Which is entirely consistent with the defence of free will in the opening post. I am defending the Two-phase Cosmology, and the two phases are quantum possibility (Phase 1) and classical-relativistic actuality (Phase 2). Free will (and also “consciousness” and “wavefunction collapse”) is the name of phase transition - it is literally the dynamic metaphysical process which selects actuality from possibility.
That contradicts the definition given (or at least part a, from which b and c follow, I think). If the choice is entirely the product of antecedents and randomness then no real choice is possible, because everything is either pre-determined or random (neither of which can be owned by a person/self). So you appear to be contradicting yourself here.
By ‘metaphysical free will’, I presume you mean ‘libertarian free will’ as indicated in the title.
The law seems to operate under a definition that is closest to compatibilism, so that’s hardly no purpose being served. A plea of “reasonable doubt due to determinism not having been falsified” is not allowed in any court I’ve heard of.
You have to justify why it’s better for your choices to be made independently from the mechanism by which choices are made.
Also, determinism plays no actual role since randomness gives one no more freedom. Libertarian free will requires quantum theory to be wrong. That’s the short of it.
That’s where quantum theory comes in. There are really no other options unless the theory is fundamentally wrong. There are no interpretations that don’t boil down to one or the other of those cases.
Randomness (if it exists) only occurs at the quantum level, so for instance the decay of an atom occurs for no reason at all (is uncause), but still with predictable probability. Macroscopic occurrences (weather, brain activity) are classical but sometimes chaotic. Chaos theory doesn’t leverage indeterminism.
That’s not begging since there’s an ‘IF’ in there. Begging would be asserting (without evidence) the impossibility of a 3rd option, and I admit to essentially doing just that since all evidence points to quantum theory being correct. There is zero evidence to falsify it.
Yes, MWI and DB-Bohm are fully deterministic. Several others are not.
Not even then. I mean, the Wigner interpretation says essentially that, but it does not in any way assert that agency can be conveyed. Consciousness may indeed cause collapse, but not in a deliberately settable way. No information can be gleaned from measuring quantum events, hence evolution has never found utility in implementing a quantum amplifier, It gives zero advantage. So even those anthropocentric interpretations have no door open to libertarian FW.
More importantly, what justification does anybody have that choices made ‘offsite’ allow more freedom than those made by physical means? Suppose there’s an offsite supernatural mind calling shots. What evidence is there that it ‘could have done otherwise’ so to speak? None, since zero is known about it. All that matters is simply hidden behind a black box curtain where one can make up any magic they want.
Agree, but perhaps not if they’re made independently of the reasoning mechanism.
Dunno. God is often asserted to be perfect, which limits what is wanted to perfect choices. Doesn’t sound very free to me, but FW being more than ‘not being compelled otherwise’ never sounded like a good thing to me anyway.
That depends on the claim. If I posit a teapot orbiting beyond Jupiter, the lack of evidence is pretty good justification of denial of the claim. A claim of a new thing for which there is no evidence needs to justify itself, not wait for justification of the default of there not being the thing.
LFW is a positive claim, and thus needs to be justified. Lack of same is a negative claim, and like the lack of teapot, needs no justification in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
Maybe not the assertion, since it becomes a positive claim then. I lack belief in Zeus, and that lack of belief is justified. But I don’t go so far as to assert the lack of Zeus any more than I can justify an assertion of the absence of the teapot.
Of course. If we’re defining “free will” as broadly as “choice” then yes, I agree it trivially exists.
If we’re using more typical definitions that would apply in a thread like this, of something contrary to determinism, or where we somehow “overcome” our knowledge and wants, or as a solution to the problem of evil, etc etc…No; I maintain that those versions of free will do not stand up to scrutiny at all.
That’s only fair, since I claim it is physically/logically impossible to build something non-physical with physical components.
