I would agree with the second, but only if you alter the first. We need a definition of “want” such that you can decide to jump whether you want to jump or not. This is because we can decide to do things which we do not want to do, as in the case of “obligation”.
Obviously, I disagree with how you are using “want”. You seem to be saying that a choice is necessarily a reflection of a want, and that is what I disagree with. As I said already we can choose things regardless of whether we want them.
This is not how “want” is commonly defined. It is defined as desire, wished for. It is very common to make decisions which are not consistent with what we want most. Sometimes what is wanted most is wrong, or illegal, or recognized as impossible. So for example, if I was a young man looking for a woman to date, I would not necessarily ask the women whom I want the most.
I think that if you think this through clearly, and compare it with your own experience, you’ll find that it is incorrect. If I decide not to do what I want to do, because it would be wrong, or illegal to do that, this is in no way “coercion”. It appears to me, that since you are working with such an odd definition of “want”, you now have to make an odd definition of :coercion". in other words, you are just redefining words to suit your system.
If, what you think “pure free will is”, requires redefining words in unrealistic ways, to create a fictitious fantasy, then I am not interested.
That’s right, your proposed dichotomy is unacceptable to me because it denies the reality of real possibility. My experience leads me to believe that possibility is a very real aspect of the world, therefore I must reject your dichotomy which excludes it.
I believe I described the third alternative very well. It starts with the experiential evidence of real possibility.
That’s only the case if you deny the ontological status of possibility. If you allow for the reality of possibility in the world, and assume that as time passes some possibilities will be actualized, then lack of predictability correlates with lack of understanding of the agent which chooses from the possibilities, rather than correlating with randomness.
I have, the third alternative is defined as free choice, and it is explained through the ontological reality of possibility.
OK, then point me toward the words in my explanation which you have difficulty with. Which of them are inconsistent with your own personal lived experience, which would make you say that they are wishful thinking? Do you not find that there is real possibility in the world?
Well sure, you want to take my starting point of “possibility” and flush it down the drain, to go back to your old unacceptable dichotomy. But I am trying to point out to you, that this way you are proceeding is contrary to your lived experience. Do you not live as if you experience real possibility in the world? You cannot take this premise which is extremely well supported by experience, and flush it down the drain for the sake of some contrary principles, without proving the premise to be false. Since it is very highly supported by experience, you need to prove it wrong before you can flush it. Otherwise you are simply making assertions (the proposed dichotomy for example) which are contrary to our lived experience, i.e. spouting nonsense.
I enjoyed reading this because you’ve clearly put a lot of thought into it. I think where we differ isn’t so much over determinism as over several assumptions that argument quietly builds upon, and quite a few stood out to me.
This is what I identify the most “pure” idea behind free will to be
And this is where I’d start. Why should this be regarded as the core conception of free will rather than one conception among many? I mean there have been centuries of competing accounts - compatibilist, libertarian, reasons-responsive, hierarchical, self-governance and so on. Simply calling one the “pure” conception doesn’t yet justify it as the standard against which other accounts should be measured. To me this premise deserves an argument of its own because much of what follows depends on it.
ANYTHING will trace back to factors outside of your control… partly because these factors may even define you. So before there is a you to be free, that same you couldn’t have caused themselves to be.
Here I think you’re making what philosophers sometimes call a causa sui argument - that because we are not the cause of ourselves we can’t be ultimately responsible for ourselves. Well that’s certainly an interesting position but to me the conclusion doesn’t seem to follow as straightforwardly as you suggest. Showing that I didn’t create myself isn’t obviously the same thing as showing that I cannot act freely. That seems like a non sequitur unless an additional premise is supplied.
We can group factors however we like.
I’m not convinced we can, well at least not if those groupings are doing explanatory work. Reasons, desires, beliefs, habits, emotions and social pressures don’t all function in the same way. Calling them all “factors” risks flattening distinctions that may actually drive the explanation. If the explanation becomes “they’re all factors” instead of gaining explanatory power we just create a very broad category.
A reason to make a decision makes that decision predictable (specifically by factors ultimately outside their control), and thus strengthen the deterministic view.
This is actually where I paused the longest. I mean why should predictability rule against freedom? If anything, one might argue that actions flowing from reasons I genuinely endorse are more expressive of my agency than actions that are random or inexplicable. The move from “this decision has reason behind it” to “therefore it is less free” doesn’t strike me as self-evident. It feels like another premise is needed here too.
