Intolerance as democratic treason - Dewey

I’m pulling this from the Archive (which might not be cricket), but I wanted to revisit it and U.S. Independence Day seemed an appropriate time.

In the 4-page attached paper Creative Democracy, John Dewey claims that democracy is a way of life, not a process or government.

“democracy is a personal way of individual life; …it signifies the possession and continual use of certain attitudes, forming personal character and determining desire and purpose in all the relations of life.”

As in Wittgenstein, an “attitude” here is the position we take towards another, and ourselves. Dewey’s claim is that democracy is not everyone arguing with the force of reason to determine the answer to what is right. Democracy is hope and respect for the capacity of each other (as if we do not yet know the terms on which to judge).

Thus Dewey claims the biggest threat to Democracy is intolerance (which he equates to treason, because it destroys our ability to constitute or selves and country).

This means “to treat those who disagree – even profoundly – with us as those from whom we may learn, and in so far, as friends.”

Our society (with each other) should develop conditions to perfect each other apart from predetermined ends (Mill) or based on a standard of rationality (Kant).

“[ ‘Inherent in the democratic personal way of life’ is ] to cooperate by giving differences a chance to show themselves because of the belief that the expression of difference is not only a right of the other persons but is a means of enriching one’s own life-experience.”

Discovering and enriching our (own and others) needs and desires is more important than opinions and knowledge. Our way of life is our democracy, not a goal, or answer, or belief, or constitution, or political structure.
Dewey-creative-democracy.pdf (82.7 KB)

Well said. The fear of difference is where the personal collides with the public.

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It’s an interesting piece. My difficulty here is that Dewey seems to be redefining “democracy” as all the things he likes, and as all the things he thinks are helpful to society. It’s not clear that there is a principled definition at stake.

But in general he seems to think of “democracy” as the belief that the common man is intelligent, sovereign, worthy of intellectual exchange, etc. So in many ways he is following Mill’s arguments for free speech.

Whatever its deficits, I think Dewey’s approach is at least needed today. We live in a very cynical age, where the “faith” that Dewey champions has become rare.

To denounce Naziism for intolerance, cruelty and stimulation of hatred amounts to fostering insincerity if, in our personal relations to other persons, if, in our daily walk and conversation, we are moved by racial, color or other class prejudice; indeed, by anything save a generous belief in their possibilities as human beings, a belief which brings with it the need for providing conditions which will enable these capacities to reach fulfilment.

-Dewey

I think this is right, even if it has more to do with the Judeo-Christian imago dei than democracy. Dewey is speaking about something like “The American way of life” rather than democracy proper. In a historical sense intolerance within democracy is not “treason”; it’s an average Tuesday.

Interesting post. I prefer William James’ version of pragmatism to Deweys’ for the reasons you identify but I’m finding things in both that surprise me and inspire me to take an interest in philosophy.

Thanks for this. There is one aspect of what Dewey says that I particularly like, but I have a couple of reservations.

First, as so often when reading the words of great Americans from past eras, I’m astonished at the cognitive dissonance that people could tolerate. In one short article, Dewey resoundingly champions “the potentialities of human nature as that nature is exhibited in every human being irrespective of race, color, sex, birth and family, of material or cultural wealth” – and at the same time is able to write of the Founders that “there was more than a marvelous conjunction of physical circumstances involved in bringing to birth this new nation. There was in existence a group of men who were capable of readapting older institutions and ideas to meet the situations provided by new physical conditions – a group of men extraordinarily gifted in political inventiveness.”

The very phrase “a group of men” clearly doesn’t disturb Dewey at all, though the 1st feminist movement had secured the vote for women just a few years ago, and Dewey could not have been unaware of the injustice of excluding women from enjoying the same rights as men. Additionally, he makes a point of talking about “young men and women” when discussing the effects of the Depression. But the “group of men” receives no comment; clearly Dewey doesn’t think this is relevant to his ideas about the founding of the US. I guess his reasoning is that, since the Founders had no real access to feminist thought and “could not be blamed”, therefore this lack had no effect on the results, and needn’t be remarked on.

Equally troubling is his apparent willingness to ignore the presence of chattel slavery throughout the American Southern colonies, and the intimate and complicit involvement of Northerners in that practice. About half of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, which laid out our democratic principles, were slave-owners. Moreover, not a single delegate proposed that Native Americans could share in the rights endowed by the Constitution.

Should we say that these men “should have known better”? Well, they were (mostly) typical of their time, and the issue of slavery was heatedly debated at the Convention, so it’s unclear what they “should have known.” But Dewey should have known better. By the 1930s, it was no longer possible to speak ignorantly about the founding of the US as “the happy conjunction of men and events in an earlier day” while leaving out everything that was unhappy about it. (I haven’t even touched on the class-exclusion laws involving who had the right to vote and debate.) Yet many besides Dewey continued to do so, and continue to this day.

Trying to be fair, I should say that this article is in praise of American democracy, written in a context of rising fascism, so perhaps Dewey did not feel called upon to present a balanced picture. I think he was wrong – an unbalanced picture of a topic this significant is not honest, no matter the occasion and the audience – but that may have been his reasoning nonetheless.

