I suggest that the we understand consciousness as disclosure of world, in others words as the “being” of the world, but “from the POV” of the “conscious” organism.
To call it a “condition” is to reify it.
This would include the being of brains themselves. For this to make sense, we must avoid the tendency to understand consciousness as an emergent “inside stuff” that is “side by side” and somehow related to an “outside stuff.”
IMV, this is very difficult without some kind of ontological perspectivism.
Right. Consciousness is the manifestation of the world, and the character of such manifestation gives the manifested as also concealed or not entirely manifested.
Husserl pries open the issue like this:
“Let us begin by noting that the aspect, the perspectival adumbration through which every spatial object invariably appears, only manifests the spatial object from one side. No matter how completely we may perceive a thing, it is never given in perception with the characteristics that qualify it and make it up as a sensible thing from all sides at once. We cannot avoid speaking of such and such sides of the object that are actually perceived. Every aspect, every continuity of single adumbrations, regardless how far this continuity may extend, offers us only sides. And to our mind this is not just a statement of fact: it is inconceivable that external perception would exhaust the sensible-material content of its perceived object; it is inconceivable that a perceptual object could be given in the entirety of its sensibly intuitive features, literally, from all sides at once in a self-contained perception” (Husserl, Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, pp. 39-40).
When we view the table, we view it from some particular side…. Yet the table has still other sides” (p. 40). “It is clear that a non-intuitive pointing beyond or indicating is what characterizes the side actually seen as a mere side” (p. 41). “In every moment of perceiving, the perceived is what it is in its mode of appearance [as] a system of referential implications…. And it calls out to us, as it were, in these referential implications: ‘There is still more to see here, turn me so you can see all my sides, let your gaze run through me, draw closer to me, divide me up; keep on looking at me over again and again…'” (ibid).
“These indications are at the same time tendencies that push us toward the appearances not given…. They are pointers into an emptiness since the non-actualized appearances are neither consciously intended nor presentified. In other words, everything that genuinely appears is an appearing thing only by virtue of being intertwined and permeated with an intentional empty horizon, that is, by virtue of being surrounded by a halo of emptiness with respect to appearance. It is an emptiness that is not a nothingness, but an emptiness to be filled-out; it is a determinable indeterminacy” (p. 42).
“The fact that a re-perception, a renewed perception of the same thing, is possible for transcendence characterizes the fundamental trait of transcendent perception, alone through which an abiding world is there for us, a reality that can be pregiven for us and can be freely at our disposal” (p. 47).
This justifies the use of “dis-closure.” The object is given or shown always as mostly un-shown or concealed. Transcendence in this single perceiver case is a temporal concept. We might say that consciousness is “time,” but “time” is metaphorical here, not mundane “clock time.”
In lived ordinary case, the transcendence of the object is our taking it “immediately” not only as a temporal synthesis of its “sides” or “moments” but likewise an intersubjective synthesis. The object is there as “more than this side now” and “more than just for me.”