How should dialectics be evaluated?

[FlamelNW]

The classical logical principles—identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle, and sufficient reason—serve as the fundamental rules ensuring certainty, consistency, and validity in human thought. In contrast, the core tenets of dialectics fundamentally conflict with these four principles; what is termed “dialectical thinking” is, in essence, a violation and dissolution of logical rules—a form of anti-logical thought.

–From a post from zhihu

Many followers of Hegel and Marx argue that this is merely so-called “vulgar dialectics,” while advocating a theory known as “materialist dialectics.” But frankly, both seem to carry a metaphysical tendency toward rationalism and essentialism, regardless of which one we’re talking about.

(I don’t really agree with either of them. I lean more toward empiricism, Hume’s skepticism, and Popper’s falsificationism. I think these are more “scientific”.)

[Baden]

Dialectics doesn’t aim to be purely scientific*, but that doesn’t make it nonsensical. Sense itself is under interrogation along with the historical context which made it what it is. The fact that philosophy is a separable discipine to mathematics, logic, and science—in fact, the discipline that tries to explore what these concepts really mean in the context of human experience points to the necessity of going beyond them.

Philosophies that deny this, such as logical positivism, end up with no soild foundation. The paradox is that the attempt to deny paradox as fundamental is itself untenable, falls into contradiction. The real constraint is language itself and what can be done with it up to the limits of sense, not any particular discipline that relies on language to be intelligible.

*Edit: Of course, there is a difference between dialectical thinking as critiqued in the quote and “materialist dialectics” in terms of their claims to be scientific that complicates this a bit.

[j_j]

@FlamelNW

But frankly, both seem to carry a metaphysical tendency toward rationalism and essentialism,

That may be the risk of theory as such.

@FlamelNW

I don’t really agree with either of them. I lean more toward empiricism, Hume’s skepticism, and Popper’s falsificationism. I think these are more “scientific”.)

I also lean toward empiricism, and I think Popper is great. But so are Marx and Hegel.

I’m actually a fan of the early logical positivists, but the dark side of this movement is a tendency to be anti-empirical about language. I suggest that merely acknowledging that signs are empirical objects “explodes” all kinds of “rationalism” and “essentialism.”

Why ? Because the problem of significance or “meaning” can then be foregrounded rather than evaded as “taken for granted.” Philosophers have a tendency to pretend that they have God’s dictionary of essences on hand, even if they are acidly secular and “scientific.”

[FlamelNW]

I admit that my thinking leans quite strongly toward nominalism and utilitarianism. (Maybe I am more of a scientific researcher than a philosopher). I acknowledge that science and empiricism are not absolute truths. As Hume already showed that induction cannot be ultimately justified by logic. But science is still the most effective tool we currently have for understanding the world. (Perhaps you would laugh at me for being so utilitarian and vulgar. )

I cannot answer why logic can serve as a standard of evaluation. But what I do know is that when I am doing research, communicating and debating with my partners within a framework of logic is a very important common ground, just as the post I quoted says:

The logical principles serve as the fundamental rules ensuring certainty, consistency, and validity in human thought.

[Baden]

Of course. It’s a matter of being pragmatic. But if we were to delimit ourselves to a kind of instrumental, and wholly rational, pragmatism, we would limit our human experience in an irrational way.

[j_j]

@FlamelNW

I think these are more “scientific”.

I might as well offer a pragmatic critique of “science ideology.”

Science can be “cynically” defined as technology that works whether or not its users or victims expect it to.

It works its terrors and wonders in the pre-theoretical lifeworld, directly on the objects we cherish and fear. The theorist will focus on the models. These symbols are the essence. How beautiful the mathematics ! And the math is beautiful. But what are these symbols for ? How do some symbols rather than others get taken as an obscure telegram from "true reality " ?

“Power is knowledge.” This cynical epistemology, which arguably dominates the world beneath theory, or beyond its bubble, reminds me of Hume’s “problem of induction.” I haven’t yet seen a plausible evasion of this our fundamental “irrationality” relative to the “Euclidean” hopes of many theoretical types.

[j_j]

@FlamelNW

As Hume already showed that induction cannot be ultimately justified by logic. But science is still the most effective tool we currently have for understanding the world.

I had already written about this before you mentioned it. FWIW, I appreciate your lack of mystification here. I might say that science is a tool for imposing on the world. We might call this “understanding” it. “Power is understanding.”