My second point of concern is that, although I can see you want him to, Dewey nowhere says “democracy is not everyone arguing with the force of reason to determine the answer to what is right.” Dewey lists a number of things that impede democratic discussion – intolerance, cruelty, prejudice, abuse, mutual suspicion, and violence both physical and psychological – but he nowhere says or implies that “arguing with the force of reason” might be a concern.

Should we want him to? Well, Dewey is not Habermas, and many of our contemporary ideas about how public policy is formed were perhaps not thinkable in the 1930s. Still, I can’t help but feel Dewey understood something of this, and perhaps you feel that too, since you want him to declare that “arguing with the force of reason” is not an essential characteristic of democracy. (BTW, I don’t mean that you read him as saying such argument is undemocratic, only that it is not an essential characteristic of democracy.)

This leads me to what I admire in the article, which is very much related to a possible suspicion of the role of the “force of reason.” It’s this: Dewey is asking us to consider democracy not as a process that produces a “special result” which is valuable in itself, but instead as “a belief in the ability of human experience to generate the aims and methods by which further experience will grow in ordered richness.”

This is a deep thought. Dewey is claiming that what he calls “the personal democratic attitude” can generate “aims and methods” that will lead to growth and “ordered richness.” Again, even more clearly: “Democracy is the faith that the process of experience is more important than any special result attained, so that special results achieved are of ultimate value only as they are used to enrich and order the ongoing process.” (my emphasis). In other words, if a “force of reason”-type argument has a role, it will not be by virtue of its producing a certain type of answer (which Dewey likens to “arrests, fixations”), but by its ability to generate the next “aims and methods” to enhance democratic society. In so doing, it will enhance our human experience, which Dewey thinks is the true purpose of democracy. All “special results” (which may be worthwhile, of course) must be judged by this standard.

I’ve gone on too long, and I could go on much longer about why I think this insight is so important. I’ll just end by pointing out the clear connection with process-oriented Rawlsian liberalism, and Habermasian ideas about communicative action.

Anyway, sorry to be so hard on Dewey earlier! Happy Independence Day.

Not that these things don’t matter, but his claim is to the possibility and capacity of us (the way we can work democratically), he’s not trying to sell what or who is good or right (thus not his own righteousness either). As with Rawls, we all (even with our sins) have standing (authority), but this as an existing practice, not to decide an Original Position.

I posted this too quick to make my point, but the argument is that this ethic creates who we are to be, it is the “constitution” of our institutions**, and thus there is no argument for it (it is not a fixed “ought”). Your participation is acceptance or rejection (or apathy), which is why intolerance is treason—you are either in for the creation of the society between you and I, or you are out, as in: outside the category of democracy.

**Our constituting our institutions is Marx’s insight (that the means of production create us) flipped on its head; or at least, to the extent we fully understand the other, say, rather that reducing them to a definition, which limits us to just defined against our reduction of them.

This point was that we are not arguing to decide an “ought”, so force is not an issue. Of course we have our values and reasons, but they do not preclude our democratic action, as they have no part in tolerance of the other. Obviously, part of that is to be reasonable (understanding), but, e.g., not to use our rationale as a means of dismissal.

But we are not generating aims and methods (there is no “next”), we are acting a certain way (an ethic), so the only ends that we would argue for are those that further ethical tolerance.

I’m not so sure. Don’t you agree he’s counterposing an ideal American democracy with the evils of Nazism?

Good. This is how to construct the move from Dewey to Habermas (if we care to).

OK, I see that, thanks.

Pretty sure Dewey says that we are, but that’s less important than:

which is where all three of us (you, me, Dewey) want to get to. “Only ends” might be a little strong, but surely they are the most important ones, and those that most spotlight the move into a Rawlsian liberalism. Our ends are not certain conclusions that reflect “special results,” but rather those that develop democracy, both in a society and in a person, in a way that is enriching. This would be too crude, but we could almost say that the means are the ends, starting with tolerance for disagreement. Or if they are not the ends as such, then they must conform to a way of “going on” that furthers the ends we’ve already posited by setting up democratic community in the first place. And those ends are as we’ve described them, above.

No. It is not a judgment of good nor a competition of states (e.g., which is more ideal). He is saying democracy is comprised by tolerance, and so just does not exist in intolerance.

There are no ends that are “beforehand” (and no Rawlsian “first position”), and we are not furthering anything. We come first, i.e., our institutions are the expression of us (thus why racism can become part of an institution), so yes “the means are the ends” but Dewey’s claim is democracy is not concerned with ends, but is a
matter of character.

That is tolerating someone. I take his sense to be more active, like: find out what makes them tick, putting ourselves in their shoes. Of course your point is important in that we may not come to agreement even when we’ve learned all we can, which is always a chance when the way forward together is unclear, but there is always the possibility, and, even when we do/must disagree, the issue would be clearer and intelligible.

Yes, if you don’t use it, the function goes away.

I dunno, “intolerance, cruelty and stimulation of hatred” sounds pretty judgmental to me but OK.

Yes, that’s a good amplification. We could point to two “moods” or “moments” of tolerance. The first governs our efforts to empathize, to understand, to find common ground. The second comes into play when we don’t completely succeed at that – what to do next? We may know more than we did before we began the discussion, and that’s a good thing, but we also require a modus vivendi for getting along. Dewey (and Habermas) hold out hope that this can be done. I hope my fellow US citizens will pay attention.