturbing is the placid assumption that such discoveries somehow settle the question of human uniqueness, when the obvious fact remains that we have become something radically different in terms of our relationship to the natural world.

And that’s why I find Horkheimer’s observation in The Eclipse of Reason relevant here. His target is precisely the tendency to reduce reason to an adaptive instrument — to treat what is distinctively human as nothing more than an elaboration of the same processes that govern biological adaptation. The paradox, as he sees it, is that this apparently humble reduction of humanity to nature can actually facilitate greater domination of nature, because reason is stripped of precisely those capacities that might enable it to question the ends toward which adaptation and technological power are directed.

In traditional theology and metaphysics, the natural was largely conceived as the evil, and the spiritual or supernatural as the good. In popular Darwinism, the good is the well-adapted, and the value of that to which the organism adapts itself is unquestioned or is measured only in terms of further adaptation. However, being well adapted to one’s surroundings is tantamount to being capable of coping successfully with them, of mastering the forces that beset one. Thus the theoretical denial of the spirit’s antagonism to nature–even as implied in the doctrine of interrelation between the various forms of organic life, including man–frequently amounts in practice to subscribing to the principle of man’s continuous and thoroughgoing domination of nature. Regarding reason as a natural organ does not divest it of the trend to domination or invest it with greater potentialities for reconciliation. On the contrary, the abdication of the spirit in popular Darwinism entails the rejection of any elements of the mind that transcend the function of adaptation and consequently are not instruments of self-preservation. Reason disavows its own primacy and professes to be a mere servant of natural selection. On the surface, this new empirical reason seems more humble toward nature than the reason of the metaphysical tradition. Actually, however, it is arrogant, practical mind riding roughshod over the ‘useless spiritual,’ and dismissing any view of nature in which the latter is taken to be more than a stimulus to human activity. The effects of this view are not confined to modern philosophy ~ Max Horkheimer, The Eclipse of Reason.

Rationality mostly consists in method not in content. We might say any argument can be considered rational if its conclusions are consistent with its premises. If we constantly contradicted ourselves in discourse, then we could not be saying anything cogent. Can premises themselves be irrational? Only if they are unsupported by anything at all I guess.

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The trolley problem is a wicked problem

On the contrary I would say that it is the fact that humans generally do believe that they occupy a “unique existential situation” that is a large part of the problem.

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No, I was quite sure it wasn’t that. You’ve never seemed that way. So I was all the more curious why the uniqueness of certain human characteristics looms so large
for you.

But much of what you go on to say helps clarify that. In fact, if there’s a point at issue between us here, it seems quite minor to me now. I agree with essentially everything you’re saying about the position that humans are in, and the responsibilities we alone are faced with. I just don’t believe it adds anything to the description of that position to say, “and this is because of unique species differences.” It is an interesting speculation whether h.sapiens and its biology has resulted in “what is distinctively human.” An equally interesting hypothesis is that our predicament is largely cultural. In short, an “existential situation” can arise from many factors.

As for Horkheimer – quite right, reason cannot be reduced to an adaptive instrument. The key word being “reduced” – there are some contexts in which looking at the adaptive advantages of reason is perfectly legitimate and interesting. But those contexts cannot reduce or explain reason.

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The old argument: Must “reason” be understood to mean instrumental reason alone? Method rather than content? Well, 2,500 years of contention hasn’t resolved it. My vote is for the expanded, non-instrumental version, in which reason can be applied to questions such as “What ought I to desire?” and “Is this goal supported by a rational argument?”

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Right I agree that reason can of course be applied to ethical questions, but there will always be premises in any ethical argument which are not strictly arrived at, or supported by, reason, but by experience, social conscience and compassion and so on.

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I use quotes ironically to defend preference as something completely respectable. I might lose my temper and kill a man who abuses a puppy in front of me. Or a child. I would feel like killing a motherfucker. That doesn’t mean that I think it would be fair and right to do so. I am trying to point beyond mere words. I can tell you here that I hate the kicking of puppies. But the best way to check that would be to check my feet, not these chains of signs. Obviously this forum is necessarily “alienated.” I’m grateful for it, of course. So my point is just that “text streams” only encourage the metaphor that “a self is a bag of verbal beliefs.”

