Limitations of Reason

I’m not surprised, but I am also not constrained by Schopenhauer’s views. He was admirably a student of biology, but he didn’t have Darwin. Even Darwin didn’t know that a single sperm cell can fertilize an egg. In many ways, Dawkins gives us a concentrated and demystified Schopenhauer in The Selfish Gene. Of course Dawkins is generally weak as a philosopher, but in this particular book he “grounds” the essential (distinctive) claims of Schopenhauer in empirical science, illuminated by mathematics.

I’m curious whether you find it plausible that other cultural animals may be “out there” beyond our solar system ? Personally, I don’t see why not. I usually only think about it in the context of philosophy, but Kant thought about it in his anthropology. Why does “the rational animal” have 5 fingers on each of its 2 hands ? Why 2 eyes rather than 8 ?

Feuerbach saw that God’s “lack of a body” contributed to God serving as a projection of the essence of our species. This essence — here we largely agree — is “reason.”

But are we the only species with “reason” ? If it is this “reason” that lifts us above the other animals, then it’s not clear that it matters that we have 5 fingers on each hand and two eyes connected to each brain.

Just as the Divine Being is nothing other than the being of man freed from the limits of nature, so is the essence of absolute idealism nothing other than the essence of subjective idealism freed from the limits, and, indeed, rational limits of subjectivity, that is, from sensuousness or objectivity as such.

Taken as an intelligible (geistig) or an abstract being, that is, regarded neither as human nor as sensuous, but rather as one that is an object for and accessible only to reason or intelligence, God qua God is nothing but the essence of reason itself. But, basing themselves rather on imagination, ordinary theology and Theism regard him as an independent being existing separately from reason. Under these circumstances, it is an inner, a sacred necessity that the essence of reason as distinguished from reason itself be at last identified with it and the divine being thus be apprehended, realised, as the essence of reason. It is on this necessity that the great historical significance of speculative philosophy rests. The proof of the proposition that the divine essence is the essence of reason or intelligence lies in the fact that the determinations or qualities of God, in so far as they are rational or intelligible and not determinations of sensuousness or imagination, are, in fact, qualities of reason.

“God is unconditional, general – ‘God is not this or that particular thing’ – immutable, eternal, or timeless being.” But absoluteness, immutability, eternality, and generality are, according to the judgment of metaphysical theology itself, also qualities of the truths or laws of reason, and hence the qualities of reason itself; for what else are these immutable, general, absolute, and universally valid truths of reason if not expressions of the essence of reason itself?

“God is the independent, autonomous being not requiring any other being in order to exist, hence subsisting entirely by and through itself.” But even this abstract, metaphysical characterisation has meaning and reality only as a definition of the essence of intelligence and, as such, it states only that God is a thinking and intelligent being or, vice versa, that the thinking being is the divine being; for only a sensuous being will need some other being outside itself in order to exist.

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FWIW, I think that “God” is “the great thought” of the human species, for this thought of “God” is part of the swelling self-consciousness of our species. Human reason is essentially “trans-human” in the sense that it is not essentially tied to the DNA that we share. The lady from Neptune with sonar enjoys reading Plato. And the humans of 2450 enjoy ancient spiritual works perhaps from distant solar systems.

One might say: but perhaps we alone in the vast universe have “reason.” I can at least grant that I may well die without having seen any evidence to the contrary. But I think it would be difficult to make a conclusive case for our species as the only “reasonable” one in the universe. Of course this was the traditional view, and Galileo was famously punished for threatening the dominance of this view.

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:rofl: That is truly preposterous.

Humans are the only species known to possess generative, hierarchically structured syntax of the kind found in human language.

From a review of Why Only Us? Noam Chomsky and Robert Berwick:

Animal communication systems are built entirely on linear sequences—a simple string of signals where meaning is tied to proximity. Human language, by contrast, relies on a hierarchical syntax powered by recursive structures, allowing the mind to link concepts across distances in a sentence based on their structural relations rather than their order.

