Exploring a Coherent Materialist View of Reality

Good morning everyone,

As requested, I’m briefly presenting a conceptual framework I’ve developed over time, which I’d like to subject to critical scrutiny. I’m a materialist, and by inclination, I tend to eliminate metaphysics from any explanation of reality. Of course, I fully understand that what I propose is quite radical, but by accepting only matter as the foundation, a coherent framework emerges. A general summary is found on the first page of the mini-site I created, so I’m reproducing it here verbatim, to honor the request for a summary. This isn’t “copy-and-paste,” it’s actually my summary. In fact, at the bottom of the site, after the summary, I’ve placed various links for further reading. If anyone is interested in reading to give me a first impression and offer criticism, I could leave the link here (if specifically requested, because I truly have no intention of spamming or violating any of the Forum’s internal rules). In any case, I report the summary here: “In recent years I have carried out a series of reflections on the idea of ​​dynamic time, reflections that have then branched out and touched on other topics: the future, determinism, free will, the dimensionality of space, in a concatenation of themes that “came naturally”, in the sense that every time I addressed a specific node that arose as a critical point and unexpected consequence of that first paradigm shift (from space-time to space-material), it then ended up fitting perfectly like a piece of a mosaic within a general conceptual framework that became gradually more solid and coherent.

There is, however, an element that precedes all this. Years ago (many years ago), I wrote a reflection on nothingness, convinced at the time that it was an autonomous and self-contained topic, and I would never have imagined that today it would fit into this journey. Now I realize that that text was the first piece of a broader framework that I had not yet fully grasped. The ontological rejection of nothingness was therefore not a conceptual provocation, but a clear indicator of a fundamental vision. By rethinking time as a dynamic, material emergence, and logically following the implications of that approach, a coherent framework emerged that I now consider solid.

What seemed like separate reflections have revealed themselves to be articulations of the same philosophical position: that of a radical realism that takes matter as its sole principle, fully accepting all its consequences.

With this article, I am not introducing any new theses, but I am presenting it as a conceptual map that can be useful in briefly and comprehensively outlining the entire framework that has consolidated over time. It shows how - assuming that only matter exists - the metaphysical residues that lurk (even) in sectors that should be free of them gradually dissolve, and questions that are traditionally treated as separate are coherently recomposed.

What follows is therefore an attempt to clarify the entire process, including that reflection on nothingness that I propose again today, reformulated and integrated, as a structural component of a system that I feel is finally complete.

“Only matter exists.”

The above statement is not a reductionist statement, nor is it an ideological, atheistic choice. Rather, it is the result of a speculative intent aimed at eliminating every superfluous entity from my conceptual framework. If something can be accepted without introducing a further, unexplained principle, then that further principle is a metaphysical excess, and my “anti-metaphysical battle” arose precisely from this assumption.

If only matter exists, this means that all those concepts we are accustomed to considering as independent -namely, time, the future, space understood as a container, free will as a suspension of causality, and even nothingness - must be rigorously reconsidered.

A conceptual relocation, starting with time, was therefore necessary. At the heart of the framework, which I have called “dynamic time,” time is no longer a dimension in which events are located: time is not a container, it is not an axis on which we can move, and it is not a fourth real coordinate: it is not dimensional.

Time is simply the name we give to the change of matter; if matter is dynamic, there is no need for a further dimension to explain change, since change is something internal to the material structure. Introducing time as an autonomous entity therefore becomes a superfluous duplication. Matter that changes is not time that flows, and with this shift, the idea of ​​spacetime as an ontological structure collapses, with the existing taking on a dynamic space-material structure. By eliminating time from the ontological dimension, the future also ceases to exist as a “place in waiting.”

The future does not exist in any sense: it is not already given, it is not inscribed, it is not awaiting unfolding; it simply reflects the structural indeterminacy of material processes in progress, and the present itself is not a section of a hypothetical four-dimensional temporal block, but the contingent configuration of matter. The future, therefore, is merely a word, and its elimination from the existential framework consequently eliminates an enormous number of metaphysical pseudo-problems.