That said, my hesitation isn’t really with determinism itself; it’s just that several important claims that you made seem to be assumed rather than argued for: that uninfluenced choice is the “pure” conception of free will, that not being causa sui rules out freedom, that all influences can be treated as the same factor, and that predictability diminishes agency.
Those are substantial philosophical commitments in their own right, and I’d actually be very interested in hearing why you think each of them should be accepted.
Please explain why you believe possibility is a very real aspect of the world.
Here’s my view: I believe determinism is true. This means I believe the world evolves per laws of nature. Some of that evolution includes quantum indeterminacy (QI), but QI entails a probability distribution of possible outcomes. It’s therefore determinate that the quantum event will be among that set of possible outcomes, so this translates to “probabilistic determinism”.
I think possibility is a very real aspect of the world, because I can decide what to do, and when to do it. This would not be the case if possibility did not inhere within the world which I act in. In that world, the world without possibility, I couldn’t make such decisions.
For example, I can hold a loaded gun in my hands, keeping it pointed at a target, and decide the precise moment to pull the trigger, or perhaps, not to pull the trigger at all. However, each moment which passes, and I do not pull the trigger, but I know that I could have, I recognize that the possibility was there, in the world, for me to do that, if I had decided to. And, when I actually do pull the trigger it is necessary that the possibility was there at that time, or else I couldn’t have pulled the trigger. So the reality of possibility is a necessary conclusion.
Of course you’re deciding, but you can’t know that an alternative decision was actually possible. Right? There are antecedents to every decision you make, and surely they influence your decision. So how do you know they don’t determine your decision?
Aside from you and other humans, is there actual possibility in the the world? Or is humanity the sole sourcec of true possibility?
Here is where I defined absolute free will. Granted I didn’t use the exact term right away, so my bad.
I wish I could give you an example, but I am afraid it’s too abstract for me to. The way I understand it is that the free will I attempted to debunk through this message, if it were true, would rightfully imply that agents bear full responsibility for their actions. My point is that this is not the case in reality, for the arguments that I put forward. IMO, Compatibilists understand the walls that these arguments pose to the implications they would like free will to bring about, and thus attempt to make creative use of their intellectual faculties (not out of bad faith necessarily) to justify a version of free will that goes around the issues while giving this impression of freedom full enough to establish that people can be blamed for their actions and for divine punishment to be right. It’s hard to give an example for me since it’s a mind twist that I believe is ultimately fallacious.
Well, yes. I agree. I do side with the fact that people should be held accountable for their actions. We are in some way responsible. And that is the key here: in some way. My argument is about absolute responsibility, which I tie to absolute control. Given that we do not have that, we are like an atom following the laws of physics to me, but from the perspective of: “the grand scheme of things” you know? In the human world of course it benefits society to look at it differently.
None of your wants are in your control. It’s like deciding who you are. Can you decide that? I personally dislike chocolate for instance. Never chose to. I just do. And even more complex wants like the want to do good in the world. You didn’t decide to want that, because to do so, you would have to genuinely be neutral on the topic and then somehow pick to adopt it. But how and why would you if you are actually neutral on the topic? Don’t get me wrong, people can change. All I am saying is that it is not so much a fruit of their will. At best, they have a basic want that causes them to seek change that snowballs into a new version of themselves. But that basic want being the key that they did not choose takes a way the freedom from a more global perspective.
Alright great question! My answer is a bit like what I just said above but I’ll nuance things here. It does seem like to act against a want indeed, but I would argue that it is not the case. IMO when you are able to go against something you want, it is because of another stronger want. Let’s look at one of your examples: A recovering alcoholic that refuses to drink. Sure they want to drink, but if they are trying to stop, then they also do not want to. Those are two opposite desires, so it makes sense to me to interpret your action as resulting from the stronger desire at a given moment (even if marginally stronger). To people that think we can willingly do something we do not want, which even sounds contradictory, I would ask: Give me an example of someone somewhere doing something they do not want without them also wanting the opposite of that thing. It just doesn’t happen. The only instance in which you do something that you truly do not want to is when you are forcefully made to or coerced.
Sure, I meant I don’t care since it is out of the scope of the argument. But yes, we should care… unless one just didn’t care about death or morals I guess lolol.
