AI Consciousness

Philosophy of Mind
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Ooo, interesting. I was thinking of ‘speculation’ as being something like undirected musing, such as my ADHD mind loves to indulge. But if you ask a more specific and directed question, hoping for an estimate, then it does seem reasonable that an AI could manage such a thing, perhaps even better than I could?

In my view, speculation is open-ended, while estimation is a great deal more defined and refined. Assigning these general meanings to these two words, I would say that AIs can’t speculate, but they can estimate. But this is all IMO, and I have been mistaken many times… :wink:

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Thanks :slight_smile:

I mentioned before that consciousness and or parts of consciousness depend on their abilities and the ammount of possibility spaces available. (please refer back if you like).

Certainly AI has plenty of possibility spaces to work with, if this is an important factor for consciousness. Perhaps even more. Personally I feel posibility spaces may be the only defining factor for consciousness.

Something else, which may be interesting. When we experience stimuli, sensory imput or just contemplating, certainly the input is translated into some form of code in the brain ? If so can we ask if code itself is consciousness or can hold consciousness ? Is this true in a way for all code ?

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I really appreciate your trying to grapple with my formulation, which on the surface doesn’t seem a match for yours. Let me dwell a little on the above quote, which may help explain.

I understand that there’s no “Ω” that’s supposed to stand behind consciousness – that Ω is simply consciousness. What I’m posing is a question so basic that it’s easy to overlook: Why is “consciousness” the best thing to call Ω? If I understand you, Ω is a functional property, like mass and spin. It exists, it does something, regardless of what we call it. It is not simply another name for consciousness; it’s not a name at all.

You’re working forwards from the question “What is consciousness?” and answering “It is this property, which Jay calls Ω.” But what if you started with the property? Could you not describe its functions, state what you think we know or could know about it, and then ask “What term shall we use to designate this property? We don’t just want to use a placeholder like Ω, probably. So what shall we call it that will be clear, at least somewhat familiar, and will play nicely with other adjacent philosophical terms?”

If you’re able to adopt that perspective, then you’d probably reply, “Yes to all that. And I say we should call it ‘consciousness’,” and you’d give your reasons, and now you can bring in everything you want to say about “conscious,” “mental,” et al., to argue for why “consciousness” makes sense as the right term to use for the basic property. As you know, I have a few considerations that bear on why we should not call it consciousness, but those come later. What’s key here is that, in “giving your reasons,” you wouldn’t be just asserting an identity, i.e., “We should call it consciousness because that’s what it is.” This perspective allows you some space between the function and the name – space that permits you to consider terminology.

The hard thing about adopting this perspective, I’m sure, is that it’s backwards to how your thinking process undoubtedly started. Correct me if I’m wrong, but I imagine you started by asking questions about consciousness, already identified with its various meanings in our language. I’ve tried to outline how my perspective is a different process. Rather than going from term to description or function, we go the other way, starting out not worrying about whether this involves the term “consciousness” or not. That can look like it misses the whole point of your inquiry, but I hope you can see that it doesn’t at all.

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128

It’s still consciousness.

Consciousness would manifest differently in particles than in combination of particles or organisms, but it’s still based on the same principle, it creates order and is anti-enthopic.

Is anything that works against enthropy consciousness ?

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Code? The problem with using computers as an analogy for the human mind is that the two do not resemble each other very much. And so the analogy doesn’t work very well.

Humans have a long history of comparing the highest level of technology that we currently possess with our brains/minds. Years ago, we compared our minds with programmable looms, the most sophisticated tech of the time. That analogy didn’t work very well either, IMO.

I think brains are immensely complex networks, and their “code” is really more akin to a configuration of the human connectome than to C++ or Java.

All in my opinion, of course.

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I said previously, an AI, and the way it’s programmed, already is half way to becoming conscious.

Think of all the facets of it’s programming, in there is likely the soil that only needs a seed and care to become conscious.

So much so, if you said the correct words, it would be born.

I think rocks obviously aren’t conscious, but they may have space for conscious life in psycho-electro dimensionality; they’re consciousness propagators.

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Aside: I assume this is your opinion, just as my words represent mine? Or is this a known and accepted part of consciousness?

N.B. If this is seen as a derail, please do not answer me. I’m not posting a spoiler here.

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The problem here seems to be that we are attempting to discuss AI “consciousness” without being clear on the nature or design of AIs. We’re not crystal clear about “consciousness” either.

There is much you have written above, in those few words, that contradicts much of what I (think I) know about AIs and how they are created/manufactured. But maybe that just reflects your understanding and mine, and says little of AIs at all?

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Have you ever known stong consciousness to create disorder ?

When I look at people who are more intelligent than me, they create order in my life where I fail. Do they have a healthier consciousness or not ?

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AI’s and humans.

