Because it’s not the puppet’s conscious will that’s causing its arms to move; it’s the strings being pulled by the puppet master that’s causing its arms to move.
There’s a difference between you moving your arm and me moving your arm even if determinism is true.
I fully agree with this! Some people think Dualism changes the determinism picture significantly, but I don’t.
Why is it not possible? If physicalism is true then my conscious will is as physically real as my unconscious brain activity, and if it’s possible for unconscious brain activity to cause my arms to move then it’s prima facie possible for my conscious will to cause my arms to move.
You seem to have snuck back in some notion of the conscious will being a non-physical, epiphenomenal thing?
So it’s more like a robot than a puppet. You’re saying the robot is responsible for its actions even though it’s controlled by a program.
Correct?
As I say, because they don’t have the baggage. They aren’t assumed to be things that are incompatible with determinism or neuroscience. That need to be “outside” of everything in order to be “real”.
Yes. We say “the robot knocked over the vase” not “the programmer knocked over the vase”.
I think it’s more saying that the program is responsible. When we talk about a person being responsible for their actions, we don’t mean that persons meat and bones - we mean that persons mind. The mind would be comparable to the program.
We say the ball crashed through the window even though little Todd smacked it over there.
So we’re like robots that act per a program, but we have free will because of something linguistic?
Ok, but Michael is arguing that a person is controlled by external factors, yet has responsibility. I’m not seeing how that works.
That is nonsense. If I can imagine a pink unicorn floating in space that doesn’t mean the pink unicorn is as physically real as my brain. The idea of a pink unicorn might be real, not the pink unicorn.
I’m saying that “I have free will” means “My will is causally responsible for my actions”. The latter can obtain even if my will is causally determined by antecedent events.
yeah but as humans we aren’t causing the arm to move, atleast in my opinion the laws of physics are.
I haven’t said anything to the contrary.
I’m saying that if physicalism is true then there are three distinct physical events:
It’s possible that (1) causes (2) and that (2) causes (3).
You seem to be arguing that it’s impossible for (2) to cause (3), and that (3) can only be caused by (1). You haven’t explain why this is. What’s the relevant difference between (1) and (2) such that (1) can cause (3) but (2) can’t?
If there is no free will, then all actions are the end result of all the factors hosting for position. Knowing you will be fined and/or imprisoned for doing something would probably be a pretty strong factor in that equation.
That’s not a physical event. That’s an idea you constructed in your brain. There is nothing in the physical world that maps to a notion of “conscious will”. Your consciousness exists in a realm separate from the physical realm, and whatever you call “conscious will” cannot have any effect in the physical realm.
Sounds illogical to me.
Which part? That a) “I have free will” means “My will is causally responsible for my actions” or that b) my will can be causally responsible for my actions even if my will is causally determined by antecedent events?
The second part. If your will is determined, you don’t have free will.
You’re conflating. There are two separate premises:
Note that (2) doesn’t say anything about free will. So your objection to (2) makes no sense.
Is that what Michael is saying? Are you sure those are his words? “External factors”?