With the assumption of matter as a single/universal foundation, one might think that everything is rigidly determined, but this conclusion presupposes the assumption of a linear mechanistic model, which I also reject. In the processual realism I propose, matter is dynamic, relational, and structurally complex, not reducible to a mere sequence of linear causes, being a web of processes. Classical determinism idealizes a complete state of the world, with fixed laws and a necessary trajectory. However, in a dynamic material universe, the so-called “deterministic” processes are not reducible to a mere sequence of linear causes. “Laws” are nothing more than descriptions of emergent regularities, not a kind of metaphysical entities.

Freedom of action is not a causal suspension; it is the peculiar way matter organizes itself in complex, self-conscious systems. There is no intervening soul, but a material system that acts on states of consciousness that are themselves material states. This is not metaphysics; it is structural degrees of freedom. The last metaphysical shadow to be addressed was space, which proved to be the most critical point of the entire system. To assert that only matter exists also eliminates the concept of a containing space. This is counterintuitive, because space seems to be precisely the dimension in which matter is located. How can this apparent contradiction be resolved?

By taking a further leap: space is not an entity distinct from matter, but is an extension of matter. There is no empty space in which matter is immersed; there is extended matter, understood as a material configuration of varying densities.

This step completely eliminates the last refuge of metaphysics, given by an absolute, infinite, eternal, independent space.

Infinity and eternity, therefore, do not belong to a containing space, being attributes of matter itself. And so dimensions: why only three?

Because, if space is an extension of matter, then dimensions are not arbitrary coordinates, but are an intrinsic property of its organization. Three-dimensionality is not a convention or one of the possible dimensional modalities; it is the only way matter is arranged. There is no need to postulate additional dimensions as hidden ontological realities. The three dimensions are not an epistemic limit, but the absolute determination of the constitution of being.

Of all the topics discussed, however, nothingness has been the most deceptive, since we are not inclined to reason by de-attributions, since we cannot attribute properties to it, we cannot describe it, and we cannot even refer to it without speculating about something. Nothingness ultimately reveals itself for what it “is”: a linguistic misunderstanding, a conceptual distortion that must also be eliminated from the paradigm of reality.

At the end of this entire discussion, one last problematic residue apparently remained: consciousness.

If everything is matter, where does subjective experience reside? Who perceives pain? Who experiences phenomenal experience? These questions, however, also arise from an approach that implicitly reintroduces a distinction between a “subject” and material processes, reproposing in another form a dualism that had already been excluded: the problem, in this case too, stems from a metaphysical presupposition.

In materialist realism, consciousness is not an entity and is not an autonomous principle, because it too falls within a mode of material dynamism. There is no separate “who” that experiences, but experience is the way in which a material system can be configured according to complexity, and the so-called problem of consciousness dissolves the moment its false approach is eliminated. This work, which I have undertaken with the desire to eliminate metaphysics from the world, I have done not to impoverish it conceptually, but with the idea of ​​restoring its coherence and coherence, albeit with a radicality of thought that some might perhaps consider excessively drastic.

Yet, an approach that justifies reality without the need for a God to corroborate attributes like eternity and infinity continues to strike me as extremely powerful and elegant; without the need for time to legitimize change; without the need for a soul to motivate free will; without the need for aleatory concepts that create the urgency of origin and extension.

Everything can be traced back to dynamically extended matter, while everything else is a nominal matter.

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It sounds like Karen Barad beat you to it.

Matter is a stabilizing and destabilizing process of iterative intra-activity. Phenomena—the
smallest material units (relational “atoms”)—come to matter through this process of ongoing intra-activity. “Matter” does not refer to an inherent, fixed property of abstract, independently existing objects; rather, “matter” refers to phenomena in their ongoing materialization.”

On my agential realist elaboration, phenomena do not merely mark the epistemological inseparability of “observer” and “observed”; rather, phenomena are the ontological inseparability of agentially intra-acting “components.” That is, phenomena are ontologically primitive
relations—relations without preexisting relata. The notion of intra-action (in contrast to the usual
“interaction,” which presumes the prior existence of independent entities/relata) represents a
profound conceptual shift. It is through specific agential intra-actions that the boundaries and
properties of the “components” of phenomena become determinate and that particular embodied concepts become meaningful.”

“In my agential realist account, scientific practices do not reveal what is already there; rather,
what is ‘‘disclosed’’ is the effect of the intra-active engagements of our participation with/in and as part of the world’s differential becoming. Which is not to say that humans are the condition of possibility for the existence of phenomena.

