We have free will only if we could have done otherwise
We could have done otherwise only if we could have done otherwise
If (1) and (2) mean the same thing then (1) is a vacuous tautology because (2) is a vacuous tautology.
If (1) is not a vacuous tautology then (1) and (2) do not mean the same thing, and your claim that if most believe (1) then (1) is true by definition is a non sequitur, with the comparison you want to make between (1) and “something is a triangle only if it has three sides” a false one. A more apt comparison is “there are objective moral truths only if God exists”. Even if most people believe it to be true it does not follow that it is true by definition.
So free will is not defined as libertarian free will even if libertarian free will is the most popular belief about free will, and asserting that it is in an attempt to dismiss compatibilism without engaging with it in good faith is bad philosophy.
No I’m not. You are still completely ignoring what I’m saying.
No it’s not. That’s how all linguists agree words and terms acquire their meaning.
That is a disingenuous comparison because “objective moral truths” is not an atomic term, and you know that.
There is a difference between “intentional unlawful killing” — where every word has a meaning and the general public doesn’t get to dictate what the complex composition means independently of the meaning of the individual words — and “murder”, which is a single lexical term that the general public does get to dictate the meaning of.
You know that to be true. Everyone does.
You don’t get to decide that. A term means what most people say the term means. That’s how language works. Period.
Even if it’s true that most people believe this it does not follow that this is true by definition.
Yes, but as I said above, if “we have free will” means “we could have done otherwise” then the claim “we have free will only if we could have done otherwise” is the vacuous truism “we could have done otherwise only if we could have done otherwise”.
You can’t have your cake and eat it too. You have to pick; either it’s a vacuous truism or they don’t mean the same thing.
“morality exists” is still not an atomic concept. Try again.
You can call the logical form of a⇔a whatever you want, but the proposition a could be true or false.
And that’s the only thing of philosophical interest: is the “ability to choose otherwise” true or false. In other words: what is the metaphysics of free will?
b (could have done otherwise)
a (have free will)
True
True
False
False
You can belittle the logical form a⇔b, but the only thing the general public cares about is whether or not a is true, and if b isn’t true, then a isn’t true, because ¬b⇒¬a. Whether a=b, or a⇔b, or it’s a “vacuous tautology”, all that is totally and completely irrelevant, because a is still false.
As should be clear from this short discussion of the history of the idea of free will, free will has traditionally been conceived of as a kind of power to control one’s choices and actions. When an agent exercises free will over her choices and actions, her choices and actions are up to her. But up to her in what sense? As should be clear from our historical survey, two common (and compatible) answers are: (i) up to her in the sense that she is able to choose otherwise, or at minimum that she is able not to choose or act as she does, and (ii) up to her in the sense that she is the source of her action. However, there is widespread controversy both over whether each of these conditions is required for free will and if so, how to understand the kind or sense of freedom to do otherwise or sourcehood that is required.
…
Indeed, some go so far as to define ‘free will’ as ‘the strongest control condition—whatever that turns out to be—necessary for moral responsibility’ (Wolf 1990, 3–4; Fischer 1994, 3; Mele 2006, 17). Given this connection, we can determine whether the freedom to do otherwise and the power of self-determination are constitutive of free will and, if so, in what sense, by considering what it takes to be a morally responsible agent.
Some have tried to avoid these lingering problems for compatibilists by arguing that the freedom to do otherwise is not required for free will or moral responsibility. What matters for an agent’s freedom and responsibility, so it is argued, is the source of her action—how her action was brought about.
You’re more than welcome to disagree with these views, but your appeal to “but most people believe that we have free will only if we could have done otherwise, therefore it is true by definition that we have free will only if we could have done otherwise” is a non sequitur, a misguided understanding of what it takes for words to mean what they do, and a bad faith objection to compatibilism.
This is a bad truth table, even for free will libertarians. If quantum indeterminacy is an objective fact then determinism is false, and I could have done otherwise had stochastic quantum events behaved differently. Does it then follow that I have free will? Or would it simply mean that some of my actions are unpredictable and random, and I still don’t have free will?
So at the very least, free will requires something more than just that I could have done otherwise. The compatibilist argument is that this something more is in fact sufficient, and so as long as this something more is satisfied it doesn’t matter if we could not have done otherwise.
That’s an equivocation fallacy. It’s like saying “evolution is not just a theory”, but your notion of “theory” is not what I’m talking about. What the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy refers to as “free will” is not what I am talking about.
Do you understand there’s a difference between the lexical token (i.e. word) “theory” and the particular notion of theory I’m currently holding in my mind?
