**Clarifying the Concepts of Knowledge**

Good question, and yes, different branches of philosophy can use these words with different emphases.

For example, truth may be discussed in logic, metaphysics, philosophy of language, and epistemology, but not always with the same focus. A logician may be interested in truth-preservation. A metaphysician may ask what truth depends on. A philosopher of language may ask how sentences or propositions get their meaning and truth-conditions. An epistemologist asks how truth connects with belief, justification, evidence, and knowledge.

So I’m not claiming that these words have one single use across all of philosophy. The thread is mainly epistemological, because the larger topic is knowledge. But I’m beginning with familiar ordinary uses because those are often the uses we carry into philosophical argument without noticing when the context has shifted.

On the descriptive versus normative point, I’d put it this way. The project is mostly descriptive in that I’m trying to clarify how these concepts function. But it has a normative edge because once a distinction is made, it matters whether an argument respects it.

For example, if someone uses certainty to mean subjective conviction in one sentence, and then treats that as epistemic security in the next, that isn’t just a different use. It’s a confusion if the shift is doing argumentative work. Or if someone treats a sincere belief as though sincerity by itself makes it knowledge, then the distinction between belief and knowledge matters.

So I’m not trying to legislate definitions from above. But I’m also not merely listing uses as though all shifts are harmless. Some shifts are harmless in ordinary conversation. Others create confusion in philosophical argument.

That’s the balance I’m aiming for. I’m trying to describe important uses clearly enough that we can see when one concept is being mistaken for another. Since this thread is about knowledge, the uses I’m focusing on are the ones most relevant to epistemology, viz., fact, truth, belief, justification, evidence, understanding, certainty, doubt, proof, error, and defeaters.

I agree that it disrupts the flow of your presentation and is personal. It was not meant to be an offensive insinuation. That would be worthy of being reported. And my posts removed.

My question was to clarify your position. Your world view. I felt it had relevance to the concepts under consideration.

From your reply, it seems that your religious position is that you have none. Or it is not what it was. I apologise if I made a wrong assumption based on your book Dedication in Nov, 2025.

I will leave this part of the discussion to prevent further distraction.
If there is anything further then PM is probably the better option.

No problem, we’ll just move on.

And yet you have not provided the context. Knowledge of what?

You appeal to ordinary language, but attempt to correct what is ordinary said. It is not uncommon to use fact and true interchangeably without confusion or misunderstanding.

Here too you stipulate something that has more to do with what you require of philosophical language than with the way terms are ordinarily used. There is no right way in which belief is connected to truth, despite what you might claim and believe to be true.

Justification is also a problematic concept. Ordinarily it can be used to defend a claim or action that is problematic. More to the point,justification does not mark the difference between truth and belief because a justification may be persuasive but spurious. Conversely, without relevant evaluative knowledge the account used as justication may seem like nonsense.

Post 5, Evidence

In post 4 I discussed justification. A belief can be sincerely held, confidently stated, or even true, and still lack justification. Justification concerns whether the belief has the right kind of support, whether it’s connected to truth in a responsible way.

That brings us to evidence.

Evidence is support for a claim. It’s what counts in favor of something being true. If I see dark clouds, that may be evidence that rain is coming. If I hear a window break and then see glass on the floor, that may be evidence that something struck the window. If several independent measurements give the same result, that may be evidence that the result is accurate.

But evidence isn’t the same as truth. A claim may be true even when we lack evidence for it. There may be a coin under the couch, even if no one has looked. And a claim may have evidence in its favor and still turn out to be false. Evidence points toward truth, but it doesn’t guarantee truth.

Evidence also isn’t the same as belief. I may believe something strongly, but the strength of my belief isn’t evidence that the belief is true. This is especially important because subjective certainty, i.e., strong conviction, can feel like evidence from the inside. But feeling certain isn’t the same as having evidence. A person can be subjectively certain and still be mistaken.

Also, evidence isn’t the same as proof, at least not always. Evidence can support a claim without settling it. The wet sidewalk may be evidence that it rained, but it may also be explained by a sprinkler, a hose, or someone washing the pavement. So the evidence has some weight, but not enough by itself to settle every case.

