I approach this question from a Heideggerian perspective. One’s existence is in an always already existing world. There is no existence in the absence of world. There is no world in the absence of existence. Existence is relational through and through.
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But the world and being in the world are alienated each other. World is silent and cold, the being is lost in the world. The being dies alone in the end, the world keeps remain silent.
Their relation is temporary, contingent, uncertain, unexplainable, clueless and irrational.
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From the point of the being, the world is an object appearing in the being’s mind. Therefore the world is, A world-in-the-Being.
When the being dies, the world goes into total blank, the eternal blank state before the being came to the world.
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I never said it was an ideal relationship. That one (hereafter Dasein) is always attuned in some way to the world does not render constant any particular attunement to the world. Instead, the constant is that Dasein is always attuned to the world in some way. There is no existence separate from the world. There is no world separate from existence. Existence is relational through and through.
It doesn’t sound like neutral monism to me, since experience is ineliminably multifarious. More suited to pluralism. Regarding pluralistic ontology you might perhaps find Justus Buchler interesting.
When it comes to being-in-the-world, the “world” as an “object” “appearing” to Dasein is one of the less useful understandings of the term “world.”
But I suspect you already know that.
Possibly. But I don’t do onto-theology.
I prefer pluralism and would rather read James that way.
Is it not rather, no relationship at all? Heidegger seems to suggest so. We had been all thrown to the world with no explanation or reason.
Being is in the world, but the world doesn’t reveal its secrets. Being knows that the only relationship between the silent world is alienation, and being’s the brief and temporary existence in the world. Hence the relation is meaningless. That’s what the existentialists claim. No?
It was just an inferred state of the aftermath of being’s death.
Dasein is the being whose being is a concern for it. Nothing, including being “thrown to the world with no explanation or reason”, will relieve Dasein of that concern.
Indeed, Dasein’s concern for its being-in-the-world may be the primary reason Dasein necessarily relates to entities within the world. Dasein is inseparable from world. The world is inseparable from Dasein. Existence is relational through and through.
I do not know “what the existentialists claim.” Instead, “I approach this question from a Heideggerian perspective”. Dasein in its average everydayness is relating to entities within the world on a regular and ongoing basis no matter “what the existentialists claim.” Existence is relational through and through.
I implied no such state upon the demise of Dasein.
Anyway, I appreciate all of your replies. Take care.
That statement seems to be telling Dasein and the world is one entity, which kills possibility of all relation between the two. If A and B are one entity, then any relation between A and B disappears.
Relation only arises when A and B are different, but when A and B are looked under some other point of view such as master and slave or cause and effect.
If you claim that Dasein and the world are in some relationship, then you need to clarify what relationship are they in, and how they interact or co-exist together, or is it in physical or metaphysical way or whatever, we do need elaboration on the detail of the relationship.
If you say they are one, then there is no room for any relationship.
My take on Heidegger’s “dasein” is that it’s an update of Leibniz’s “monad.” What some might call your “stream of experience” is just an “aspect” or “face” of the world itself. So it is a “torrent of naked reality” but “from a point of view.”
In this vision/conception, each “existence” is a “face” of a world that has no “true” or “final” face. The movie Rashomon and the novel As I Lay Dying illustrate this structure. The viewer/reader isn’t given in either work an “official version” of what “really happened.” Yet the “situated torrents” are entangled, involve the same objects from different points of view.
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Dasein and world: inseparable but not identical — and not identical in the sense of identicality either. The binding is possible because of the distinction.
From a perspective side, the world has no true or final face.
But some things keep coming with consistency, from different positions, and that is where care comes into life as something which includes attention to what makes openness possible—not just demanding it.
The entanglement you point at is what keeps faces together, by what are all faces of, including the hard ones.
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Depends if you think “dasein” refers the empirical subject. For me it’s the “presence” or “being” of their entanglement.
I also take Plato’s “ideas” as a pointing at this “glue.”
Dasein, “Being-in-the-world” whose structure includes its own situation. Not faceless, not a subject, but with a “risky” empirical attitude.