Back-to-Basics: Making Sense of the Non-Sensible (Forms and their Behaviours)

Metaphysics & Epistemology
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Woohoo! My first ever post!

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I would like to begin by summarising my understanding of the relevant information in the texts that I think the majority of us started philosophizing with: the Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo. I think this is more for my own benefit than the reader, please feel free to skip to the second heading for the meat and potatoes. :saluting_face:

Note: I have italicized all terminologies in the first use but not there after. I thought this would be helpful, but I was too lazy to italicise all use cases. :sun_with_face:

Expository Section: The Theory of Forms, Forms, Reasons against the Soul of Attunement, and the Argument of Recollection

In the confusion of the sensible world nothing is fixed; thought can gain no foothold. Socrates stalwartly defends the claim that he knows nothing because he believes the way things actually are is very different from the way they appear to be. Regardless, we must still try to understand the world, and when we attempt to perceive our surroundings, we detect a nuance that surpasses the perceptible. This nuance is what Socrates calls the forms – an unchanging, abstract substance.

If the forms are not of this world, how is it we have come to know them? There must be some form of connection between the sensible and non-sensible world. For Socrates’ ideas to work transmigration is essential: our soul exists before and after death bringing with it knowledge of the forms. The soul is of the same nature as the forms: unchangingand abstract. Therefore, Socrates does not recognise the soul as attunement for we can reasonably analogise that a poorly tuned instrument would produce an inadequate melody; this would directly contradict the soul’s nature as an unchanging and complete substance.

Socrates posits that, regardless of the question, provided it is phrased well, we will always find the right answer – this is known as the argument of recollection. The right answer can be perceived through the senses because of our prior knowledge of the forms; perhaps rationality helps us here, too. However, Socrates makes an important distinction: we do not perceive the form itself, merely an imitation of the form (this is particularly important for my exploratory section). In other words, knowledge of the form comes to us by association from things that are both like and unlike it.

Exploratory Section: How do forms of an opposite nature behave within the same agent or physical object?

As we leave the expository section behind, my understanding begins to breaks down. I found myself asking whether it is possible to know how the forms behave? Socrates takes a few stabs in the dark, and they will be important for our discussion. I hope to show it is possible (I guess that also depends on whether l’ve understood the original text).

In following paragraphs, I hope to extract some clear statements to build a starting point for further discussion.

Despite belonging to the non-sensible world, the forms remain identifiable to us. This may be because forms are unable to divide or dissipate. It is my observation they leave behind a trace, pattern, or some consistency in the ways they exhibit themselves through their many imitations. The Aristotelian view of universals seems more helpful here, for universals exist in re (in things), thereby we can use the senses to know them. From these physical agents, actions, or objects in which the forms reside, we can discern some general information, such as where do we observe a particular form, to what purpose is it used, as well as where we do not observe it, and how it is not used. It seems evident to me the sensible world contains enough information to narrow down how forms behave. Let’s move onto the specific forms Socrates gives us the most information on and start narrowing down the options: aliveness/deadness contrasted with bigness/smallness.

Socrates makes some clear distinctions between aliveness and deadness that starkly contrast with bigness and smallness. Prior to drinking the hemlock provided by the jailer, Socrates is confident that his soul will exit his body. He describes this process as aliveness departing and deadness arriving. It seems absurd to say these two forms could co-exist within a single body, for they are strict opposites, or strict forms. By contrast, when discussing bigness and smallness, he is simultaneously big relative to Simmias and small relative to Phaedo; these are relational forms. It is therefore reasonable for us to conclude some forms entirely exclude their opposites whereas others do not. In other words, these forms have compatible/incompatible essences. This begs the question of the in-between: are there semi-compatible forms? What defines whether they are in a compatible/incompatible state? What forms can we observe that seem to be semi-compatible? How are they used? We can use the virtue of wisdom to begin exploring these questions.

When discussing the virtues needed for the good life, Socrates pays special attention to wisdom. He says that wisdom is a kind of currency for which virtues may be exchanged. Socrates state the other virtues, such as moderation (temperance), justice, and courage, are a sort of purification for the soul, whereas wisdom is what does the purifying. I struggle to think of an analogy for this mechanic. What is the distinction being made here? I wonder if anyone can help me below? I don’t believe l’ve fully grasped this because it suggests that forms themselves possess characteristics (moderation, justice, and courage is purifying). Wouldn’t that be covered by the form of purity? Regardless, what I can confidently say is that it gives us the precedent that forms are used in specific ways. Wisdom acts to purify, whereas the other three simply have purifying properties. This begs the question: What forms act to pollute? Are some forms a double-edged sword being being able to purify and pollute? If so, this suggests that forms act in many ways, consequently giving credence to our idea that some forms may be semi-compatible. Sheesh! Why not be flexible in their characteristics too?