Let’s see if your understanding of linguistics works with an analogous claim:
«your appeal to “but most people believe literally means virtually, therefore it is true by definition that literally means virtually” is a non sequitur»
Do you really think that makes any sense whatsoever? First of all, a non sequitur is a fallacy, a fallacy is an error of reasoning in an argument, and this is not an argument, this is a proposition: it can either be true or false. A proposition “if a, then b” cannot be a non sequitur.
This is just lazy. Replying with “non sequitur” to a proposition you disagree with is not a valid argument.
This is a smoke screen. You are trying to distract from the only thing that matters. If you use a coin flip to decide what to eat for dinner, the source of the decision wasn’t you, it was randomness. Moreover, the term I used was “ability to choose otherwise”, not “ability to do otherwise”. Just because I ate salad doesn’t mean that I chose to eat salad.
But I’m not going to fall your smoke screen, I’ll grant for the sake of argument that this is true.
The incompatibilist claim is if a) determinism is true, then b) free will is false. It does not say anything about ¬a. If you deduce anything from ¬a, then you are committing the simplest error in logic you can commit: inverse error fallacy.
Once again this is just lazy.
Once again, this is a red herring. I said multiple times already that what matters is ¬b⇒¬a, and here you are saying that even if b was true, a might still be false, which I have already argued multiple times is completely irrelevant.
No one is arguing that b is sufficient for a (even though I could, it would be a waste of time), the incompatibilist claim is is that b is necessary for a, not sufficient.
The table shows the logical form of a⇔b, something you brought up, and I already argued multiple times it’s completely irrelevant. The only reason I provided the table was to show that a could be true or false, and your response is: a could be false even when b is true? No one cares.
I’m going to repeat it once again: the only thing that matters is ¬b⇒¬a. You keep bringing up distractions that have nothing to do with this proposition: if there’s no ability to choose otherwise, there’s no free will.
Your claim that b the ability to do otherwise is not sufficient for a free will does nothing to address this proposition.
It’s what I, and other compatibilists (and even other non-compatibilists), are talking about.
I didn’t say that “if a then b” is a non sequitur. I said that “a therefore b” is a non sequitur. Do you understand the difference between a material implication and an inference?
Your argument has been some form of:
Most people believe that we have free will only if we could have done otherwise
Therefore, “we have free will only if we could have done otherwise” is true by definition
Therefore, compatibilism is false by definition, and has changed the meaning of the term “free will”
I am explaining that (2) and (3) do not follow from (1), and so are non sequiturs.
You literally did in your own truth table. This is what you said:
Your truth table says that if (b) is true then (a) is true. If I were inclined to suggest a fix for you, I’d suggest you offer this truth table instead:
b (could have done otherwise)
a (have free will)
True
True or False
False
False
Although I disagree with the bottom line, obviously.
I know, that’s what “equivocation” means: we are not talking about the same thing.
This is a classic example of the use-mention distinction. “London is a large city” and “London has six letters” are both valid, but they are not the same notion.
The compatibilist view is that the lexical token “free will” is a placeholder completely devoid of any meaning whatsoever where you get to assign any meaning your heart desires.
What I already explained to you multiple times already is that that’s not the view of the general public. For the general public, the lexical token “free will” has a meaning.
You can completely ignore this meaning all you want. The notion is still there.
You are committing a straw man fallacy then, because I never “argued” a∴b (obviously).
No, that’s a straw man.
Most people believe that we have free will only if we have the ability to choose otherwise
The definition of a term is what most people believe the term means
Therefore, we have free will only if we have the ability to choose otherwise, by definition
You are conveniently avoiding the second premise that I have already explained multiple times.
I do not care about compatibilism in this argument because it invites an equivocation, like conflating “London” the city with “London” the word.
It’s not my truth table, it’s the truth table of the logical form a⇔byou came up with, not me.
I do not care about that truth table. I will repeat, once again, that the only logical form I — and the general public — care about — which you conveniently completely ignored, once again — is ¬b⇒¬a.
b (ability to choose otherwise)
a (free will)
¬b⇒¬a
T
T
·
T
F
·
F
T
F
F
F
T
That is “my” truth table, which once again, you have completely ignored, especially my claim that you cannot find a single philosophical paper asking if this is the case for the general population.
And the reason is obvious: do you do not want to know the answer.
No, it isn’t. It is, as the SEP article says, “a significant kind of control over one’s actions”. The debate concerns the nature of this control. Do I control my actions only if I could have done otherwise? The compatibilist argues in the negative.
