“WE” are not supposed to be sure; it is none of “OUR” business.
Of course it’s private. The implementation of a willed moral act is not; the willing of it, the judgement representing the form the act must then take, re: volition, is entirely subjective, and the public can never know which principles the subject used in his practical reasoning, for he himself may not know, which reduces the pure subjective ground of his act to a feeling.
What is so cryptic about the difference in consequence between using the wrong fork at the salad course, in which case someone is probably going to be ashamed of me and I might be ashamed of myself for not knowing any better, or, betraying a trust, in which case I am certainly ashamed of myself and for which anyone else’s shame toward me is utterly superfluous, therefore irrelevant.
———————
In a certain sense, yes. In its original deduction, the categorical imperative denotes the extreme of degrees of moral acts. Any adherence to a categorical imperative, that is to say, “act only as if……”, simply represents the impossibility of NOT being a perfectly moral agent, and vice versa, not so adhering represents the impossibility being one.
The concept of ‘Etiquette’ is about more than the correct use of a fork.
“The world was my oyster, but I used the wrong fork” — Oscar Wilde
“Manners are a sensitive awareness of the feelings of others. If you have that awareness, you have good manners, no matter what fork you use.” — Emily Post
“Those who have mastered etiquette, who are entirely, impeccably right, would seem to arrive at a point of exquisite dullness.” — Dorothy Parker
“Nothing is less important than which fork you use. Etiquette is the science of living. It embraces everything. It is ethics. It is honor.” — Emily Post
“I make a distinction between manners and etiquette - manners as the principles, which are eternal and universal, etiquette as the particular rules which are arbitrary and different in different times, different situations, different cultures.” — Judith Martin
And we’re right to ask the question, is this a point about consistency in general? What would make it a point about ethical consistency?
From a non-Kantian perspective: Yep, if we identify as rational beings, and want to act rationally whenever we can, then using tools to help us be consistent, no matter the subject area, will be important. And by removing the idea of a truly categorical imperative, as I did in my speculations, we’re left with only this.
From a strict Kantian perspective: But that’s precisely why you can’t “remove” the cat imp. If you do, there is nothing to distinguish the “ought” of ethics from the various hypothetical oughts we might adopt for purposes of consistency etc. I, Kant, claim that what makes something ethical is that it is categorical in a special way, applying to everyone no matter what they may accept as premises.
From a modified Kantian perspective: We can accept the stricture that an ethical decision must include the type of consistency identified above, and that merely knowing the virtues is insufficient. Impartiality is, we might say, the essence of ethics. But we still need a subject matter, and that would be morals, understood much more generally than Kant’s usage would suggest. We also acknowledge that ethical consistency poses special problems that are barely touched on in the way the cat imp is formulated.
Maybe not to make it so simple? Morals much more generally, is ethics?
True enough, in that correcting ethical problems is far mor possible than obeying moral law predicated on something the subject is absolutely incapable of doing. Hence the “as if” incorporated in the c.i.’s formula.
I didn’t quite get “Morals much more generally, is ethics?” What do you mean?
And then, what do you have in mind by “correcting ethical problems”? The kind of complications I had in mind were those associated with conflicting duties to, say, family, friends, community, country. But I think you mean something different?
Hell, I lost my chain of thought, which means it was probably wrong.
Given that ethics usually means rule-bound community conduct, one merely needs to learn the rules of whichever community he’s in. This is so much simpler, in that he doesn’t need the occassion for conducting himself in order to know how he must. One is always taught manners before he’s looked upon to properly display them.
In his moral affairs on the other hand, it’s far from simple, in that he never knows what his act will be before the occassion requiring one presents itself. He may think himself sure of a range of acts beforehand, but he doesn’t have the totality of circumstance, which affects the final determination of his will for the act itself..
Yes, and I agree. Learning rules is meant to encompass all the relevant information, but that’s often not the case. I meant something similar, in regard to learning the virtues, when I talked about how adjurations like “Be kind!” aren’t helpful. We need to know a great deal more than that in the many cases where two sorts of kindness may conflict. Again, it’s the special meaning of “the right thing to do” as advocating a particular action.
Foot changed her mind about whether moral reasons track self-interest, which is adjacent to but not identical with the etiquette point.
The SEP article is worth quoting in detail here, so as to hopefully head of some casual misrepresentation.