Phenomena do not require cognizing minds for their existence; on the contrary, ‘‘minds’’ are themselves material phenomena that emerge through specific intra-actions. Phenomena are real material beings. What is made manifest through technoscientific practices is an expression of the objective existence of particular material phenomena.

This is, after all, a realist conception of scientific practices. But unlike in m traditional conceptions of realism, ‘‘objectivity’’ is not preexistence (in the ontological sense) or the preexistent made manifest to the cognitive mind (in the epistemological sense). Objectivity is a matter of accountability for what materializes, for what comes to be. It matters which cuts are enacted: different cuts enact different materialized becomings…

Events and things do not occupy
particular positions in space and time; rather, space, time, and matter are iteratively produced and performed. Traditional conceptions of dynamics as a matter of how the values of an object’s properties change over time as the result of the action of external forces won’t do. The very nature and possibilities for change are reworked. Time has a history. Hence it doesn’t make sense to construe time as a succession of evenly spaced moments or as an external parameter that tracks the motion of matter in some preexisting space.

Intra-actions are temporal not in the sense that the values of particular properties change in time;
rather, which property comes to matter is re(con)figured in the very making/marking of time. Similarly, space is not a collection of preexisting points set out in a fixed geometry, a container, as it were, for matter to inhabit. Matter isn’t situated in the world; matter is worlding in its materiality.”(Meeting the Universe Halfway (2007)

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Thanks for the feedback and the information. I very much agree with the author. Many topics are thus reconfigured, starting from matter: time is eliminated, future space is dissolved, determinism are reformulated, space is redefined and nothingness is excluded, the problem of consciousness is addressed. However, if you have the patience to read the entire framework I propose, I feel like I cannot find a “stable closure” on space, which remains the most critical point. My aim is to eliminate all metaphysics, but it seems as if it can only be compressed as much as possible.

Please explain how (your) “materialism” itself is not (a) “metaphysics”.

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My materialism is ontological, because it focuses only on what actually exists. It is not metaphysical, because I do not introduce unobservable entities; on the contrary, my aim is to limit myself to the minimum necessary to describe reality.

Does your definition of matter depend on physics, or is it more a philosophical notion?

Great OP!

I note that extended matter cannot have any gaps in it, for ‘Nothing’ cannot be. The matter would be as the quantum fields that exhaust all reality.

Well, your claim “only matter exists” (OP) seems “unobservable”, ergo metaphysical.

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All is matter? That’s a metaphysical claim, an ontological claim to be precise. What you want to do, AFAICT, is to propose a kind of parsiomonious view by collapsing existing metaphysical distinctions,like matter-space-time. For example time in your system is reduced to change in matter and space is an extension of matter. A radical metaphysical monism: everything is matter or reducible to a property of matter.

Why not posit stuff like time particles and space particles? I find the idea of particles quite materialistic.

Lastly, all this, to what end? What motivates your project?

I hope I’m up to your expectations. I must preface this by saying that I’m neither a physicist nor a philosopher. I have a mixed background, technical/humanistic (I studied at a technical institute in high school and sociology at university, but my work focuses entirely on other subjects). I enjoy mathematics and have a passion for philosophy. I’m therefore self-taught in this sense. I’ll reply in a single comment, for everyone’s convenience:

@Viandante

“Does your definition of matter depend on physics, or is it more of a philosophical notion?”

It’s philosophical speculation; everything I’ve written is the result of speculation without any direct physical evidence (I wouldn’t be up to it). However, I’ve tried to be rigorous, examining it through relativity, which I believe to be an essential tenet. I’ll try to explain it in the complete framework I propose.

@PoeticUniverse

“Dynamically extended matter”

Great post!

I note that extended matter cannot have gaps, since “Nothing” cannot exist. Matter would be like quantum fields that exhaust all of reality."

Thank you so much. Yes, you hit on an important point: nothingness is a “linguistic misunderstanding.” I’ll try to clarify this too; it’s not clear in this summary.

@180Proof

"My materialism is not metaphysical, because I don’t introduce unobservable entities.

Well, your statement “only matter exists” (OP) seems “unobservable,” therefore metaphysical."

