Limitations of Reason

Metaphysics & Epistemology
22

But my argument is that this is not a raison d’être in a cosmic, as distinct from the social and personal, sense. Not in the cosmic sense that the religions and higher philosophies provide. So I didn’t mean ‘random’ in the sense of ‘without order’. Obviously order is presumed by science, but the larger question of why life exists at all is not addressed by the naturalistic approach. It can’t be, as naturalism presumes that nature is somehow self-explanatory.

I’m not going to defend ‘intelligent design’. It’s more that Piggiliuci’s kind of outlook makes existence itself seem contingent: it might have happened, or it might not, and there is no real criterion to distinguish the two. It’s basically a shrug. It’s not as if it’s entirely chance in the sense of lacking in order, but that the only purpose that naturalism can discern are those given by us as participants in it, namely, adaptation and procreation (the point of my OP Beyond Survival of the Fittest.)

The essay I wrote after my brief exchange with Piggliuci was a criticism of how modern culture arrived at the idea of the universe being meaningless. That idea has a distinct historic geneology originating in the Cartesian division and the advent of modern scientific method.

But then again, I’m also grappling with the fact that, even if the implicit purposiveness of organic life is recognised, that this doesn’t in itself provide any kind of cosmic raison d’être. The fact that animals aren’t ‘mindless mechanisms’ is of course a necessary corrective to mechanistic materialism, but it doesn’t yet amount to a raison d’être different to that of other creatures. But then, that is also implicit in naturalism: that we’re creatures same as others. Here, I’m reminded of a snippet from Jacques Maritain:

Every progress in evolution is dearly paid for; miscarried attempts, merciless struggle everywhere. The more detailed our knowledge of nature becomes, the more we see, together with the element of generosity and progression which radiates from Being, the law of degradation, the powers of destruction and death, the implacable voracity which are also inherent in the world of matter. And when it comes to man, surrounded and invaded as he is by a host of warping forces, psychology and anthropology are but an account of the fact that, while being essentially superior to them, he is at the same time the most unfortunate of animals. So it is that when its vision of the world is enlightened by science, the intellect which religious faith perfects realises still better that nature, however good in its own order, does not suffice, and that if the deepest hopes of mankind are not destined to turn to mockery, it is because a God-given energy better than nature is at work in us.

I feel uncomfortable quoting it, because I really don’t want to evangalise belief in God. But it’s the ‘sense of something missing…’

23

If we regard the mind as everything that exists, then—much like anything else that exists—we cannot know the ultimate properties of the mind in itself. I believe these properties will continue to unfold as the mind encounters new things.

As an amusing example, consider the electric kettle. Once, when I needed to boil eggs and had nothing else at hand, I used an electric kettle for the task. I doubt the kettle was designed for that purpose, yet—why not?

The mind is, of course, not an electric kettle. Yet, as humanity evolves, we devise new ways to use it as a tool for various purposes; after all, if we consider early Homo sapiens, I do not think they foresaw that we would one day use our minds for things like mathematical calculations. We are likely in a similar state of ignorance regarding our own future capabilities.

24

I know you think this. I just don’t share it. Contingent meaning seems more than enough. But I enjoy reading about it and like hearing how others think.

Ok fine. That makes more sense. Yes, I think my tentative view would also be there is no inherent meaning, so I probably wouldn’t even include procreation. But I’ll think over this some more. If humans were to become extinct (and we seem to be working towards this) I wouldn’t mind. But I would want, unrealistically of course, the road to extinction not to cause suffering.

25

This member denies reason has limits.
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Assumptions, experiences and structures ground what to us appears sensible. What to us appears rational, is a function of logic, which in turn is a function of the relations of concepts to each other, which in turn is a function of judgement, which, finally, is legislated by principles, provided by pure reason.

Pure reason has no direct function for experience.
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In Kant the world is not given to us through experience, but through perception alone. Our experience is of and through representation, in no other way is the affect on us of the given perceived objects, or, which is the same thing, our relation to them, at all possible, which we call knowledge.

Pure reason is not limited by experience, from which follows it is not limited even by possible experience, which is merely that experience the object of which has not yet appeared to the senses.