This is why we need to think about the strength of evidence. Evidence can be weak, moderate, or strong. Weak evidence gives only weak support. Stronger evidence makes the claim harder to dismiss, especially when it converges with other independent lines of support. In some cases, one piece of evidence may not be enough, but several pieces together may make the claim much more secure.

There is also the question of relevance. Not everything offered in defense of a belief is evidence for that belief. A claim may be emotionally important, personally meaningful, widely repeated, or attached to an impressive name, but none of that by itself makes it evidence. To function as evidence, it has to bear on whether the claim is true.

For example, suppose someone says, “I believe the meeting is at 3 p.m.” The calendar invitation may be evidence. A confirming email may be evidence. A message from the organizer may be evidence. But the mere fact that the person badly wants the meeting to be at 3 p.m. isn’t evidence. It may explain the belief, but it doesn’t support the claim.

Evidence also has to be considered with possible defeaters in view. A piece of evidence may support a claim until further information weakens it. A witness may seem reliable until we learn that the lighting was poor, or that the witness was too far away, or that there’s a recording showing something else. Evidence doesn’t function in isolation. It belongs within a wider setting of checks, background assumptions, and possible corrections.

This matters because people sometimes treat any evidence as though it were decisive evidence. But “there is evidence for this” doesn’t yet tell us whether the claim has been proven, or in what sense of proof. In a loose inductive sense, evidence may be strong enough to establish a claim for practical or epistemic purposes. In a stricter deductive sense, proof requires that the conclusion follow necessarily from the premises. Those are different standards.

So evidence is best understood, at least for present purposes, as support that bears on the truth of a claim. It may be weak or strong, direct or indirect, defeated or undefeated, sufficient or insufficient. What matters is not merely that something has been offered in favor of a belief, but whether it genuinely supports the belief and how strongly it supports that belief.

This brings us naturally to understanding. Evidence can be present, but misunderstood. Someone may repeat the right evidence, cite the right source, or give the right formula, and still not grasp what the evidence shows. So if evidence is to contribute to justification, it has to be understood in relation to the claim. We need to see not only that evidence has been offered, but how it bears on what is being claimed.

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I don’t know how we could deal with

  1. Credo quia absurdum
  2. Certum est quia impossibile
    ~ Tertullian
  3. I know that I know nothing
    ~ Socrates
  4. I non intelligo
    ~ Pyrrhonism
  5. Gödel’s incompleteness theorems
  6. Knowledge is nisphalam (futile) and bahudosavat (disadvantageous)
    ~ Sanjaya Belathiputta
  7. Problem of the criterion
  8. Gettier problems

??

:melting_face:

Interesting issue: Knowing how to deal with short philosophical phrases in English, Latin or any other language or translation/interpretation.
Why are they something to be ‘dealt with’? Do they confuse in the project of clarifying concepts of knowledge?

Perhaps, ask how important it is to you. What matters?
If unknown, then gain information of the context and the intended meaning. And so on — follow the process of evaluation to include both theory and practical implications…

Throwing away some thoughts. Soon, I will be even more thoughtless…

I provided a list of known problems in epistemology. You’re free to choose one and open a discussion on it, in this thread if the OP is ok with it or in another separate thread if you feel like it.

The OP wishes to shift gears/switch to another topic. I’m ok with that but he simply decided to “move on” from some hard questions put to him. That’s also fine.

Do any of the entries (1 through 8) resonate with you? The first 2 are rather obscure and more often ridiculed than given serious consideration. 3 is the classic Socratic paradox. 4 is one of Pyrrho’s responses to dogma, 5 is also quite well-known, utilizes the liar to construct a sentence that scuttled Hilbert’s program, 6 is Indian (radical) skepticism, 7 is a chicken-and-egg problem in epistemology, 8 was just Edmund Gettier submitting an essay/article as a course requirement but turned out to be major discovery.

