A defence of libertarian (ish) free will

I don’t see “will” as non-computing or finished-computing. I see it as “computing”, and “free” pointing at the exclusion of non-computing and finished-computing from its own computing.
Not-free will is more of a “pause”, “illusion”.

I think this debate depends on whether we can choose our own thoughts … if I want to i can think of a blue elephant in my mind, this suffices to me that I have free will.

Don’t see what the big fuss is about.

MWI applies to absolutely everything in the cosmos. It literally says that every physically possible outcome manifests in diverging timelines. Every physical interaction produces an entire new branch of the cosmos. Including every physically possible choice you can make in any situation.

Every outcome of quantum measurements. You completely misunderstand MWI.

Yes, it is subjectively “obvious” that we have free will. Even people who deny free will accept this obviousness – apart from a few cynical liars.

The fuss is that the laws of physics appear to suggest that everything is either determined or random, including whatever your brain is doing, in which case our subjective impression is wrong.

Which makes this similar to the argument about consciousness itself – it is even more subjectively obvious than free will, but there’s no place for it in physicalism so some people say our subjective judgement must be wrong.

I understand MWI perfectly. Judging by what you are posting, you have misunderstood MWI to take a concept of “measurement” inherited from (some variation of) the Copenhagen Interpretation, and applied it to MWI. This is completely wrong. MWI doesn’t say anything about “measurements”. It abolishes them.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-worlds_interpretation

The many-worlds interpretation (MWI) is an interpretation of quantum mechanics that asserts that the universal wave function is objectively real, and that there is no wave function collapse. This implies that all possible outcomes of quantum measurements are physically realized in different “worlds”.

And what do you think “measurements” means here? What is a “quantum measurement” in MWI, according to you?

It concerns such things as the spin and position of an electron (specifically, every electron in the universe), not the macroscopic behaviour of the human body.

So, as an example, let’s say there are 10100 electrons in the universe, and that each is in a superposition of having either an up or a down spin. According to MWI, there is a universal wavefunction with 2^{10^{100}} possible states, and that each state is an equally real world.

I asked you to define what “measurement” means in MWI. Your own previously reply – the wikipedia quote – bolded this word. That means the definition is crucial. I have asked you to define it, and you did not do so. Saying that it concerns microscopic events rather than macroscopic ones is not a definition, is it? When (according to you) does a “measurement” occur in MWI? Is it a specific subset of physical interactions with a specific trigger/cause? Or does it apply to everything? And either way, what determines which outcome manifests?

The correct answer is that it applies to absolutely everything, including macroscopic states, because macroscopic states are just made of lots of micro states.

OK…so you edited your reply and now it is clear that in MWI, “measurement” applies to absolutely everything. In other words, there is no such thing as a “measurement” in MWI, because all physically possible outcomes occur. If everything is a measurement then you do not need that word, which was invented specifically to privilege individual events as observations or measurements.

Which is exactly what I originally stated, and you claimed was “completely wrong”.

All physically possible outcomes of such things as an electron’s spin and position. It’s not the case that the universe branches into either a universe where I raise my hand or a universe where I don’t.

No, you don’t understand. If all possible outcomes happen at the quantum level, and there is just one reality, then all possible outcomes happen at every level. It’s the same thing. Macro-outcomes are made of micro-outcomes, just like your body is made of atoms.

If you still don’t believe me, go and ask an AI.

No, not necessarily; I could be saying it makes as much sense as flipperty-gibbert in that it is poorly-defined.
However, I do think some conceptions of free will are indeed contradictions as they essentially define a reasonless reasoned action. Or of willfully transcending the will.

Go ahead and give your definition and I’ll probably be able to show where it’s self-contradictory.

I think this is just semantics though at this point, as not computable =/= not determined =/= not simulatable. You can have a deterministic machine that is not a computer.
So again, within this discussion, I have no interest in whether the brain is turing-emulatable or not, as I don’t see that it makes any difference.

This afternoon I was on a walk and I came ro a Junction where some vandal had stolen the signpost so I was at a complete loss which way to go

Do you think its possible that in the absence of a computable answer, cause and effect within my brain might stop working. Im not convinced.

And how does that deal with the problem of evil. St Augustine claims we have effective free will. God created a world full of temptations but gave us the free will to resist them. He didn’t say we only have that free will under certain indeterminate quantum conditions.

But what would I know. Im a compatibilist. Dammed by god and damned now on earth apparently.

Free will is generally understood as the capacity or ability of a person to (a) choose between different possible courses of action,[1] (b) exercise control over their actions in a way that is necessary for moral responsibility, or (c) be the ultimate source or originator of their actions. – wikipedia

Since we’re evaluating the concept in the broadest sense, show that it’s a contradiction for an omniscient and omnipotent divinity.

If we’re defining it that way then of course I agree it exists.
I make a choice that is a product of antecedents (knowledge, predilections) and randomness.

Ok. So you agree the concept makes sense?

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It makes all the difference in the world. I think you do not want to discuss it precisely because it is the one thing which actually threatens the coherence of your own position.

The self, in this model, is defined as emergent from the whole system created by a quantum (superposed) brain and the Void (the ground of all being (Brahman) instantiated as an Atman). It is only because the Void is involved that non-computability is even possible, but the Void is not some external agent which “pokes” an already-collapsed brain (it is not the self, because it is not specific to an individual, and has no perspective of its own…and if it did then it would become God, not a person). That would be exactly the system which you think doesn’t make sense, because this “poke” must either be random or determined by something in the brain. Again…that is NOT what I am describing. The self is itself superposed, and it is entangled with the outside world (especially your own nervous system, but also the rest of the world your self-model is aware of and interacting with). That self is a continuous process, and the process critically involves non-computable valuations assigned to different possible futures. We then have a system which cannot continue to exist in a superposition, because it cannot branch across incompatible futures with contradicting valuations, and we also have a set of valuations which can determine which branch is selected. That means those valuations are an element of the system which does determine something (which quantum outcome is selected by collapse), but which itself is not determined by the prior state of the system (nothing determines the valuations the self makes).

According to you, everything is either determined or random. In which case, in which of those two categories do these non-computable valuations fall? Answer: neither. No law of physics is driving them, because they are non-computable, but they are not random, because they are valuations – there is a “self” which is non-computably prefering one outcome to another.

The very existence of a non-computable valuation invalidates your position. Now…if you want to argue that non-computable valuations are impossible, or cannot be applied to physically possible futures known to a superposed self-model, then we must agree to disagree. But you are not saying that.

That’s a complete strawman. Nobody has claimed cause and effect “stops working” in your brain. If it did then free will would be impossible, for the same reason that disconnecting the steering wheel from the rest of a car makes the car undriveable.

And anyway, this example is irrelevant because regardless of the lack of information, you still need to choose an action (go left, go right, use a map, phone somebody…), and you will still own that action as a coherent self.

It is not designed to deal with the problem of evil. That is a problem for theology – it is an argument against the existence of an omni-everything God. Free will is sometimes cited as an objection – if humans have free will then God can’t stop us from choosing evil.

Yeah, well this is why I didn’t want to discuss compatibilism. All it does is confuse people.