Consider this example of nested dependency:

“Which files did you assume the manager claimed the team should update before the audit?”

Even though the word “update” is separated from “files” by a long chain of intervening clauses but we’re able to perceive the connection - we understand that files are what get updated, not managers or teams, because structural hierarchy over-rules linear proximity.

A cleaner, more immediate illustration of how structure overrides linear distance involves the positioning of modifiers. Take the ambiguous sentence:

“Clever students who study diligently pass.”

Here, “diligently” can either modify how they study or how they pass. But if we shift the qualifier:

“Diligently clever students who study pass.”

The ambiguity dissappears. Despite being shoved all the way to the front—far away from the verb it actually governs—“diligently” must now modify the act of passing at the highest clause level. The mind doesn’t calculate distance by counting words; it parses the sentence as an architectural tree, locking distant elements together because of where they sit in the structural hierarchy.

Schopenhauer’s account of animal consciousness predates Darwin’s theory of natural selection and is independent of it. But notice the convergence. For Schopenhauer, animals possess understanding: they perceive, pursue ends, and apprehend causal relations, but lack Vernunft — the capacity for abstract concepts and the reflective organisation of experience that those concepts make possible. In that respect, his distinction anticipates an important question still at issue today: whether the distinctive feature of human cognition is not consciousness as such, but the conceptual and linguistic capacities that make reflective consciousness possible.

Animals have understanding without the faculty of reason, and consequently they have knowledge of perception, but no abstract knowledge. …Perfect reflectiveness or circumspection (Besonnenheit) rests on distinct consciousness of the past and of the eventual future as such and in connexion with the present. Therefore the real memory required for this is a systematic, orderly, coherent, and thinking recollection. This, however, is possible only by means of general concepts, whose aid is required even by what is entirely individual, so that it is recalled in its order and concatenation. For the boundless multitude of things and events of the same and similar kinds in the course of our life does not admit directly of a perceptive and individual recollection of each particular thing; for that neither the powers of the most comprehensive faculty of memory nor our time would be sufficient. Therefore all this can be preserved only by subsuming it under universal concepts and by the reference arising out of this to relatively few principles.

Perhaps, but life is short.

Thanks for this thoughtful response.

I think that’s right, except that I didn’t intend anything suspicious. There are all kinds of crude or unaccomplished views being put forward, here and elsewhere. I just figured you and I were both more interested in engaging with views that grow out of a deeper conversation. I was hoping your examples would have focused on that sort of view.

Good point! I too can be held responsible for oversimplification, especially when I imagine I’m talking to a “general audience” who may not be as familiar with philosophical traditions as I am.

That said, though, the reasons why I proposed that instrumental rationality “cuts rationality off from anything normative” are quite different from the idea of a “normative ought-stuff.” But it would have been better to say – and I do say now – that some versions of instrumental rationality raise the question of how rationality can relate to the normative. That would be much less either/or, so thanks for the prompt.

Still curious about this, which I asked you about before. Can you say more about what you mean by “performance”?

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Yes, we are. But I am perhaps more critical of some relatively respectable views. I see the tradition ( even stronger philosophers) as having largely failed to pick up on the breakthrough achieved by thinkers like Mach.

I’m a big fan of Brandom’s work, though.

Sure. I mentioned Brandom above. Basically the “atomic self” trope that features an isolated self-consciousness who “may or may not” share a world with others is “insane” or “blind” on the issues of self-hood and logic/language.

I use “performance” in a value-neutral sense. I am saying that selfhood is “essentially social,” that “sociality” precedes and enables individuality.