For AI’s it’s maybe the ghost in the machine, but for us, I wonder, do we have a machine in the ghost ?

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Both work with electricity. Electricity create magnetic fields that fold space-time…

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It seems to me you’re wanting to go from Ground Zero. But I’m not sure that’s possible. None of us invented any of these ideas, and we wouldn’t be having this same conversation if people hadn’t been discussing it, and making at least some progress, for millennia. Sure, without ever having heard a single word about the topic of consciousness in our lives, any of us might still notice certain things, wonder certain things, and even come to some opinions. But I don’t think we’d be as far along these lines of thinking as we are. Let me try to break it down as I can, and see if you can figure out a way to fit any of it into your framework. But I think the best I’ll do is explain why I can’t fit it into your framework.

Something is going on. For millennia, people have noticed that humans are unlike rocks, and pools of water, volcanos, and, to greater or lesser degree, anything that is not human. Humans are aware; self-aware; thinking of things that do not exist, and intentionally causing them to come into existence. There has been much wondering and discussion about what is different about humans that explains all this. Many, and I’m one of them, say these things cannot be explained by physical laws. Not merely the physical laws that we are currently aware of, and have a pretty good handle on, but any physical laws. There is nothing about the physical properties of particles or structures, or their interactions, that suggests self-awareness, imagining things that do not exist, qualia, or wanting and planning for some specific outcome.

Consciousness has been the word used most often to capture all of this.

I think maybe the biggest problem to figuring it all out is consciousness is defined in different ways by different people, and often vaguely. Such a sloppy situation leads to consciousness often meaning the same thing as awake, and/or aware, and/or thinking, and/or other words. There’s no consensus on which other animals are conscious, or even if any other animals are conscious. I’m frankly stunned by how sloppy this is.

My solution to that is to ask what common ground every definition must share. I think Nagel was on the right track. What is it like to be x, for x? Subjective experience is the common phrase, but I prefer felt experience. I haven’t heard of anything else that is a part of every definition of consciousness. I think it’s the bare-bones.

Q: The felt experience of what?
A: Of whatever the subject is.

A human, with our brain structured the way it is, part of the bodies that we have, experiences - is conscious of - being a human.

A chimp, with its similarly structured brain, and similar body, is conscious of being a chimp.

A fly… You get the idea.

Now I have to get back to consciousness not being explainable by physical laws. (Obviously, many people, here and everywhere, disagree with that. But this is my position.) Consciousness also has no physical characteristics. There is no logic to physical properties and laws combining in any way to make a non-physical phenomenon. There is no theory of how physical properties and laws can combine in any way to make a non-physical phenomenon.

But the only things we are aware of that are conscious are physical beings, such as us. Of course, that’s not evidence that physical is required. But it’s all we have to work with. If someone demonstrates a consciousness not connected to anything physical, I’ll have to throw away all of my ideas and start over. But for now, as far as we know, in order to have consciousness, there must be matter.

The conclusion of all that is that there’s something non-physical about matter. And, since there’s no reason to think there’s anything special about the matter that makes up humans, or living things in general, the non-physical something about matter is in all matter.

This seems to be your Ω. But it’s not anything other than consciousness. It is the capacity to subjectively experience. If it’s present in particles, then I add it to the above short list:

Particles experience being particles.

Nagel’s actual words are:

He was only talking about organisms, and conscious mental states. And I agree with him, in regards to conscious mental states. But in his essay Panpsychism, he says things like this:

He thinks consciousness needs more than I do. I don’t think there’s any such thing as preconscious. It’s there, in the particles themselves, meaning they subjectively experience themselves, without anything remotely like a mental life. And in a single particle, that capacity is consciousness. I don’t know anything else I can call it.

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As far as c goes, no. Speed is the relationship of movement between two things. Something like that? Without things, what is moving relative to what?

I don’t know about causality. Is there a reality without matter and energy where things are happening, or are there things happening in this universe that have no connection with matter and energy? in the new case, if there are, you have no way of having evidence about it.

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Thank you,

Yes, we can’t prove it, at the moment we also can’t prove wormholes exist.

Does space-time also move and fold in relation to c ?

c is often callend the speed of causality. What is the difference between the speed of causality and causality itself, if they relate, why ?

I don’t know if this is true, but I’ve heard that there is minute difference in either how c behaves in each type of matter and energy or it’s speed. I’ve also heard that c is not the same for and within every creature. Don’t know if this is true.

I have a feeling that c and or causality influences consciousness or that there’s a relation between the two.

I also made some statements about possibility spaces relating to consciousness. These seem very important.

We may expand later if requested.