Etiquette and morality are different in many ways, but they both tell us what we ought to do. In fact, as Foot points out, rules of etiquette are usually presented in the same categorical form as moral considerations; etiquette tells us what must and must not be done, period. Imperatives such as, “You should not discuss money”, or “Don’t make personal remarks” use a categorical form. Foot calls these “non-hypothetical uses” of ought (1972 [VV 160]). Yet Foot takes it to be obvious that one can rationally ignore the rules of etiquette. Hence, the rules of etiquette do not give me any reason to act on them unless I have the purpose of doing what I ought to do from the point of view of etiquette. Of course, there is still a sense in which the rules of etiquette are unconditional. I am ‘gauche’ if I flout the requirements of etiquette, regardless of my purposes. Still, Foot thinks it cannot be said that I necessarily have reason to conform to those rules, drawing the conclusion that
if a hypothetical use of ‘should’ gave a hypothetical imperative, and a non-hypothetical use of ‘should’ gave a categorical imperative, then ‘should’ statements based on rules of etiquette, or rules of a club would be categorical imperatives. (1972 [VV 160–161])
Yet these ‘should’ statements do not really give us categorical imperatives. We therefore cannot trust the surface grammar of our ‘should’ or ‘ought’ statements to tell us whether we have a categorical or a hypothetical imperative.
These points were maintained into Natural Goodness. And later, some specifics on her change of mind:
Prominent defenders of moral rationalism criticize Foot’s analogy with etiquette. Unfortunately, Foot’s actual position is sometimes misrepresented in the debate. It is sometimes thought that Foot adopts at this point a wholly conventional view of morality, by analogy with etiquette. Yet, Foot did not renounce her earlier view that morality has some determinate content, tied to facts about human life.
I’ve bolded the salient piece. Her view on the logical similarity between etiquette and ethics was maintained.
Thanks @Banno for your summary (post 63). An excerpt:
Thought I’d use this as an entry point to express some thoughts re: ‘etiquette’, societal and moral expectations and their interplay in terms of ‘binding’ or ‘acceptance’.
The different ways of ‘falling’ - how we are ‘held’ tightly close or pushed away, as in ‘punished’. The psychological need for certainty found in strong, formal absolutism. The apparent attraction or ‘inescapability’ of a categorical imperative.
Foot, like others, is caught up in the changing winds of war. Not only in Oxford, England, but in France, post-WWII, society is changing. May 68 - Wikipedia
Foot had an aristocratic and privileged background with the usual expectations of what it meant to be a woman or should I say ‘lady’. How to be and act to catch the proper and fitting gentleman. Not to look intellectual, for starters.
Foot knows about the workings of ‘etiquette’ as a compelling norm of power and control. A social guide but more than that. It can be action‑guiding, — and yet not binding in the Kantian sense.
Foot studied and worked alongside others who were not part of the mould, who were not ‘comme il faut’ - conformists to the status quo.
Conscientious objectors of war were prime examples testing and breaking social expectations and mores. Women’s roles were shifting. Such perceived ‘failure’ in showing a ‘fitting’ character, nature or sexuality, came with penalties.
In this context, ‘etiquette’, is not trivial. It’s a way of showing how people are held by norms — by class, by religion, by ‘how things are done’ — and yet, can refuse them without falling into chaotic irrationality, even when so accused.
We can see the political undercurrent of radicalism. Foot is perhaps more subtle in her philosophical argumentation. Gently dismantling the idea that moral authority must be absolute.
We might call her a ‘conscientious objector’ who does not ‘fall’ into obedience but stands against the prevailing winds.
This article can be viewed as a subtle defence of moral pluralism and moral courage, smuggled in through an apparently trivial example of ‘how it’s done’.
Moral action, then, is not obedience to an abstract law but taking a certain stance or approach to living — getting on with human life in a humane manner.
There is more to be said about, e.g. the civilisation or criminalisation of the ‘fallen’ or those who would have them fall in battlegrounds. The civility of wearing suits in the White House…
This is the broader theme, the rejection of an absolute in our ethical considerations while maintaining an ethical stance; the very thing that, as I understand him, @Count_Timothy_von_Icarus supposes to be impossible.
It took me some time and energy to work through the reading. To clarify what was important to me and then to carefully express it. As well as possible.
Grateful to you and others for this stimulating discussion. “Just the job!”