From my ramblings, we have a humble list: Forms could be compatible, incompatible, and semi-compatible; Forms are used for specific purposes (which may vary); Forms have characteristics (which also may vary). This provides us some clear statements for further discussion on how forms behave.

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I am new to the forum, and I appreciate you taking the time to read my thoughts. I am a philosophy graduate who wants to rebuild my understanding of Western philosophy. I have tried my best not to write anachronistically here. I did not want to stray too far from the original text, and I wanted to engage with the original texts in their true spirit, as authentically as possible – I was so close to imagining being there with Socrates as he slammed back his final “immuno-booster” shot, haha.

I would really appreciate to see where you think I should look next. Do you have an interpretation that differs from mine? What relevant philosophical concepts have I missed? Perhaps there are some must-read texts for this discussion. I am sincerely grateful for any and all of your glorious comments.

Nothing but love here!

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We are not blank slates
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Greetings and welcome. An excellent first post. I don’t have much to say now as I’ve been lurking and posting all day, but I will make one observation, which is that caution is required in respect to the ‘non-sensible world’. Plato does indeed speak of a realm, the topos uranus, where the eidos are said to reside. But I think it has to be interpreted carefully - it is more like, in modern terminology, a domain such as the ‘domain of natural numbers’. It is not a world or place in any sense other than the allegorical. So the point of the forms or ideas is that they are ‘grasped by reason’ - the are perceived through the act of comprehension rather than by sensory impression. But I resist the idea of a ‘super sensible world’ or ‘ethereal place’ as I think it pushes the allegory of ‘domain’ in the wrong direction.

Not much to add apart from that, although I will say, I benefited from some of your intepretive suggestions, such as why the ‘argument from harmony’ fails, and the idea of the relativity of some kinds of form. Well said.

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Are you proposing a heterodox view of Platonic forms or are you simply regurgitating what you learned? There’s not much to forms, being abstractions. We have such things as form of a tree or a man or a shrimp.

I don’t know about how forms behave. They possess properties e.g. a circle will be such that all points on it are equidistant from another point, the center. :smiley:

Wisdom is, presently, undefined and though philosophy means love of wisdom, nobody knows what it is. The characteristics of prudentia, fortitudo, temperantia, iustitia you listed are correctly identified with wisdom.

Looks as though you’re looking for confirmation of your possibly long-held suspicions about reality. There’s nothing better than learning by doing (philosophy) and Plato’s theory of forms is right up there, among the first ideas you have to feather-in-your-cap.

Good luck on your journey.

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As I see it, the forms are very much “of” this world as everything that is (imperfectly) repeatable in it. My perception of my cat today is a perception of my cat because it is linked with other perceptions of “that same cat” by myself and others. Each perception is singular and fugitive, but the cat “is” the unity of possible and actual perceptions. Note that I use “perception” here to be understood, but I don’t believe that perceptions are “internal” or made of “mind stuff.”

To me, trasmigration is a mythical expression of enculturation. As a child, I “absorb” a way of enacting the unity of things like Tuesday. Or the king in Chess, which is not “localized” in any fixed form but only makes sense in terms of a larger structure. I read the soul that leaps from corpse to infant as “tribal software” or “the way we do things around here.” Philosophy “only remembering” is a preview of phenomenology or positivism, occupying itself with getting a grip on the already-assumed mundane and eschewing the speculative.

Have you given much thought to the unwritten doctrines ?

The One and the Indefinite Dyad are the ultimate ground of everything because the realm of Plato’s Forms and the totality of reality derive from their interaction. The whole manifold of sensory phenomena rests in the end on only two factors. Form issues from the One, which is the productive factor; the formless Indefinite Dyad serves as the substrate for the activity of the One. Without such a substrate, the One could produce nothing. All Being rests upon the action of the One upon the Indefinite Dyad. This action sets limits to the formless, gives it Form and particularity, and is therefore also the principle of individuation that brings separate entities into existence. A mixture of both principles underlies all Being.