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Distinguishing humans from others is just one of many achievements attributed to normative rationalism. Brandom is going for broke. In the first half of this short book, ‘A Semantic Sonata in Kant and Hegel’, he depicts normative rationalism as the rightful inheritor of the best and deepest in the German idealist tradition. His argument ranges boldly over norms, selves, concepts, autonomy, community, freedom, history, reason, reality. Selves come in because they incur the responsibilities and commitments. Since contradicting oneself is bad, unlike contradicting someone else, rational norms demarcate the boundaries between selves. Concepts are rules for applying words; they give specific shape to the norms. Those concepts are ours because we make the rules. Our autonomy is that power to bind ourselves with self-given norms. Since it would amount to little if one always acted as judge and jury in one’s own case, we must make and maintain the rules as a community, rather than each of us drawing up our own personal rulebook. In particular, concepts are expressed by words in a public language. It is in such a language that we request and supply reasons. The rules develop as a system of case law, not statutory law, for words have meanings in virtue of how we use them, not by a once-forall act of stipulation. Thus normativity and reason have an essential historical dimension, because applications of rules must be judged by the standard of past applications and in turn modify the standard for judging future applications. Since retrospective criticism is possible too, the process works backwards as well as forwards. We grasp the concept of objective reality by reflecting on that history of self-correction. This does not make reality itself as mind-dependent as the process of self-correction; Brandom’s idealism is more semantic than metaphysical. He makes no pretence at detailed exegesis of Kant and Hegel’s crucial texts. Rather, he self-consciously engages in a selective rewriting of the history of philosophy as a triumphant progress up to his own views, including the view that so presenting one’s views is a central philosophical task.

On the continent side, we have Heidegger’s concept of “the Anyone,” which Dreyfus brilliantly explicates in an analytic lingo in Being-in-the-world.

If it helps, my own approach is anchored in the primacy of perception and in the primacy of sociality. Nothing is more real than other people. Even “me” as “me” is not “more real” than those other people “for whom” I am a unified performance. This should be read as a pointing. It’s even absurd to ask for a proof of this. Those who ask for a proof enact the very belief that they doubt only on the surface. To ask for a proof is to presuppose a sharing of the world that includes the sharing of a normativity that governs the warrant assigned to claims.

On the other hand, the world is there for particular humans, who compare the claims of others ( which are often “surrogate perceptions”) to their own personal perceptions. We do not need a theological-ideological “view from God” or a non-sensical “view from nowhere.” We do not need “perfect certainty.” Belief is primary “enacted” below the neck. I demonstrate my belief in a particular parachute by leaping out of the plane. But philosophy tends to be “stuck in talk” to such a degree that it (insincerely) plays with negating the primacy of perception and the primacy of sociality.

So we agree here. Schopenhauer opposed vivisection. He “felt” for non-human animals. I like this about him.

I’d say that “of course” we aren’t the only sentient creatures. And yes the distinguishing quality of the human animal is the “reason” discussed in those Feuerbach quotes above.

Returning the OP, human “reason” is indeed amazing. But I’d say it’s grounded in “merely animal” sense perception, and that human motives are not “higher” than chimpanzee motives. I grant that humans understand as Chimpanzees do not that they can “partially cheat death” by etching their highest thoughts in stone, for instance. Mach is explicit about this. The scientist and the poet can achieve relative immortality through the general adoption of signed memes.

I know. Everyone thinks that. They think it is what naturalism means. It’s this kind of romanticism about nature — look! We’re one with nature! Nature is nowadays taken to symnbolize purity, unspoiledness. In some ways, it’s a stand-in for the Unconditioned. But regrettably nature is not benign. Everything in nature eats or is eaten. It’s also popular to believe that one ‘lives on in one’s work’, which is true in a sense, but not in the ultimate sense.

I don’t idolize reason, but I insist that in the proper sense it is the prerogative of h.sapiens - hence the designation!

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OK. But what do you mean when you say, “To be ‘rational’ is to perform a virtue in a fundamentally social space”? I think I see the “essentially (or fundamentally) social” part, but if “performance” is value-neutral (and presumably applies to every way we present ourselves, not just the presentation of rationality), where does the “perform a virtue” part fit in? In what sense is it a virtue?