Yes, it’s a theoretical construct that necessarily assumes an unprovable foundation. I’ll try to unpack this aspect in its entirety: metaphysics doesn’t seem completely eliminated, but it can be minimized. And I’ve noticed that it lurks even in areas that apparently should be free of it (think of string theory).

@Delirium

“Is everything matter? This is a metaphysical statement, or rather, an ontological statement. What you want to do, as I understand it, is propose a sort of parsimonious vision, erasing existing metaphysical distinctions, such as matter-space-time. For example, in your system, time is reduced to a change in matter, and space is an extension of matter. A radical metaphysical monism: everything is matter or reducible to a property of matter.

Why not hypothesize entities like temporal particles and spatial particles? I find the idea of ​​particles rather materialistic.

Finally, what is the purpose of all this? What motivates your project?”

Yes, but as I may have already written, I deny any equivalence between all ontologies.

Exactly, a “parsimonious vision,” which can also be explained as the search for and elimination of superfluous metaphysics.

No specific purpose; it’s a framework that emerged from combining various reflections. At a certain point, I realized that everything could be connected, and I enjoy discussing it.

In this regard (and here I want to be as respectful as possible of the Forum, its users, its administrators and managers, and the common rules), I’ve created a mini-site that I’d like to link, containing the complete framework. I’m therefore asking the administration if I can do so so that anyone interested can read it at their own pace and, whenever they wish, give me feedback here.

I’d point out that I’d do this only for convenience (it’s like something written, accessible), without having to translate a lot of material, even with the translators’ character limits. On the minisite, it would be enough to use the “translate page” function that Google provides.

I have a blog where I write about philosophy and current affairs, but I don’t intend to advertise it, and I have no interest in increasing traffic (which is nonexistent and I don’t care) to the site. I now use the blog as a personal diary. When I want to interact with my content, I post it on my social media and I can discuss it. But thinking that people would flock to a small blog these days is anachronistic and not my goal.

These reflections were scattered throughout the blog among many other things, but then I wanted to put them together because I connected everything. This is to make it clear that this isn’t a “hidden” interest. I don’t have traffic, I don’t advertise, I’m not interested in any of that. It’s just practical, and I’m not asking for interactions “over there.” Any observations should be made here and here, and only here would they be discussed. At the bottom of the minisite page, there’s a section called “Main Criticisms,” which is under construction. And I would build it thanks to your valuable contributions.

That’s the goal. Have a good weekend everyone.

I had a lecturer, who used to compare positivism - which says that metaphysics is nonsensical - to the mythical Uroboros, the snake that consumes itself.

‘The hardest part,’ he would say, ‘is the last bite.’

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Yes, it’s “the last bite” for me, space turns out to be. However, it can be understood as a work of conceptual hygiene, an attempt to compress metaphysics to the bare minimum.

If space is an extension of matter, then does it mean space and matter are the same entity? It sounds incorrect from the fact that space pre-exits any matter, not they come to existence at the same time.

Another point is, extension cannot pre-exist what it is extended from.

You touch on my critical point. In my article on dynamic time, I showed how time is not an autonomous entity, but a description of the change of matter. But just when I thought I’d closed the circle, a fragility reappears, right here. To avoid external nothingness, I argued that space is infinite and eternal, posing it as the ontological condition for the unfolding of matter. Self-critically, I noted that this statement risks surreptitiously reintroducing what I seek to eliminate: a metaphysical foundation. I wondered, in fact, whether introducing a fundamental and primary, non-derivative, and eternal space this doesn’t mean introducing yet another structural principle that plays precisely the role I’m rejecting elsewhere. It’s a question that intellectual honesty demands, and one I take seriously. Because if space is something distinct from matter, my materialism would reveal a dualism (and this seems consistent with my idea of a space-material paradigm). If, on the other hand, space is a relational property of matter itself, then it isn’t a foundation but a descriptive modality, which, however, would leave open some significant questions. One thing, however, is clear to me: space cannot become a rug under which to hide metaphysics. That’s not my intent. The original point certainly remains, namely that nothingness must be excluded from the existential paradigm. As I wrote, there is no conceptual counterpart that can provide a correct idealization of it, and my own “what is not” is fallacious. Nothingness is not a self-sufficient philosophical entity, so we need only acknowledge what is: 1. Existing things “are.” 2. Material dynamism “is.” 3. Nothingness is not. And if I still have a metaphysical residue to clarify in the status of space, evidently greater rigor is needed, which I have not yet managed to develop. In any case, I believe that philosophy does not consist in introducing superfluous conceptual complications because, sometimes, it is sufficient to recognize that a problem arises from the improper use of language, and in this sense, the concept of nothingness is a textbook case.

