No, because I wouldn’t say it’s true that beating a dog is bad even if I might express that in my wants or emotions. To be honest I would say I most likely align as an emotivist, but emotivism is practically moral nihilism but adding on the claim of where the idea of morals comes from.
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What do I mean by “true”? Just that. As minimalist as we can get. We agree that folk should not kick puppies for pleasure. It follows that we agree that it is true that folk should not kick puppies for pleasure.
Not an “objective” fact, whatever that is. Not something that is discovered by investigating the way that the universe is, or commanded by the Lord, or the outcome of an evolutionary imperative.
Heres’ a way to look at it. Some sentences are true because that’s the way the world is, and we work out what is true by looking around and experimenting. That one ought not kick puppies is not of this sort.
Some sentences are true because that is how we want things to be.
That’s why we can’t derive an ought from an is; no set of sentences about how things are can tell us how we want them to be.
All of this has firm philosophical discussion behind it, from Hume through Wittgenstein and Anscombe and Foot and Searle and Gillian Russell and lots of other folk. but that’s not much needed here.
But you said from your perspective, it is wrong to beat a puppy. Did you change your mind?
No. Me thinking it is wrong does not mean it is true that it is wrong, it’s just the expression of my emotions towards hitting dogs. Also for the most part I believe the distinction between subjectivism and nihilism is mostly linguistic, but I just think subjectivists use the word true incorrectly.
Those who have been following my posts here might see now why I object to this characterisation. What I have argued is that there are true ethical statements. That’s not the same as that there are objective moral facts.
So, are you a moral subjectivist? I just think the way you use true is incorrect. It is true that we believe people should not kick puppies, but it is not true that people should not kick puppies. That is the distinction.
So, you are saying that what you think is wrong is not wrong?
That’s not entirely unfair. But don’t you think most people follow folk superstitions and disorganised combinations of the above rather than hold coherent, theorised views? And do you think this will ever change outside of a theocracy or some other imposed authoritarian value system? It seems to me that the idea of an agreed value system is something we are unlikely ever to see.
And I wonder whether there is an example of an agreed value system we can point to. If we take Christians, for instance, they do not agree on values. Even within one religion this seems unattainable, and if we limit ourselves just to Protestantism, there is no agreement on doctrine, on literalism, or on morality. Christianity might fly the rainbow flag of diversity or it might promise hellfire to gays.
Might need a thread on this, since the problem is apparent elsewhere.
Sure, the sentences “we believe people should not kick puppies” and “people should not kick puppies” have different truth conditions.
There’s a thing called a performative contradiction, which is not a strict logical contradiction, but more a manifestation of a misuse of a way of speaking. The classic case is what’s called “Moore’s Paradox”, which is not a formal paradox, just an oddity about how we speak.
Consider someone who asserts “There is a fly on the wall”. Now we are entitled, just from the assertion, to infer that they believe that “There is a fly on the wall” is true. For it seems infelicitous for someone to say things like:
- “There is a fly on the wall, but I do not believe that there is a fly on the wall”
- “There is a fly on the wall, but it is not true that there is afly on the wall”
- “I believe that it is true that there is a fly on the wall, but I do not believe that there is a fly on the wall”
- It is true that I believe there is a fly on the wall but it is not true that there is a fly on the wall.
and so on. At the very least, there is something incongruous about these combinations. The last, at the least, shows an inconsistency between how things are and what one believes.
So now consider
- It is true that we believe people should not kick puppies, but it is not true that people should not kick puppies
Again, at the least, this shows an inconsistency between how things are and what one believes.
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No. I’ve been at pains to distance myself from that characterisation.
There are ethical truths.
Ethical truths differ in that they set out how we want people to behave.
So we do something nice and kind for someone else. I don’t see what the problem is. It’s a win-win situation.
it is true that it is wrong to me, it is not true that it is wrong in an objective sense
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How we want things to be seems to me to be a solid beginning.
I was going to ask you earlier a question about what you believe to be the preconditions for a moral system. By this I mean, why should we have a moral system anyway? It seems to me that it would be impossible to imagine a society without one (a failed state, perhaps). I’ve always thought we have morality because (mostly) people hold that fairness is important and, pragmatically, we need to get along together. Do you have a formulation on this?
I’ll reply to my own post, to head off an objection.
Banno has set out an excellent argument, but he makes a mistake; what he takes to be ethical truths are not really true, because they are not really statements. Sure, they look like statements, btu really they are just expressions of his sentiment; so “One ought not kick puppies” is properly analysed as “Boo to puppy kicking”. Just a sentiment, not a fact.
And there is something in this, though not as much as some suppose. And it is to do with the difference between preferring tea to coffee, and prefering that others not kick puppies. “Boo to puppy kicking” does not allow for a discussion, and does not expect others to agree. But “One ought not kick puppies” does. It places the ethical consideration firmly within the community, where it belongs.
And also there is Moore’s paradox, again, showing the infelicity of “Boo to puppy kicking, but it is not true that you ought not kick puppies”
Calling ethical truths a grammatical anomaly tries to diminish their worth. But how we expect folk around us to behave is important.
Wouldn’t a moral nihilist say that the first clause is meaningful, but the second isn’t?
That would mean that “believe” in “fly on the wall” does different work than “believe” in “kicking puppies”. The former is more akin to a guess, while the latter is more akin to a commitment. That is: if you believe there’s a fly on the wall, then the test is whether there’s a fly on wall. If you believe kicking puppies is wrong, the test is in how you behave with respect to kicking puppies. That’s less a truth-condition, and more a consistency-condition.
I agree.
Hence, ethics.
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Yes. See my reply to myself, above.
Simply because we are communal creatures. We have no choice but to be with others, and so must give consideration to how we are to interact.
The big step is the move from merely transactional interaction to looking out for each other.
Yep. Wasn’t there when I started typing. Read it afterwards.
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I mean I just don’t get your point here. I am still a moral nihilist.