Most physical phenomena are effects. For example, electromagnetism is a result of electrical current and this generates a magnetic field. If this current is stopped, then the magnetism stops. (Hope I stated that properly.) If consciousness is an effect, then there are certain neural correlates of consciousness in the brain that generate consciousness and, like electromagnetism, ceases when the neural correlates stop generating its effect.
The issue with this is that as an effect it either has physical efficacy or it is physically ineffacious like a shadow is an effect of sun being blocked by one’s person walking in sunlight and their shadow is an effect of that. The shadow is not an efficacious effect. If consciousness is effectual then it should have physically measurements like mass, charge, etc. But, no one has seen any way to measure one’s consciousness since it subjective and an internal state. However, in that case, if it’s an effect then it suggests it lacks physical efficacy. As such, that’s epiphenomenalism which most physicalists reject.
So, if it’s not epiphenomenal then how can it be efficacious and still be an effect. Or, if it’s not an effect of some physical process/states, then what is it exactly? What is the Something Else?
Your question exposes a genuine paradox at the heart of philosophy of mind.
If consciousness is an effect, it’s either epiphenomenal (inefficacious) or requires a new physics to explain its efficacy.
If it’s not an effect, it’s either fundamental (like space-time) or an illusion.
I understand we don’t yet have a satisfying answer. But the search for one is driving some interesting work in neuroscience and physics. And excuse my mysticism, but the fact that we’re even able to ask the question might be the most remarkable thing of all. Haha.
Lots of biological phenomena emerge from the interactions of physical, chemical, and lower-level biological parts. Photosynthesis, for instance. Conscious or mental states of animals are biological phenomena.
When we have a consensus definition/description of consciousness , then we might be able to consider the points you raise here. Good points. Until then, how can we search for something we can’t even describe, in a manner with which most agree?
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Can we consider these non-physical phenomena to be “biological”? Rooted in biology, yes, but biological in themselves? That doesn’t feel right to me.
I am not entirely sure what you mean. However, the brain requires significant amounts of energy which is entirely consistent with there being a physical process involved in its major functions.
Just to make sure I am following you, are you referring to these biological phenomena as diachronic effects or synchronic phenomena where each emergent layer can be thought of as identical to the pre-emergent layer but due to the complexity of the interactions we like the Cliff notes version by mainly studying the epistemically emergent version of the synchrony that is happening. If consciousness is a diachronic result of a previous biological state, then it’s an effect without a physical measurement, do we agree on this point (although that’s not to say there aren’t electro-chemical patterns in the brain that indicate consciousness)?
Enactivists and phenomenologists have an interesting take on this.
For most scientists and philosophers, consciousness is regarded as just another phenomenon in the world. Of course, theorists disagree about the nature of this phenomenon. Some hold that consciousness is produced by the brain or is identical with a state of the
brain; others hold that it’s something nonphysical, irreducible to physical nature. Some say that it’s a kind of cognitive illusion, while others argue that it’s one of the fundamental ingredients of reality, which a purely physical
description cannot capture.
Nevertheless, despite these differences, the common idea is that consciousness is a phenomenon in the world and that it can be distinguished from other phenomena. The horizonal conception is different. Instead of being just a phenomenon
in the world, consciousness is also understood as a precondition of the world’s disclosure. Consciousness is the horizon within which any phenomenon we can talk about or point to is present. This includes anything we may be able to indicate about particular states of consciousness in relation to the brain.
Consciousness as a phenomenon in the world always shows up inside consciousness as a horizon. At the same time, horizonal consciousness is nothing in itself or all by itself, because it’s nothing other than the disclosure or manifestation of the world. Disclosure and manifestation imply a recipient, the one to whom something is disclosed or manifested. For this reason, phenomenologists often describe consciousness as the “dative of manifestation” (manifesting is manifesting to).
Consciousness is the recipient of the manifestation of presence, including all the ways that absences, such as what’s over the horizon, are intimated within presence. Using Buddhist philosophical terms, we can say that horizonal consciousness is “empty” of “own-being,” because
it’s “dependently arisen” with the manifestation of the world. We can now say more fully what we mean by the primacy of consciousness. Horizonal consciousness is not something we have, in the way we have a feeling of pain or a visual impression of a color.
It’s something we live. It’s a mode of being or a form of existence. So it has existential primacy. Consciousness also has cognitive primacy. As our parable of temperature illustrates and as we have argued throughout this book, conscious experience is both the point of departure and the ultimate source of validation for acquiring knowledge, particularly scientific knowledge.
Finally, consciousness has transcendental primacy. Something is transcendental if it is an a priori condition of the possibility of knowledge (a condition not provided by experience but presupposed by it). Consciousness is not just another object of knowledge, but also, and more fundamental, that by which any object is knowable. For this reason, consciousness is irreducible to any object or domain of objects: any explanation of consciousness in terms of a specific object, such as the brain, or even a totality of objects, already presupposes consciousness as that by
which objects are individuated and intelligible.
As we said at the outset of this section, there is no way to step outside of consciousness and account for it exhaustively in terms of something else. (Evan Thompson, The Blind Spot of Science)
Nature is full of effects of things that happened billions of years ago, or just recently.
It takes about 0,5 seconds from when this bundle of photons hits my eyes until I have a visual experience of this text. So what is it that you want to measure? The text is on the page, not inside my head. Inside my head there are electro-chemical events.
I am returning to this because having read the OP again I see a differemt question
What does consciousness do in a deterministic world.
I think the answer to that is all the things we intuitively expect
We calculate, we consider, we plan. Conciousness is part of what makes us active agents in the world.
Think of a plant turning energy from the sun which would otherwise warm the ground into leaves.
Think of a beaver in a river withot the beaver the river flows straight to the ocean but by building dams the beaver creates beaver world of lakes etc. Thats agency.
If you are looking for a physicialism answer then consciousness is a precise tuning mechanism—locking onto a signal and giving it directional discipline. When that tuning breaks down, the noise takes over and consciousness drops off, even though the brain itself is still active. I created a thread on it.
Thanks John. Do you see consciousness as a synchronic emergent effect like the wetness of water. Nothing causes water to become wet, rather the properties of the molecule when combined with a thousand or so molecules just has the epistemically emergent properties we call wetness. However, in that case, wetness is kind of a Cliffs note version of what is happening with those thousands or tens of thousands of molecules. You could in principle, with enough computational power, describe everything about wetness without even referring to the Cliff notes. Is that how you see consciousness? If so, then could we completely bypass the Cliff notes of this and just talk about the neural correlates and what is happening at the pre-emergent level? But, consciousness is internal to the host, so is it just an after-effect of what the non-Cliff notes are doing down there? That suggests it’s an effect. If it’s an effect then how can it be causal since it’s not needed in the non-Cliff notes version of things to account for how the system is behaving.
I want to second what @Joshs presented in that excerpt above particularly this observation:
That undercuts practically any ‘theory of consciousness’. Theories generally rely on explanans-explanadum (what is to be explained and what explains.) But consciousness is both explanans and explanandum - what explains, as well as what is to be explained. Hence the inevitable circularity of attempts to ‘explain consciousness’! There’s an inescapable recursiveness involved in any attempt to do that, as it must always assume what it sets out to prove.
You’re jumping to conclusions? For a moment there I thought you were trolling. We merely linked a study to you and shared their perspective. You don’t seem to be interested in it. I don’t know what cliff notes means.
I’m not sure what you mean. We can physically measure flight. Speed, direction, duration, height… Is flight a diachronic result of a previous physical state?