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I guess I don’t see why the line has to be drawn so strongly. If it could be shown to your satisfaction that chimps, or dolphins, engage in some form of reasoning, would that really affect what you want to say about the importance of rationality for humans? Or is it that your conception of rationality demonstrates that only humans could have it? – that seems too strong a line as well.

We don’t have to idolize or sentimentalize nature in order to notice that we are part of it. The question is, what part? In which regards do we share qualities with other animals? Every species is no doubt unique as regards some capacity or feature – must it be the case that, for humans, that capacity is reason? It may be, but I’m asking what important difference it would make if that were not true.

‘The designation’ being ‘sapiens’. In the writings of some of the perennialist philosophers ‘sapiential’ is used as a description of the wisdom traditions. It has long been said that a more fitting description of the human is actually ‘homo faber’, ‘man who makes’. There’s some truth in that.

But we’re plainly no longer part of nature. In a material sense, we live in an artificial environment, sorrounded by artifices, dressing in artificial fabrics and consuming many manufactured food items. We have shaped natural principles to our ends, such that their products are no longer naturally occuring. And existentially we’re separated from nature by self–consciousness in a way that other animals are not.

I was tremendously impressed by an essay published by Zen teacher and poet Norman Fischer, about the 9/11 atrocities (one of two by notable American Buddhists, the other being an essay by David Loy that I also mention from time to time.) Fischer’s essay went offline but was later published as part of an anthology of his writings from which this is an extract. It’s too long to try and summarise but I have shared it here The Violence of Oneness.

Again, I’d say that’s too decided – though as we’ve seen on TPF, trying to say what “natural” ought to mean is pretty tough. At the very least, we are an animal species and a product of evolution, so surely natural in that sense?

That may well be true. But to extend my thought-experiment about rationality, suppose we discovered that dolphins have a kind of self-consciousness? That would show, presumably, that self-consciousness is more “natural” (in one sense) than we’d realized – but only a little.

Or, again, do you maintain that we know something about self-consciousness such that we know it to be impossible for any other species to have it?

The upshot, in any case, doesn’t seem to do any harm to our conception of what it means to be human. Or maybe I’m less concerned with unique, definitional capacities of humans.

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Right. I mean it’s no accident that I linked Schopenhauer to Dawkins. Schopenhauer is a grim thinker. Personally I’m not interested in a “feel good” story. Hobbes is another of my favorite thinkers.

We might say “regrettably” nature is not benign, but only a part of us is saying that. We keep the slaughterhouses running. We devour resources to breed. Our actions are rapacious, nepotistic. But I am not trying to moralize here, to pose as one of the hand-wringing innocents, somehow less complicit than others. I’m saying we are largely wolves who enjoy posing as lambs for one another. It is good for “wolves” to cooperate, to create property laws, etc. It is good for groups of “wolves” to externalize their violence. I am not trying to celebrate or excoriate here but only point out my sense of the “cruelty” of nature relative to the part of us that wants to identify with the lamb. I think lots of discourse is basically unrealistic on this issue, because it’s a political device that flatters its target audience. “We are the lambs. They, over there, are the wolves.”

What is the significance of human birth in Buddhism?

We don’t arrive at the bank to deposit money in our birthday suit. We flush the toilet before we leave the bathroom. We don’t say “it’s raining outside” and then (immediately) “it’s not raining outside.”

I’m not talking about “virtue in God’s eyes.” I am saying that selfhood involves a sense of the self as witnessed by others. Indeed, this “immersion in others” is primary. The child slowly develops distance from peers and parents. A developed personality may go against everyone alive in their future community in the name of an ideal future community.