I am obsessed with the role of the future in our existence. So for me prediction is a great theme. I am tempted to understand understanding largely in terms of a wider conception of prediction (expectation).

For instance, perhaps I understand the other person all the more the less I am surprised by what they say and do.

[j_j]

@FlamelNW

I cannot answer why logic can serve as a standard of evaluation.

Some of my favorite philosophers view logical-linguistic norms as something like an organism. For a particular generation, these norms may change slowly enough that not much is noticed. Mostly everyone is comfortable, and the “unconscious” routine logic works well enough.

To me these norms don’t “hover over us.” They are more like patterns in the movement of our bodies, including the speech we emit. We in fact just ignore Jeff when he is “talking nonsense.” In a few cases, Jeff is later declared a “visionary” who was “ahead of his time.” But the norms of that later time that celebrates Jeff are also fragile and drifting.

[FlamelNW]

I tend to think of this more in terms of Quine’s web of belief.

Some “logical rules” (or perhaps more accurately, beliefs) change relatively easily over the course of human history, such as the belief that “humans ought to protect the environment.”

Other beliefs can be revised through scientific experiments and empirical observations of the world, such as “light exhibits both wave-like and particle-like behavior.”

But there are still some beliefs that seem much harder for us to give up, such as “a proposition cannot be both true and false” or “1 + 1 = 2.”

[Jamal]

The Marxist pejorative “vulgar dialectics” refers to the rigid, mechanical formula of Marxist-Leninist “Diamat”, the official philosophy of the Soviet Union etc. I don’t think the quotation is targeting only that.

The problem with the quotation is it confuses different kinds of contradiction.

As I said a couple of months ago:

@Jamal

Non-contradiction is a rule of thought, but it is not a universal law that reality is obliged to obey

But while this sounds pretty good, it’s not clear what it means.

Your quotation confuses (a) a critique of formal logic’s tendency to hypostasize or resolve, with (b) a rejection of formal logic as such. Formal logic is fine as far as it goes, but its abstractions can obscure the movement, interdependencies, and antagonisms of reality.

There are “subjective thought-errors” (Adorno), and dialectical philosophy ought to avoid them as much as any other philosophy does—but there are objective contradictions too. These cannot be reduced to “antagonisms”, “conflicts”, “tensions”, and so on. I’ll try to explain why with an example…

Exchange in the market both is and is not an exchange of equivalents: commodities are actually made and treated as equivalent, but since they are qualitatively different, they are also not equivalent. This seems easily resolved: commodities are equivalent in the economic context, but not in another.

But! The crucial point is that “in the economic context” is not just a perspective we can choose to adopt or not. Economic equivalence is an abstraction, but a real one: it governs what people actually do. And what it governs is not a mere aspect of things but the things themselves, which are really exchanged as interchangeable while really not being so. This is not bad thinking to be sorted out with finer distinctions.

That’s what my earlier quoted line was getting at. We keep to non-contradiction in thought, and that’s why a real contradiction like this shows up as a contradiction in the first place.

@FlamelNW

But frankly, both seem to carry a metaphysical tendency toward rationalism and essentialism, regardless of which one we’re talking about.

Not all dialectics is rationalist (the claim I made that reality need not obey the rules of thought is the opposite of rationalism), but I concede it tends to rely on essences. The difference is that Marx and Adorno historicized essence: it is not eternal, but the internal necessities of a particular form of society, which could itself be otherwise.

[FlamelNW]

@j_j

I might say that science is a tool for imposing on the world. We might call this “understanding” it. “Power is understanding.”

Sadly, modern quantum mechanics has shown us the fundamental limits of precisely predicting the future in the natural sciences. Popper, in The Poverty of Historicism, also pointed out the difficulties and paradoxes involved in predicting the future course of human history.

So this “power” seems to be much weaker than we might have imagined.

In the end, I still find myself surrendering to pragmatism. For now, it seems we don’t really have a better choice, so I guess we’ll just have to accept it.

[Frank]

Zhihu is incorrect. Dialects does not violate of the laws mentioned. Dialects is the outcome of adhering to logic.

[FlamelNW]

I have some difficulty agreeing with the claim that commodities “are” and “are not” equivalent simply because they are qualitatively different.