(2) is questionable (I’m sure most people will get the meaning of legal or scientific terms wrong), but more importantly (3) doesn’t follow from (1) and (2), because these do not mean the same thing:
Most people believe that we have free will only if we have the ability to choose otherwise
Most people believe that “we have free will” means “we have the ability to choose otherwise”
You are committing the very same use-mention error that you accused me of.
I haven’t ignored it. I’ve addressed it several times. Even if most people believe that ¬b ⇒ ¬a is true it does not follow that ¬b ⇒ ¬a is true. Here are several examples:
Most people believe that if God does not exist then nothing is immoral
Therefore, if God does not exist then nothing is immoral
(2) doesn’t follow.
Most people believe that if we don’t sacrifice virgins then it won’t rain
Therefore, if we don’t sacrifice virgins then it won’t rain
(2) doesn’t follow.
Most people believe that if we could not have done otherwise then we don’t have free will
Therefore, if we could not have done otherwise then we don’t have free will
(2) doesn’t follow.
But I want to return to this, because it shows that there might not be any point in continuing this discussion. I am interested in defending compatibilism, and compatibilism is a legitimate position on the topic of free will, regardless of what you are talking about. Despite your earlier claim, it is not the case that “the only thing of philosophical interest: is the ‘ability to choose otherwise’ true or false”. The subject matter is not so reductive as you insist it to be.
Yeah but that’s just sweeping the problem under the carpet, because you are going to define “significant kind of control” not as what most people understand by it, but as whatever makes “free will” true.
Once again you are misinterpreting linguistics. You can argue most people would get the meaning of the word “theory” “wrong” (and you would be correct within the scientific context). But scientists do not get to define language. In general parlance the word “theory” doesn’t mean the same thing as it does in the scientific context, so it’s not “wrong”.
Wrong. They don’t have to mean the same thing.
The claims “a means b” and “the definition of a includes b” are different but compatible. Also, the proposition “most people believe that a only if b” is compatible with “most people believe that a includes b”.
But all this is splitting hairs, because philosophers haven’t asked the general public any of these questions:
Do you think a means b?
Do you think a includes b?
Do you think b is necessary for a?
This is once again another attempt to distract from the only relevant point.
If the general public had answered any of these questions in the affirmative, that would dismantle your view. So the technical differences between them does not matter.
No you haven’t. Not a single time.
That is a straw man, because that’s not what I argued. I already provided the full syllogism, with the premise you tried to hide, and you are hiding again.
That’s an intellectually dishonest example because “if God does not exist” is not a single lexical term mapping to an atomic notion. Something I already pointed out here:
Something you completely ignored.
Except by “free will” you don’t mean free will, you mean Free Will ™.
There is a difference between Coca-Cola the beverage, and Coca-Cola ™ the brand. You are not interested in the notion of free will that is directly tied to how most people use the term. All you are interested in is the brand Free Will ™ and stamping your own personal definition into it, regardless of what most people think.
You’ve made it very clear you don’t care what most people think at all. You don’t care about semantics, you don’t care about dictionary definitions, you don’t care about folk intuitions.
So we go back to the claim I made at the very beginning:
So you are very right, if you are not going to engage in linguistics at all, then there’s no point in discussing “free will”. Just ignore semantics completely, and assign any meaning you want to it.
All I’m saying is that your Free Will ™ bubble is separate from what the overwhelming vast majority of people understand by actual free will.
The notion of access doesn’t mean they are different entities.
The engine is not separate to my car just because it’s under the hood.
Several assertions in a row. What’s the evidence for any of it?
As I say, Libet’s experiment is now widely seen as not indicating the lack of conscious choice. (e.g. summary here)
Do you have any other basis for your assertions?
That’s a very strange (and unrealistic) way to think of language felipec. Most terms have multiple meanings, look at a dictionary when you have some time. So we can’t say that the meaning which is correct, is the one that most people would judge to be the correct one, because the correct meaning is actually given by the context of use.
And when we consider context then we must consider the author’s intent. It is often argued that the correct meaning is the one intended by the author. That’s why “meaning” is defined as what is “meant”, or intended by the author.
So it doesn’t really matter “what most people say the term means”. Most people may be misunderstanding the author, and therefore wrong as to what the word means. Misunderstanding is very common, and not confined to individuals, it also happens in a mass form, because people are similar to sheep.
With a philosophical term like “free will”, there are many different ways it could be used. It is very difficult to determine what ought to be the correct way to use the term. For example, look at the way Plato deals with “just” in “The Republic”. He is not looking for what most people think “just” means, he is looking for what “just” ought to mean.
All of those meanings are determined by popular usage.
All of them are correct.
Not by the general public it isn’t.
