Might need a thread on this, since the problem is apparent elsewhere.
Sure, the sentences “we believe people should not kick puppies” and “people should not kick puppies” have different truth conditions.
There’s a thing called a performative contradiction, which is not a strict logical contradiction, but more a manifestation of a misuse of a way of speaking. The classic case is what’s called “Moore’s Paradox”, which is not a formal paradox, just an oddity about how we speak.
Consider someone who asserts “There is a fly on the wall”. Now we are entitled, just from the assertion, to infer that they believe that “There is a fly on the wall” is true. For it seems infelicitous for someone to say things like:
- “There is a fly on the wall, but I do not believe that there is a fly on the wall”
- “There is a fly on the wall, but it is not true that there is afly on the wall”
- “I believe that it is true that there is a fly on the wall, but I do not believe that there is a fly on the wall”
- It is true that I believe there is a fly on the wall but it is not true that there is a fly on the wall.
and so on. At the very least, there is something incongruous about these combinations. The last, at the least, shows an inconsistency between how things are and what one believes.
So now consider
- It is true that we believe people should not kick puppies, but it is not true that people should not kick puppies
Again, at the least, this shows an inconsistency between how things are and what one believes.