What exactly do we mean by this difference? If we’re referring to some underlying “essence” of things, I feel that this risks falling into metaphysical essentialism.

From a broadly Kantian perspective, I don’t think it’s meaningful or even possible to investigate the “essence” of things as they are in themselves, independently of the categories through which we understand them. Our observations and discussions of the world always take place within some conceptual framework.

Since we’re already using concepts like “commodity” and “equivalence” in this discussion, wouldn’t it be reasonable to assume that we’re talking within an economic framework? And within that framework, a $10 cup and a $10 loaf of bread are equivalent in terms of their exchange value.

What I don’t quite understand is why the economic framework becomes something special simply because it governs actual human behavior.

After all, other frameworks also affect how we behave. For example, from a biological perspective, humans can digest bread but not ceramic. So even if we paid $10 for both a cup and a loaf of bread, we wouldn’t eat the cup and try to drink water out of the bread.

To me, these seem like different ways of describing and understanding the same objects, rather than a contradiction in reality.

[j_j]

@FlamelNW

I tend to think of this more in terms of Quine’s web of belief.

Me too ! But especially lately I’ve been thinking of belief so that it includes all expectant conduct. For instance, we hurry up the stairs to answer a ringing phone. We don’t hesitate to verbalize our trust in the function of the stairs. We hardly even notice the stairs. They vanish into their function. Likewise “blindly” and expectantly flip the lights witch. So much of life depends on this kind of “visceral blind belief” or “tacit skill.”

To me this stuff is “real” in the sense of part of experience, but it’s hard to imagine a mathematical model doing it justice. A “literal” approach will tend to find the issue swampy.

@FlamelNW

But there are still some beliefs that seem much harder for us to give up, such as “a proposition cannot be both true and false” or “1 + 1 = 2.”

I see both of these as pretty secure, of course, but how much of that is convention ? If we follow the rules, then yeah. Are these rules metaphysically deep ? I don’t think so.

For instance, maybe Joe calls P “true” and Bill calls it “false.” There you go, both true and false. On the other hand, it’s confusing if Bill calls it “true” and “false” in the same sentence.

Some might say that “a proposition can’t be true and false” is a deep metaphysical principle. I expect they have “objective reality” or something metaphysical in mind. To me this juts out as a traditional assumption that has begun to wobble. I find some kind of “ontological perspectivism” to be a reasonable approach to the philosophy of science.

It’s arguably more open and less biased, because it does not “force” a monological prejudice onto the world. I don’t want to derail your topic, so suffice it to say that an intensely pragmatic approach can do without framing science as a pursuit of “truth.”

@FlamelNW

Sadly, modern quantum mechanics has shown us the fundamental limits of precisely predicting the future in the natural sciences. Popper, in The Poverty of Historicism, also pointed out the difficulties and paradoxes involved in predicting the future course of human history.

So this “power” seems to be much weaker than we might have imagined.

In the end, I still find myself surrendering to pragmatism. For now, it seems we don’t really have a better choice, so I guess we’ll just have to accept it.

It turns out we are largely on the same page. I’m some flavor of a pragmatist, and I loosely define “reality” in terms of the future that forever resists our prediction and control. In other words, I expect the unexpected. This is even a tragic vision of the world.

I see human beings as “navigators” of the “temporal depth” of the world. We tend to call “real” (1) what we count on and (2) what gets in our way. So world-for-scheming-human is structured by “care.” Objects manifests as tools and obstacles. Of course we have our theoretical joys, where we are temporarily lifted above our usual immersion. I see pragmatism as the strange moment when theory looks down and tries to theorize the pre-theoretical.

[FlamelNW]

@j_j

I see both of these as pretty secure, of course, but how much of that is convention ? If we follow the rules, then yeah. Are these rules metaphysically deep ? I don’t think so.

I agree. I don’t think these beliefs are fundamentally different from other beliefs. They’re just closer to the center of our web of belief. Questioning or revising them would affect many more of our other beliefs and come at a much greater cost.

(By the way, your example about P being both true and false was pretty bad )

@j_j

an intensely pragmatic approach can do without framing science as a pursuit of “truth.

Actually, I think it’s quite the opposite.(update: I agree.) To me, a truly scientific attitude is one of thorough skepticism and empiricism. It doesn’t assume that there is any such thing as absolute “truth” in the world.