For you and anyone else reading, I’ll share what seems like a plausible projection ( in Gadamer’s sense) on the fragments that remain. The manifold of sensory phenomena is just the familiar lifeworld in all its richness. The “two factors” it “rests on” are the two speculatively-generated “ingredients.” We live their “absolute fusion,” but Plato is unfolding the given like a phenomenologist. The “indefinite dyad” is what I’d call the “qualitative continuum.” Stuff like pre-organized color, sound, pain, thirst, and so on. Note that we never access this stuff. It’s a theoretical posit, used to say something about objects in the world, as they are actually there for us.

Which takes us back to my cat. The “form” of my cat is the “unity” of the perceived “quality” of my cat. Without such a substrate, the One could produce nothing. This is a fascinating line, because to me it “screams” that forms are “nothing” except “through” the “perceptions” they “fuse” into enduring objects. We can step into the same river more than once because we “say so.” We live that way, just as Tuesday “really” comes once every wheeling week.

A “mixture of both principles” underlies all being. This speaks against a common “information mysticism” that tries to pull “immaterial meaning” as a spectral stuff out of a more mundane stuff that functions as “carrier.” In line with my reading of Plato here, it’s better to think of enacted equivalence classes of qualitative lifeworld events. Numbers are fuzzy equivalence classes of generalized numerals. But I don’t mean equivalence classes as sets, as some might. I mean that 1/2 is “just as good” in this or that context as 2/4 or 16/32. Likewise, “how are are ?” and “hello” and “good morning” are inter-changable in certain contexts, equivalent and stamped with a “form” like “greeting.”

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It is not a world or place in any sense other than the allegorical.

@Wayfarer

This puts my mind to rest, haha. Thanks, Wayfarer!

Are you proposing a heterodox view of Platonic forms or are you simply regurgitating what you learned?

@Delirium To be honest, a bit of both! The main reason I posted this was to follow a different trail of thinking this time, albeit somewhat forced. I suppose both yourself and Wayfarer have helped clear up any pitfalls I may have fallen into. Many thanks, Delirium!

I have the terrible habit of repeating whatever has been said to make sure my understanding is sound, I fear if I don’t it’s very easy to get muddled. This won’t be the first post you see with a lengthy expository section (not unless you don’t come back). :cry:

Do I qualify to bind that feather to my hat yet? I hope so, haha.

I read the soul that leaps from corpse to infant as “tribal software” or “the way we do things around here.”

@j_j A morbid scene, haha.

After all these dialogues are allegory for explaining the world as we perceive it. I see your viewpoint, and I find it quite helpful in furthering my own understanding until I read the section above. I can’t help but wonder
 If the soul is of a similar nature to the forms: unchanging and abstract, it does not seem that cultural norms fit the description. Not unless I have misunderstood, and you’re not referring to cultural norms.

For convenience in reading you in the future, if I am not misunderstood, you seem somewhat of a materialist (physicalist) considering even the soul seems to be situated in the physical world. I wonder are there any immaterial substances for j_j? Or is it strict monism?

Lastly, thank you very much for pointing me toward Plato’s unwritten doctrines. I think this is the perfect next stop!

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That’s awesome! Yes, I’m trying to light the way for you, as much as I possibly can. The burden of thinking must be passed on down to eager beavers like yourself I suppose.

Everybody has their own habit demon to worry about. My habit is cigarettes. :smiley: Repititio mater studiorum est. Me and my broken Latin. Don’t worry about getting into a muddle. A good study group should help you get over that hurdle. Look at Christianity as an example.

I hope so too. You’ll know when you get there.

Good luck on your journey. :heart:

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Hello. I appreciate your desire to go “back to basics” here. However, to truly get to the root of this issue, we might need to ask ourselves if the very concept of “Forms” is actually a productive starting point, or just a linguistic trap.

If we look at it structurally, the entire concept of “Forms” seems to be a rather unfortunate categorical overgeneralization.

It stems from a very real and fascinating phenomenon: the absolute existence of mathematical objects. For instance, the truth that 2+2=4 exists autonomously as a pure object of Thought. It is absolute and non-contingent.

