Here is a counterargument to your position. Supposing we behave in a way that satisfies our wants, it is nevertheless true that we often deliberate about what we want, we often find that we do not want what we thought we wanted, and we often realize that we don’t actually know what it is we want. Thus our wants are a product of uncertainty and rational deliberation rather than a simple given, and both uncertainty and rational deliberation are things that seem different from a causal-deterministic chain of events. After all, whenever we deliberate we at the same time presuppose that we are fully capable of coming to different conclusions; and whenever we reach a point of uncertainty or aporia we have lost grip on the guiding thread that was previously leading us. It would not be possible to deliberate while simultaneously presupposing that we cannot reach different conclusions, just as it would not be possible to be uncertain while at the same time simply following our wants in a linear manner.