I don’t think there is a “mechanism”. I think consciousness is a fundamental property of matter, like mass and charge. But, unlike mass and charge, it is not a physical property. It is the capacity to subjectively experience.
I have only barely heard of this idea. Googling fort a few minutes, I can see why you would say it’s pretty close.
Correct.
Very true. 
My understanding/definition of consciousness is likely very different from yours. I don’t want to shift the focus of your thread by going too much into it, although it’s obviously connected. But this post has the gist of it:
But that is exactly why the metaphysics is irrelevant to the law. Holding people responsible for their actions is the only game in town. The real importance of the free will debate is much more existential than that – it is to do with the meaning of life, the legitimacy of spirituality and things like that.
You have to justify why it’s better for your choices to be made independently from the mechanism by which choices are made.
Also, determinism plays no actual role since randomness gives one no more freedom. Libertarian free will requires quantum theory to be wrong. That’s the short of it.
I didn’t understand that at all. LFW requires a specific kind of interpretation of QM to be true, not for the scientific formalism to be false.
That’s where quantum theory comes in. There are really no other options unless the theory is fundamentally wrong. There are no interpretations that don’t boil down to one or the other of those cases.
I am describing one to you.
Randomness (if it exists) only occurs at the quantum level, so for instance the decay of an atom occurs for no reason at all (is uncause), but still with predictable probability. Macroscopic occurrences (weather, brain activity) are classical but sometimes chaotic. Chaos theory doesn’t leverage indeterminism.
The whole idea of there being a “quantum level” (i.e. a micro/macro split between QM and GR) is itself a metaphysical interpretation, and it is incompatible with free will. In the model of reality I am defending there are two “phases” of physical reality – Phase 1 is quantum reality (non-local, pre-spatio-temporal, superposed, informational) and Phase 2 is classical reality, which only exists from the perspective of an embodied observer (requiring a brain). That is a completely different interpretation of QM, and it makes very different assumptions to the ones you are making.
That’s not begging since there’s an ‘IF’ in there.
Exactly. But if there’s an IF then there can also be an IF NOT.
Begging would be asserting (without evidence) the impossibility of a 3rd option, and I admit to essentially doing just that since all evidence points to quantum theory being correct. There is zero evidence to falsify it.
As already stated, it is not QM that is incompatible with free will, but the specific micro/macro interpretation you are assuming (and many other interpretations, for various different reasons).
The position I am defending is descended directly from von Neumann, not via Wigner. Von Neumann never said that consciousness causes collapse. He said that consciousness is the only place we can conclusively end an otherwise infinite chain of physical observers – it is the only ontologically privileged thing in the system. That is consistent with the claim that consciousness/will IS collapse, and the cause is something else. This difference is absolutely critical, because Wigner’s version (and Stapp’s) is dualistic. The position I am defending is explicitly not dualistic (it is neutral monist or dual aspect) – it does not claim consciousness is a non-physical thing which “pokes” the physical system. Rather, it says consciousness is the process by which classical actuality (phase 2) is selected from quantum possibility (phase 1), and the cause is the need to maintain logical coherence. The wavefunction collapses because unitary evolution has become logically impossible, and the conflict is set up by the impossibility of making conflicting valuations. MWI says our minds split. My theory says minds can’t split, so the wavefunction must collapse. And finally, to avoid Wigner’s friend problem, we will need a resolution rule which uses the various different agent’s valuations to decide which shared objective reality is selected. That rule can be found here.
The capacity to collapse wavefunctions confers an enormous advantage (it is why animals have an advantage over plants), but there is no standard mechanism by which this could have evolved. That was Nagel’s point in Mind and Cosmos, and why he said consciousness must have evolved teleologically. I am proposing a structural mechanism which explains how that can happen without needing any of the teleological laws he says we should look for.
MWI (essentially) was true until the first brain evolved, which selected the entire timeline leading to that brain as a block.
That assumes Wigner-Stapp style dualism.
Agreed.