My way of peeling a banana or approaching a particular cognitive dissonance will presumably only be relevant to others who are enough like me to “get” it. I don’t envision myself as a pulpit man speaking to The Human Family in terms of an Eternal Species Logic. But I was young once, so I remember the ethical-erotic object “left Hegelian humanism.” Now I’m more a pessimist, but thankfully equipped with gallows humor and an attachment to at least a minimal decency. I guess I make sense as a member of the Disaster Mitigation Squad. I was careless enough to get myself born, and too much of a mammal to live like a god on locusts and honey in the woods. So I try to treat kindly and fairly those who treat me kindly and fairly. I work outward from there, but I don’t pretend that I am scattering a great surplus on strangers. My super-important appearances at the ballot box are respectable if ineffectual. Our values are probably similar. But perhaps I am gloomier about what is possible. And yet I also insist on trying to enjoy my brief stay in this stinky, burning hotel.

I can only say that — from my POV — you don’t really “get” my POV.

I enact normativity constantly constantly constantly. I think you want to chop normativity into two pieces, one piece mundane and the other sacred. I find Brandom’s semantic inferentialism highly plausible. You would not understand me at all — even as a me — if I abandoned all normativity. We are “performing English together” right now. The “explicitly” normative is the mere tip of the iceberg. Indeed, the explicit in general is the cream that floats on an ocean of living darkness.

This is part of what I mean by “logocentrism.” It goes back to “free will” and a pre-Freud, pre-Marx, pre-Heidegger “top down” model of the self. An “essence computer” in the “pineal gland” is the seat of the immaterial spirit. The “spirit” is slightly demoted by “Kant-style linguistic philosophy” to a “bag of verbal beliefs.” The “deep assumption” is that “thought is immaterial.” Moreover the “sacred essence” of “immaterial thought” is “accurate description” of truth-making objective reality — reality for “God” as the vague, ideal narrator.

What goes with this is a normativity that is “only at the top.” Normativity is not washing your hands after a piss or standing in a line automatically or using a fork for pork and a spoon for soup. It is primarily a “higher” thing. The “truly human” floats cleanly above established animal habit.

So I have to “choose” between impious rhetoric and “serious” logic. For — the faith proclaims — logic is “external” to rhetoric. Yet it’s particular human beings who rattle their vocal chords who call some other human’s speech act “logical” or “sophistry.” I have been trying to point out the projection of a “God” as the tacit move in even “secular” philosophy. From my POV, much of philosophy just is permutations on the old inherited myth of immaterial spirit in the pineal gland of a moist robot. Theories of meaning, theories of perception, theories of logic, theories of truth — all insisting on the essential “purity” of something “untainted” by time and chance. The theory of the “lever” or “gavel.” The theory of “more than just my belief as one more mammal.”

But do I contradict myself ? Why should you care about my opinion ? If it doesn’t appeal to God’s opinion ? Obviously “God” is metaphorical here. “If you aren’t speaking for God, then why should I care ?”

But I am not “essentially” speaking to those who demand a speech from the mouth of “God.” I mean that I understand — of course — that my position is not a living option for most people. I see critical philosophy as fundamentally “elitist.” I presuppose the taste and autonomy of my ideal listeners, and this is of course in terms of what I’d call “taste” and “autonomy.” I “perform rationality” by exposing myself to different approaches, by avoiding any attempt to mute or silence others. To me the whole “rationality is euclidean” is itself strongly associated with tendencies to oust richer conceptions of rationality. “Anything goes!”

Feyerabend, who celebrated Mill in his work, understood the futility and even the folly of “institutionalizing” rationality as a frozen fetishized and sacred Method.

Since I no longer believe in “speaking for God,” I don’t experience my own position as lacking something essential. For me it’s more like a return to planet Earth. “Of course I can only offer one perspective among others.” “Of course not some people will hate my approach, call it silly or nonsense or evil or who knows what.”

I’d view this in very concrete terms. Two roommates “argue” about something. They need to settle the issue or decide to split up. If they don’t both prefer to settle things in a civil manner, we don’t get even get to the moment of rationality.

I have to give a damn about my role in a relationship or a community to enact civility. My being civil “enacts” this “giving a damn.”

The roommates will hopefully both accept the vague principle of equal duties and equal rights with respect to the shared apartment. They may then debate the “point value” of this or that task or freedom. “I should be able to have friends over past 10 PM, because I am always the one who washes the dishes.” It gets very messy, very blurry and qualitative. Even the tone is hugely important. A disrespectful tone, an ugly facial expression — this is also “irrational.” Rationality is something like civility.

