Can “existence” be thought without relations?

[Sahin]

I understand the concern regarding the limits of conceptual systems, especially in thinkers such as Wittgenstein or Heidegger, or in traditions which emphasise silence before what exceeds discursive articulation. But I am not convinced that this therefore entails abandoning systematic philosophy altogether.

For even the recognition of conceptual limitation, ineffability, or the withdrawal of Being still appears to occur through intelligible structures of judgment, distinction, inference, and relation. In that sense, critique itself seems unable to entirely escape the conditions of rational intelligibility it questions.

At the same time, I recognise that we are still articulating all of this through human cognition itself. But perhaps transcendental inquiry does not attempt to step outside cognition altogether. Rather, it asks what structures already appear unavoidable within the very possibility of intelligible thought, judgment, or questioning as such.

The deeper difficulty, then, may not simply concern whether transcendental structure is dependent upon cognition or independent from it, but whether the recognition of such structure is ever possible without already being mediated through cognition itself.

Yet even this recognition still seems to presuppose determinate intelligibility through relation, distinction, and inferential structure. And for that reason, I am not sure systematic philosophy is merely optional. Without some attempt at coherent structural integration, thought risks collapsing into fragmentation, arbitrariness, or isolated intuition lacking justificatory unity.

So perhaps the issue is not whether systematic philosophy should be abandoned, but whether it can become sufficiently reflexive to account for its own conditions and limits without undermining the intelligibility of critique itself.

[Corvus]

@Sahin

One difficulty here may be that the question of existence cannot easily be separated from the conditions under which anything becomes intelligible as existing at all.

Simple apprehension requires only the object you perceive with your sense organ. The apprehension itself confirms the existence of the object.

[Sahin]

My hesitation would be that apprehension alone does not yet seem sufficient to explain how existence becomes determinate as the existence of a particular being.

For to identify something as an object already appears to involve distinction, identity, differentiation, and relation. Otherwise one could perhaps speak only of undifferentiated experiential givenness, rather than a determinate being recognised as this rather than that. For even existence seems to require some identifiable structure of being.

In that sense, apprehension itself does not appear free from intelligibility structure, but already presupposes determination through relation and distinction in order for a being to become intelligible as a specific being at all.

[Corvus]

@Sahin

My hesitation would be that apprehension alone does not yet seem sufficient to explain how existence becomes determinate as the existence of a particular being.

The apprehended existence doesn’t require to be a particular being. What you saw with your eyes will leave you image in your mind, which is sufficient confirmation for the existence.

[Corvus]

@Sahin

For to identify something as an object already appears to involve distinction, identity, differentiation, and relation.

Existence itself doesn’t require identity or any relation to it. The visual image of the existence is sufficient for the existence existing.

[Sahin]

My difficulty is that the very notion of a “visual image” already appears to presuppose intelligible determination.

For if there were no identity, distinction, or differentiable structure whatsoever, it becomes unclear how anything could ever become apprehensible as an image, object, or existent in the first place. Even the recognition of “what was seen” seems to require some identifiable relation through which the apprehended content becomes intelligible as this rather than that.

So I am not convinced that existence can be separated from determination altogether, since apprehension itself already appears to presuppose intelligible identity and distinction. Otherwise, you would be unable to ascribe anything as a visual image.

[Corvus]

@Sahin

For if there were no identity, distinction, or differentiable structure whatsoever, it becomes unclear how anything could ever become apprehensible as an image, object, or existent in the first place.

I see a tree. I don’t know what tree it is. But my seeing the tree confirms there is a tree. It is not violating the existence of the tree in any possible way.

If I want to find out what tree it is, then I will have to find out all the shapes of leaves and colour of the barks and flowers etc. That is surplus activities.

It doesn’t add anything for the existence of the tree. Because the tree is confirmed as existing already by my visual experience of it standing there.

[Sahin]

I do not mean that one must possess exhaustive conceptual knowledge of a being in order for it to exist.

My point is rather that even the apprehension “there is a tree” already appears to presuppose minimal intelligible determination: distinction from background, unity, objecthood, identity, and relation between perceiver and perceived.

Otherwise it becomes unclear how anything could become apprehensible as a tree — or even as an existent at all — rather than as undifferentiated sensory immediacy.

So the issue for me is not exhaustive classification, but the more fundamental conditions under which anything becomes intelligible as a determinate being whatsoever. Yes, classification does not add anything to the tree existing, but what presupposes you knowing it is a tree at all requires intelligible determination.

[Corvus]

@Sahin

My point is rather that even the apprehension “there is a tree” already appears to presuppose minimal intelligible determination: distinction from background, unity, objecthood, identity, and relation between perceiver and perceived.

All those points are not directly necessary elements for the existence of tree. You can confirm the existence of tree without knowing any of those elements just by seeing the tree.

You don’t need to worry about anything other than the tree when seeing the tree, and confirm the existence of the tree by saying “I see a tree”.

