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Is this Part 1 of something longer?
This seems a misstep. You donât seem to have taken into account the primitive mind which governed the behavior prior to the development of the conscious mind and continues to influence it. In some much more heavily than others. Itâs a continuum. Similarly for the âmentalscapeâ.
Depends. Weâll see how things go. I prefer not to get ahead of myself if possible.
Good. But if it isnât physical and it isnât spiritual, what is it? It sounds remarkably like a haunted house for the ghost in the machine! The software analogy is misleading, I think. If I asked, âBut what is software?â the description youâd give wouldnât have any room for items like selfhood, agency, and conscious life. So how is the mentalscape analogous?
Seems to me this merely reiterates the old mind-body dualism, or a vaiant of it. Not something classical pragmatism would accept, I think.
What is it?
To see how the mentalscape works in practice, consider a concept we all take for granted: the concept of a country.
A nation is inherently a construct of the mentalscape. Think of how many wars have been fought, how many lives have been forsaken, all in defense of something that any primitive mind would recognize as completely abstract. There is no physical wall etched into the Earth separating one nation from another, yet millions have died to honor that invisible boundary. That is crazy.
And yet,purely physically speaking, that line does not exist in a form you can measure as solid matterâyou can dig into the soil, but you will only ever find dirt, not a border. Purely universally speaking, no foundational natural order divided the Earth into political sects; the land was simply given to life as a whole.
Why, then, do we honor it? Because we are socialized within the mentalscape. It is through these shared informational constructsâabstract as they may beâthat we define our boundaries, shape our collective identity, and establish the subjective frameworks of purpose and worth by which we live.
Itâs the âquiet peaceâ of nihilism. Nothing to fear, no harm can become you, once you no longer exist.
Descartes in particular bequeathed this image to us. Mind and body, spirit and matterâthe âgreat divisionâ of RenĂ© Descartesâ dualism. And Descartes is hugely influential in culture, even for those who donât know his name. He is regularly taught at University as âthe first modern philosopherâ â thatâs how he was presented to meâand one of the triumvarate of modernity, the other two being Newton and Galileo.
The points about children being born in a comparatively unformed cognitive state are well-founded. In fact human infants are uniquely dependent on their mothers and other family members, until well into adolescence. That is the period of extra-somatic learning, in which they acquire language (as you say) and also many other social and survival skills. (Unlike deers or horses who must be able to run with their herds from the moment of birth, lest they fall victim to predation, which many do.)
But I question the âblank slateâ (you call it âclean slateâ) idea. Even if humans are not born with language, theyâre born with the capacity to acquire language, unique amongst all species. Furthermore as children grow, they clearly demonstrate proclivities and talents which differentiate them from others. Some children show precocity in language acquisition â John Stuart Mill started learning ancient Greek by age three. Wolfgang Mozart had his first compositions played in public, in which he also performed, while still a child. I myself have always felt that naturalistic accounts of such prodigies are clearly deficientâwhat Darwinian logic could account for such innate genius?
I notice the meticulous avoidance of any suggestion of âthe supernaturalâ or âthe spiritualâ in your account. Indeed, putting it in terms of âinformation processingâ is only, well, natural in our computer-dominated age. But think about the origin of the term âsoulâ. It was originally used to translate the Greek psuchÄ, which of course becomes psyche, to this day an alternative to âmindâ (and the root of âpsychologyâ). Psuche was originally derived from âbreatheâ (because all living beings breatheâeven plants, as we now know.) Over the centuries it gained many layers of meaning, but the use of âsoulâ in philosophy right up to the modern period essentially meant âmindâ (you read the term in translations of Kant and Locke.) Today we speak of the âhard problemâ â but itâs still basically exploring the same turf.
And a fly in the ointment for the naturalistic, informational account of mind, is that cultural inheritances â Mozartsâ prodigious talent being but one exampleâseem to beggar our comprehension in terms of physical causes such as genetics. People will say nowadays that itâs âin the genesâ as if this might explain it, but human culture is far richer and more diverse than, I think, such genetic accounts can provide.
The mentalscape is one conceptualization. It does not require duality in any way.
You raise a fair point: the human mind is certainly not a blank slate. We arenât born as empty vessels; we are born with an innate capacity for language and abstract thought that sets our species apart. Beyond that baseline, individuals clearly inherit distinct physical and cognitive proclivitiesâsome children possess atypical processing speed, working memory, or musical sensitivity right out of the gate. However, we must separate innate talent from the concept of âgenius.â
Talent is a biological variance; genius is a value assigned through society. Take 19th-century chess prodigy Paul Morphy. In his era, Morphy was heralded as an unmatched, almost supernatural genius. Yet by modern standards-where teenagers train alongside chess engines-his game winning strategies look entirely ordinary. Society crowned Morphy a genius because his mind represented the absolute peak of what his culture needed and understood at that historical moment. When the collective baseline shifted, the designation faded. A child can be born with extraordinary biological gifts, but whether those gifts are recognized as âgeniusâ depends entirely on whether the surrounding mentalscape has built the stage to value them.
On purpose and apart of the abstract.
If you say so. But I think your statements that Mother Nature âownsâ our bodies, and weâre merely âtemporary stewardsâ of them, or ârentâ them, necessarily draws a distinction between âusâ and âour bodies.â
I am generally on the same page with you, so any critique is offered in a friendly spirit.
You use âloanâ metaphorically here. I donât think you take the mother metaphor seriously either. But a certain ethical framework is still suggested. Iâm not for or against this framework. Itâs just that it all still feels very âmammal normative.â Perhaps it distracts from your point ?