This is misleading lol, but based on what you explain right below I get it yeah. It has a paradoxical nature indeed but I’d call it a soft paradox, only a paradox based on the specific perspective and definitions one can adopt.
I agree that we have a limited understanding, and that obtaining more information of various nature can teach us new ideas and ways to conceptualize of this that get us closer to the answer. However, I personally disagree with the existence of actual paradoxes haha. Paradoxes are basically a logical incoherence. And what I would argue is the most fundamental law of the universe, the law of non-contradiction, teaches us that in the face of a direct contradiction, one option has to be wrong. In this case, no grand free will. That is why this is a solved problem to me rather than an open one. The experienced freedom doesn’t constitute a problem to that. It’s a whole different way to look at freedom. More organic, less philosophical, perhaps more beautiful as well.
That’s right. And obligation is not free by definition. My whole point.
Me think no we cannot. Here is why:
It does seem like to act against a want indeed, but I would argue that it is not the case. IMO when you are able to go against something you want, it is because of another stronger want. Let’s look at an example: A recovering alcoholic that refuses to drink. Sure they want to drink, but if they are trying to stop, then they also do not want to. Those are two opposite desires, so it makes sense to me to interpret their action as resulting from the stronger desire at a given moment (even if marginally stronger).
If you disagree, I would ask: Give me an example of someone somewhere doing something they do not want without them also wanting the opposite of that thing. In other words, no coercion (or external force driving them to do something), yet they do it without wanting to at all like… at all. It just doesn’t happen. The only instance in which you do something that you truly do not want to is when something compels you to, even if partially or indirectly.
Again, if you disagree give me just one real life example.
I like this a lot. Discussion does bring lots of nuance that I could hardly hope to think of myself. My point still stands, but in the case of something illegal that you supposedly want most, it is coercion that prevents you from doing it. It is just indirect, but you are avoiding what you want most because you know the consequences will be bad. Thus, you want a world where you do NOT do that thing and also do NOT face bad consequences MORE than a world where you do that thing and face the bad consequences.
I’ll admit that what you want most here depends on perspective. If you do not factor in the external pressure into your want, then sure, you are indeed NOT doing what you want most. But it becomes a subjective matter of where you draw the line. My line englobes everything that goes into the decision you make, so all the factors. Yours is a bit more arbitrary, because even values and preferences have external origins, so it is hard to say at which point something becomes internal enough to become your true want… That’s why I prefer my approach. It recognizes that some things are higher on the scale of “personal want” but everything that plays into a decision ultimately fits under. It’s not trying to draw a line that doesn’t objectively exist.
I do redefine words. True. But I am always looking for the best or most pure meaning. If anyone proves me wrong on anything this very second I’d like to think that I would change my mind. This is not me trying to protect some idea by twisting words. I think it is a mistake to think that words are not flexible in meaning, because they literally are. Ask any linguist anywhere. We infuse meaning into words. As explained in my original post, I sought the most core idea behind free will. Same here. The most general way to look at coercion is anything that is a deterrent to something. It just has varying degrees of discouraging effect. If coercion is too strong, sure, replace my use of it with a deterrent instead. The point is that it is a force (negative want) that adds resistance to your positive want.
Far from me this idea. Hopefully what I wrote above gives you an idea where I am coming from. It’s not words that matter, but the idea I am after and if it is sound. If a word I use does not match, then focus on the definition or meaning that I propose and evaluate whether the idea is coherent through the meaning.
Let me simplify my argument for you and you can attack whatever premise you want:
P1: An action can only be brought about by wants or randomness.
P2: you are not in control of what you want.
P3: You are not in control of randomness.
C1: By P1 and P2, you are not in control of the portion of your decision brought by a want.
C2: By P1 and P3, you are not in control of the portion of your decision brought by randomness.
C3: By P1, C1, and C2, You are not in control of your actions.
If you are attacking P1 with your whole ontological status of possibility, then explain how it brings about control please. That is what you have not done. Even if I add your thing in the argument, the conclusion will be the same if the premise: “you do not have control over the ontological status of possibilites.” is true. Whatever the ontological status of possibilities is. Are there multiple possible timelines and our world branches from them? Sure, how are you in control of which timeline is selected? Good luck.