It’s appropriate to quote Foot’s own critique of the article, from her later book Natural Goodness:
Now I am quite aware that to make this suggestion will seem most foolhardy: a case of putting one’s head, philosophically speaking, into the lion’s mouth. For is it not difficult to establish even the coincidence of moral and rational action? What, after all, about those problem cases where justice or charity forbids the only way out of a tight corner, and the life of the agent may even be at stake? Isn’t the demonstration of the rationality of just action a problem with which David Gauthier, for instance, has been wrestling for years, with great energy and skill?¹² And isn’t this the fence at which I myself have repeatedly fallen, trying now this way, now that, of getting over—from ‘Moral Beliefs’ in 1958 to ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives’ in 1972? All of this is true, and if I am hopeful of greater success this time round it is because I think I now see why I couldn’t have managed it before. Roughly speaking, it was because I still held a more or less Humean theory of reasons for action, taking it for granted that reasons had to be based on an agent’s desires. To be sure, in another article written in 1972 I had (rather inconsistently with my doubts about the rational status of morals) allowed considerations of self-interest an independent ‘reason-giving’ force.¹³ But this didn’t help with the rationality of disinterested justice, which rationality I was, rather scandalously, inclined to restrict to those whose desires were such as to allow them to be described as lovers of justice. I have therefore, rightly, been accused by my critics of reintroducing subjectivity at the level of rationality while insisting on objectivity in the criteria of moral right and wrong.
In common with others, I took it for granted at that time that a discussion of the rationality of moral action would start from some theory or other about what a reason for action must be: rather favouring a desire-fulfilment theory, with some special allowance for the force of considerations of self-interest. I now believe that both the self-interest theory of rationality and the theory of rationality as desire fulfilment are mistaken. Moreover, there seems to be a mistake of strategy involved in trying to fit the rationality of moral action into either theory: such an enterprise implying that we first come to a theory of rational action, and then try as best we can to slot in the rationality of acts of justice and charity.
Foot tried to show that natural-historical modes of description have normative, and so ethical, implications. I don’t think her program quite worked, in that the is-ought gap remains as an objection to be overcome by one’s being trained into a practice.
But I’m now thinking of heading in a slightly different direction - indeed, in a turn-around that would go back to the theory of action, by looking at some of Davidson’s early articles; going back to look at what a reason for an action might look like.
Sounds good, and, if you don’t mind another plug for McDowell, he addresses Davidson directly on this topic in Mind and World, often (but not completely) to point out common ground. One of the points of disagreement concerns the way in which we can understand reasons as being causal, so it would be cool if you looked at Davidson’s basic doctrine there. I could use a reread myself, after hearing what McD has to say. The issue centers on whether causal constraints are good enough to use as warrants for judgment and action, as Davidson believes, as opposed to rational constraints.
I can’t help but think of Foot in terms of practical reasoning. With particular emphasis on exploring the ethics of war. Morality and ethics as frameworks for some kind of guide to human behaviour and decision-making. As if we really need a theory to provide a sense of right and wrong.
What use are such theories or commandments when warmongers and criminals are not held responsible or to account?
Contemporary example:
“By unilaterally declaring the power to seize Palestinian land, property and buildings for their own use without consent, compensation or redress, the Board of Peace is taking a page out of Israel’s repressive playbook,” said Omar Shakir, executive director at Dawn, a non-profit dedicated to investigating the impacts of US foreign policy in the Middle East. “Far from signaling an end to genocide, apartheid and occupation, this document suggests entrenching some of its ugliest signature characteristics. This risks not only complicity, but direct perpetration of grave abuses.”
The UN security council authorized the Board of Peace to oversee the administration of Gaza until 31 December 2027. The UN charter affords its diplomats and organizations specific legal protections for work conducted on behalf of UN missions abroad. Language in the Board of Peace’s draft resolution appears to draw on those existing frameworks, which include protections against the arrest or detention of UN diplomats during official work, as well as the seizure of UN property. It is unclear if the Board of Peace could draw on the UN immunities for its own protection.
How did we get here? How the hell did this happen?
Adopted by the Security Council at its 10046th meeting, on 17 November 2025.
The Security Council, Welcoming the Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict of 29 September 2025 (“Comprehensive Plan”)(annex 1 to this resolution), and applauding the states that have signed, accepted, or endorsed it, and further welcoming the historic Trump Declaration for Enduring Peace and Prosperity of 13 October 2025 and the constructive role played by the United States of America, the State of Qatar, the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the Republic of Türkiye, in having facilitated the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip,
Determining that the situation in the Gaza Strip threatens the regional peace and the security of neighboring states and noting prior relevant Security Council resolutions relating to the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question,
1.
Endorses the Comprehensive Plan, acknowledges the parties have accepted it, and calls on all parties to implement it in its entirety,including
maintenance of the ceasefire, in good faith and without delay;
2.