Yeah but the project of reasoning what the term “just” should mean begins with addressing the use-mention distinction and acknowledging that the word “just” and the common notion of just are two different things. Plato’s project could have ended with the conclusion that “just” should mean the opposite of what most people understand by just. That would not change the definition of just, which would still be determined by most people, just like all terms. It would just create another (obscure) notion.
The whole purpose of Plato’s project would be to create good arguments to redefine the term “just” so that the general population is convinced and changes their notion of just.
But even then, it’s still the case that the general population is the one that decides.
It’s nothing like this, and this is getting tiring to explain. All of these might be true:
We could not have done otherwise
We have control over our actions
We are morally responsible for the actions we control
We have free will
I don’t care if most people believe that (4) is true only if (1) is false. Your understanding of what it takes for words to mean what they do is impoverished, and your suggestion that anyone who believes the above can be dismissed as “wrong by definition” is lazy and bad philosophy. If the extent of your defence of libertarian free will is “most people believe it” then I’m not interested in continuing.
You’re in the wrong here. Free will has a traditional meaning that’s mentioned in the SEP article which you cited.
It’s perfectly appropriate and reasonable to adhere to traditional meanings until persuaded otherwise, and you have provided no arguments in defense of a non-traditional definition other than some odd references to the fact that definitions are trivially true. You are the one engaging in “bad philosophy.”
As should be clear from this short discussion of the history of the idea of free will, free will has traditionally been conceived of as a kind of power to control one’s choices and actions. When an agent exercises free will over her choices and actions, her choices and actions are up to her. But up to her in what sense? As should be clear from our historical survey, two common (and compatible) answers are: (i) up to her in the sense that she is able to choose otherwise, or at minimum that she is able not to choose or act as she does, and (ii) up to her in the sense that she is the source of her action.
The fact that (i) is a common answer to the question “in what sense do I control my actions?” does not entail that “I have free will” means “I could have done otherwise”. Like felipec, this is an impoverished understanding of what it takes for words and terms to acquire their meaning. (ii) is also a common answer, and sometimes a competing answer, but it would be wrong to define free will as (ii).
If “I have free will” has a ‘traditional’ meaning, it is only “I control my actions”. And as the SEP article, says:
Questions concerning the nature and existence of this kind of control (e.g., does it require and do we have the freedom to do otherwise or the power of self-determination?), and what its true significance is (is it necessary for moral responsibility or human dignity?) have been taken up in every period of Western philosophy and by many of the most important philosophical figures, such as Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, and Kant.
So I think it perfectly coherent to say that we have free will if we control our actions, even if we could not have done otherwise, and that if moral nihilism is false then this is sufficient for moral responsibility.
You’re failing to engage with the subject matter in good faith if you think that it can be reduced so simply to “most say that we have free will only if we could have done otherwise, therefore by definition we have free will only if we could have done otherwise”. It’s lazy and bad philosophy.
No, the definitions in the dictionary are determined by an analysis of popular usage. It is not popular usage which does the determining, it is the people who do the analysis which do the determining.
Very clearly, the general public has a multitude of different ways of using “free will”. For instance, “I did it of my own free will” means that I did it without coercion or influence from others. But “human beings have free will” means that human beings make conscious decisions concerning their actions, choices in relation to possibilities.
Those two forms of usage are completely distinct and actually inconsistent with each other. The person who is coerced in decision making does not choose by “free will” according to the first manner of usage, but does choose by free will according to the second form of usage.
I have demonstrated very soundly and conclusively that this is false. Definitions are not determined by “most people”. That is a fundamental and very significant misunderstanding of language. Consider the dictionary again, as a common reference for definitions. There is a very limited number of authors and these select few authors determine the definitions. That is not “most people”. And the criteria they use is to examine patterns of usage context, and this reveals a number of distinct generalized “ways” in which a word is commonly used. From this they formulate definitions. In no way is a definition “determined by most people”.
So you state this as if it is a fact which would refute my argument. But asserting something does not refute an argument. When the assertion is inconsistent with the conclusion of the argument, the opposite is true, the argument refutes the assertion. If you’d like to produce a counter argument go right ahead. But you’ll have a very difficult time to show how most people (a multiplicity) determine the meaning (a single). Do you suppose that people vote on meaning?
In a discussion on free will, this is a very significant mistake. Decision making is something which only an agent of free will does. In no accepted, coherent use of “free will”, is “the general population” the agent which decides.
You should, because if they all might be true then (1) and (4) are not inconsistent, and your argument falls apart; it is not true-by-definition that we have free will only if we could have done otherwise.
Your responses seem to suggest that you don’t understand how to actually do philosophy, so I’m not going to engage further with you.