It seems to me you are appealing to personal experience alone for this idea. If it doesn’t make any sense to me, especially philosophically, how am I suppose to know what you are talking about? Your personal experience is not mine. If by free choice you mean feeling that you are in control, well everyone does… but you are only in control given that your want has already been determined. The whole point of thinking rationally is to try to understand how reality actually is. And when I do, it leads me to deny absolute free will. Feeling like you are in perfect control is an illusion. You are not, and personal experience is not a trustworthy source of objective knowledge when humans are as biased as we are and know as little about themselves as we do. The closest I can relate to your idea is the following:
But again, I am looking at a broader concept, and the very thing behind our minds, not the down to earth choice to raise my arm if I wanted to.
Why is it that you think the universe isn’t deterministic? For me I leave room for what I call “true hazard” which is the possibility of an event to be either one of two or more options for genuinely no reason at all. Humans do not have control over that obviously, it would be more of a feature of reality. For all I know the universe could be deterministic, but I happen to like the idea of true hazard more.
Interestingly though, in the face of infinity, even true hazard would yield a deterministic result I believe… Like according to the probabilities behind the events subjected to it, you find a proportion of existing states that matches the probabilities of each options that lead to these states. In a way, it would be a static universe in the face of infinity, but that would be a property of infinite motion ironically. I am digressing, but this is EXTREMELY fascinating to me. I have been thinking about the concept of infinity and its role in reality recently, and it could be were everything breaks while making the most sense… truly FRIGHTENING!
Absolutely right. It may be one account among many at the end of the day. At least, I wouldn’t be able to prove to you that this is the core idea behind it. Simply because it is my brain’s heuristics doing their work of identifying pattern between all the accounts of it that I have heard. I believe to be good at that and to be right on this particular point. But I can never prove it to anyone. Maybe it’s provable with a massive data analysis project of “free will” its origins and all of its usages across time, but who is going to do that? In the meantime, anyone is free to disagree. Either way, it is still the concept I am addressing here, whether fundamental or not.
I did say “partly” before giving one reason why things may trace back to factors outside our controls to be fair. But technically you are right, in a way we could ultimately be the cause of ourselves. I guess what I mean by “we” here is “we” exactly as we are now. if a more enlightened version of me caused me to come about through this seemingly random / deterministic process, cool, but that wouldn’t be “me” because the set of properties I possess right now would need to be different to the set of properties of this higher self. So your higher self may have this hypothetical magical absolute free will, but “you” certainly wouldn’t. If both of you were the same, then you may as well have been a god by now, and I would guess none of us are. Some spiritual folks might beg to differ though.
Now if by free will you mean something other than the absolute version of it I am talking about, then absolutely! You can have some free will despite not having created yourself.
I would argue no. The only property of the word “factor” needed for this argument is if they contribute to your decision or not. It matters not what their nature is or how exactly they fit into the explanation. It’s not about the actual explanation, but rather whether or not they explain.
You are right, I did not do great job at presenting my point here. I would agree with you that “If anything, one might argue that actions flowing from reasons I genuinely endorse are more expressive of my agency than actions that are random or inexplicable” from the practical free will viewpoint I talk about at the end. I guess what I am going for here is something along the lines of: “Predicting your decisions is only doable if they are influenced, so if I can predict them then you can no longer have this uninfluenced will kinda thing.”
I hope I did a decent job at explaining my thoughts on those above. I’d like to leave a simpler version of my argument down here. I probably should have included that in the original post to help with comprehension:
P1: An action can only be brought about by wants or randomness.
P2: you are not in control of what you want.
P3: You are not in control of randomness.
C1: By P1 and P2, you are not in control of the portion of your decision brought by a want.
C2: By P1 and P3, you are not in control of the portion of your decision brought by randomness.
C3: By P1, C1, and C2, You are not in control of your actions.
If any act is not determined by the agent, then something other than the agent must have determined it. But that “something” is forever elusive for the determinist. If there is some factor other than ourselves behind our decisions, then why won’t anyone tell us what that factor is, how that factor is foreign to the agent, and lastly, describe how that factor determines our decision?
IMO, agency implies the agent is doing the determining. But that does not entail libertarian free will.
The agent has been caused. His every belief, his conditioned responses, his passions and desires, his capacity to reason, his priorities, his selfishness and magnanimity, and his tendency to act impulsively… are all caused.
The unique way these aspects are bundled together is what makes this agent the individual he is.