[Sahin]

But the moment you say “I see a tree,” some minimal intelligible structure already seems present implicitly.

For there is already:

• a distinction between the tree and its background,
• a unity through which it appears as one object,
• an identity through which it is apprehended as “a tree” rather than undifferentiated sensation,
• and a relation between the perceiver and what is perceived.

I do not mean that one must consciously analyse these structures before perception occurs. My point is that they already appear operative within the very possibility of perceiving anything as a determinate object at all.

[Corvus]

@Sahin

My point is that they already appear operative within the very possibility of perceiving anything as a determinate object at all.

Yes, they could be. My point is that they don’t need to be called upon for the tree to exist or perceived to exist.

[Sahin]

Oh yes, I never denied that. But just because this relational determinacy does not need to be called upon, it does not mean that a ‘tree’ does not still structurally presuppose these intelligible structures altogether. They are still conditions of apprehension itself.

For example, one can speak grammatically without consciously thinking about grammar, yet grammar still remains operative within the possibility of intelligible speech

[Corvus]

@Sahin

For example, one can speak grammatically without consciously thinking about grammar, yet grammar still remains operative within the possibility of intelligible speech

We perfectly understand well, when one says “night” for meaning wishing you a good night and good sleep, “morning” for meaning it is a good morning, and wishing you a good morning and good day.

Soldiers in the battlefield will perfectly understand well what to do, when the commander shouts “Fire”. The driver will know what to do when told “drive!” The race runners will know what to do when told “run!”

You know exactly what your wife wants from you when she tells you “salt” at the breakfast table etc etc.

You don’t need the full grammatical sentences to be able to know what to do, and what exists in front of you.

[Banno]

@j_j

Above he suggests ( reasonably ) both the “public” concept of red, which is something like the equivalence class of things that “one calls red” and the “private” concept of red, which is what things that I call “red” have in common “qualitatively.”

My reading of the subsequent remarks is quite at odds with that. The stuff leading up to

279. Imagine someone saying, “But I know how tall I am!” and laying his hand on top of his head to indicate it!

That is what a “private sensation” amounts to. He is rejecting a place for your “private” red in our discourse.

[Jin]

@Corvus

You don’t need to worry about anything other than the tree when seeing the tree, and confirm the existence of the tree by saying “I see a tree”.

I also think it’s important to simply see a tree as a tree.

Nāgārjuna had the idea of “conventional truth,” and I feel that’s something important not to forget. Even if philosophy leads us toward emptiness or relationality, we still live in a world where trees are trees, people are people, and language still somehow works.

Not losing sight of that may itself be something important.

[Corvus]

@Jin

Not losing sight of that may itself be something important.

Agreed. From our own mind, things may look all intertwined. However from the point of view of the objects in the world, they all exist on their own with no idea or relation to anything.

If we think about it, existence is a word which gets born in our head whenever we speak or think about it.

The objects in the world has no idea what existence means. They don’t care what existence is.

[Andy]

@Jin

This may not come across very clearly, but I’ve been wondering whether it might be possible to describe dependent origination and emptiness across Western philosophy, physics, and mathematics — and perhaps even eventually move beyond them somehow (though I still have no clear image of what that would mean).

The author of this paper seems to be moving in a direction that might resonate with your aims:

Andrei Preece, Dependent Origination as the Universal Logic of Existence -...

[Jin]

Thanks, Andy! This looks really interesting. I’ll start reading it right away.

[j_j]

It may or may not have wings, but perhaps I’ll give this another go, via recap.

@Wittgenstein

Or is it like this: the word “red” means something known to everyone; and in addition, for each person, it means something known only to him?

What do or what can we mean by ‘red’ ? If you can only see what I call ‘red’ but not see that same thing through my eyes, the perhaps ‘red’ has no ‘private’ content ?

@Wittgenstein

It is as if when I uttered the word I cast a sidelong glance at the private sensation, as it were in order to say to myself: I know all right what I mean by it.

Wittgenstein drops the ball here. Theories of “internal patches of red” are beside the point.

He should have talked about ripe tomatoes.

@j_j

Does the tomato “show itself” to others as it does to me ? I can’t see it through their eyes, but we all call it “red.”

One can evade this issue, especially in its folksy tomato form. But it’s related to what “love” means to Harry that maybe it doesn’t mean to Sally. Not the “concept” love but a saying of it in a particular room at a particular time, as that saying is there for Sally and ( possibly differently) there for Harry.

[Corvus]

@Jin

Even if philosophy leads us toward emptiness or relationality, we still live in a world where trees are trees, people are people, and language still somehow works.

Yes, agreed. When you see a tree in the garden or a field, you make a statement. “There is a tree.” confirms the existence of the tree in your thought.

Anything else is in the category of the other mental operations such as judgements, analysis or reflection on the tree.

You don’t need the existence of the tree for that. You can do them with your own ideas on the tree.