Battlefield Technologies and the Citizen

Back to the Future? Parallels Between Modern Military Automation and the Stirrup

Today, we appear to be witnessing a seismic shift in the technologies of warfare, one on a level not seen in centuries. The integration of automated systems and AI into combat platforms is, at the very least, as consequential as the advent of aerial warfare. However, there is a strong argument to be made that it is already proving as consequential as the advent of gun powder and the stirrup.

In those prior two cases, changes in military technology radically altered society and the rights and roles of the citizenry for centuries.

With the stirrup, it became possible for small, elite cadres of professional soldiers to master much larger mass mobilized armies. The age of heavy infantry and the citizen soldier came to a close, and the (incredibly expensive, and trained from birth) mounted knight reigned over the battlefield for a millennium. This was a key factor in the shift towards feudalism and the rule of a (then hereditary) military elite. It wasn’t the only factor, but it is perhaps the defining one. The capabilities and needs of the heavily armored, professional knight shaped society for centuries.

Political Consequences: Rights Grow from the Barrel of a Gun?

With the advent of gun powder and small arms, mass mobilization was once again on the table. To win wars required mobilizing a large portion of the citizenry. This incentivized larger, centralized states. As military technology advanced, this also meant that economic development mobilization became crucial to winning wars. It was this sort of incentive that was the primary driving factor behind the expansion of universal compulsory education in the West (i.e., to form good conscripts and factory hands) for instance.

In this new environment, many historians argue that the citizens were able to win increased rights because they now held leverage over the survival of the political and economic elite. So too, economic liberalization (a path to economic growth) became a means of building military power. Indeed, in some cases, most notably China, liberalization was pursued explicitly in service to these sorts of ends.

However, what we’re seeing in today’s wars is more akin to the shifts the stirrup brought. Mass mobilization, the mass production of relatively simple tanks, bombers, etc., is no longer the rule of the day. Specialists are required to produce today’s technologies. New technologies also allow much smaller, expensively equipped professionals to dominate the battlefield. This tendency seems likely to increase dramatically as AI target recognition continues to get better for spotter drones, and automated artillery systems become the norm, allowing for extremely accurate and rapid fire missions. Artillery has long been the number one killer on the battlefield, and it is a sea change to be able to launch tiny spotters that let you place smart munitions directly onto even moving targets at a rapid pace.

In the battlefield environment that these technologies will create in the relatively near future, the style of war fighting that dominated from the Second World War through the Cold War will become as suicidal as line infantry assaults after the advent of the machine gun. If you don’t have a layered interception umbrella, ground forces are going to be picked apart. But this also means that wars will now center around extremely sophisticated, high tech equipment that is best operated by increasingly smaller cadres of career professionals.

What does this mean for the citizenry? Well, if the thesis that citizens tended to win rights by being essential for national and elite survival are correct, then perhaps nothing good. What happens when the average citizen is irrelevant to a nations’ military success, or when their economic output is increasingly irrelevant as well?

In The New Jim Crow, Michelle Alexander remarks that the problem for African Americans is no longer that the leadership class wants to exploit their labor, but that their labor has become increasingly irrelevant, so that, as a class, they become seen more as a problem to contain than as a constituency whose support needs to be fostered. That sort of relation could be more the “canary in the coal mine” for the age of automation.

As Gibbon remarked, the professionalization of Rome’s legions near the death of the Republic: “elevated war into an art, and degraded it into a trade.” Across all liberal democracies we have seen this same shift from citizen soldiers to professional warriors, and technology will only exacerbate this trend.

Internal Security: The Panopticon

Finally, one might turn to internal security. Here too, technology is changing things. New technologies of surveillance, best exemplified in China’s various minority repression campaigns—which now involve genotyping, facial recognition, near universal camera coverage in urban areas (true of the West as well), and the ability to comb through all this video and other signals intelligence with AI—all would seem to make organizing effective internal resistance increasingly difficult. That is, the same sort of relationship appears. A small, elite, technologically enabled force is able to effectively dominate internal security spaces as well.

There are, of course, potential upsides to this. Wars may kill far fewer people. Collateral damage can be reduced more effectively. Internal security technologies, and the ability to identify suspects, has many positive uses (just think of all the cold cases solved with DNA technology or ubiquitous camera coverage). It’s just that, given the current economic and political situation, it’s hard for me to envision these shifts largely resulting in positive outcomes.

Economic Similarities to the Middle Ages

Here, another similarity to feudalism emerges. In an automation economy, the primary source of income isn’t labor, but the ownership of capital. This tended to be true in the Middle Ages as well. There was a surplus of labor. Power flowed from the ownership of capital, and military power was downstream of this. Further, the heavy focus on natural monopolies in today’s markets means that deriving rents tends to define elite income more than production (e.g., Amazon is a great example).

Across the world’s liberal democracies, the labor share of income (the total amount attributable to working, versus income of capital investment) has been declining for over half a century straight. But automation will surely accelerate this, and so we may soon live in a world where most income comes from capital, not labor. In the US, it has plunged to about 50/50, which explains why the top 10% wealthiest households account for half of all consumer spending (and indeed, the top 10% also own 90% of equities).