You mean the dictionary definitions? There were multiple definitions, not intended to lead on from each other. Not that general-purpose dictionary definitions are all that useful in philosophical discussions anyway.
Yes this is the very typical framing of the issue, and I am asking you to consider if it actually makes sense. What is this special sauce that we think choice is lacking?
Or, to put it another way:
Forget about our universe, forget about Determinism. Invent any universe you like with any properties: non-deterministic, souls, magic, gods, anything. In this hypothetical universe, we ask one of the angelic beings whether they want coffee or tea…
How do they decide? Remember, it can’t merely be the product of knowledge, wants and randomness – that would be like our universe, which is supposedly inadequate, or something. What’s the extra thing that their decision-making has?
The concept of free will does make sense. It just becomes problematic when applied to an individual human whose wants and needs are apt to have external causes.
Let’s say you’re right. I don’t see how it contradicts the idea that it’s “no real choice”. In what way is it more of a real choice than a boulder has regarding where it comes to rest after an avalanche? Sure, we say the physical events that determine where a boulder lands after an avalanche are a part of physics. And we say the physical events that determine what the energy stored in a particular molecule of ATP is used for are a part of life. And we say the physical events that determine whether I eat chocolate layer cake or pecan pie for dessert are a part of choosing (not sure if you would prefer thinking or consciousness?). But if all are the results of different numbers, kinds, and levels of physical events, and there was no possibility of any of these scenarios ending any way other than they did, what is it about the one scenario that makes it more significant, or something to be called a “real choice”?
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Non-computable valuations.
If 2PC is correct then physics-busting magic is impossible (I call this “hypernatural”, to distinguish it from quantum dice-loading, which I call “praeternatual”). There are no individuated souls, and if there are gods then they do not have brains, so they cannot want things and cannot decide things.
In 2PC, decision-making requires a very specific set of conditions to be satisfied, one of which is a brain capable of having an internal perspective.
If it helps you to understand, this is exactly why the position I am defending is inconsistent with idealism and panpsychism, as well as Abrahamic theology. All of those things claim that minds can exists without brains, and that non-physical things can make decisions. 2PC is structurally dependent on the claim that brains are necessary for consciousness, and that both of those things are necessary for non-computable valuations to occur.
The only “extra thing” is the Void, but even this is already part of the system (its ultimate source and ground), so actually the only extra thing is the claim that Atman=Brahman, which literally means that the “special sauce” is the identification of the root of personal consciousness with the ground of being. And this was proposed by Erwin Schrodinger to be so crucial to understanding the nature of reality that he called it his “second equation”. In 2PC I take this as a structural hypothesis, stripped of any non-critical mystical baggage.
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Why should I care about that? It makes no difference, from my own perspective, of how/why I did a thing.
And, as I say, non-computable doesn’t mean non-predictable anyway (if being predictable is the issue here).
Well, it should do. It certainly matters to a lot of other people. Indeed, it is the difference between there being a “you” which does things, and there only being the laws of physics.
It absolutely means non-predictable. If you cannot compute an outcome, not because the calculation is too hard, but because the result cannot be known in advance, then how can the outcome be predictable? What method could be used to predict it?
Is that better, at all?
The non-computer aspect of synapses or whatever would also be part of the laws of physics.
And why are we trying to look for something outside physics anyway?
Upthread, I asked about how a non-deterministic being, in a non-deterministic universe, would choose between coffee and tea (when their decision cannot be merely the product of antecedents and randomness). Do you want to take a stab at that question? Because I am trying to illustrate to you that this thing that you (and lots of other people) feel decisions lack, doesn’t make a lot of sense when held up to scrutiny.
These things are not interchangeable because a computer is a specific kind of machine, and therefore positing that the brain is not a computer does not entail it is not a machine, and indeed a deterministic one. And, if it’s deterministic, it’s predictable – even if the machine to perform that prediction could not be a computer.
An “in principle” machine?