Excellent point.

Folks like Heidegger, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein would consider that statement about nothingness to rest on a big, fat metaphysical assumption.

What is called the grounding question of metaphysics would then have to be understood and asked in terms of fundamental ontology as the question that comes out of the ground of metaphysics and as the question about this ground.

But if we grant this lecture that in the end it thinks in the direction of its own distinctive concern, how then are we to understand this question? The question is: Why are there beings at all, and not rather Nothing? Granted that we do not remain within metaphysics to ask metaphysically in the customary manner, but that we recall the truth of Being out of the essence and truth of metaphysics, then this might be asked as well: How does it come about that beings take precedence everywhere and lay claim to every “is,” while that which is not a being - namely, the Nothing thus understood as Being itself- remains forgotten? How does it come about that with Being It is really nothing and that the Nothing does not properly prevail?

Is it perhaps from this that the as yet unshaken presumption has entered all metaphysics that an understanding of “Being” may simply be taken for granted and that the Nothing can therefore be dealt with more easily than beings? That is indeed the situation regarding Being and Nothing. If it were different, then Leibniz could not have said in the same place by way of an explanation: “For the nothing is simpler and easier than any thing.” What is more enigmatic: that beings are, or that Being “is”? Or does even this reflection fail to bring us close to that enigma which has occurred with the Being or beings? (Heidegger, Introduction to What is Metaphysics 1949).

Nothingness is space. It is the precondition for existence. It predates all existence, and what validates nothingness which separates matter from nonmatter. Without space, no matter can exist. Without nothingness, there is no thing.

My position on nothingness is clear: nothingness is a false argument.

Nothingness is merely an idealization and can only exist as a concept within our minds, since its existence outside of a mental state would invalidate reality itself.

What I say is derived from the very definition of nothingness, which I state as follows:

“Nothingness is the irreversible condition of a space that has never existed, that does not exist, and that will never exist, for a matter that has never existed, that does not exist, and that will never exist, assuming that creative interventions are excluded.”

This definition, which I have tried to convey as best I can, is inevitably imprecise and reveals an internal contradiction: nothingness, in order to be delineated, requires categories pertaining to being. It is therefore a concept that arises as a dependent reflection of speculation on “what is,” but which does not enjoy, nor can enjoy, autonomy. Its inconsistency, therefore, is given by its factual non-existence and its denial lies in the evidence of the existent. Existence is existent-extended and fills reality in all directions and across all dimensions: there cannot be, within existence, “portions of nothingness.” If nothingness existed, it would necessarily have to be extended, immutable, and constant non-existence. That is, something.

This also explains the error of considering nothingness as an entity.

From my perspective, Parmenides, in defining Being, made a “logical leap” that I cannot agree with, being, for me, a completely arbitrary conclusion.

Why does “perfect Being,” devoid of determinants and of which nothing else can be said “except that it is,” necessarily translate into its opposite, the concept of nothingness?

It is clear to me that we are faced with a philosophical choice that is not based on any logical matrix.

Parmenides, therefore, intellectually hardened his position, reaching entirely unpredictable conclusions, because they were in complete contradiction to the argument and, therefore, with paradoxical results: perfect Being would coincide with Non-Being, and this seems to me sufficient evidence to reject his perspective. I consider it sufficient because the concepts of Being and Non-Being are all-encompassing and necessarily in opposition. This is factual. There is no “abstract entity Being” to which we can apply attributes and qualifications: if it coincides with everything, and if it did not, we would not be here questioning ourselves, and it is precisely in this unavoidable and catastrophic dichotomy that the fallacy of the nothing argument lies.

Instead, as Heraclitus clearly understood, becoming is the substance of Being.

But if becoming is the foundation of Being, then constant immutability is the essential prerequisite of the nullific state: nothingness simply is not, on the condition that it has never been and can never be.

Nothingness therefore remains only a concept that can undoubtedly be pondered as a self-serving pastime, but which by definition falls outside of what can be understood as a philosophical entity with specific attributes. There is no substance to an argument in the strict sense, but only the production of self-referential reasoning (I do not dispute that this can be a gratifying activity).

