So to Page Five.
It follows that if a hypothetical use of “should” gives a hypothetical imperative, and a non-hypothetical use of “should” a categorical imperative, then “should” statements based on rules of etiquette, or rules of a club, are categorical imperatives.
Ouch.
Foot addresses a potential reply: that imperatives of etiquette are answerable with "Why should I bother?', that is, that mere etiquette has no hold on us. We have to add some reason to follow the rules of etiquette. And “…by contrast, it is supposed that moral considerations necessarily give reasons for acting to any man.”
So to things not being as they should be. And here’s a curious comment:
…the amoral man, who agrees that some piece of conduct is immoral but takes no notice of that, is inconsistently disregarding a rule of conduct that he has accepted… The fact is that the man who rejects morality because he sees no reason to obey its rules can be convicted of villainy but not of inconsistency.
This plays somewhat against my own argument, from elsewhere, using T-sentences and Moore’s paradox.
Working through that, Foot seems to be asserting that her man can agree that X is immoral, continue to that one ought not to X and yet still do X, and not be considered as being inconsistent.
Still thinking on that, but as it stands, I think her amoral man is inconsistent, suffering that form of inconsistency we call hypocrisy.