Welcomes the establishment of the Board of Peace (BoP) as a transitional administration with international legal personality that will set the framework, and coordinate funding for, the redevelopment of Gaza pursuant to the Comprehensive Plan, and in a manner consistent with relevant international legal principles, until such time as the Palestinian Authority ¶ has satisfactorily completed its reform program, as outlined in various proposals, including President Trump’s peace plan in 2020 and the Saudi-French Proposal, and can securely and effectively take back control of Gaza. After the PA reform program is faithfully carried out and Gaza redevelopment has advanced, the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood. The United States will establish a dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians to agree on a political horizon for peaceful and prosperous coexistence;…
What use philosophical threads, theories or discussions?
When world institutions play the game of who wins the Gold Prize. Who sets the playing field? Who are the referees?
Would a Philosophy World Cup podcast produce a winning blueprint — to effectively clarify aims or will all actions lead to an own-goal?
Blood-soaked thoughts hanging meaningless in mid-air — Spot the Ball?
The amoral or immoral ‘winners’ claim victory no matter the outcome.
I haven’t read Natural Goodness yet, so thanks for the quote showing her development in moral thinking.
I don’t know whether these thoughts belong here or in your ‘taking a shit’ thread…both appeal.
They touch on the historical trajectory behind the reason vs emotion split. What interests me is how personal worldviews get mirrored, or sometimes mired, in moral theory: religious vs non-religious outlooks, political commitments, and the ways people trust (or otherwise) institutions and authority. The oaths some love or are loath to take. Some defend the status quo; others revolt. Both think they are ‘right’.
I keep seeing two distinct types of moral interpretation.
A narrow rule-based structure where emotions or bodily functions are irrelevant to reasoning. (duty, commandments, abstract principles).
A wide, holistic view where thinking and feeling are inseparable from the physical. Digestion, pain, fatigue — all the basic human elements that psychology, neurology, and biology show to be integral to judgement.
I think of Maslow’s hierarchy as intuitive. Morality begins with the basics.
Foot’s wartime experience makes this vivid. The deliberate withholding or destruction of basic goods — food, shelter, bodily safety — is already a moral wrong —it can destabilise, demoralise, and kill not only individuals but whole communities.
Then again, we have seen the opposite occur. The rebellion and revolt started by the intrepid. Where do we find morality? In obedience to orders, in resistance or in world conditions that can make either possible?
Today’s reported humanitarian atrocities in e.g. Gaza raise questions as to the accountability of leaders who possess access to basic goods (awareness of trusted news sources is vital and should be confirmed).
In sum, moral life is never purely cognitive: even our most basic bodily states shape how we perceive, judge, and act.
Is that the conclusion of Foot? I don’t know. It is certainly one of the threads running through her work.
One of Wittgenstein’s most important insights is that criteria such as “objectivity” are created by us from the desire for certainty, or, put another way, from our interest in predictability, universality, abstraction, etc. Thus, even the categorical imperative has an “interest”.
Kant has a type of this interest in wanting the form of an act to be what matters so he can remove consideration of the personal because he wants to be assured how it will be judged. The need for certainty is because he looks at morality as the judgement of the person to be “moral” (why Nietzsche will want to go beyond “good and evil”), but he sees that knowledge of the cause of an action cannot be certain (Wittgenstein will say we can only—grammatically, not as a limitation—“hypothesize”. BB, p. 15); moral causality being uncertain in the same way he concedes the thing-in-itself (as “cause”) is not subject to knowledge (though here he frames the issue as our failure, our sin of unpredictable interest). Foot wants to include our interests in any judgment, but she hangs onto the framework of judging the motivations of an act, and seems to merely be making a plea that they should matter.
I take Wittgenstein to resolve this issue by including our interests—while separating the person as a cause—in claiming that causality is not how action works (thus morality is not always about motivation either). He shows that there are other criteria (than certainty), for each of our practices, which come from what matters about those things; thus they reflect/embody our interests (“our” being our shared cultures) without it being a personal matter, so categorically (based on the form of each practice), not hypothetically (contingent on the person). We fulfill the criteria of an act or fail (or cross them). Instead of judging the person on what they ought to do or have done (and why), we judge the act, as adequate or correct. Thus, instead of being certain of a cause, or replacing that certainty with a rational necessity, or judging what is a good or bad motive (as Foot retreats to), the person simply has an ongoing responsibility under (or even beyond) that criteria (thus why reasons come afterwards).