It’s questionable then, how liberal values, already unmoored from their metaphysical and religious roots, survive in an economic and military (and so geo-political) environment that seems hostile to them.

Maybe another data point for Alasdair MacIntyre’s call for a new Saint Benedict, or something like Asimov’s Foundation.

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It seems like drone warfare might have an impact opposite to the one you’re describing. Suddenly inexpensive readily available weaponry has become the focus, making expensive weapon systems seem obsolescent.

I read that, in a recent NATO war game, Ukrainian drone forces consistently beat conventional warfare forces of the modern militaries.

It’s both. Drones make expensive legacy platforms like main battle tanks vastly less effective, particularly in their conventional roles. This also means that interception systems, SHORAD, and last ditch systems like trophy become essential for operating in a drone saturated environment. But the latter is expensive and technologically sophisticated, and also increasingly automated.

So yes, the new technologies render older ones obsolete. But that doesn’t mean that poorer countries or armed groups are going to be advantaged by this long term, or negate the way in which this tends to make mass mobilization less relevant.

Note that the number of soldiers employed in offensives in Ukraine are tiny compared to either World War. It is, in fact, not particularly helpful to mass men for breakthroughs in the way one might have in 1943, or even 1963 or 1983. The battlefield is too transparent and porous. But this also means that there is a premium on technology and skilled labor, and this will only accelerate as drones become more and more autonomous.

Actually, the heavy reliance of Ukraine and Russia on kamikaze drones is a display of both side’s limitations and the fact that the technology as a whole is in its infancy. Even now, there are ways to intercept those sorts of drones at quite high rates if you have the funding for the right kind of equipment. But long term, slow moving drones packed with explosives are probably not going to keep being that effective. They are necessarily easier to intercept or disabled with EW. By contrast, a spotter can be far smaller and stealthier, doesn’t need to get close, and can coordinate vollies of faster moving munitions that can overwhelm interception umbrellas.

At the same time, Ukraine and Russia are both peers, and largely operating with Soviet legacy militaries, so they probably aren’t the best example for a breech in parity.

Israel’s performance in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran is probably the better example for emerging asymmetries. In purely military terms, Israel’s losses in comparison to the scale of its operations were better than they have been since the 1980s intervention in Lebanon, or perhaps ever.

The situation now with Iran is perhaps misleading because the US desire to have an extremely high volume of commercial shipping flow throw through an extremely constricted waterway, without putting boots on the ground, tests the limits of any technological advantage. The situation here is maximally asymmetric in terms of geographic advantages. But in terms of an ability to hit targets in Iran without losing aircraft, US hardware seems to be performing vastly better than even the large gap that existed during the Gulf War. And in comparison to US aerial losses in Vietnam or Korea, it’s a totally different world. The problem for the Trump administration isn’t a lack of technological advantage, but massive strategic and planning failures.

So, the Iran situation is instructive on the limits of air power, but there also aren’t that many wars a party can win simply by shooting at civilian shipping that is stuck in a ‘fish in a barrel’ situation. That’s pretty unique. Having absolutely massive targets that cannot maneuver, that have no defensive capacities, no real damage control, and which are packed with flammable material is probably the optimum situation for using small drones, but also not something common to most conflicts.

But the goal is not to hit targets, it’s to destroy capabilities, and the US as I understand it has failed to do this so far. Iran’s ability to retaliate has not been effectively removed.

I will grant you know a lot more about this than I do, so I don’t really mean to be argumentative. I just have heard how technology will win quickly in every conflict I’ve lived through since the 1960s.

That makes sense. I didn’t mean to suggest new technologies ensure “victory.” Rather, they lead to wars being fought by small numbers of professionals.

For instance, Iran maintained a quite large conventional military, but it has been doing very little aside from being a target. It’s navy and conventional air force, but also its ground forces have mostly just absorbed strikes. It’s the much smaller set of air defense system operators and drone/missile system operators who have been doing all the combat operations. It’s the same thing on the US side, the air force and ground air defenses are the focus (obviously with supporting logistics).

But in a more wide ranging conflict, the asymmetry would be more obvious. You cannot move large numbers of ground forces to take and hold territory the same way.

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Sounds good. How about public bomb shelters? A lot of them were built here after WW2. Do you think they will be needed in the future?

I imagine a swarm of enemy drones flying around the block can prevent people to access or exit a shelter. Underground entrances might be a solution.

Excellent stuff, which gels with some of my own pessimistic musings about the future.

For instance, it became vivid for me at some point that the poor, as they begin to cost more than robots ( health care and education) , are not resources to be exploited but just the looming threat of revolution — from the POV of oligarchs and their lackeys, of course. The “wage slaves” are demoted to dormant revolutionaries, perhaps bought off with UBI and regimented doses of “soma.” Panoptically watched over for signs of badthink by the Department of Precrime, brought to you by Amazon.