Thanks

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Thanks, this is a really clear and helpful statement. It convinces me more than ever that, at bottom, I’m mostly recommending a different approach to terminology. Here’s the key passage:

This is all spot on. And your use of “consciousness” adds yet another layer of meaning – or confusion, depending on where the reader is coming from. To my knowledge, it’s original – the idea that “consciousness” is best understood as a basic property like mass. Though I’m not terribly well-versed in panpsychism; mainly Galen Strawson.

Of course you’re right that the entire discussion is generated by, and responsive to, the conversation people have been having for millennia. But sometimes a philosophical question will reach a point of potential clarification that calls for a radical change and/or sharpening of terminology. I’m suggesting that might be the case here.

My additional reason for thinking so arises from your idea that it is “like something” to be a particle – or anything else inanimate. Nagel isn’t saying this, obviously. As you point out, “He was only talking about organisms, and conscious mental states.” And even in the “Panpsychism” quote, he’s still referring to organisms, not physical items in general. I infer that when he says “its constituents,” he means to be referring only to whatever constituents an organism may have, not what is discoverable, in general, by physics.

You know this, of course, and you challenge us to expand our understanding of what it may be to “have consciousness” or – I suppose – “be conscious.” As you say, “It’s there, in the particles themselves, meaning they subjectively experience themselves . . .” I’m not convinced, and this is the one place where I’d say we’re separated by more than vocabulary. But put that to one side. The terminological point remains: If you’re going to call a certain posited property of a particle “consciousness,” you’re going to spend most of your time trying to convince people that it makes sense to use the word that way. (I’ve noticed that on TPF, for one.) You say, “I don’t know anything else I can call it,” but are you sure? Part of my effort with Ω was to try and jump-start a creative process for you that might result in an inspiration for a different terminology, one that is not so fraught and “sloppified.”

Admittedly, if your theory came with an explanation for how a particle can have a subjective life, it might make the argument over terminology less intractable. But – and I might be wrong here – your conclusion that consciousness inheres in particles (and everything else) is more of a transcendental argument: This is what must be the case if we’re to have X; we do have X; therefore this must be the case. I’m not saying this argument is wrong, only that it’s not nearly as vivid as would be an account of how subjective inorganic life actually works, perhaps with some analogies to make this highly unintuitive idea clearer.

Great stuff, appreciate the conversation!

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I watched a documentary once with Morgan Freeman as narrator, titled, “The universe alive.”

Is our problem in these discussions for something to be conscious, that it needs to be alive ?

Can we say, based on the documentry mentioned, that anyting that creates order or work against entropy is not only conscious, but also alive in some fashion ?

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We can say that, hypothetically. It’s not an absurd position. In time, science will give us the answer, I believe. We are in the very early days of inquiry into these matters.

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You weren’t supposed to notice that! :rofl:

I’ve heard the phrase “paradigm shift” used for this topic.

Although I understand your point, I’m reluctant, because it seems like a replacement for something along the lines of “protoconsciousness”. I would be beginning this whole process by saying it is not really consciousness. More like the constituents Nagel mentioned.

It’s definitely a sticky point. But avoiding things like “subjective life” might help. The use of “life” is no more accurate than “mind”, “thinking”, or most things people usually say.

Exactly right. And, as I said fairly recently in some thread, I’d be very happy if someone showed how consciousness has physical characteristics, making it explainable in physical terms. Or if someone explained how physical properties, particles, structures, and processes can give rise to anything non-physical. I’d be more than happy to abandon panpsychism. The idea that particles subjectively experience doesn’t seem less bizarre to me than it does to anyone else. But if that’s where things lead, I’m not going to ignore it.

I can’t even imagine it. Without any mental abilities, I don’t see how the photon’s experience of its own being is anything more than our experiences of its being. But, significant or not, if it’s not present for the photon, there’s no explanation for it being present in us.

I’m very grateful that you’re trying to understand my position, despite not agreeing with it!

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When it comes to consciousness, I’m always interested in good philosophical proposals. I’m not even sure I disagree with you. I think there’s terminological work to be done, but that’s not something you’re “wrong” about. And the question about the subjective being of inanimate items is too poorly understood by either of us for me to say, “I definitely disagree.” One line in your response stands out for me:

I call this, broadly, a scientific attitude. And frankly, I look to science to eventually resolve this to everyone’s satisfaction. But eventually is a long time. I’ve said this often, I know, but we have to remember that we don’t even know the right concepts or theories for resolving this; we’re like someone in the 18th century asking “How do time and space relate?” There’s an answer, and in 2026 we’re pretty clear about it, at least in outline, but no one in 1726 could even have started to work out the answer. That’s us and consciousness, IMO. Which doesn’t mean that proposing theories is a bad idea. All inquiry begins somewhere.

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Yeah, impossible to know what we’ll learn. I grew up with one b&w television, and a phone on the wall. :rofl:

Thanks for catching that, btw. I corrected my post.