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I think every human is differently exposed to meanings of words which some might make sense to and some dont this is one aspect of human qualities according to it also, fights, debates , lies , evil or good imprints its meaning in everyday human life. Removing nonsensical words from sentences , is according to yours perspective not the other human being , it just rolls out in thr category of perspectives i believe.

Grateful for further explanation of your post, along with the invitation.
Right now, I am not inclined to start another discussion but will follow any other with interest. Definitely not in this thread.

  1. Socrates always resonates with me. However, I think this has probably been done to death.
  2. Indian (radical) scepticism is new to me; it sounds intriguing.

Having said that, I am open to read others. Perhaps I should explore more and not follow my usual attractions.

There are historical facts, scientific facts, but there are not mathematical facts.

Facts are grounded in empiricism.
Truths are grounded in rigid finite structures.

Knowledge is the thing that appears to try and tie these things together; wrongly or rightly, yet justifiably.

I don’t think your list shows that my project is in trouble.

Each item would have to be dealt with on its own terms. Tertullian, Socratic humility, Pyrrhonism, Godel, Sanjaya, the problem of the criterion, and Gettier don’t all challenge knowledge in the same way. Some are about faith or paradox. Some about intellectual humility. Some about the suspension of judgment. Some about the limits of formal systems. Some about criteria for knowledge. And others about whether justified true belief is sufficient.

That’s precisely why I think conceptual clarification matters.

For example, Socratic humility isn’t the same thing as skepticism. Pyrrhonian suspension of judgment isn’t the same thing as saying knowledge is impossible. Godel’s incompleteness theorems concern formal systems, not ordinary epistemic practices directly. The problem of the criterion raises a genuine question about how we identify knowledge and criteria for knowledge. Gettier raises questions about whether justification, as usually understood, is strong enough to rule out accidental truth.

So yes, these are important issues. But they don’t remove the need to clarify truth, belief, justification, evidence, certainty, doubt, proof, understanding, error, and knowledge. They presuppose those concepts. If we bring in Gettier before clarifying justification, or Pyrrhonism before clarifying doubt, or Godel before clarifying proof and system, the discussion will likely become less clear, not more.

My answer is that these problems should be handled later, and separately. The present thread is laying the groundwork. Once the concepts are clearer, we’ll be in a better position to ask what each of these challenges actually shows.

I agree that people come to words with different backgrounds, experiences, and associations. That’s one reason philosophical discussion can be difficult. A word may carry one set of associations for one person and a different set for someone else.

But I don’t think that makes meaning merely a matter of individual perspective. If meaning were only private perspective, then communication would be almost impossible. We wouldn’t be able to correct misunderstandings, ask what someone meant, distinguish one use of a word from another, or say that someone had confused two concepts.

The point of this thread isn’t to remove words just because they don’t fit my perspective. The point is to ask how words function in a particular context. For example, if someone uses certainty to mean strong personal conviction in one place, and then uses it to mean epistemic security in another, we need to notice the shift. That isn’t just my private preference. It affects the argument.

So I agree that words come with human histories, emotional force, and different associations. But in philosophical discussion, we still need standards of clarity. We need to ask what claim is being made, how the words are being used, and whether the argument depends on shifting from one meaning to another without noticing it.

Since most of it is AI-generated, I’m closing this topic.

Yet i suspect there’s not much one can do of other perspectives untill and unless they are some in way similar to you, and you can guess that here now destiny philosophy is running smoothly as others are not exposed to meanings that are not from their destinies and still one can’t do anything about it.

It seems open now. Have you changed your mind? What happened?

I use AI for editing. However, most of my ideas have been generated over years of study and writing. AI has a difficult time generating this type of reasoning without obvious errors. This isn’t anything new I’ve said this before.

Then why accept the editing? What is the purpose of editing — to achieve a certain style e.g. authoritative? What is it that you change and why?

Edited to add:

Perhaps not new to you but if you keep encountering the same problem of mis-identification as AI, then what is the best solution?

The purpose of editing is the same purpose used when writing books. You think books aren’t edited for better writing and clarity?