Reason has no boundaries of its own, but technically has no other use than to develop the principles that ground rules for the faculty of understanding in its construction of cognitions generally.
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One faculty among many, in a system, in this case, given a Kantian perspective, the Boss faculty, the General, the one not by which the subject thinks, but by which the subject realizes the principles related to cognitions of sense a posteriori are very far from the principles related to the rational cognitions a priori, and he is conscious of this, for he can think anything he pleases and both validate or contradict himself with it.

But, yeah, one’s notion of reason depends on what he wants it to be, what he wants it to do for him. Or even that there is such a thing.

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26

This is an interesting discusion.

I think that most naturalists accept that statements about facts can be truth sensitive and so can statements about relationships between things (logic).

In other words, some things are either right or wrong and clear thinking can help us judge which.

The question is are we better at thinking about what things benefit us rather than what things are true. Do we confuse the two?

Sometimes the two are the same. For example, if you are about to cross the road and you are trying to judge the speed of an approaching car. Theres a truth and there is a judgement based on self interest and the two are indistinguishable.

However, if we ask whether our favorite leisure activities are good for us and our community. We may be inclined to think yes because it reduces cognitive dissonance and discomfort rather than realise the truth that no - our favourite hobbies are a menace. If, indeed, they are. Perhaps you play loud music late into the night.

So does this undermine the approach of modern stoics and others who say we should value reason over emotion. Does it undermine reason if our reasoning is always biased.

I think it presents us with an obstacle. It weakens our reliance on reasoning but it may not render it meaningless. We may become progressively better at thinking about difficult subjects on the occasions that it matters.

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27

This is close to my own view on the limitations of reason. Habermas saw quite early on that if the role of Reason in the Enlightenment project was to be rejected, then such a rejection could not be accomplished for reasons. By viewing all texts, including philosophy, as essentially rhetorical – exercises in persuasion – a philosopher like Rorty has a way to escape the usual charge of performative contradiction. Habermas tried to hold Rorty, Derrida, and similar thinkers to account here, but I don’t think anyone could say that the issue has been settled. So what does that tell us about the limitations of reason? Habermas went on to reconceptualize reason as “communicative action” but although this successfully challenged instrumentalist or procedural versions of rationality, it still requires placing faith in what he called “the unforced force of the better argument.”

In short – if I want you to “be reasonable,” must I persuade you or convince you? Which of these approaches represents “the unforced force”? This is the question that perhaps “draws the edge” of rationality’s limits.

Not to my knowledge. I believe he identifies as Jewish. Are you perhaps confusing him with someone else?

28

To talk about the limits of reason in terms of truths that are present in the world but unavailable to our understanding is to set up a representational model of a ‘foundation’ of knowledge. It assumes the truth is both ahead of us and behind us. Ahead of us in that we continually strive to attain a better and more complete rationality, and behind us in that it is assumed as already out there somewhere as a source of our representations.

But what if we assume that the world isn’t already there, and that it is not our job to mirror, represent or catch up with it as the foundational ground of knowledge and reason? What if we imagine that the world is itself always in the midst of becoming something other than what it was, but not according to some preset logic of development we can come to capture?

If things the case, then knowing and reasoning are about producing temporarily stable pattens of engagement with our surroundings which allow us to make our way around in the world more fluidly and with less interruption and surprise, and to provide a house for anticipating what will happen next.

From this vantage, reason is its foundation, the only foundation we need, a pragmatic compass for making our way around.

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29

Interesting thinking. Could you provide a citation? (Sorry if I missed it.)

I find the phrase “the unforced force of the better argument” intriguing. I’m interested in reading more about what Habermas has to say on that topic.

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Yes, happy to encourage you or anyone to read Habermas.

That phrase was kind of etched in my mind forever, so I was starting to dig through my library to find it . . . ah but then I remembered SEP. They quote it in a disucssion of Theory of Communicative Action, his magum opus, but seem to attribute it to a compilation volume called Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, which I know I haven’t read under that title. But I found it in a different compilation volume called Habermas and Modernity.