What exists, therefore, either “is” or “is not.” Since what exists “is,” it instantly identifies “everything that is,” rendering, just as instantly, idle and completely useless any reasoning that would aim to identify “what is not.” On the other hand, it is not possible to qualify a concept that, by definition, cannot be attributed and to which reference is uncertain: my very “what is not” is fallacious and leads us down arduous paths. Nothingness as a concept must simply be excluded from the existential paradigm, since there is no conceptual counterpart that can provide a correct idealization, not even by approximation.

I consider it a clear philosophical error to consider nothingness as an entity (the first contradiction in terms), attempting to qualify it through attributes and thus failing to take into account its peculiarity, which lies, as noted, in the intrinsic fallacy of the argument that arises as a dependent reflection of speculation on “what is,” but which does not (cannot) enjoy any autonomy as a concept in its own right. Therefore, outside the existential paradigm, nothingness would be the extended, immutable, and constant non-existence, but in any case, it could never exist as a self-sufficient argument, not even outside the existential model, because:

  • Either nothingness would be in the extended sense (and here the discussion is fully exhausted in this statement, which makes any clarification superfluous);

  • Or everything exists, and the argument is consequently fallacious.

At this point, Leibniz’s question is poorly posed: asking, in fact, “Why is there something rather than nothing?” presupposes that nothingness is a valid alternative to existence. It therefore presupposes an ontology of nothingness (a second contradiction in terms). But if nothingness cannot be conceptualized even approximately, then it is not a concrete term of comparison. The question, however philosophically tantalizing, is only linguistically so, but it remains fundamentally inappropriate, being a mere empty placeholder.

At this point, a further question arises: if nothingness does not exist, what is there “outside” the universe?

And what was there “before”? The answer is consistent with what we observed about the concept of nothingness:

there is no “outside” and no “before” in the “nullifying” sense.

The “outside” presupposes an external space, and the “before” presupposes an external time; But space and time are not metaphysical containers, being instead modalities of material dynamism. In my article on dynamic time, I had indeed shown how time is not an autonomous entity, but a description of the change of matter.

Finally, on the metaphysical aspect, I’m beginning to think that not everything that is ground is metaphysical. A ground can be that which exists and does not derive from anything else, without thereby introducing entities or properties beyond what is necessary. I see no reason to attribute a limit or an observable origin to space, which is why I assume it to be unlimited and not derived.

But that would already be something.

The philosophers I mentioned take nothingness not as a pure void, but as a fecund absence which co-defines presence. For instance, Karen Barad engages Heidegger’s famous question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” but flips its terms. For Heidegger, “the nothing” has a kind of ontological significance; it “nothings.” Barad agrees that nothingness is not mere absence, but she rejects the framing of “something vs. nothing” as a binary. That distinction, for her, is already too classical, too committed to separable entities.

Instead, she suggests that “no-thingness” is the condition of possibility for “things,” but not as a prior ground. It is not before being; it is entangled with it. There is no clean separation between something and nothing, only ongoing processes of differentiation.

For Barad, “nothing” is not an empty void but an active, indeterminate, materially real “no-thingness” that is inseparable from the becoming of the world. It is not the absence of being but one of the ways being is dynamically constituted. “nothingness” is not absence but a kind of indeterminacy that is constitutive of being. The “void” is not outside being; it is part of how being happens. Or more precisely, it is the ongoing openness, the “no-thingness,” through which determinate things emerge. Is that consistent with your view?

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I’d say no. I also don’t understand nothingness as absolute emptiness either, because the very concept of “emptiness” seems to me to presuppose a space or some form of being. Contrary to what you’ve shown me, for me, being and nothingness remain an unavoidable dichotomy, and I don’t think of nothingness as something active and/or a constitutive condition of being. This is why I tend to exclude it from the ontological framework, and I certainly wouldn’t exclude it if I too understood it as “a fruitful absence.” Instead, I exclude it because I understand it as “non-being” in a radical, extreme sense, which in no way enters into the constitution of reality. It’s just a conceptualization. I mean, in my opinion, approaches like the one you’ve presented, by Barad, blur the distinction between being and non-being, but this is for me a strong distinction, which I consider fundamental.