Perhaps (?) you are asking me to “ground” virtue in “objective reality.” But I’ve been saying that I find “objective reality” to be an empty fetish, a residue of monotheism. This means that I do not pretend to “speak for God.” I offer my own self-consciously situated belief. I am one more “eye-witness.” I can speak to how the world makes sense to me, confident that my way of seeing things has value for some but not all other human beings. I don’t need “truth.” I don’t need to “mirror” a paradoxical fetishized “objective reality.” I offer my signs to other primates, vividly aware that only a tiny minority of those who perceive them will have any use for them. So I am speaking from a “post-monological” sense of the situation.

This “post-monological” or “post-truth” attitude is confusing and impious for many, it seems to me. Because “of course” the “intellectual” is “speaking for God objective reality.” To me there’s something darkly amusing in all of this, because I find it unrealistic in an informal sense. The “realism” of “intellectuals” is church-boy theatrics, essentially alienated from our non-verbal and non-theoretical conduct. Wolves dressed as sheep, believers dressed as skeptics. Again, I present a self-consciously situated ( owned/claimed) belief that I do not expect to “mean anything” to most people. My analogy is that I am an “atheist” who does not expect to talk the average “theist” out of their commitments. To me it’s psychologically unrealistic ( in the non-seminarian sense of “realism”) to expect to deflect a crystallized pose. Still, I hope to find and relate to others that I find “realistic” about the world in my sense of the word, which is far from the video-game confusion of “objective reality” ( dehydrated water.)

I don’t know. Please go on.

OK. So “virtue” in the sense of “customs or practices we agree, as a society, are desirable to practice.”

Not at all. I just want to understand how you use a term that, on the surface, doesn’t seem to fit your philosophy. But you’ve explained it well. “Virtue in quotes” is a good way to put it! You don’t pretend that there is actually anything to recommend being rational, other than your own preference for it, which you claim is based on a preference shared with others so as to achieve certain preferred ends. Your own “self-consciously situated belief” is the bedrock where your spade is turned. There are no further performances of reason – not even “your reasons” – you could engage in that would take you or your interlocutor out of the Space of Preferences.

Would you agree that Rorty’s “irony and solidarity” is also a good description of this position? And that what you call “offering signs to other primates” is more or less what Rorty means by “rhetoric,” as opposed to logical/rational argumentation?

And of course, if I’ve mischaracterized what your saying, please correct me.

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The background is that in the Indian traditions, beings are continually reborn in the various realms (six in Buddhist lore) according to their karma (intentional actions). Buddhist texts emphasize how difficult it is to attain a human rebirth. A famous parable from the Samyutta Nikaya illustrates this: the Buddha compares the chance of a blind turtle—surfacing once every hundred years in a vast ocean—slipping its neck through a single golden yoke floating on the waves to the likelihood of obtaining a human birth after having fallen into lower realms. This metaphor underscores that human existence is not guaranteed; it is a precious, fleeting window. One will frequently encounter the expression ‘this precious human birth’ particularly in Tibetan sources.

So human life provides the opportunity for awakening (‘bodhi’) which is the way it is differentiated from other forms of life. (See also David Loy Are Humans Special?)

Whereas popular Darwinism, if I can use that phrase, tends to treat humans as on a continuum with other species. The fact that it is thought to have displaced the Biblical accounts of creationism, also displaces much traditional lore about the human condition. I will affirm that I’m conversant with the evolutionary facts, but that the biological similarity between h.sapiens and other species, ought not to mask the existential dissimilarities which are part of the human condition.

This “we” is “ideal” and in-progress. We impose on one another. The English language is an “organism.”

You are missing that any “me” is 95% bot. In other words, an “I” is primarily the dancing meat of the generic communal subject. We can only ( mostly) understand one another because both of us have been trained like monkeys ( or rather naked apes ) to mostly respond in the same-enough way to the same chains of signs.

To me you are still taking my approach too logocentrically. My situated belief is largely visceral habit, like closing the door when I go to the bathroom, responding to a wave with a wave. Dreyfus is great on this. Belief is only verbal and explicit at the tip of the “iceberg.” The hard part is dragging autonomic belief up “into” the realm of critical rationality so that such belief is sufficiently “visible” for critique.

