Just to circle back to this: Yes, this is a problem you’d want to avoid, if you’re even considering different terminology.
It’s an interesting dilemma. Is there any way to simultaneously claim “Ω is consciousness” and “But ‘consciousness’ is not what we thought it was, and what we based our usage of the term ‘consciousness’ on”? This looks like saying that Ω both is and isn’t consciousness.
One possible disambiguation: “Ω is what consciousness really is, and so we must ameliorate the false or imprecise uses of the term ‘consciousness’ so as to reflect this.” This pushes us right up against the question of how, and when, a philosopher can outright say that a term has been used incorrectly. We know some of the circumstances when a scientist can do that, but with philosophy it’s much less clear.
This is, indeed, my stance. The lack of any consistent definition, from any field, means nobody can argue from a position of greater strength than mine. It’s all just opinions. But I am trying to be clear, and trying to get down to a very core definition.