So . . . here’s a recommendation. Habermas is dry, and not an especially good writer, in translation. I was introduced to his ideas through a couple of books by the American philosopher Richard J. Bernstein, and then went on to tackle Habermas directly – which I’m still in the process of doing, as he was prolific up till his death at 96! Kind of like reading Kant, though – you have to work.

Bernstein edited Habermas and Modernity, which includes, along with essays by Habermas himself and his critics, a lengthy introduction by Bernstein. It’s the best single thing I know on Habermas, and sure enough, on p. 19 it includes the “force of the better argument” passage in its discussion of Theory of Comm. Action. So maybe get ahold of that book and start there.

And in the spirit of the OP, here’s a passage Bernstein quotes from another Habermas volume:

In these validity claims [involved in determining “the better argument”] communication theory can locate a gentle, but obstinate, a never silent although seldom redeemed claim to reason, a claim that must be recognized de facto whenever and wherever there is to be consensual action. (Communication and the Evolution of Society, p. 97)

Consensual action is what makes this declaration of faith different from the usual paeans to reason, and characterizes one of the main original themes in Habermas.

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31

Reason is not the fault- the fault is the foundation of reason. Define the foundation of reason correctly, and one can perceive correctly. That is why I developed a new definition of Good and Evil in my thread: a new Axiom for a new beginning.

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You’re right, I got this wrong, thanks,

33

Nice. I am sympathetic to this view.

34

I like this but I imagine it might be hard to do.

Is there any further texture you can provide to a pragmatic compass?

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Yes. Personally I think I value what works over truth. And often they are the same.

I wonder if at the heart of my question is a different question. Does reason work universally or is it better for certain tasks? Eg, problem solving in the world versus metaphysics.

36

I’m interested to know in what sense you’re sympathetic. If, like Rorty, we maintain that we are no longer “replying to an argument” but instead using the phenomenon of rationality as a tool of persuasion (which Rorty, to his credit, is very candid about; his famous “irony”), we do escape the charge of performative contradiction – but at what price? What happens when rival attempts at persuasion collide? A favorite response of Rorty’s is that we “hammer things out” but this is way too vague for me.

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So I’m not a philosopher. I’ve dipped in and out of subject over the years, and Rorty has often intrigued me. Pretty sure I share an anti-foundationalist outlook. I’m skeptical that humans can access Reality itself or discover a capital-T Truth. At best, we develop stories and frameworks (Rorty would say vocabularies) that help us make sense of the world and navigate it, particularly in the realm of values.

Very quickly, to me, much of philosophy looks like an effort to persuade others that one story about the world is more compelling than competing stories. Not that this makes philosophy unimportant. It shifts the focus from discovering objective foundations to creating and defending interpretations that help us live together and solve problems. I understand the criticism of this view, and the concern that radical contingency risks collapsing into a kind of relativism where there is no basis for judging between competing beliefs or values.

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38

I’ve worked with a few IT professionals of Indian descent over the years. A common Indian first name is Satya. It means Capital-T Truth. There’s also Satyananda. It means ‘bliss of truth’ (‘ananda’ being a common suffix for Indian proper names). Not that those I worked with embodied or conveyed that sense - they were urbanised professionals. But the name has symbolic value. I think what it originally was intended to convey was living ‘in light of truth’ - not in terms of propositional content (‘cat on mat’) but in an existential sense.

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39

Nice. :grinning_face:

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I’m good with this too. The issue that Rorty and other like-minded philosophers raise is precisely what it means to defend an interpretation.

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41

Interesting. I don’t quite understand the distinction. In my understanding, experience refers to perception, how things appear to us, and the way we encounter and interpret the world. When I use the term “experience”, I’m referring to how things seem from our perspective and what we directly experience. Whther thsi says anything abotu a potential reality beyond us (noumena?) does this matter? I’m not a good Kantian, so I may well be missing a nuance.

I like this.

I’m not sure I fully get this can you rephrase it?

If I were to ask for a simple paragraph, in ordinary language, about the use of reason, what would you say? I suppose my actual question is, does reason deliver certainty and when it doesn’t why doesn’t it?