To point out “situated belief” is only “dramatic” against a background of the inherited pretense that we are sparks of “pure reason,” isolated from bodies that dance inherited habits. As I see it, it is a triviality-in-retrospect that a particular primate has its own specificity of response to stimuli. Of course we only have community through a dominant synchronization of such responses.

I also personally find it trivial-in-retrospect ( as an atheist ) that we don’t have a “magical authority lever” that plugs us into a disembodied “true rationality” or “absolute logic.” It may sound impious to point out that I see us as constrained largely by our fellow primates, and not some surrogate for God, but to me this impiety is a by-product of a monotheist, monological residue.

“Preference” is not a dirty word to me. And I am not saying that it is to you. I “prefer” that people don’t kick puppies. I “prefer” that people don’t murder strangers for kicks. I may “prefer” this enough to support the death penalty, call for a hanging. The “seriousness” of “mere” preference is “visceral.”

A person can be a “relativist” in a “technical sense” without any loss of vigor in their moral life. I’m not saying that you don’t already understand this. I just want to clarify that “living without truth” and “absolute word-web foundations” is not necessarily a big deal. Following Peirce, I’d look for real doubt in visceral paralysis, in a loss of nerve that shows itself in indecision. Of course it’s difficult to “point to” the visceral via a text forum. But indeed I am pointing out the limits of words, and also the “immersion” of conceptuality in a much larger context of an organism’s shaking of its bones. So pragmatism is not another boring theory of truth but a pointing below the neck.

That’s close. But we don’t have rhetoric versus logic. We have a larger more realistic conception of discourse that includes a more narrow conception. The “calculative reason” that formal logic tries to capture is relatively trivial. The “Euclidean prejudice” looks to me to be grounded ( to use a cartoon) in a vision of the “higher rational mind” as a “essence computer” in the “pineal gland.” Metaphoricity, as Derrida and others have emphasized, has been cast in the role of the suspicious candyman. We also inherit the fact/value distinction and basically a fetishization of mathematical models as metaphysical “truths,” which obviously-in-retrospect clashes completely with how such models earn their rhetorical prestige in the first place.

So I, for instance, will make arguments, appeal to rational norms. At the same time, I don’t forget that dialogue is larger and richer than that particular component. I personally acknowledge that “calculative” reasoning is motivated. So of course the goal or “image of virtue” matters here. Much of philosophy is a kind of abnormal discourse that fidgets with the goal, and this includes an adjustment of the role of the sign “rationality” within a community. Along with Rorty, I’d suggest that rationality is fundamentally an ethical concept. It’s not about “fidelity to Euclid” ( “proof rhetoric”) but the tolerance of difference via the prioritization of individual freedom, especially the freedom to speak differently than others. Freedom is of course a binding, a prohibition of my willful tyranny over others. I am constrained ideally only by the freedom of others. This becomes highly complex, because we are sharing a lifeboat. We aren’t just clouds of verbal beliefs.

Thanks, I didn’t know this about the Buddhist tradition. But I ask (gently), Does this give us a reason to suppose that there must be an existential divide between humans and other animals?

We are uncanny. I grant you that. But are beavers not part of nature, because they build dams ?

Korzybski nailed it when he pointed out that we are the supreme time-binders on this planet, as far as we know. And we seem to suffer a sense of alienation as presumably other animals do not.

The reason for the Buddhist example is to make the point that in that culture, the distinction is taken as fundamental. For the Greeks, the distinction was rationality, the ability to ‘see reason’, you might say, with man as ‘the rational animal’. And in the Bibical tradition, I believe the rupture from the animal world is the inner meaning of the Myth of the Fall.

I don’t know if you glanced at the Norman Fischer essay I posted, so I’ll provide a long excerpt below. (It is Fischer’s gloss on a book by Georges Battaille, an existentialist philosopher with whom I have no acquaintance elsewhere).