I am an atheist who doesnât expect an afterlife. That said, Iâm also a phenomenalist (but not a dualist). So darkness is non-being.
Wholeness reminds of the object of Freudâs postulated âdeath drive,â which he mentions e.g. in his late Outline.
Iâm a philosophical pessimist, so my objection is not from an investment in optimism. Iâm just saying that âreturn to wholenessâ reminds me of this death drive.
Here we basically agree. Responsible selfhood is a âmeme.â It is âculture tech.â I read Heidegger as one of the great thinkers on this issue. Proximally and for the most part, we are bots. But Iâd add that we, even if bots, are also weirdly âdisclosure of world.â
I donât personally think that dry ( AI ) rather than moist robots ( Dawkins ) are sites of world disclosure.
Also with you here. The âmental/physicalâ distinction is itself a fragile, fuzzy piece in this environmentally immersed social process you point toward.
I might push back a little on one point tho. In normative terms â especially in atomistic societies â I am the relatively isolated owner of this meat. Or this meat has been trained to speak the sign âIâ as a label for its temporal unity, which is socially enacted. Joe is blue and jerky at the end of the noose for what Joe did yesterday, not for what Sally did yesterday. Ideally, anyway.
If I am a steward for someone or something else, then âthey/itâ âownsâ what I steward ? Does lady Nature âgive a damnâ ? As far as I can make out, itâs organisms that care, that invent the memes of selfhood and property.
âSoftwhere running on the crowd.â Or âaloftwareâ dancing meat in time, contagiously and cumulatively. Gene meat dancing as meme meat. A layer of meme on a layer of gene. "Out of the blue into the black. "
You need two distinct things for this to be considered dualism. Software isnât a ghost sitting inside the circuit board; it is the configuration and movement of the physical hardware itself. The relationship between the mind and the brain is no exception to this.
Iâm claiming, from a pragmatic perspective, that we, the mind, emerge from childhood. Theology states we magically arrive and control our meat robots.
Point taken, but his games are still highly regarded and often showcased. He had an uncanny ability to win from what seemed hopeless positions. And I donât believe genius is always subject to the whims of cultural relativism. Certainly the word is bandied about nowadays but the genius of a Shakespeare or a Plato or a Buddha will still be recognised through the ages.
Echoing my influences, I think the crucial move is an emphasis on the temporal.
The dance and the dancer arenât different âthingsâ except that we evaluate two different dancers to be âequivalentâ in terms of which dance they are dancing. We live or enact these distinctions within our own, individual âmeat dances.â
Platoâs unwritten doctrine can be read as a sophisticated quasi-hylomorphism. The world is âjust thereâ as âarticulated.â But âwhatâ is articulated is hard to point at. We might say âsensory-affective pre-stuff,â but this is already a categorization that almost stifles the pointing.
Right ! Basically the âidealâ is a kind of âperfect self-control.â So we have the vague fantasy of a âspark of free will.â
I see pragmatism largely as a reaction to and overcoming of a tacitly monotheistic dualism. The dualism is a source of confusion on many issues. The ghost in the machine is like God before the creation. The âimmaterial meaning stuffâ in the material signifier just echos the ghost in the machine.
Basically Western philosophy is still mostly caught in a ghost story. Thinkers like Heidegger and others got beyond this ghost story, more or less, but they are only barely assimilated.
Inadvertently replied to the wrong poster, see next.
That seems to collapse several quite distinct levels.
Consider the same software application running on Windows and macOS. At the level of machine code and underlying hardware, the implementations can be radically different â yet at the functional level they are recognisably the same application, performing essentially the same operations. And what the application produces â say, a document â can then be completely independent of the particular hardware and operating system on which it was produced. They are physically distinct but share the same functional organisation.
So software isnât a âghostâ sitting inside the machine, certainly. But neither is it simply identical with the physical configuration of the machine. It is a formal and, ultimately, semiotic organisation realised in a physical substrate.
And the analogy with brain and mind has another problem. A computer is an allopoietic artefact: its hardware, architecture, software and purposes are externally specified and maintained by designers. An organism is an autopoietic system whose organisation is continuously produced and maintained by its own activity (ref). The brain isnât âhardwareâ awaiting a program to run on it; in organisms of all kinds, the integration is at a far more subtle level than that.
So the fact that software is physically instantiated doesnât establish that mind is related to brain in the same way. The analogy assumes the computer model of cognition that it is being used to defend.
In other words â it begs the question.
From a pragmatic perspective, considering whether nature gives a damn has zero practical value. If death is the end either way, weighing it is pointless. Unless someone produces a genie that has real actual existence, the things opinion is irrelevant.
This is THE structure perhaps that philosophers should ponder. It is all âalready right thereâ in Saussureâs âacoustic image.â
Forget semantics for a moment. The acoustic image is a sensory form.
The sensory form ( the âabstract soundâ of a word ) is independent from any particular vocalization. But it is not independent from vocalization altogether.
Switching to a visual analogue, the numeral 3 is not âindependent of shape altogether.â That is absurd, because the numeral is an abstract or âsecond-levelâ shape that is not reducible to any particular pencil scribble.
Likewise an algorithm is not reducible to any particular âmaterialization.â But it is nothing at all apart from its âmaterializations.â
Basically I agree. So itâs a matter of getting a grip on this âfunctional organization.â We âenactâ the equivalence of events in the world. We âenactâ numerals by treating this scribble more or less as we treat that one.