When empirical observations from experiments contradict a theory, scientists won’t hesitate to abandon, revise, or improve it. They never believe that their theories are “truth” in any absolute sense, but rather “patterns that haven’t been proven wrong yet.”

Trust me, if God descended to Earth, scientists would immediately kick Einstein aside and rush toward God with magnifying glasses in hand.

[j_j]

@FlamelNW

Actually, I think it’s quite the opposite. To me, a truly scientific attitude is one of thorough skepticism and empiricism. It doesn’t assume that there is any such thing as absolute “truth” in the world.

Perhaps you misread me. You were responding to:

@j_j

I don’t want to derail your topic, so suffice it to say that an intensely pragmatic approach can do without framing science as a pursuit of “truth.”

I get it if you expectantly read the opposite. I catch grief on this forum for suggesting the sound “true” is like a turn-signal or a thumbs-up.

A “total” pragmatism or “generalized instrumentalism” presents itself as (“only”) a tool or attitude rather than as “the truth.”

@FlamelNW

(By the way, your example about P being both true and false was pretty bad )

I thought it was charmingly simple. But I didn’t realize yet that you were already skeptical about truth.

@FlamelNW

When empirical observations from experiments contradict a theory, scientists won’t hesitate to abandon, revise, or improve it. They never believe that their theories are “truth” in any absolute sense, but rather “patterns that haven’t been proven wrong yet.”

Trust me, if God descended to Earth, scientists would immediately kick Einstein aside and rush toward God with magnifying glasses in hand.

I’m not sure that all scientists live up to that ideal, but I like the attitude. Perhaps you’ll agree that a failed prediction can always be excused in terms of this or that piece of the web of beliefs.

I’m tempted to think more in terms of the general reliably of a set of tools that ideally increase the effectiveness of one another. We might not throw away a tool the first time it disappoints us, etc.

[FlamelNW]

@j_j

To me this stuff is “real” in the sense of part of experience, but it’s hard to imagine a mathematical model doing it justice. A “literal” approach will tend to find the issue swampy.

NVM, I agree with you. There was a translation error on my end.

[Jamal]

Yes, it’s an option. You can tidy things up like that, and it’s worked pretty well for natural science. But in the human sciences those frameworks are part of the object under investigation, not just different ways of describing and understanding the same objects. The equivalence of the cup and the loaf isn’t just a way of describing them; it’s a real abstraction, enacted when people actually exchange them and enforced by social institutions. It determines what is produced and who gets it, and thus whether and how the biological even comes into play. That’s all I mean by essence: not a thing in itself, but the social relations that make a thing what it is.

So you can clean things up and remove the contradictions, according to a judicious use of different frameworks, but this is to sweep reality under the rug. There remains a contradiction internal to exchange. The cup and the loaf are not interchangeable, or they wouldn’t be exchanged at all—but in the act of exchange they are interchangeable. The contradiction is in what people do, not just in how we describe it. Again though, I’m not saying this is equivalent to logical contradiction—only that dialectical contradiction appears as logical contradiction to thought that adheres to logic (as it must). It’s like @Frank said:

@Frank

Zhihu is incorrect. Dialects does not violate of the laws mentioned. Dialects is the outcome of adhering to logic.

The deeper or meta-issue is that you seem to assume a position above it all, picking and choosing between frameworks, seemingly unaware that taking up this position is already to apply a framework. I appreciate that science often strives for a view from nowhere, but one of the best lessons of dialectics is that there is no such thing. In natural science, taking such a position is sometimes harmless and even productive, but what you’re doing isn’t science—it’s philosophy, where it helps to be aware of one’s own presuppositions.

When it comes to society, you can’t survey all frameworks from above. You’re already involved, and your opinion is already political. Treating the economic framework as just one description or perspective among others isn’t neutral—it represents an acceptance of the way things are.

[FireOlogist]

@FlamelNW

identity, non-contradiction,

How do you do dialectics without identifying a thesis (identity), and keeping it utterly distinct from its anti-thesis (non-contradiction)? Seems like “thesis/anti-thesis” entails identity and the LNC to me.

Just a thought.

@FlamelNW

both seem to carry a metaphysical tendency toward rationalism and essentialism

I agree. I think Hegel found a new way (really helpful, interesting way) to seek the same truth (the absolute) that essentialists seek.