The Violence of Oneness

The animal world is a world of pure being, a world of immediacy and immanence. The animal soul is like “water in water,” seamlessly connected to all that surrounds it, so that there is no sense of self or other, of time, of space, of being or not being. This utopian (to human sensibility, which has such alienating notions) Shangri-La or Eden actually isn’t that because it is characterized at all points by what we’d call violence. Animals, that is, eat and are eaten. For them killing and being killed is the norm; and there isn’t any meaning to such a thing, or anything that we would call fear; there’s no concept of killing or being killed. There’s only being, immediacy, “isness.” Animals don’t have any need for religion; they already are that, already transcend life and death, being and nonbeing, self and other, in their very living, which is utterly pure.

Bataille sees human consciousness beginning with the making of the first tool, the first “thing” that isn’t a pure being, intrinsic in its value and inseparable from all of being. A tool is a separable, useful, intentionally made thing; it can be possessed, and it serves a purpose. It can be altered to suit that purpose. It is instrumental, defined by its use. The tool is the first instance of the “not-I,” and with its advent there is now the beginning of a world of objects, a “thing” world. Little by little out of this comes a way of thinking and acting within thingness (language), and then once this plane of thingness is established, more and more gets placed upon it—other objects, plants, animals, other people, one’s self, a world. Now there is self and other—and then, paradoxically, self becomes other to itself, alienated not only from the rest of the projected world of things, but from itself, which it must perceive as a thing, a possession. This constellation of an alienated self is a double-edged sword: seeing the self as a thing, the self can for the first time know itself and so find a closeness to itself; prior to this, there isn’t any self so there is nothing to be known or not known. But the creation of my me, though it gives me for the first time myself as a friend, also rips me out of the world and puts me out on a limb on my own. Interestingly, and quite logically, this development of human consciousness coincides with a deepening of the human relationship to the animal world, which opens up to the human mind now as a depth, a mystery. Humans are that depth, because humans are animals, know this and feel it to be so, and yet also not so; humans long for union with the animal world of immediacy, yet know they are separate from it. Also they are terrified of it, for to reenter that world would be a loss of the self; it would literally be the end of me as I know me.

I’m always taken aback that the distinction is called into question. It’s like: look around you! The entire planet has been utterly transformed by h.sapiens in a way that it could never have been by other species. Surely we’re biologically descended from other species, but we’ve crossed an evolutionary gulf since we became as we are.

Here’s the controversial bit: I feel that as evolutionary biology has occupied the vacuum left by the abandonment of religion, that it has also usurped, or had assigned to it, a kind of formative or foundational role about ‘the human condition’ that it actually doesn’t support. In other words, evolutionary biology has been drafted to fill a metaphysical vacancy it was never built to govern.

I think this also at the base of Nagel’s essay ‘Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion’, but enough for one post.

Again, thanks for the interesting, detailed reply. I’ll probably return to it, but just for now:

A dirty word? No. But how does expressing your preference, viscerally or otherwise, help when someone else has a different preference? [EDIT: But see my next post.] Also, something I genuinely don’t understand: Why are you putting “prefer” in quotes? Does this mean you don’t literally prefer not kicking puppies, that it’s only a manner of speaking?

Well, no, you don’t. You’ve been commendably clear that you don’t do any such thing. Given your premises, you can only use rational norms to try to persuade, as Rorty says. An appeal to such norms would involve some belief that they are norms – but you don’t believe they are, or only in a weak, societally-dependent sense. Again, the difference between sincerity and irony, between rational argument and rhetoric.

Now here is some interesting common ground. I wouldn’t say rationality was fundamentally ethical, but it is so indispensable for ethical thinking that we might as well say that.

But of course now I have to ask, Do you mean that you prefer being rational because of its ethical power? But why prefer that? And is it the 5% non-bot part of you that has the preference too, or only the 95% animal part?