The intellectual trap that classical philosophers fell into—and which I believe we should be very careful to avoid today—was taking this unique, abstract property of mathematical logic and lazily projecting it onto the rest of Reality. They assumed that because a mathematical equation is eternal, there must also be an eternal, absolute “Form” of a table, or a mystical “Form” of a swallow, floating in some supernatural metaphysical space.

As I am sure you can logically deduce, taking the specific properties of abstract mathematics and copy-pasting them onto physical matter or biological life is a massive category mistake.

I offer this perspective in the hope of saving you from a very old, 2,000-year-old epistemological dead end. Once we recognize that the idea of “Forms” is merely the result of human thinkers inappropriately projecting mathematical certainty onto the physical world, the entire “mystery” completely dissolves. At that point, there is simply nothing more to be said about it.

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Cultural norms, yes, but DEEP cultural norms especially. How is it that we can even communicate with only these approximately repeatable black letters against a white background ?

Insightful question ! I’d call myself a radical pluralist. Definitely not a monist or physicalist. The key concept is “quality.” I wish I had a better word for what I’m trying to point at, which is basically the “sensory.” But I don’t like the theory of qualia. The objects in the world we share “always have quality.” If you see an instance of “the letter A,” then that instance is a singular “piece of quality” that you “categorize” by responding to it “as” an “A.” If someone hands you a handwritten phonenumber, you normally ignore the exact shape of the glyphs. What “matters” is the repeatable pattern that is weirdly “above” any instantiation of that pattern. To me Plato’s unwritten doctrine suggests that we don’t understand this “floating-above-ness” in terms of an immaterial-as-non-qualitative “substance.” Instead we look at the “pragmatic equivalence” that allows for “approximate repetition.” Instead of thinking of numbers as hiding “behind” numerals, we can understand numbers as the interchangeability of numerals in this or that context. It doesn’t matter which competent agent computes the sum. The point is that we trust the method that is itself approximately repeatable as part of the tribal software.

As I see it, Plato is pointing out the “articulation” of the “lifeworld” in terms of “quasi-types” that should not be understood as “other than” their tokens in terms of a mysterious stuff.

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I highly recommend you read Plato’s Parmenides. It’s the one dialogue where Socrates gets a smack down, as Parmenides shows all of the ways the theory of forms doesn’t work.

Here is a pretty good companion podcast about it.

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Welcome. A well-thought-through and interesting OP (original post). I’m going to broaden the issue out a bit. If you think that distracts from the discussion, tell me and I will buzz off.

One of the things that always strikes me when I read philosophy is how often a theme found in one source shows up in another which might be from a very different culture and time—often transformed or shifted. One common theme comes from the understanding that not everything we know comes from learning, observation, or socialization. When we’re born, we are not blank slates. We come into the world already knowing things, or at least predisposed to see things in a particular way. As I see it, this understanding resides right at the intersection of metaphysics and psychology/ cognitive science.

This is how I interpret Socrates’ forms. Another manifestation of a similar insight is found in Kant’s discussion of a priori knowledge. This is from “Critique of Pure Reason”:

Space and time, along with what they contain, are not things, or properties of things, in themselves, but belong merely to the appearances of such things; thus far I am in agreement with the previous idealists. But these idealists, and among them especially Berkeley, saw space as a merely empirical representation, a representation which, just like the appearances in space together with all of the determinations of space, would be known to us only by means of experience or perception; I show on the contrary, first, that space (and time too, to which Berkeley gave no attention), along with all its determinations, can be cognized by us a priori , for space, as well as time, inheres in us before all perception or experience as a pure form of our sensibility and makes possible all intuition from sensibility, and therefore all appearances

One of my favorite takes on this issue comes from Konrad Lorenz in two publications; a book—“Behind the Mirror”— and an article—“Kant’s Doctrine of the A Priori in the Light of Contemporary Biology.” This from the book:

What a biologist familiar with the facts of evolution would regard as the obvious answer to Kant’s question was, at that time, beyond the scope of the greatest of thinkers. The simple answer is that the system of sense organs and nerves that enables living things to survive and orientate themselves in the outer world has evolved phylogenetically through confrontation with an adaptation to that form of reality which we experience as phenomenal space. This system thus exists a priori to the extent that it is present before the individual experiences anything, and must be present if experience is to be possible.

This selection is not at all exhaustive. Two other instances that come to mind are Jung’s collective unconscious and Lao Tzu’s naming as the origin of our everyday reality.