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Yes, exactly.
I’ll state again though at this point, that I don’t care if my decisions are predictable or not. Because what a prediction actually means is duplicating me, perfectly, including my memories and train of thought, and then asking that duplicate whether it wants coffee or tea.
So, asking me whether I want coffee or tea is the same as asking…me…whether I want coffee or tea. So what?
The fear of a decision being predictable is one of the failures of intuition that underpins this whole topic IMHO.
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Because “free” in libertarian free will means “not entirely determined by the laws of physics”.
I did not answer that question because the examples you gave were of Gods, angels and breaking the laws of physics, and I am not suggesting any of those things. We are talking about a conscious self, not an angel. And no laws of physics are broken (except the Born rule, which is not a law, and we cannot prove it always holds).
Look at all the things humans can do that AI cannot. We can understand value and meaning, we can be genuinely creative and intuitive, and we can make moral judgements. We also do not suffer from the Frame Problem – we don’t get paralysed by an exponential explosion of different possibilities, because we just “know” what matters and what doesn’t. How do conscious beings do any of these things? From your perspective, you cannot explain this. You would have to argue that if only we could make AI even more powerful, it would suddenly be able to do these things, but I see no reason to believe it is true, not least because animals with tiny brains do not suffer from the Frame Problem either. I therefore conclude that it has got something to do with consciousness, and that whatever it is, it is the same thing that Penrose is talking about when he posits non-computable valuations. If non-computable valuations are possible, then these abilities cease to be mysterious. Instead, it is the capacity for non-computable valuations which seems mysterious. And my answer as to why is because consciousness involves an infinite entity (the Void).
You didn’t answer my question.
It makes no difference to you how/why you do a thing, yet your extensive participation in these conversations suggests it makes quite a bit of difference to you that other people agree with you on how/why they do a thing.
To come to greater understanding of our nature.
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If it’s defined that way then it largely becomes interchangeable with “not Deterministic”. I don’t think it’s a very useful definition; not only would it define Compatibilists out of existence, it defines free will in a way that’s completely divorced with the actual reality of choices and how we make them.
It’s like defining an apple as the thing that’s in my draw, rather than any properties of the apple itself.
Firstly, I didn’t say “breaking the laws of physics”, I said “non-deterministic”, which is the position that you’re advocating for, no?
Secondly, and more importantly, I wasn’t talking about your position, I was putting a hypothetical to you, to illustrate a point.
A couple weeks back I was watching one of the theology call-in shows, and one of the presenters, I think Jon Cohen, remarked that people who hold irrational, easily-debunkable beliefs are almost always unwilling to engage in a hypothetical.
It’s fascinating because there’s no obvious reason why this should be so. But I’ve seen so much evidence of it in the weeks since.
So, are you willing to engage with a hypothetical?
From the perspective of both believers in libertarian free will, and of determinists, compatibilism should indeed be “defined out of existence”. That is because compatibilism itself attempts to define free will out of existence, so all non-compatibilists have no choice but to argue that compatibilism is an illegitimate philosophical position, because it makes a mockery of free will.
And as “the actual reality of choices and how we make them”, that is exactly what we are debating. I fundamentally disagree with you about what a “real choice” is, and how we make them.
But on what grounds do you claim to know what the properties of a real choice are? You are just assuming your conclusion here.
I refused to engage because it was misleading. It was an attempted trap, and I refused to walk into it.
You effectively asked me how something without a brain can make a decision. My answer is that it cannot, which makes your question equivalent to “have you stopped beating your wife yet?” Would you like to engage in that hypothetical?
Refusing to answer a loaded question is not evidence of weak thinking.
To be clear: the thing which is responsible for making these non-computable valuations is not a brain, and not the infinite Void, but an entity which is emergent from the whole system of a quantum (superposed) brain and the Void. “You” are both of these things at the same time. Only entities which are both infinite and have an embodied perspective can have free will.
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