What exactly is “the force of the better reason” ? Is it the reason in God’s ear ? We don’t have a God to judge which reason is better. But “the better reason” still points at something, however vague. Our “better” selves — our less angry selves — recognize “ok that’s a good reason.” But I don’t see us ever having the luxury of sitting above the conversation. I am always me, feeling the way that I feel, judging the way that I judge. I might feel punished for my virtues. I maintain my belief that what I did was fair indeed, but everyone hates me now. I am misunderstood, etc.

To me this is just life. We are down in the trenches. Philosophy can help us broaden our sense of the situation. We confer with the mighty dead. Perhaps it helps us come off as more trustworthy, as more capable, as more sophisticated. But finally we live the concrete collision with other human beings who are almost as weird as we are.

If we extend adaptation generously to include “joyful cooperation,” the I don’t see the problem.

We can jettison the insane and anti-social Cartesian trope of the atomic jar of internal icons, filled also with an oxymoronic private language.

Not only the “power”, but also the “will”! :cry:

“Human beings occupy a unique existential situation” — are we as “unique” as you seem to think? Yes, all species, and all individuals, are unique. But other living things are pretty amazing too. And unique, of course. :person_shrugging:

I do too. But I think it’s not only “spirit” that we have discarded, but also morality: simple right and wrong.

Yes. What is it with humans, that we try so hard, and so often, to find a single reason or cause for something? Surely we should have worked out by now that the real world is never that simple? Everything is connected; everything is part of everything else. And so it appears to be all mixed up. But it isn’t really, in the pejorative sense that this short phrase carries. Wholeness is a universal property of reality, IME and IMO.

I actually want to have a go at this, inspired by Mach.

I suggest that we aren’t fundamentally just “staring” at the world. We want buttons and levers. We want to control and predict. A technique for control/prediction is better if it smaller and easier. Life economizes. “As simple as possible, but no simpler.”

Second approach. Our beliefs function together. A more coherent vision of the world is better, generally speaking. If a single model or metaphor “kills two birds” as one stone, that’s better than two theories that live beside one another in tension. Physics had to “just live with” light as particles and light as waves. Of course they options were initially totalizing. Reduction to a simpler, single metaphor was in fact less effective, for many pragmatic purposes even, as modern technology based on QM shows.

And that’s where our simplistic approach falls down, I think. To seek just one reason or cause for something is often simplistic, not “simpler”. IMO.

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Because when we ask a single question, we assume to get one single answer.

Yet we forget that our question itself defines the potential answer we can get. The question part in our attempt in reasoning complex events is crucial as it frames what answer we can get. Many things are about asking the right questions. Above all, we might have made presumptions that are faulty, which then make our questions wrong.

History is a perfect example of this. Even if there is objectively just one way things happened, just one way what people did and talked and acted, that isn’t at all the end of it. There is no disagreement about the date and time when the atom bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. It didn’t happen in 1944 or 1946 and the place was Hiroshima (and Nagasaki). Yet we find the interesting questions in a question like “How much did the Atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki affect the decision for Japan to surrender compared to the fact that Russia had invaded Manchuria and was advancing rapidly?” That is an interesting question, and those who were making the decisions are dead. Yet we are interested in this question for the justification for using nuclear weapons in the first place.

Mathematics is another example. Earlier people assumed that because Mathematics is so beautiful and logical, all numbers are rational. Well, there are irrational numbers. Or thought you could square the circle or in all geometry, Euclid’s fifth postulate (the parallel postulate) was true. All of these relied on axioms that actually were not true and hence weren’t axioms at all. If we believed those axioms, we simply wouldn’t ask many important questions.

This effects then the reality we picture around us and even the machines we have. For me a good example of this is that if we were stuck in the Newtonian physics sphere, our GPS navigation would be lousy (if we would even have gotten to the stage of having a satellite system based GPS navigation). You have to take into account Einstein’s ideas to get as precise satellite navigation as you have today.

Yes, that’s the plausible rebuttal, a more sophisticated version of Hume’s “slave of the passions” argument. But is it true? Why is your spade turned (hitting a foundation or bedrock) at experience, social conscience, and compassion? Can’t we ask, “What, in turn, forms them?” And is it obvious that reason is silenced at that point, so that it can have no role in forming, for instance, our compassionate responses? Personally, I had to develop mine; they weren’t “given” at all.